

DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 186 168

RC 011 967

AUTHOR Herriott, Robert E., Ed.; Gross, Neal, Ed.
TITLE The Dynamics of Planned Educational Change: Case Studies and Analyses.
INSTITUTION Abt Associates, Inc. Cambridge, Mass.
SPONS AGENCY National Inst. of Education (DHEW), Washington, D.C.
PUB DATE 79
NOTE 409p.
AVAILABLE FROM McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 2526 Grove Street, Berkeley, CA 94704 (\$15.20)

EDRS PRICE MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS Case Studies; *Change Strategies; Educational Administration; *Educational Change; Federal Aid; *Federal Programs; Financial Support; Innovation; Problems; Program Development; *Rural Education; Rural Schools; School Districts; *School Organization; *Small Schools
IDENTIFIERS *Experimental Schools Program

ABSTRACT

During the past two decades federal, state, and local school leaders have attempted to institute major changes in educational programs and organizational arrangements. Recent assessment studies reveal that the great majority of change efforts did not meet intended objectives. As a result, policy formulators have developed serious reservations about the ability of school officials to institute successful reforms. This book is designed to help educational officials become more incisive analysts of the process of organizational change. It presents case studies of five rural small school systems located in different regions of the nation that received funding from the federal Experimental Schools Program from 1972 to 1977 to carry out comprehensive change projects, and analyzes each one in depth and from different perspectives. Part I provides ideas and background information needed to identify and examine factors that facilitate or block educational change efforts. Part II discusses the contexts in which such efforts occur and conditions that can impede or facilitate their development. Part III analyzes the case studies and considers their implications for those who have a major stake in the process and outcomes of change efforts. Part IV examines ways in which the case study findings call for a revision in existing change frameworks and considers their implications for the improvement of change efforts at both the federal and local levels. (Author/NEC)

* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *

ED186168

The Dynamics of Planned Educational Change

CASE STUDIES AND ANALYSES

EDITED BY

Robert E. Herriott

Abt Associates Inc.

and

Neal Gross

University of Pennsylvania

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
EDUCATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY.

McCutchan Publishing Corporation
2526 Grove Street
Berkeley, California 94704

RC 011967

© 1979 by Abt Associates Inc.
All rights reserved

Library of Congress catalog card no. 78-61456
ISBN 0-8211-0761-5

Printed in the United States of America

Copyright is claimed until September 1, 1984. Thereafter all portions
of this book covered by this copyright will be in the public domain.

This work was developed under a contract with the National Institute of
Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. However, the
content does not necessarily reflect the position or policy of that
Agency, and no official endorsement of these materials should be inferred.

Contents

Preface	vii
Contributors	xi
PART I. INTRODUCTION	1
Chapter 1. The Complex Nature of Educational Change Robert E. Herriott and Neal Gross	3
Chapter 2. Basic Issues in the Management of Educational Change Efforts Neal Gross	20
PART II. THE EXPERIMENTAL SCHOOLS PROGRAM: FEDERAL CONTEXT AND LOCAL PROJECTS	47
Chapter 3. The Federal Context: Planning, Funding, and Monitoring Robert E. Herriott	49
Chapter 4. River District: A Search for Unity Amidst Diversity Donald A. Messerschmidt	74

Chapter 5. Jackson County: Local Norms, Federal Initiatives, and Administrator Performance C. Thompson Wacaster	112
Chapter 6. Butte-Angels Camp: Conflict and Transformation William A. Firestone	150
Chapter 7. Arcadia: Local Initiatives and Adaptation William L. Donnelly	185
Chapter 8. Shiloh County: A Matter of Agendas Charles A. Clinton	215
PART III. INTERPRETATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	237
Chapter 9. The Management of Educational Change Efforts in School Systems James Kent	239
Chapter 10. Consultation: Traps and Potentialities Ronald Lippitt	258
Chapter 11. Strengthening Federal-Local Relationships Supporting Educational Change Michael W. Kirst	274
Chapter 12. Designing Federal Policies and Programs To Facilitate Local Change Efforts Hendrik D. Gideonse	298
Chapter 13. Leadership and the Change Process: Preparing Educational Administrators Terry Tinson Saario	328
PART IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS	351
Chapter 14. Theoretical and Practical Implications Neal Gross and Robert E. Herriott	353
APPENDIX. The Announcement	381
Name Index	393
Subject Index	395

Preface

This volume is addressed to individuals who are or will be centrally involved in efforts to institute major changes in educational systems. It presents and analyzes from different perspectives case studies of comprehensive change projects undertaken by five school districts that participated in an innovative federal program. The volume is designed primarily to provide practicing and future educational administrators with an awareness of the realities and complexities of educational change efforts and with perspectives, understandings, and concepts that will increase the likelihood of their offering effective leadership. It is also intended to enhance an understanding of the stages of the process of planned organizational change and of the factors that facilitate or impede it.

Between July 1972 and June 1977 each of the five school districts received substantial supplemental funding to carry out a comprehensive change effort supported by the Experimental Schools (ES) program, a unit of the National Institute of Education. A social scientist lived in each district for an extended period of time and recorded the events that occurred during the periods when the district entered the competition for ES funding, attempted to plan its five-year project, and attempted to implement it.

The case studies presented in Part II describe the developments that transpired during each of the change efforts. Other sections of the volume offer interpretations or analyses of the case studies (Parts III and IV) or ideas and background information of use in examining them (Part I). In carrying out their assignments, the authors of chapters in Parts I, III, and IV were encouraged to utilize and comment on pertinent literature in the field of educational change, their experience as analysts of or participants in educational change efforts, and their judgments about social and political issues involved in the planning and implementation of educational change.

By presenting several interpretations of the case studies we have attempted to provide the reader with an opportunity to compare his or her own analysis of the innovative efforts of these school districts with those of several specialists. This volume, therefore, enables educational officials and students of educational administration and change to share vicariously in the experiences of individuals involved in federally stimulated educational change in school districts and also permits them to examine those experiences from different perspectives. We believe that this approach provides a strategic way for students of educational administration and for practicing educators to acquire fresh perspectives and new competencies, including conceptual skills, that can be of considerable value to them in offering leadership to educational change efforts.

The preparation of this volume has been facilitated by the dedicated efforts of many individuals within the National Institute of Education (NIE), Abt Associates Inc., and the five school districts whose change efforts are being examined. In their capacity as NIE project officers, Robert Cunningham, Lynne Fender, and Norman Gold played major roles in developing the objectives of this volume. The authors of chapters 4 through 13 undertook complex writing responsibilities and performed them conscientiously. Sheila Rosenblum skillfully coordinated preparation of the first drafts of chapters 4 through 8 and their editing by Abby Freedman and Peter Wolff. Portions of the manuscript were also reviewed at various stages of preparation by Wendy Peter Abt, Nancy Brigham, David Budding, Jack Culbertson, Robert Cunningham, Robert Everhart, Lynne Fender, Stephen Fitzsimmons, Joseph Giacquinta, Norman Gold, Michael Kane, Matthew Miles, Peter Miller, and Barbara Rose. The manuscript also benefited greatly from the editorial skills of Marshall

Ledger and the clerical assistance of Karen Baar, Jean Carrillo, Andrea Kovacs, and Mary Schumacher. Mary Vogel prepared the index in a highly competent manner.

Finally, we wish to express a special debt of gratitude to the school administrators, teachers, pupils, and residents in the five school districts described in the case studies who gave so generously of their time for the purposes of this research.

Cambridge, Mass.
Philadelphia, Penn.
October 1978

Robert E. Herriott
Neal Gross

Contributors

CHARLES A. CLINTON serves as Acting Head of the Department of Anthropology at Mississippi State University. He formerly served as a field researcher for the Longitudinal Study of Educational Change in Rural America conducted by Abt Associates Inc. of Cambridge, Massachusetts.

WILLIAM L. DONNELLY is Director of the Lane Interagency Network in Eugene, Oregon. He formerly served as a field researcher for the Longitudinal Study of Educational Change in Rural America conducted by Abt Associates Inc. of Cambridge, Massachusetts.

WILLIAM A. FIRESTONE is a research associate with Research for Better Schools, Inc. in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He formerly served as a field researcher for the Longitudinal Study of Educational Change in Rural America conducted by Abt Associates Inc. of Cambridge, Massachusetts.

HENDRIK D. GIDEONSE is Professor of Education and Policy Science and Dean of the College of Education and Home Economics at the University of Cincinnati. He formerly served as Director of Program Planning and Evaluation, National Center for Educational Research and Development, U.S. Office of Education.

NEAL GROSS is Professor of Sociology and Professor of Education at the University of Pennsylvania. He formerly served as Dean

of its Graduate School of Education and as Professor of Education and Sociology at Harvard University.

ROBERT E. HERRIOTT is a senior social scientist with Abt Associates Inc. of Cambridge, Massachusetts, where he has been responsible for directing its Longitudinal Study of Educational Change in Rural America. He formerly served as Professor of Sociology at Florida State University and Director of its Center for the Study of Education.

JAMES KENT is Superintendent of Schools in Marblehead, Massachusetts. He formerly served as Director of Southeast Alternatives, Minneapolis Public Schools—an Experimental Schools Project funded by the National Institute of Education.

MICHAEL W. KIRST is Associate Professor of Education and Business Administration at Stanford University. He is also the President of the California State Board of Education.

RONALD LIPPITT is Professor Emeritus of Sociology and Psychology at the University of Michigan. He formerly was a Program Director at its Institute for Social Research and cofounder of the National Training Laboratory.

DONALD A. MESSERSCHMIDT is Assistant Professor of Anthropology at Washington State University. He formerly served as a field researcher for the Longitudinal Study of Educational Change in Rural America being conducted by Abt Associates Inc. of Cambridge, Massachusetts.

TERRY TINSON SAARIO is a program officer with the Ford Foundation and Adjunct Associate Professor at Teachers College, Columbia University. She formerly served as a staff member in the Educational Program and Social Science Division of the Rand Corporation.

C. THOMPSON WACASTER is Vice President for Educational Programs and Research with the Phil Hardin Foundation of Meridian, Mississippi. He formerly served as a field researcher for the Longitudinal Study of Educational Change in Rural America conducted by Abt Associates Inc. of Cambridge, Massachusetts.

PART I

Introduction

1

The Complex Nature of Educational Change

Robert E. Herriott and Neal Gross

This volume is concerned with the fate of *deliberate* efforts to institute major innovations in educational organizations.¹ It is designed to strengthen the capabilities of officials who are or will be responsible for the management of change efforts in school systems. Like executives in other governmental agencies responsible for the mass delivery of essential community services, administrators on the firing line of American public education are confronted with a set of perplexing problems.

One of their most serious difficulties is the worsening financial plight of schools. An indication of its severity is the fact that approximately five times the proportion of local school bond issues were rejected in the United States in 1975 as were turned down in 1960 (54 percent versus 11 percent). Another is that budgets of school districts throughout the nation—in cities, affluent suburbs, blue collar communities, and rural villages—have been cut substantially in recent years. In response to these financial constraints school officials have had to release young teachers, eliminate new academic programs, and curtail counseling and other important services.

A second serious difficulty confronting school executives is an erosion in the support of public education by political leaders and their constituents, a circumstance described by Hechinger (1975, p.

11) as the "headlong retreat [of America] from its commitment to education." The relatively low priority given to public education in recent years by the White House and the Congress reflects this condition at the national level. At the local level it is evidenced by the passivity with which parents generally have reacted to the curtailment of school programs and services previously offered their children. These developments strongly imply that school systems are highly vulnerable to attack, and that if severe criticisms of the schools are unleashed in the future from any direction—the political right, the left, the "back to basics" movement, or any other group—school officials may find they have few champions or supporters.

Many reasons have been offered to account for the financial difficulties of the schools and the erosion of public support for them. One of the most important, in our judgment, is the growing belief among individuals centrally involved in the formulation of public policy in education at the federal, state, and local levels that educational officials are unable to design and implement major innovations that will result in significant educational benefits for their clients. Since the great majority of change efforts introduced into the schools in recent years did not achieve their intended objectives, those who express serious reservations about the capabilities of school officials to institute successful reforms can point to an abundance of supporting evidence.²

The erosion of confidence in the ability of school officials and their staffs to institute successful reforms, and the limited benefits derived from most educational change efforts in recent years, underscore the urgent need for educational officials to become more incisive analysts of the process of organizational change and more adept in its management. Furthermore, the quality of their performance in managing change efforts can be expected to influence materially the proportion of the tax dollar that will be allocated to school districts to cope with their pressing problems. The success or failure of the efforts of school officials to institute deliberate changes in their educational systems thus has important consequences for all who are directly affected by American public education: administrators, teachers, students, and parents. It also has consequences for the extent to which government officials at the state and federal level and local school boards will resist or support future attempts at educational innovation.

This volume considers questions of fundamental importance to

individuals responsible for the management of educational innovations, officials of governmental agencies who fund them, school personnel who are expected to implement them, and citizens who have a stake in their outcomes. It examines factors that facilitate or block educational change efforts, the contexts in which these factors occur, and conditions that influence their development and effects. It presents case studies of federally stimulated efforts to institute comprehensive changes into school systems located in different regions of the nation and analyzes them from a number of perspectives. It directs attention to circumstances and developments occurring within and outside school districts, which can influence the fate of change efforts. It examines the case study findings with reference to their implications for local school administrators, government officials, and other groups concerned with educational change in American schools. It also utilizes the data of the case studies to develop a theoretical formulation of the educational change process, one which extends and elaborates upon models currently available to educational practitioners.

NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF EDUCATIONAL CHANGE

For a number of reasons, the issues examined in this volume deal with matters of major importance to those who manage educational systems. One is that many educators in school districts throughout the nation are directing change efforts that are faltering or in serious trouble. They are discovering that their attempts to institute "promising" innovations into their schools are a demanding and highly complex undertaking, exposing them to vexing problems that they find difficult or impossible to solve. Many of these officials are concerned about the negative impact which their inability to cope with these problems is having on their faculties, on students, and on the fate of the innovations. In our judgment, their difficulties are in part attributable to serious inadequacies in the way they perceive and conceptualize the change process and circumstances that influence its development. We hope to provide these administrators with conceptual tools that will be functional for their managerial responsibilities and that will increase the likelihood of achieving successful outcomes for innovations introduced into their school systems.

A second reason is that a growing number of educational officials are becoming aware that an important and largely neglected obstacle to successful educational change in America is the misunderstandings and feelings of mutual distrust that develop between officials of school systems and governmental agencies when innovative activities of school districts are funded by these external sources. Our observations of unsuccessful change efforts also suggest that the difficulties which some school districts encounter in their change endeavors partly arise because of problems in their relationships with the agencies that support them. It is our impression that these agencies are often displeased with the manner in which school districts they have funded carry out their projects.

A third reason derives from the speculation of school officials that many innovations introduced into schools during the past two decades and judged by their evaluators to have been "failures" may in fact not have received a fair trial because they never were effectively implemented. Individuals who assess innovative projects generally ignore whether an innovation has been implemented when they compare the performance of "experimental" and "control" groups on a particular measure of project effectiveness. Unless the innovation has been actually implemented, however, questions about its effectiveness are inappropriate.³

A fourth reason is that school officials have become acutely aware that they can no longer administer change efforts as they have in the past. They realize they need more effective ways of conceptualizing the change process that can be of use in the analysis and management of their change efforts. Many administrators are puzzled by the obstacles and serious complications of widely publicized innovations and the demise of many others. In their training they were exhorted to identify and eliminate the deficiencies of educational systems. Yet, too frequently, they lack the conceptual tools necessary to perform these functions in a realistic, incisive, and creative manner.

A fifth reason is the awareness of educational officials that they need to become more skillful in their use of consultants and in their ability to reduce the problems of role definition and communication that can arise in their relationships. School districts undergoing planned change often employ specialists in some aspect of primary or secondary education who are expected to provide technical assistance to teachers in areas such as reading and career education. Other

consultants serve as "brokers" or middlemen between school districts and federal officials. Others offer advice of a more general nature, for example, recommendations about innovations to be introduced and the most effective way to impart new skills to teachers. The educational and social science literature on planned organizational change, however, is largely silent about ways to use consultants effectively or to reduce the role ambiguity and conflict to which they can readily be exposed.

OBJECTIVES OF THE VOLUME

This volume has four interrelated objectives. The first, addressed to officials at the local, state, and national levels who are or will be centrally concerned with efforts to institute changes in school systems, is to provide them with perspectives, understandings, and ways of conceptualizing the educational change process that will permit them to design and implement change strategies based on a knowledge of the realities and pitfalls of innovative efforts.

The second is to make available the first collection of case studies of educational change efforts that examine systematically federal-local relationships in innovative attempts. The five change efforts to be presented provide a unique opportunity to identify the kinds of problems and strains encountered by federal and local officials in federally stimulated change programs. We shall observe the developments that occurred *before* and *after* the school systems were invited to participate in a program designed by a federal agency to institute comprehensive change in school districts. If taxpayer resistance to increased local expenditures for schools continues in the years ahead, and if major reforms are to be introduced into schools, such changes will most likely be stimulated and funded primarily by agencies of the federal or state government. By providing data about circumstances that impede and facilitate effective working relationships between local and external officials, the findings of the case studies can suggest designs for more efficient and effective collaborative programs.

The third objective is to consider the *implications* of the findings of the case studies for those who have a major stake in the process and outcomes of educational change efforts, particularly for local school officials, federal and state educational agencies, legis-

lators who design policies to promote educational change, educational consultants, and university-based educators who prepare school administrators. The fourth objective is to ascertain if the case study findings indicate any need to extend or modify in important respects existing frameworks for conceptualizing the educational change process. Since the way in which officials conceive of the change process and of the factors that influence it can be presumed to affect their performance, this theoretical issue has important practical implications.⁴

These four objectives reflect a more general purpose of the volume: to provide educational officials responsible for initiating and implementing educational change efforts with the kinds of intellectual tools that will better equip them to exercise *leadership* in their challenging assignments.

It is necessary at the outset to emphasize that we shall not propose or recommend a set of detailed prescriptions to be used by educational administrators for the efficient and effective management of innovations in their organizations. We eschew this approach for two reasons: first, because present knowledge about the determinants of successful innovative efforts is too limited; second, because we believe that although educational change studies conducted by social scientists or educators can be extremely useful to educational officials, they do not yield foolproof formulas for designing and implementing successful change efforts in their schools. (We consider this issue in some detail in chapter 2.)

The settings for the organizational change efforts to be examined in this book are five school districts in rural America. To place the problems that we shall examine in their larger educational context, we now consider briefly the educational change efforts of American school systems in recent years.

EDUCATIONAL CHANGE EFFORTS IN THE 1960s AND 1970s

Many public school systems throughout the nation have engaged in deliberate and sustained efforts to institute major changes in their educational programs and organizational arrangements during the past two decades.⁵ They introduced hundreds of innovations into their schools in attempts to upgrade student performance and to

cope with serious shortcomings of their organizations. Their change efforts were most frequently directed at the following kinds of problems: the low reading test scores of large numbers of elementary school pupils; the functional illiteracy exhibited by many high school graduates; high rates of student dropout, truancy, and other forms of deviant behavior; outmoded curriculum and dysfunctional teaching methods; and the hostile feelings about school experiences on the part of an increasing proportion of adolescents who perceive school as meaningless or irrelevant to their immediate needs and long-range interests.

To deal with these and other pressing difficulties of city, suburban, and rural school districts, school administrators of the 1960s and 1970s attempted to institute changes of varying scope and complexity that focused on a variety of targets. Hundreds of school districts introduced new techniques for teaching reading to elementary pupils. Large city school systems initiated compensatory education programs to upgrade the academic performance of students with specific learning deficiencies. New courses of study in mathematics, biology, physics, and the social studies, frequently based on the inductive method of teaching, were widely introduced. Large numbers of schools attempted to establish individualized learning programs so that their students would be able to learn "at their own pace" or experimented with a British import, the open classroom. Large-city school districts designed alternative or magnet schools in the belief that they would provide students with socialization experiences that were more meaningful, functional, and realistic. Numerous school systems made efforts to institute innovations such as programmed instruction, learning centers, and "modern" vocational schools. Long-standing procedures of class scheduling and teacher assignment were abandoned in many schools in favor of innovations such as team teaching and nongraded classes to permit more flexibility in scheduling, allow greater individualization of instruction, and maximize the unique talents of teachers.

Important catalysts for these change efforts during the past decade were community action groups, professional educational associations, public school administrators, and federal programs designed to promote equality of educational opportunity and "quality" education for children from disadvantaged backgrounds. Earlier, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, however, the salient motivating conditions

were different (Gross et al., 1971, pp. 2-3). They included Sputnik, the "knowledge explosion," new theoretical notions about the learning process, the civil rights movement, and sharp criticisms of the public schools by prominent Americans such as James Conant and Hyman Rickover. Local teacher associations seldom served as catalysts for educational change during the past two decades. However, a number of teachers with a strong commitment to their profession proposed an assortment of innovations designed to upgrade student performance or resolve difficult and complex problems of their schools.

The funding of these innovative efforts came primarily from monies appropriated by Congress to promote equality of educational opportunity or to facilitate specific educational reforms (Timpone, 1974). Additional funding was obtained from state departments of education that made grants from federal and state funds at their disposal to support promising educational innovations. Local tax dollars also supported change efforts in many school districts.

To what extent did these change efforts achieve their objectives? When systematic evaluations have been made, the findings reveal that intended outcomes generally were not achieved. Assessment studies conducted by a number of investigators show that educational innovations introduced into many schools were in fact never carried out.⁶ An evaluation of over 300 compensatory education programs introduced into urban school systems revealed that their influence on raising the academic achievement of students was minimal (Gordon and Wilkerson, 1966). The evidence from large-scale evaluations of federal educational programs such as ESEA Title I and project Head Start has generally been discouraging.⁷ Neither of these heavily financed programs could point to "a consistent or significant effect on student outcomes that could be attributed to participation in special programs funded by federal dollars" (Berman and McLaughlin, 1974, p. 4). Furthermore, for those projects in which success was claimed, a careful examination of their outcomes generally showed their results to lack statistical significance (Berman and McLaughlin, 1974). Hundreds of programs designed to upgrade reading performance in urban, suburban, and rural schools have been discarded. A large number of alternative and magnet schools, once described by their proponents as the answer to many of the ills of urban education, have been aban-

done. Many school systems that introduced innovative courses in various fields in the 1960s dropped them in the 1970s. Furthermore, nearly every systematic study of the fate of a specific educational innovation in public schools has concluded that its anticipated outcomes were not achieved, that its educational benefits were minimal, or that it was not fully implemented.⁸

TWO ORIENTATIONS TOWARD FUTURE EDUCATIONAL CHANGE EFFORTS

Administrators of public school systems and state and federal officials who have been involved in major educational change programs generally have reacted to their experiences in two distinct ways. The first may be described as a *defeatist* reaction. As a consequence of past frustrations and obstacles, many officials have concluded that the human and financial costs of change efforts far outweigh their educational benefits. They cite the numerous barriers that blocked their efforts—the resistance or apathy of teachers and administrators, community pressures, school politics, inadequate funds, unrealistic demands and expectations, and difficulties in communicating and working with parents, consultants, and universities. Their disillusionment is pinpointed in statements such as, “What’s the point of knocking your head against a stone wall?” Their disenchantment with educational innovation reflects a negativism that appears to be on the upsurge in school systems in all regions of the nation. This defeatist attitude accounts in part for the exodus of a growing number of change-oriented administrators from public education. In the words of a top school official of a major city: “I’ve had it. I’ve given everything I have to introducing changes into our district that we thought would have real payoffs for our kids. But all my efforts have gone down the drain. That is why I’m getting out of public education.”⁹

The second reaction may be characterized as one of *muted optimism*. Officials who react in this manner generally recognize that innovations introduced to overcome serious deficiencies of their schools have generally been ineffective. They also are acutely aware, however, that the problems they were designed to solve persist and that it is their responsibility to deal with them. Despite the failure of their past attempts, they remain cautiously optimistic about the pos-

sibility of instituting successful change efforts in their schools. They view their earlier failures as temporary setbacks and consider the serious difficulties of their systems as difficult challenges that can be overcome. These officials are willing to assume the responsibility for managing promising change efforts that may be launched in the future in their school districts.

These officials readily admit, however, that they are perplexed by the dynamics and complexities of the educational change processes they have managed. They acknowledge that their performance was largely based on intuition and on ad hoc decisions. In view of the discouraging results of their previous change efforts, it is not surprising that they are acutely aware of their need for perspectives, conceptual frameworks, and strategies that will increase the likelihood that the changes they introduce into their schools in the future will be successful. They are seeking answers to the following kinds of questions:

1. What kind of planning activities can enhance the likelihood of successful implementation of educational innovations?
2. How should individuals responsible for the management of educational change efforts define their role?
3. Of what utility to educational practitioners are the research findings of social scientists and educators?
4. What obstacles resulting from the introduction of an innovation can be expected to arise at different stages of the change process?
5. What precautions and strategies can be taken to minimize or overcome such obstacles?
6. What conditions are required in order to maximize the contributions of consultants to educational change efforts?
7. Are there ways of conceptualizing the educational change process that can be functional in the management of educational innovations?
8. In school districts with change efforts funded by federal or state agencies, what can be done to facilitate the development of mutual trust and confidence in their working relationships?

This volume considers questions of this kind.

THE UTILITY OF CASE STUDIES OF EDUCATIONAL CHANGE

As noted, one of the major objectives of this volume is to provide individuals centrally involved in efforts to change educational systems with conceptual tools that will permit them to diagnose incisively and rigorously the problems they can be expected to encounter and allow them to design and implement realistic and effective change strategies. The basic approach we employ is to direct continuous attention to case studies of major educational change efforts in five small communities. Some of the chapters present the case studies. Others offer interpretations of them or consider ideas about organizational change and ways to conceptualize it that readers may find useful in their attempts to identify internal and external factors influencing the dynamics and outcomes of the educational change efforts.

Since we place so much emphasis on case studies to probe the complex dynamics of educational change efforts and to examine the capabilities and skills required of individuals who manage them, it is pertinent to specify the assumptions that led us to adopt this approach as our strategy in designing this volume.

The first assumption is that case studies provide a useful form of vicarious experience for individuals preparing to manage educational change efforts. The second is that case studies provide the type of information needed to ascertain whether important stages of the change process were ignored in innovative efforts, and to determine the impact of decisions made during different stages of the process on the fate of the innovation. The third is that case studies permit the identification of the specific circumstances and kinds of internal and external factors that may have an important bearing on the dynamics and outcomes of change efforts. The fourth is that their findings can be useful in highlighting how the performance of those who manage innovations can influence the behavior of those who are expected to implement them. The fifth is that case studies provide an excellent mechanism for stressing the importance of how the school system and community contexts in which a change effort occurs can influence its developments and outcomes.

Each of the case studies describes major innovative efforts of a small school district, but the organizational and community settings

in which they occurred differed in many significant respects. In chapter 2 we contend that change strategies must be tailor-made for each innovative effort. Since all school districts are unique in some respects (they are of different size, they serve communities with different social and cultural characteristics, they have staff members with different experience and competencies), school officials may wonder about the relevance of the educational change experiences of one school district for another. We believe that those who manage educational change efforts can learn much from an analysis of innovative efforts elsewhere. School systems that embark on change efforts, regardless of their locale, can expect to encounter similar *types* of problems. Although the specific solutions to particular problems may vary from one locale to another, the *general procedures* to be followed in determining the most appropriate innovation, in planning an implementation strategy, in identifying and coping with implementation problems, and in designing mechanisms to assure that emergent problems are identified early are unlikely to depend upon the locale. Thus, even though school systems and their communities vary in many respects, and such variation needs to be taken into account in designing change strategies, an analysis of the elements common to most change processes and the essentially similar kinds of decisions that must be made can provide vicarious learning experiences of considerable value.

These ideas should not be construed, however, as implying that one school district can simply follow the change procedures of another that appear to have been effective, or attempt to avoid the pitfalls of one that has been ineffective. Nevertheless, in designing a tailor-made change effort the strategies and procedures followed by others—both those who seemed to have succeeded and those who seemed to have failed—can be instructive.

The case studies presented in chapters 4 through 8 provide a means to examine intensively the dynamics of educational change processes, to identify the types of internal and external factors that influence them, to explore alternative change strategies, and to examine the role of management in change efforts. As noted, school districts and the communities in which they are embedded vary in many important respects, and, therefore, the *specific* nature of the obstacles they will encounter in their educational change efforts and the *specific* strategies they will need to employ to overcome them will

differ. Careful examination of the case studies and the chapters that appraise them from different perspectives will provide educational officials with models, concepts, and understandings that can be useful in efforts to offer leadership to educational change efforts.

OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS

Chapter 2 examines a number of issues that have a direct bearing on the dynamics and outcomes of educational change efforts and presents two ways of conceptualizing the educational change process. It considers deficiencies in the way individuals who manage educational innovations define and perform their roles, the consequences of inept management, and the role of leadership in change efforts. The rationale for considering these and related issues in the introductory part of this volume is that they provide ways of thinking about the change process, and the circumstances that can influence it, that will be useful in analyzing the several case studies.

Chapter 3 examines the funding context of the Experimental Schools (ES) program, the federal endeavor that supported the comprehensive change efforts of the five school districts. In addition to specifying the overall objectives and methods of the ES program, this chapter also presents the relationships of the ES program with local school districts and to other federal agencies that had a bearing on its activities.

Chapters 4 through 8 present the five case studies. Each was written by a social scientist who devoted at least two years to observing the developments that occurred in a school district participating in the Experimental Schools program. The authors of the case studies had previous advanced training in sociological or anthropological field research techniques and became full-time residents in the school districts they were to observe. During this time they engaged in systematic observation and analysis of community and school life. They attended meetings of the village council and school board, teacher workshops, project planning sessions, consultant briefings, and other events associated with the change efforts they were studying. They also visited numerous classrooms, met with teachers informally at educational and community events, and attended informal social gatherings in each other's homes.

In addition to these "participant observation" activities, the

author of each case study periodically conducted formal interviews with school administrators, teachers, pupils, parents, and other citizens. Each also carefully reviewed a variety of documents to obtain additional information about the community, its educational systems, and its Experimental Schools project. After distilling and blending the full range of information obtained from these varied data sources, each began the task of preparing a book-length case study that describes the change effort initiated in his school district. The chapter-length case studies presented in this volume are based on the authors' larger reports. They focus on the following topics: the objectives of the project, its community and school system context, the response made by the local school system to the announcement of the availability of federal funds to support comprehensive educational change efforts, tasks that were performed during a one-year planning period, and the developments that occurred in efforts to implement the project over a three-year period.

To check the validity of their field observations, the case study authors used the technique of "triangulation," i.e., cross-validation through the use of multiple observations and data sources. Their observations and other data sources are primarily locally based. They did not have direct access to the files of the federal funding agency, to its meetings and conferences in Washington, D.C., or to its many telephone conversations with local school personnel. Consequently, descriptions of the behavior of staff members of the federal agency presented in chapters 4 through 8 are based primarily on observations of their performance in the local school districts and on reports by school district personnel.¹⁰

The case study reports provide a unique opportunity to examine the realities of externally stimulated planned educational change. They can be especially useful to educators about to embark upon the planning and implementation of such change efforts, for they provide a rare opportunity to observe the problems that arose when five school districts participated in the same federally funded program.

Chapters 9 through 13 present analyses of the events described in the case studies from five different perspectives. In chapter 9, James Kent, a school superintendent, identifies the major factors that in his view accounted for the outcomes of the change efforts supported by the Experimental Schools program. In chapter 10, Ronald Lippitt, focuses on the role of the consultant in the change

efforts and specifies steps that can be taken to maximize the contributions of consultants to organizational change activities. In chapter 11, Michael Kirst examines a number of dysfunctional aspects of federal-local relationships in the several change efforts and proposes short-run and long-run strategies to deal with them. In chapter 12, Hendrik Gideonse raises a number of fundamental questions about the assumptions and goals underlying the Experimental Schools program and inquires about the sources of its basic problems. He also considers the implications of the case studies for designing new federal policies and programs to facilitate local change efforts. In chapter 13, Terry Saario examines the implications of the case studies for preparing leaders of educational change efforts. In the final chapter we consider the implications of the five case studies from four perspectives. The first is their theoretical implications, and we propose a conceptual framework for the analysis of educational change efforts that extends and elaborates upon present models. We then consider what the case studies imply for the management of educational change efforts at the local level, for governmental agencies that fund change programs of this kind, and for the need to develop new mechanisms for strengthening federal-local relationships in education.

NOTES

1. In the social science literature this problem area is frequently characterized by the phrase "planned organizational change." A good overview of the type of problems examined in this literature can be found in Bennis et al. (1968) and Zaltman et al. (1973). For a presentation of a large number of diverse case studies of attempts at educational change, see Baldrige and Deal (1975).

2. See, for example, American Institutes for Research (1976), Berman and McLaughlin (1976), Glass (1970), Gordon and Wilkerson (1966), Gross et al. (1971), Heller and Barrett (1970), Mosbaek et al. (n.d.), and Wargo et al. (1972).

3. For a more extended consideration of this aspect of program evaluation, see Charters and Jones (1975, pp. 341-53), Gross et al. (1971), and Hyman et al. (1962).

4. For a consideration of the use and abuse of theoretical frameworks designed by social scientists for educational practitioners, see Gross and Fishman (1967, pp. 304-58).

5. For a description or appraisal of many of these change efforts, see Fullan and Pomfret (1975), Fallon (1966), Stufflebeam (1966), and Brickell (1961).

6. See, for example, Goodlad and Klein (1970), Gross et al. (1971), Heller and Barrett (1970), and Wargo et al. (1972).

7. See, for example, Glass (1970), Mosbaek et al. (n.d.), and Wargo et al. (1972).

8. See, for example, American Institutes for Research (1976), Berman and McLaughlin (1976), Gross et al. (1971), and Havelock et al. (1969).

9. Among those individuals who reject or are highly skeptical of specific educational innovations as a basic change strategy, some view general staff development as a more efficacious strategy (see, for example, Goodlad, 1970).

10. An analysis of federal-local relationships in the Experimental Schools program from the perspective of the federal program officer has, however, been conducted by Corwin (1977).

REFERENCES

- American Institutes for Research. *Impact of Educational Innovations on Student Performance: Project Methods and Findings for Three Cohorts* (Project LONGSTEP Final Report: Vol. I, Executive Summary). Palo Alto, Calif.: American Institutes for Research, 1976.
- Baldrige, J. Victor, and Deal, Terrence E. (eds.). *Managing Change in Educational Organizations*. Berkeley: McCutchan, 1975.
- Bennis, Warren G.; Benne, Kenneth D.; Chin, Robert (eds.). *The Planning of Change* (revised ed.). New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1968.
- Berman, Paul, and McLaughlin, Milbury W. "Implementation of Educational Innovation." *The Educational Forum* 11, no. 3 (March 1976): 345-70.
- Berman, Paul, and McLaughlin, Milbury W. *Federal Programs Supporting Educational Change, Volume I: A Model of Educational Change*. San Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1974.
- Brickell, Henry M. *Organizing New York State for Educational Change*. Albany, N.Y.: State Education Department, 1961.
- Charters, W. W., Jr., and Jones, John E. "On Neglect of the Independent Variable in Program Evaluation." *Managing Change in Educational Organizations*, edited by J. Victor Baldrige and Terrence E. Deal. Berkeley: McCutchan, 1975.
- Corwin, Ronald G. *Patterns of Federal-Local Relationships in Education: A Case Study of the Rural Experimental Schools Program*. Cambridge, Mass.: Abt Associates Inc., 1977.
- Fallon, Berlie J. (ed.). *Educational Innovation in the United States*. Bloomington, Ind.: Phi Delta Kappa, 1966.
- Fullan, Michael, and Pomfret, Alan. *Review of Research on Curriculum Implementation*. Toronto: Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1975.
- Glass, Gene V. *Data Analysis of the 1968-69 Survey of Compensatory Education (Title I), Final Report*. Boulder, Colo.: Laboratory of Educational Research, University of Colorado, 1970.
- Goodlad, John I. *The Dynamics of Educational Change*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970.
- Goodlad, John I., and Klein, M. Frances. *Behind the Classroom Door*. Worthington, Ohio: Charles A. Jones, 1970.

- Gordon, Edmund W., and Wilkerson, Dorey A. *Compensatory Education for the Disadvantaged*. New York: College Entrance Examination Board, 1966.
- Gross, Neal, and Fishman, Joshua A. "The Management of Educational Establishments." *The Uses of Sociology*, edited by Paul Lazarsfeld, William H. Sewell, and Harold L. Wilensky. New York: Basic Books, 1967.
- Gross, Neal; Giacquinta, Joseph B.; and Bernstein, Marilyn. *Implementing Organizational Innovations: A Sociological Analysis of Planned Educational Change*. New York: Basic Books, 1971.
- Havelock, Ronald G.; Huber, J. C.; and Zimmerman, S. *Major Works on Change in Education*. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Center for Research on the Utilization of Scientific Knowledge, University of Michigan, 1969.
- Hechinger, Fred. "Murder in Academe: The Demise of Education." *Saturday Review* (March 20, 1975): 11-13.
- Heller, Barbara R., and Barrett, Richard S. *Expand and Improve: A Critical Review of the First Three Years of ESEA Title I in New York City*. New York: Center for Urban Education, 1970.
- Hyman, Herbert H.; Wright, Charles R.; and Hopkins, Terence K. *Applications of Methods of Evaluation: Four Studies of the Encampment for Citizenship*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962.
- Mosback, E. J., et al. *Analysis of Compensatory Education in Five School Districts: Summary*. Washington, D.C.: General Electric, TEMPO, n.d.
- Stufflebeam, Daniel L. *Changes in Ohio Public Schools*. Columbus, Ohio: College of Education, Ohio State University, 1966.
- Timpane, P. Michael. "Federal Aid to Schools: Its Limited Future." *Law and Contemporary Problems* 38 (Winter/Spring 1974): 493-512.
- Wargo, Michael J., et al. *ESEA Title I: A Reanalysis and Synthesis of Evaluation Data from Fiscal Year 1965 Through 1970, Final Report*. Palo Alto, Calif.: American Institutes for Research, 1972.
- Zaltman, Gerald; Duncan, Robert; and Holbek, Jonny (eds.). *Innovations and Organizations*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973.

Basic Issues in the Management of Educational Change Efforts

Neal Gross

Individuals who manage educational innovations generally receive little or no preparation for their challenging assignments and few have previously served in these demanding roles. They attempt to carry out their responsibilities and cope with their managerial tasks as best they can, leaning heavily on intuition, previous work experiences, and "common sense." Their decisions tend to be ad hoc in nature, uninformed by systematic analysis of problems, and made without reference to an overall change strategy. They soon discover, however, that many of their assumptions about educational change and its management are simplistic, misleading, and dysfunctional. They also become aware of inadequacies in the way they have conceptualized the change process and identified internal and external conditions that can deflect it from, or push it toward, its targets.

Since innovations in American school systems are frequently introduced on a crash basis, individuals who manage them typically are provided with little time to engage in essential planning activities such as exploring the costs and benefits of alternative strategies and attempting to identify circumstances that can either block or facilitate their change efforts. They frequently overlook or discount the potential impact that opinion leaders or political forces in the school

district and its external environment can have on the acceptance or rejection of an innovation. They ignore obstacles that teachers and administrators will likely encounter as they attempt to implement a major new program. They embark upon courses of action that are frequently based on tenuous assumptions, for example, that teachers will quickly accept new ideas about teaching and learning which are proposed by educational consultants or that staff members will readily accept additional workloads. In addition, of the many educational administrators who have played key roles in major change efforts of school districts, few have been given the opportunity to consider systematically the dynamics of the change process, useful ways to conceptualize it, and the types of circumstances that can influence it.

The frenetic pace of the activities that accompany many major educational innovations exposes individuals responsible for their management to considerable pressure and stress and frequently results in "crisis management." Consequently, administrators devote most of their time to coping with emergencies and little of it to planning and other analytic tasks. These conditions, plus inadequate preparation for their difficult assignments, undoubtedly explain in part why so few administrators appear to be aware that their own role performance can have a major impact on the fate of innovations introduced into their organizations. Furthermore, they shed light on why change efforts, even when based on some type of coherent strategy, are so frequently unrealistic and, at times, counterproductive.

In this chapter a set of ideas and conceptual tools is presented that will permit administrators to obtain a more realistic understanding of the dynamics and complexities of the educational change process and that will be helpful and provocative in interpreting and analyzing the case studies presented in chapters 4 through 8. More specifically, it focuses on five topics. First, it presents a brief description of an unsuccessful educational change effort to demonstrate both the utility of case studies for generating new ideas about organizational change and how inept management can jettison an innovation. Second, the chapter considers circumstances that have been identified by analysts of the organizational change process as major contributing factors to the failure of innovations. This information can be useful in searching for circumstances that served as impediments to the change efforts in each of the five school districts. Third, it presents two conceptualizations of the educational change process that raise important questions about its stages and the kinds of vari-

ables that may influence its development and outcomes. Fourth, it examines ways in which social science and educational inquiries about change efforts can be used and abused by educational practitioners. Fifth, it specifies the kind of role performance required of administrators if they are to offer leadership to change efforts.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE INEPT MANAGEMENT OF AN INNOVATION

The findings of case studies of educational change efforts conducted in recent years by Bentzen (1974), Charters (1973), Gross et al. (1971), Sarason (1971), Smith and Keith (1971), and others¹ have increased our understanding of the dynamics and complexities of attempting to transform educational systems. A synopsis of the case study by Gross et al. (1971), which systematically examined an attempt to institute a major change into an urban elementary school, illustrates how case studies can increase our understanding of both the conditions that influence educational change efforts and the significant role of management in them. The study recorded the dynamics and outcomes of an innovation that was designed to redefine the traditional role of the elementary school teacher. It also identified the major circumstances that influenced the outcomes of the change effort. Seven months after it was introduced the change effort was judged an abysmal failure. It was abandoned shortly thereafter, when it became apparent that the teachers had become thoroughly disillusioned with the innovation. They would no longer tolerate the stressful conditions to which they had been exposed in their attempts to implement it, and they refused to devote any more time and effort to what they perceived as a highly dubious and badly managed change effort.

Staff resistance, however, did not exist at the outset of the change effort. When the teachers were first informed of the proposed innovation, they were either positively predisposed or neutral toward it. They recognized that their role performance was not meeting the varied needs of the disadvantaged pupils in their classrooms and expressed considerable interest in the innovation as a means to offer greater service to them. Another facilitating circumstance was that funding for the project was assured and more than ample to cover its substantial budget.

Through an analysis of data obtained from intensive daily obser-

variations of the dynamics of this change effort, and from frequent interviews with members of the teaching and administrative staff, the following major barriers to the implementation of the innovation were identified: teachers were unclear about the new role; they lacked the skills required to perform it; essential instructional materials and professional services were unavailable; adjustments in other aspects of the educational program required for implementation of the innovation were not made; teachers were exposed to role overload; and teacher motivation and support of the innovation steadily declined.

The implementation strategy followed by the director of the change effort consisted of three components: "(1) explain the philosophy and objectives of the innovation through several written documents; (2) give teachers maximum freedom to carry it out; and (3) delegate responsibility to an administrative subordinate (the assistant director) to see that the innovation is implemented" (Gross et al., 1971, p. 201).

The findings showed that the director's management of the innovation was defective in two fundamental respects. First, he gave no consideration to the kinds of obstacles that the teachers could be expected to encounter, even though most of the barriers that arose could have been anticipated at the outset. Furthermore, when impediments arose, he was unaware of them or incapable of initiating courses of action to overcome them. Second, he did not recognize the need to establish monitoring and feedback mechanisms to chart the dynamics of the innovation and to identify the circumstances that were blocking its implementation. Consequently, he was unaware that his administrative assistants and the teachers were becoming increasingly irritated about the obstacles they were encountering and could not overcome in their efforts to implement the new role model. Nor was he aware that they were becoming indignant and frustrated because of his inability or unwillingness to provide the type of leadership they expected. Without feedback mechanisms, the teachers were largely deprived of the opportunity to express their candid views and feelings. Partly because the teachers had not been provided with mechanisms to release their frustrations, they later completely rejected the innovation.

The findings of the case study indicated that a number of the director's assumptions were erroneous:

The director made numerous assumptions about the innovation and the operation of the Cambire School that were in fact tenuous. He assumed that the assistant director and he were in agreement about the nature of the innovation. He assumed that the teachers would not experience any serious problem in carrying out the innovation, and that those that would arise could be effectively handled by the assistant director or the subject specialists. However, these and other assumptions he made were erroneous, and since he did not provide for feedback mechanisms in his strategy of implementation, he had no way of obtaining the facts and therefore could not identify or take steps to cope with these barriers to implementation. (Gross et al., 1971; p. 204)

The director attributed the failure to shortcomings in the professional attitudes and behavior of the teachers. But the analysts of the case study concluded that the failure of the innovation was primarily due to the way he managed it. Gross et al. (1971) concluded that the inferior quality of his leadership could be attributed essentially to four circumstances: his simplistic conception of the educational change process, his tenuous assumptions about factors that could influence it, his unrealistic views about organizational processes and relationships in his school, and the manner in which he defined his own role.

The case study credits the director of the project and his administrative staff with a strong commitment to instituting changes that would upgrade the academic achievement of children from disadvantaged backgrounds and facilitate their social and emotional development. It reports that the director had developed the innovation, "sold" it to the central administration as a promising project, and obtained funding for it from a governmental agency. These aspects of his performance reflected his dedication to reforming elementary public schools. Yet his performance in administering the change effort was largely dysfunctional and resulted in the abandonment of an innovation that was launched in a setting ripe for educational change.

The findings of this case study underscore the impact that the intellectual tools (perspective, assumptions, knowledge, and conceptual schemes) educators bring to change efforts have on the fate of educational innovations. The findings also suggest the types of vicarious learning experiences that can be obtained from case studies, especially in identifying factors that can impede or preclude change efforts from achieving their targets.

THE FAILURE OF EDUCATIONAL INNOVATIONS

What accounts for the disquieting fact, documented in chapter 1, that most of the major innovations introduced into American schools during the past two decades have not achieved their intended objectives? This question has been of major concern to educational officials and policy makers at the local, state, and federal levels, but only in recent years have empirical inquiries designed to examine it in a systematic manner been undertaken. Although our present knowledge is still too limited to give a clear cut answer, analysts of change efforts have identified a number of circumstances that have constituted major contributing factors to the failure of educational innovations. Eight important impediments to educational change efforts will be considered.

Failure To Diagnose Problems Properly

One major impediment has been the introduction of innovations into school systems without a careful diagnosis of the educational problems they were designed to solve or ameliorate.² Change efforts with this fundamental flaw are generally doomed from the outset because they are off-target. They represent organizational responses to problems that have been ill-defined and poorly analyzed. As an illustration of this deficiency in many well-intentioned innovative efforts, consider the hundreds of new reading programs that have been introduced in big city school systems in recent years. It is widely acknowledged that these programs have infrequently been successful (Popp, 1975). They were generally based on the assumption that the essential cause of the reading problems of disadvantaged children was the inadequacies of the educational technology available to the teacher, and that the solution was to be found in new and more effective *techniques* for teaching reading.

This approach, however, is extremely limited. It brushes aside social influences which can have a significant bearing on whether a child wants to learn to read or improve his skills in the language arts. More specifically, it ignores the influences of a child's parents and his peer group on his attitudes toward learning in general and reading in particular. It also overlooks how role models can influence a child's conception of his capabilities. It glosses over the importance of teacher attitudes and their expectations for the academic perform-

ance of pupils. In short, the poor record of efforts to upgrade the low reading scores of children from low socioeconomic areas may be attributable largely to the limited manner in which the problem has been defined and to the narrow view of its determinants.

Failure To Anticipate or Resolve Implementation Problems

A second circumstance involved in wrecking change efforts in school systems has been the failure of officials to recognize the critical importance of the *implementation* stage of the change process and to identify and deal with obstacles that arise during it.³ If administrators are confronted with staff resistance at the outset of a change effort, they must give priority to overcoming or minimizing this serious impediment. Teachers who oppose an innovation can be expected to devote minimal effort to implementing it and upon occasion may even attempt to sabotage it.

However, a number of obstacles, in addition to staff resistance, can serve as barriers to change efforts. One is the development of *belated* staff opposition to the innovation. Teachers initially positive or neutral may later offer resistance when they become aware of the difficulties of implementation or the additional or unanticipated burdens involved. A second barrier is that staff members lack the skills or capabilities needed to carry out the change effort. Major innovations such as the open classroom or individualized instruction can be effectively implemented only when teachers have learned new instructional techniques and less formal ways to relate to their clients. The resocialization of teachers in change efforts, however, has frequently been inadequate and, in many instances, nonexistent.⁴ A third factor is the failure to consider how an innovation may conflict with other school programs or routine processes. The disruptions and battles that have resulted from collisions of this kind have led to the rejection of promising innovations (Gross et al., 1971, pp. 139-42).

A fourth factor is "role overload."⁵ In introducing innovations many administrators have failed to take into account how the additional duties assigned to staff members will affect their ability to continue to carry out their present responsibilities. Consequently, work overload has been a serious problem for both school officials and teachers in many change efforts since new time-consuming tasks must compete with ongoing responsibilities. Scheduling after-school planning meetings, for example, may create serious difficulties for

teachers who are the mothers of small children. Letting substitutes assume some of the ongoing classroom duties of teachers who attend meetings during the regular school day can aggravate, rather than relieve, the problem of overload, especially when the teacher and the substitute use different teaching techniques or emphasize different topics.

A fifth factor is the failure to provide staff members with the assistance and materials they require to implement an innovation.⁶ Teachers involved in major change efforts usually need considerable professional assistance and support and typically require special types of instructional materials and equipment. They frequently find, however, that inadequate arrangements or no provision at all were made to provide them with essential professional support services; when such services have been made available, they frequently find them of little value. The belated arrival or unavailability of essential materials has also frustrated teachers and impeded innovative efforts.

A sixth factor is weak support from the central administration or the school board, especially during the later phases of a change process.⁷ A seventh factor is the inability of school officials to select and use effectively consultants who have the skills required to help their change efforts.⁸ An eighth factor is the misunderstandings and problems that arise between officials in the central administration and individuals who manage innovations.⁹ The adversarial relationships that at times have developed as a result of these encounters have served as impediments to change efforts. In addition to diagnostic and implementation difficulties, other circumstances have contributed to failure.

Ad Hoc Approach to Educational Innovations

A third circumstance is the disjointed manner in which many school systems have introduced innovations. They displayed little concern for whether they were educationally compatible with other aspects of the curriculum. Innovations isolated from other parts of the school program can readily achieve a marginal status. When funds to support them dwindle or their original sponsors lose interest, they usually disappear.

Uncritical Acceptance of Existing Innovations

A fourth circumstance is the uncritical acceptance of educational innovations that have been widely publicized.¹⁰ Many school systems threw caution to the winds and allocated resources to an assortment of untested, fuzzy, and ill-designed innovations that lacked clear operational procedures or guidelines. Many of these innovations were promoted by business firms and had been developed or were sponsored by well-intentioned educators. The educational benefits claimed for these programs and practices and the wide publicity they received led some educators to assume that they constituted solutions to long-standing problems of their school systems. Other administrators introduced changes that they did not fully comprehend simply because they had been informed that the innovations were functioning successfully in other school systems. Officials who initiated these innovations assumed that because an educational change had achieved its objectives in another educational setting, it would also be successful in theirs. They later discovered, however, that this assumption is tenuous. An innovation that works in one kind of educational context may or may not be effective in another, depending upon the kinds of conditions that are essential for its success. For example, innovations like the open classroom require teachers who have excellent diagnostic and interpersonal skills and who are willing to devote after-school hours to their professional tasks. They also require parents who will support this kind of educational program. When these conditions are not present, this innovation cannot be expected to succeed.

Absence of Monitoring and Feedback Mechanisms

A fifth circumstance is the lack of monitoring and feedback procedures, which precludes early identification of barriers to an innovation and, hence, the ability to deal with them promptly.¹¹ These mechanisms are essential if an educational change process is to proceed in an orderly manner and with a sense of direction to its objectives. They locate the stresses, strains, and frustrations that accompany most change efforts; feedback sessions can reveal ways to cope with them. If major impediments to an innovation are not identified and eliminated, they can readily snowball and result in the rapid abandonment of the innovation.

Absence of Teacher and Community Participation

A sixth circumstance, one stressed by many students of the educational change process, is the reluctance or failure of school systems to involve faculty, parents, and concerned members of the community in deliberations about proposed major changes.¹² They maintain that many innovations have been introduced largely because "experts" advocated them or because monies from external sources became available to finance them. They note that school authorities frequently make little effort to elicit the views of teachers and parents. If these concerned groups have limited or erroneous information about proposed change efforts, or are not invited to express their views about whether the innovations should be introduced, they will often, upon the slightest provocation, turn against them. Furthermore, some educational administrators view the involvement of teachers and parents as a vehicle to elicit their support for administration-sponsored reforms. These officials contend that when a change effort is devoid of teacher and parent participation, those who manage it are failing to exploit a strategic public relations mechanism.

Inadequate Planning

A seventh circumstance, implicit in most of the others, is inadequate planning.¹³ School districts generally have dealt with large-scale change efforts in an essentially ad hoc manner. Their goals have generally been fuzzy and incapable of being operationally defined. Their administrators did not develop short-, intermediate-, or long-term targets for their change efforts, and hence could not design strategies and operational plans to achieve them or, if necessary, to revise them. Their planning efforts typically failed to consider that the way an innovation is initially presented to members of a faculty can have a critical bearing on their reactions to it and their motivation to implement it. They gave little thought to anticipating the types of obstacles that could arise during different phases of the change effort and to mechanisms that could be established to identify and overcome them. They usually failed to consider role definition and role overload problems and failed to provide teachers with professional services and support needed for implementation. They generally made no provision for instituting regularized procedures to monitor the dynamics of the change effort, to identify the major

circumstances influencing it, and to develop open lines of communication with the staff.

Absence of Leadership

The eighth circumstance is the paucity of leadership exhibited by individuals who have managed educational change efforts.¹⁴ Skillful management of a change effort is a difficult and complex task and requires the exercise of considerable leadership in order to succeed. Often, school districts have selected personnel to manage major change efforts who lack the requisite commitment and skills. The demise of many promising educational innovations has frequently been a consequence of inept leadership.

THEORETICAL FORMULATIONS OF THE EDUCATIONAL CHANGE PROCESS

Two theoretical formulations have been proposed to account for the fate of educational innovations. Each has important implications for the management of educational change efforts. These models stress the potential significance of selected organizational and personal variables and the relationships among them. Prior to considering the two formulations, it is relevant to comment briefly on the state of affairs in the theoretical literature on educational change.

In his review of the literature on the process of organized change in schools, Giacquinta (1973) states:

The literature is basically atheoretical in nature. It contains little work designed to develop and test theories describing the dynamics of the change process or explaining how organizations like the schools vary in the degree and speed with which they change. The extension of knowledge about organizational change will require empirical studies of greater theoretical, methodological, and statistical sophistication. (p. 178)

In a more recent appraisal of the literature, Berman and McLaughlin (1976) arrived at similar conclusions.

Most studies of organizational change efforts in education have lacked theoretical orientation, a circumstance which largely explains the paucity of formulations to account for the outcomes of these change efforts. Their primary concern, as Giacquinta (1973, p. 179) notes, has been with "precipitating change rather than studying it."

Neglect of theory has had serious negative consequences for the development of a body of cumulative research findings in this field. In addition, the atheoretical nature of this literature and its conceptual poverty has severely limited the perspectives and conceptual frameworks available to those who manage planned educational change. Lacking analytic tools, many administrators have been at a loss about how to design a systematic change strategy and how to carry it out in a skillful manner. Embedded in this body of literature, however, are two theoretical formulations that have been used by educational officials who have managed change efforts in the United States, England, and other nations.

The Overcoming Resistance to Change (ORC) Model

The Overcoming Resistance to Change (ORC) formulation posits that the success or failure of planned organizational change efforts is basically a function of the ability of management to overcome staff resistance to change *that exists just prior to, or at the time of, the introduction of the innovation.*

An excellent description of this formulation of organizational change is provided by Argyle (1967). In his words:

In the first place, there is usually resistance to change of any sort. . . . In social organization patterns of behavior become established and are of great stability because individuals work out drive-reducing ways of adapting and fear that any change will be to their disadvantage in some way. Changes in industry are resisted by workers because they are afraid that they will be paid less or will have to work harder to earn the same amount. Wage-incentive schemes have often foundered for this reason. Changes are resisted by managers because they are afraid that their position will be weakened somehow or that they will be further from the centers of power. Current changes in prisons are resisted by prison officers and prisoners alike because they have no desire to associate with each other. . . . There is anxiety either about possible material loss or about the disruption of a well-established and satisfying social system. (p. 95)

This model assumes that whatever the basis of resistance to a proposed change—fears, misgivings, misapprehensions, or other factors—the change effort is doomed to failure unless staff resistance can be overcome. In addition, it assumes that resistance to innovations occurs only at one time period: just prior to, or at the time of, the *introduction* of the innovation.

On the assumption that the ability to institute courses of action

that will overcome staff resistance to change is the key to the successful management of organizational change efforts, Argyle (1967) states: "The main principle here is that subordinates should be persuaded and motivated rather than ordered—so that they actually want to behave in the new way. This persuasive and democratic style means allowing people to take part in discussion and decisions" (p. 94).

Power equalization between management and organizational members constitutes one strategy that may be used to overcome resistance to change. It assumes that subordinates will initially be negatively predisposed toward an innovation, and hence will resist it, if they are not centrally involved in the deliberations that lead to its introduction into the organization. In order to overcome the resistance of staff members, management must share its power with subordinates by allowing them to participate in decisions about proposed organizational changes. As a consequence of their involvement, it is assumed that members will tend to view the innovation as self-imposed, and thereby become committed to it since it is perceived as a shared decision. In short, power-equalization involves two key ideas: first, management must allow subordinates to participate in change decisions and, second, subordinates will thereby be induced to accept and implement new behavior patterns.

In reviewing power-equalization strategies as a mechanism to achieve organizational change, Leavitt (1965) has observed:

Power-equalization has thus become a key concept in several of the prevalent people theories, a first step in the theoretical causal chain leading toward organizational change. It has been constructed as an initial subgoal, a necessary predecessor to creative change in structure, technology, task solving, and task implementation. Although the distances are unmarked, there is no obscurity about direction: a more egalitarian distribution is better. (p. 1159)

Another strategy that has been used to overcome staff resistance to change is that of group dynamics. In addition to employing it for such purposes as developing team functioning, facilitating collaboration during implementation, aiding solidarity, and increasing feedback, school systems have employed social sensitivity, T-group training, and related techniques in efforts to unfreeze teachers' resistance to proposed innovations or to develop a positive predisposition toward change efforts.¹⁵

The ORC explanation of the success or failure of organizational innovations focuses on an extremely important potential barrier to change. It alerts administrators to the importance of determining the amount of resistance or support that exists for an innovation prior to its introduction. If it turns out that staff resistance does constitute a serious problem, the theory asserts that management must overcome it at the outset of the change effort if its target is to be achieved.

Gross et al. (1971, pp. 195-202) pointed out, however, that the ORC theory had several major limitations as an explanation of the success or failure of organizational change efforts. They contended that it overlooked a set of organizational conditions that could have a significant impact on the fate of an innovation *after* it has been introduced into an organization. In their words:

- (1) Organizational members who are not resistant to change or whose initial resistance to it has been overcome may encounter *obstacles in their effort to implement an innovation* which, if not removed, may make it impossible for them to carry out.
- (2) Individuals in organizations are in large part dependent upon their formal leaders to overcome their obstacles and they may not remove, or even be aware of, these constraints.
- (3) Members who are *initially* favorable toward organizational change may later *develop* a negative orientation to an innovation, and therefore be unwilling to implement it as a consequence of the barriers and frustrations they have encountered in attempting to carry it out. (pp. 8-9)

In addition, Gross and his associates observed that the ORC formulation assumes that initial staff resistance to change is ubiquitous. They maintained that the amount of staff resistance at the outset of a change-effort is an empirical question and hence that staff resistance needed to be treated as problematic, rather than as given. They also stressed that the ORC formulation overlooks the effects of the performance of management on innovative efforts *throughout* the change process.

Their reservations about the ORC explanation stimulated them to conduct an intensive case study of a major change effort in an elementary school to determine whether their ideas received empirical support. A thumbnail sketch of their empirical findings was presented earlier in this chapter. We now examine the *theoretical* results

of their work, the Leadership-Obstacle Course (LOC) theory and the conceptual scheme underpinning it.

The Leadership-Obstacle Course (LOC) Theory

The explanation proposed by Gross et al. (1971, pp. 202-03) to account for the success or failure of organizations in their efforts to implement innovations is based on three assumptions, one of which (staff resistance as a potential obstacle to organizational change) serves as a basic premise of the ORC model. The LOC formulation extends that model by introducing additional assumptions and variables that reflect ways in which specified organizational conditions, including the performance of management throughout the change process, may serve to block or facilitate the implementation of innovations.

The initial assumption of the LOC theory is that if members are resistant to a *proposed* organizational change, then overcoming or neutralizing this obstacle constitutes an essential prerequisite for the implementation of an innovation.

Its second assumption is that the degree to which an innovation is implemented depends on the presence of five conditions during the period of *attempted* implementation. The first is the degree to which organizational members obtain a clear understanding of the proposed innovation. If they are confused about it, they will not know what is expected of them and will not be able to carry it out. Furthermore, their efforts to implement the innovation will be misdirected if they have erroneously interpreted it. The second condition is the extent to which organization members possess the skills and capabilities needed to carry out the innovation. The third is the extent to which the materials and equipment required by the staff are available when needed. The fourth is the extent to which organizational arrangements incompatible with the innovation are made congruent with it. The fifth is the extent to which organizational members are motivated to spend the required time and effort to implement the innovation.

The third assumption of the LOC theory is that the extent to which these five conditions are present during the period of *attempted* implementation depends primarily on the performance of management. If, for example, staff members are confused about the

innovation or what is expected of them, management can or cannot clarify these ambiguities. Management alone possesses the authority to establish needed training programs and to procure the necessary equipment and supplies. It can or cannot perform these essential tasks. Furthermore, management is the only agency with the power to change existing organizational arrangements and provide the rewards needed to motivate the staff.

The theory asserts that, since staff resistance at the outset of a change effort can block the implementation of an innovation, then, when this obstacle exists, management must overcome it. It further asserts that, since implementation depends on the extent to which the five conditions specified above are present, and since the extent to which these conditions prevail will be a consequence of the performance of management, then it follows that the degree of implementation will be a function of the extent to which management establishes and maintains these five conditions.

The LOC model thus builds upon the ORC formulation of the organizational change process. It conceptualizes facts neglected by the ORC model that were identified by empirical inquiry. More specifically, the LOC theory extends the ORC theory of the change process in three significant respects. The ORC model conceptualizes the educational change process as consisting of *two* stages: (1) the *initiation* (or introduction of an innovation) stage, and (2) the *incorporation* (or inclusion of the innovation as part of the ongoing processes of the organization) stage. It assumes that if management can overcome staff resistance to a proposed change during the initiation stage, the innovation will become incorporated into the organization. If management's efforts to eliminate or diminish staff resistance is ineffectual, it assumes that the innovation will be abandoned. The LOC model, on the other hand, views the educational change process as consisting of *three* stages: (1) initiation, (2) attempted implementation, and (3) incorporation. The stage of *attempted implementation* is defined as the period starting as soon as the initiation stage is completed and ending when either the innovation is discarded or the incorporation stage begins.


A second important extension of the ORC theory which is made by the LOC theory is the specification of a set of *organizationally rooted* obstacles that can arise during the period of attempted implementation. A third extension is that it places management in

the limelight during the stage of attempted implementation as well as during the initiation stage. The LOC theory posits that the fate of an innovation is dependent on the ability of management not only to overcome staff resistance at the *outset* of a change effort, but also to establish and maintain the set of conditions that the theory posits as desiderata during the *period of attempted implementation*. Thus the LOC theory, in contrast to the ORC formulation, asserts that management continues to have a critical role to play in a change effort after an innovation has been introduced. The major features of the ORC and LOC models are summarized in figure 1.

In what ways can the LOC model be of service in the analysis of the case studies presented in chapters 4 through 8? To begin with, it makes the analyst acutely aware of the complex nature of the educational change process and the multiple and interrelated factors that may be influencing it. Second, it focuses attention on staff resistance as a potential impediment to a change effort. Third, it emphasizes the importance of identifying obstacles that arise during the attempted implementation stage and the way management responds to them. Fourth, it suggests the importance of determining whether staff members have a clear understanding of the innovation and of the performance expected of them. Fifth, it raises the issue of training requirements of a change effort and the extent to which they are met. Sixth, it focuses attention on whether the supplies and equipment essential to the change effort are available when needed. Seventh, it alerts analysts to the possibility that the failure to modify existing organizational arrangements may impede the change efforts. Eighth, it draws attention to whether staff resistance exists at the outset of the change effort and during its later stages. Ninth, it highlights the need to examine carefully whether management carried out its essential functions in the innovative attempt.

Since the LOC model focuses on major types of obstacles that management will encounter, and the type of leadership performance required to overcome them, it can serve as a highly useful provisional framework for the analysis of the dynamics and outcomes of case studies of educational change. We urge readers to employ the LOC model in this way when they examine the case studies presented in chapters 4 through 8. In addition, we strongly suggest that they attempt to identify variables overlooked in the LOC formulation that had an impact on the fate of the five change efforts. In chapter 14,

Figure 1
Two Models of Planned Educational Change:
The Overcoming Resistance to Change (ORC) Model and
the Leadership Obstacle Course (LOC) Model



we present an expanded version of the LOC model that gives conceptual recognition to factors identified in the five case studies that have been overlooked in prior theoretical formulations.

THE IMPROPER AND PROPER USE OF RESEARCH INQUIRIES ON EDUCATIONAL CHANGE

Educators involved in organizational change efforts can derive considerable benefit from studies of educational change conducted by social scientists and educators if they make appropriate use of them. If, however, they are unaware of the limitations of the studies, draw erroneous inferences from them, or apply them to their own change efforts without exercising the necessary precautions, they will find that these studies can be dysfunctional. It is important, therefore, to be alert to ways in which research inquiries have been misused by educational practitioners. Later in this chapter we will present our view about their legitimate use.

In summarizing their discussion of the utilization of research on innovations for the management of educational change, Baldridge and Deal (1975, p. 7) state:

The profusion of innovation research has not been particularly useful for administrators as they are changing, reforming, or installing new ideas in educational organizations. This gap between the research and administrative action stems from several characteristics of the innovation research: an individualistic perspective tends to ignore the fact that most social inventions are adopted by organizations, not individuals; there has been a focus on factors that are difficult or impossible for an administrator to control; the policy implications of much innovation research are not spelled out; alternative strategies for change that result from the research are not adequately tested; consultants have discouraged an experimental problem-solving approach by promising simple solutions from their "black bag" of tricks.

These observations are in our judgment essentially sound. It is important to be aware that most studies of innovations have been concerned with the adoption of new practices by individuals, not organizations. The substantial and sophisticated body of research on agricultural and medical innovations, for example, is concerned with adoption processes as they apply to individual farmers or physicians and the characteristics that differentiate adopters, laggards, and non-adopters. Innovations adopted by organizations and those adopted

by individuals, however, are different in many significant respects, particularly in the ease with which they can be introduced, in the complexities and difficulties of implementing them, and in the types of circumstances that can influence their outcomes. The relevance and utility of most of the body of literature on the adoption of innovations by individuals for instituting and effecting *organizational* change is therefore highly questionable.

What of inquiries conducted to obtain knowledge about the dynamics and outcomes of educational change processes and factors that influence them? Do their findings offer detailed specifications or formulas that, if applied to a change effort, will assure its success? Our response to this question is an unequivocal "no." Administrators who believe that research inquiries of social scientists and educators will provide them with a set of precise specifications for their change strategies are subscribing to a myth.

Our views on this matter are based on three interrelated considerations. The first is that the framework for analysis employed in most research inquiries that test hypotheses about educational innovations is fundamentally different from the framework that will provide the greatest utility for managers of educational change efforts. Investigators who test hypotheses about factors related to the success or failure of change efforts in schools generally focus on a few selected variables that they assume will influence the fate of an innovation. Their "explanatory" variables are determined by the theoretical framework they employ or the particular questions they examine. Analyses of this kind, like scientific analyses in general, are necessarily selective. They involve only variables relevant to the problem *as it has been delimited* by the investigator. Individuals responsible for the management of an educational change process, however, do not perform in such contrived settings. They work in complex environments that have unique characteristics. Variables of critical importance for instituting change in their school systems may have been excluded from the analysis by a social scientist investigating a narrowly defined problem. In short, in contrast to the strategy of delimiting a problem usually employed by social scientists, an educational administrator needs to identify the primary factors within and outside his school system that can have a major impact on the change effort.

A second reason for the limited utility of most organizational

change studies is the conditional nature of their findings. Whether the findings of change inquiries conducted in industrial settings can be directly applied to educational contexts is problematic. Educational administrators and their consultants have at times ignored the limited applicability of research findings.

The third reason is that innovations vary in their complexity, scope, and requirements. Variables that had a major influence on the implementation of a relatively minor innovation in the school curriculum may have little or no impact on efforts to implement a large-scale and complex innovation like the open classroom.

We have maintained that the *findings* of inquiries on educational change, whether based on case studies or sample surveys, do not and cannot provide a set of precise rules or specifications for the *management* of educational change efforts. This statement, however, should not be interpreted as implying that such investigations are of little value to the educational practitioner. Quite the contrary; studies of this kind can be of great importance and utility to men and women who manage educational innovations because they offer them fresh perspectives, sensitize them to types of variables which otherwise might easily be ignored, and suggest functional ways of conceptualizing the change process. More specifically, such studies can be useful for the following reasons:

1. They alert administrators to the importance of scrutinizing carefully the quality of proposed innovations and of investigating their relevance to the organizational problems they are supposed to ameliorate or solve. They make administrators aware of the dangers of introducing "misfit" innovations into their schools and of ignoring contextual factors.
2. They make administrators aware of the importance of obtaining an understanding of the multiple forces and conditions that necessitated a proposed change effort and of examining their implications for the design of a change strategy.
3. They make administrators aware of the complexities of change efforts and of the need to recognize that the change process consists of several distinct stages, each with its own unique problems.
4. They alert and sensitize administrators to frequently overlooked obstacles that may arise at different stages in the history of a change effort and to the importance of identifying them as quickly as possible.

5. They make administrators aware of the critical importance of their own role performance in the change efforts they manage and indicate the kinds of role behavior required for the exercise of leadership.

6. They draw attention to frequently overlooked aspects of the school district and community context that influence educational change efforts.

7. They make administrators aware of the critical importance of careful planning in the change process and the negative consequences that follow from ad hoc and intuitive orientations to decision making. They also underscore the need for flexible strategies.

8. They broaden and deepen the intellectual perspectives of administrators by providing them with ways to conceptualize the change process, the several social systems in which they are embedded, and factors and forces that may influence the fate of educational innovations.

If administrators can derive substantial benefits from the research studies of educators and social scientists, but should only partly base their strategies on these studies, then how should they define their role in their efforts to offer leadership to educational change processes in their school systems?

OFFERING LEADERSHIP TO EDUCATIONAL CHANGE EFFORTS

Managing an educational change process is one thing. Offering leadership to it is quite another matter, one much more difficult to accomplish. Foolproof formulas or rule books for conducting successful change efforts do not exist and probably never will. "How to do it" manuals that present detailed and unconditional specifications for highly complex interpersonal processes like planned organizational change efforts are of little or no value, and in fact can be highly misleading.¹⁶

It is precisely because cut-and-dried rules do not exist that leadership of high quality is needed if an organizational change effort is to succeed. What is required are administrators who can give leadership to the following tasks: identifying basic problems of their schools, determining their contributing factors, selecting or developing innovations that are "on target," designing and implementing

efficient and effective change strategies, incorporating the innovations into their organization, and assessing their effects. Once the decision to introduce an innovation is made, the tailor-made strategy these officials develop to implement it needs to reflect a hard-headed assessment of the matrix of forces in and outside of their schools that could block the innovation at different stages of the change process. It also needs to specify courses of action to overcome obstacles if they arise.

Characteristics of individuals, such as social sensitivity and skill in human relations, undoubtedly have a bearing on leadership performance. Yet individuals who score high on these attributes and who have been placed in charge of change efforts precisely because of their excellent interpersonal skills have frequently been ineffective. Their inadequate performance may be due to (1) their limited understanding of, or lack of sensitivity to, organizational and external factors that influence the dynamics and outcomes of a change effort; (2) their proclivity to view complex organizational and political issues as problems that can be resolved by improving human relationships; and (3) their failure to comprehend that the performance of staff members is dependent on the behavior of management.

We list below a number of basic questions about educational innovations and their management. The quality of the responses given to them by administrators can be expected to influence the quality of their leadership. These questions will also be functional and provocative for readers in their examination and analysis of the educational change efforts presented in chapters 4 through 8.

1. Has the problem that the proposed innovation is supposed to solve or ameliorate been adequately analyzed?
2. Is the proposed innovation on target with respect to the problem it is supposed to resolve?¹⁷
3. To what extent and in what manner should the staff be involved in the decision to introduce the innovation?
4. In what respects should the community be involved in deliberations about introducing and implementing the innovation?
5. What is the most effective way to introduce the innovation?
6. What internal and external obstacles will probably arise at

the initiating and implementing stages of the educational change process?

7. What courses of action can be taken to overcome or minimize these obstacles?
8. What steps can be taken to facilitate the implementation of the change effort? How can they be operationalized?
9. What types of procedures will be required to monitor the innovation?
10. What types of feedback mechanisms should be established?
11. What steps should be taken to enhance the likelihood that the change effort will receive leadership of high quality?
12. What procedures should be established to cope with crises?
13. What short-run and long-run targets should be established?
14. What procedures should be used to assess how well they are being achieved?

The exercise of leadership requires that questions of this kind be raised and answered. It also requires that procedures to cope with anticipated and emergent difficulties be developed and carried out. The function of leadership in an educational change effort, in short, is to influence its design and implementation in ways that will direct it toward its target(s).

NOTES

1. See especially the valuable collections of short case studies presented in Miles (1964) and Baldrige and Deal (1975).

2. For consideration of the diagnosis and needs assessment problem, see Baldrige and Deal (1975).

3. The importance of the implementation stage of the change process is emphasized by Gross et al. (1971). For a review of research on the implementation of curriculum, see Fullan and Pomfret (1975). For an overview of the recent studies of the Rand Corporation with respect to the implementation of educational innovations, see Berman and McLaughlin (1976).

4. For a consideration of the issue of teacher resocialization in change efforts, see Hess and Buckholdt (1974), Ashley and Butts (1971), and Cole (1972). For the serious negative consequences that can result from the failure to take into account the need for resocialization, see Gross et al. (1971). For an overview of strategies concerned with the consequences of differential approaches to teacher retraining, see Fullan and Pomfret (1975, pp. 80-83).

5. Role overload is frequently experienced by school superintendents and

principals. See Gross et al. (1958) and Gross and Herriott (1965) for a consideration of these problems. Role overload with references to teachers has come into prominence only recently, in part due to their additional responsibilities when innovations are introduced into their schools.

6. For a review of studies on staff resource support during implementation efforts, see Fullan and Pomfret (1975, pp. 83-85).

7. This factor reflects the observations of a number of school personnel who have been in charge of innovations. They note that especially at the outset of a change effort, the central administration strongly supports it. Later, however, the support of the central administration considerably wanes, as other matters, including new change efforts, preoccupy its time.

8. In chapter 10 of this volume, Lippitt examines this extremely important and neglected problem.

9. This obstacle is a common complaint of individuals responsible for the management of innovations. They maintain that the bureaucratic procedures of their school districts are applied to the change efforts, whereas implementation necessitates the use of nonstandardized procedures. For an illustration of how this type of obstacle can influence a change effort, see Gross et al. (1971, pp. 168-71).

10. The availability of large sums of money, under the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act, for innovative programs to deal with the pressing problems of the schools undoubtedly stimulated this practice.

11. See Fullan and Pomfret (1975, pp. 85-87) and Gross et al. (1971).

12. See, for example, Fantini and Weinstein (1968). The issue of teacher and parent participation in change efforts is a controversial one, as evidenced by the different points of view expressed by Kent (chapter 9) and Kirst (chapter 11) in this volume. Discussions of this issue generally ignore the following kinds of questions: Should teachers and parents be involved in all, some, or none of the issues? Should their participation, if any, include the right to *decide* certain issues, and if so which ones?

13. Although there is general agreement that complex processes like educational change efforts require systematic planning, the type of planning procedures most functional for procuring organizational improvements is problematic. See, for example, Trist (1976) and Filley et al. (1976).

14. For a review of various conceptions of leadership in educational settings and the deficiencies and consequences of the Executive Professional Leadership of a national sample of elementary principals, see Gross and Herriott (1965).

15. For a carefully developed strategy to overcome individual resistance to change based on the notions of unfreezing, changing, and refreezing, see the classic paper of Lewin (1958).

16. The efforts of some students of the educational change process, notably Ronald G. Havelock, to be of service to educational practitioners reflect a keen awareness of the dangers of offering rule books or other forms of unconditional specifications. See, for example, Havelock (1973).

17. It is important to stress that a school system that borrows an innova-

tion from another school system may need to alter it to fit its special situation and context. Such decisions about adaptation must be made at the outset of a change effort. After a change has been introduced, further adaptations may be needed as a consequence of information about its functioning and implementation problems obtained through feedback from teachers and monitoring procedures. For a provocative consideration of this issue, see Berman and McLaughlin (1976).

REFERENCES

- Argyle, Michael. "The Social Psychology of Social Change." *Social Theory and Economic Change*, edited by T. B. Burns and S. B. Saul. London: Tavistock, 1967.
- Ashley, J., and Butts, D. "A Study of the Impact of In-Service Education Programs on Teacher Behavior." *Research and Curriculum Development in Science Education*, edited by D. Butts. Austin, Texas: Science Education Center, University of Texas, 1971.
- Baldrige, J. V., and Deal, T. E. (eds.). *Managing Change in Educational Organizations*. Berkeley, Calif.: McCutchan, 1975.
- Bentzen, Mary M. *Changing Schools: The Magic Feather Principle*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974.
- Berman, Paul, and McLaughlin, Milbrey W. "Implementation of Educational Innovations." *The Educational Forum* 40, no. 3 (March 1976): 345-70.
- Charters, W. W., Jr. *Measuring the Implementation of Differentiated Staffing: A Comparison of Two Elementary Schools*. Eugene, Oregon: Center for the Advanced Study of Educational Administration, University of Oregon, 1973.
- Cole, H. *Implementation of a Process Curriculum by the Campus Term Strategy*. Syracuse, N.Y.: Eastern Regional Institute for Education, 1972.
- Fantini, M., and Weinstein, G. *The Disadvantaged: Challenge to Education*. New York: Harper & Row, 1968.
- Filley, A. C.; House, R. J.; and Kerr, S. *Managerial Process and Organizational Behavior* (2nd ed.). Glenview, Ill.: Scott Foresman, 1976.
- Fullan, Michael, and Pomfret, Alan. *Review of Research on Curriculum Implementation*. Toronto: Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1975.
- Giacquinta, Joseph, B. "The Process of Organizational Change in Schools." *Review of Research in Education: 1973*, edited by Fred B. Kerlinger. Itasca, Ill.: F. E. Peacock, 1973.
- Gross, Neal; Mason, Ward S.; and McEachern, Alexander W. *Explorations in Role Analysis: Studies of the School Superintendency Role*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958.
- Gross, Neal, and Herriott, Robert E. *Staff Leadership in Public Schools*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965.
- Gross, Neal; Giacquinta, Joseph, B.; and Bernstein, Marilyn. *Implementing Organizational Innovations*. New York: Basic Books, 1971.

- Havelock, Ronald G. *The Change Agent's Guide to Innovation in Education*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Educational Technology Publications, 1973.
- Hess, R., and Buckholdt, D. "Degree of Implementation as a Critical Variable in Program Evaluation." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association (April 1974).
- Leavitt, Harold J. "Applied Organizational Change in Industry: Structural Technology and Humanistic Approaches." *Handbook of Organizations*, edited by James G. March. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965.
- Lewin, Kurt. "Group Decision and Social Change." *Readings in Social Psychology*, edited by Eleanor Maccoby et al. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1958.
- Miles, Matthew B. *Innovations in Education*. New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1964.
- Popp, Helen M. "Current Practices in the Teaching of Beginning Reading." *Toward a Literate Society*, edited by John B. Carroll and Jeanne S. Chall. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975.
- Sarason, Seymour. *The Culture of Schools and the Problem of Change*. Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1971.
- Smith, Louis M., and Keith, Pat M. *Anatomy of Educational Innovation: An Organizational Analysis of an Elementary School*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971.
- Trist, Emory. "Action Research and Adaptive Planning." *Experimenting with Organizations' Life*, edited by A. W. Clark. New York: Plenum Press, 1976.

PART II

The Experimental Schools Program: Federal Context and Local Projects

3

The Federal Context: Planning, Funding, and Monitoring

Robert E. Herriott

Since the early 1950s, a dramatic shift has been occurring in the relationship of the federal government to local school districts. In order to understand the experiences of the five school districts, presented in chapters 4 through 8 and analyzed in chapters 9 through 14, it is important to consider that shift and the place of the Experimental Schools program within it.

From the founding of the U.S. Office of Education in 1867 through the 1940s, the federal role in education at the local level was largely passive, being confined primarily to the collection and dissemination of a series of statistics about schools and schooling (Timpane, 1974). In 1950, however, legislation provided direct federal financial assistance to school districts affected by the establishment of new federal installations and, since then, the role of the federal government in the direct support of education at the local level has grown. This development goes beyond an increase in the proportion of expenditures for elementary and secondary education attributable to federal sources (from 3 percent in 1950 to 8 percent in 1975) to touch upon the responsibility for determining how such monies are to be spent.¹

Historically, federal financial assistance has taken two major forms:

—*General aid*, in which federal dollars are made available directly to local school districts (or to them through their respective states) for use in ways determined primarily at the *state or local level*.

—*Categorical aid*, in which federal dollars are made available directly to local school districts (or to them through their respective states) for use in ways determined primarily at the *federal level*.

There has been much debate over the advantages and disadvantages of each approach for the various levels of American government (local, state, and federal), particularly over whether federal assistance of either form can be received at the local level without accepting a degree of federal control over local decision making (Kirst, 1973; Berke and Kirst, 1972; Summerfield, 1974). Regardless of its form, however, federal aid to local education is generally justified at the *federal level* as being needed to assist or motivate local governments to adapt to changing national priorities.

During the 1950s, threats to the stability of American democracy were the major stimulants of federal-aid legislation. The National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958, for example, was passed into law largely from a concern that Russian technology (dramatized by the launching of the first Sputnik) was advancing more rapidly than American technology. NDEA emphasized categorical programs designed to provide better training in science and mathematics and to encourage more students to enter technological careers (Sufrin, 1963). More recent concerns have focused upon internal rather than external problems. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965, for example, was passed into law partially from a concern that racial and other inequities within American society conflicted with the Constitution and threatened political stability. ESEA emphasized categorical aid for the enhancement of educational opportunity, particularly for children who had traditionally been discriminated against on racial or economic grounds (Bailey and Mosher, 1968). The act brought the "first noticeable level of federal financial assistance to most school districts" (Timpane, 1974, p. 495).

The Experimental Schools program arose during a period of "pause and reflection" early in the Nixon presidency, when basic assumptions about federal involvement in local education were being re-examined. Out of the reflection came a concern that the federal role during the 1960s had been too directive and too fragmented,

leading to a variety of local assistance programs that lacked overall coherence at the federal level and provided insufficient opportunity for initiative at the local level. The lack of overall coherence was thought to have fostered a *piecemeal* change strategy and an emphasis upon the development of new educational products (curricula, techniques, and machines) inappropriate for widespread utilization at the local level (Budding, 1972). One conclusion emerging from these concerns was that a new change strategy was needed, one that would give greater autonomy to local school officials to plan and implement innovations which they thought would best address local needs.

The Experimental Schools (ES) program became a major vehicle for testing the efficacy of one new strategy (National Institute of Education, 1974). It was first announced publicly in President Nixon's budget message to the Congress in January 1969, and was further explicated in his "Message on Educational Reform and Renewal" of March 1970, as a strategy for building "a bridge between educational research and actual practice." It was to represent a new approach for federal change efforts, involving local school districts and the federal government as "partners" in a cooperative effort of "field experiments" in *comprehensive* educational change. The reform message also proposed the creation of a new National Institute of Education (NIE). The Experimental Schools program was seen by many of its proponents as a prototype of the research initiative which NIE would carry on.

Originally funded through the U.S. Office of Education (OE) and later transferred to the National Institute of Education (NIE), the Experimental Schools program became operational in December 1970 with an anticipated budget of \$190 million to be expended over a period of eight fiscal years. Approximately 75 percent of the program's expenditures were to be devoted to the support of educational change at the *local level*—the remainder was to go to the evaluation and documentation of the local change efforts. The knowledge gained from systematically studying the linkage of federal aid and local initiatives was to be widely disseminated so that future federal and local efforts could benefit from the ES experience (Budding, 1972).²

During the period from January 1971 through June 1972, the Experimental Schools program held three separate competitions and selected eighteen projects—eight urban and ten rural—for substantial

long-term funding.³ The experiences of five of these eighteen projects are described in chapters 4 through 8. Each is a small school district, but the events associated with its efforts in planning and implementing federally stimulated educational change are not unique. They illustrate well the complexity and diversity of activities that can influence the fate of educational innovations.

The specific experiences of these five school districts occur in the larger context of the Experimental Schools program. This context has three important aspects: (1) the general objectives and methods of the Experimental Schools program; (2) the formal relationships between the ES program and the small school districts; and (3) the relation of the Experimental Schools program to the larger federal bureaucracy of which it was a part.

These five school districts were enmeshed in a complex set of organizational and interorganizational relationships which they understood only partially and which they could seldom influence. What was to be an experiment in educational change in each district was also an experiment in the design and implementation of a new relationship between the federal government and local education agencies. The success of these school districts in planning and implementing change depended not only on what happened at the local level, but also on what was happening at the federal level.

OBJECTIVES AND PROCEDURES OF THE RURAL ES PROGRAM

The inauguration of the rural portion of the Experimental Schools program was made known through an "Announcement of a Competition for Small Rural Schools," sent by the U.S. Office of Education to all school districts in the U.S. having fewer than 2,500 pupils. (Henceforth, this document will be referred to as the "Announcement." It has been reproduced in the Appendix.)

The Announcement emphasized four special features of the program. To be eligible for funding, the school districts would have to indicate a willingness to:

- Design their projects locally, but within some general federal guidelines;
- Seek to bring about changes which affected all schools and

- subject matter areas in the district and hence were "comprehensive" in scope;
- Assume the continuation costs of the project after the federal funds had been phased out in five years; and
- Be intensively studied over the five years of their project.

Let us consider each of these features in some detail.

A Local Plan

This program was not to be another instance of a federal agency persuading school districts to accept a federally endorsed innovation to solve local problems. Rather, it was committed to the proposition that local problems must be solved with local initiative and can be solved by capitalizing on the unique strengths of each community:

... the problem is not that the rural schools are small, but that small schools have not been encouraged and supported to seek quality and improvement in ways specifically appropriate to smallness. (Announcement, p. 1)

In stressing locally generated plans, the program's designers hoped to encourage participation and commitment of the community and to avoid the half-hearted support so often found when change is perceived locally as having been initiated from the outside.

The stress on local initiative resulted in the creation of a series of distinct projects—each specific to the circumstances of the district for which it was planned. But local initiative was, in part, precisely the source of many of the difficulties which these districts faced during the initial year of their projects. In general, because of their limited experience with "comprehensive" change, these districts did not have sufficient expertise to put together the complex project envisioned by the staff of the Experimental Schools program. In attempting to overcome this problem, many of the districts developed tense, if not strained, relations with the federal government.

Comprehensive Change

A comprehensive (rather than piecemeal) approach to educational improvement was stipulated in the Announcement. The purpose of this requirement was to:

... find out whether new educational programs which address all parts of an educational system simultaneously will be more effective than past reform efforts which have focused on only one or several parts of an educational system at a time. (Announcement, p. 1)

The definition of comprehensive change proposed by the Experimental Schools program included:

- (a) A fresh approach to the nature and substance of the total curriculum in light of local needs and goals;
- (b) Reorganization and training of staff to meet particular project goals;
- (c) Innovative use of time, space, and facilities;
- (d) Active community involvement in developing, operating, and evaluating the proposed project;
- (e) An administrative and organizational structure which supports the project and which takes into account local strengths and needs. (Announcement, p. 2)

Although all of the above had to be considered in each rural ES project, the requirement was not necessarily intended to replace totally everything being done with something new; it did mean that "... what is going on in each of these areas should be related to, consistent with, and supportive of all of the other areas" (Announcement, p. 2).

Those school districts interested in planning and implementing a project of this extent were requested to submit a Letter of Interest to the U.S. Office of Education. Of the more than 7,000 eligible rural school districts, 316 responded.

Five-Year Terminal Funding

The amount of funding to be provided for a period of five years appears to have been a powerful incentive to attract school districts to enter the competition:

No fixed amount of money is projected for each small rural Experimental Schools site; each project will be awarded supplemental funds based on its unique needs. It is anticipated, however, that no Experimental Schools grant will exceed 15 percent of the annual operating costs of the system(s) involved. (Announcement, p. 4)

The funds were authorized only to help the districts *transform*

their educational programs. They could not be employed to subsidize activities previously underway or to pay for routine capital improvements and operating costs. At the end of the five-year period, each district was expected to be doing markedly different things educationally, but at either the same per-pupil costs that existed prior to the advent of its Experimental Schools project, or at an increased level which could be realistically borne by the school district itself. After June 1977, each district would assume all continuation costs.

In order to facilitate such long-range planning on the part of participating school districts, the Experimental Schools program intended to make long-term commitments to each district:

The intent was . . . to provide a measure of security to the districts from the usual annual refunding cycle. It was felt that reducing the refunding uncertainties . . . would enable districts to make greater commitments to the changes they were proposing. (Rose, 1976)

Since there was no authority for making five-year commitments to school districts that would be "legally binding" on the federal government, officials of the Experimental Schools program intended to make commitments that would be "morally binding." Although local school officials were continually skeptical of the ability of the ES program to honor its long-term commitment, the funding pattern which emerged (a one-year planning grant along with a three-year contract for project implementation, followed by a one-year extension for the transition from federal to local funding) clearly represented a major advance over the series of one-year awards typical of the federal government at that time.

Participation in a Research Endeavor

The Announcement also attached great importance to the need for the documentation and evaluation of the ES program.

The Experimental Schools program, through this competition, is making available the opportunity for a limited number of rural school systems to test new ideas for educational improvement which are developed in and for a small rural school setting. Since the number of projects that can be funded is limited, and since what can be learned from them may be valuable for many small school districts, it is important to have these efforts thoroughly documented and evaluated. (p. 1)

To achieve this objective, each school district was expected to design and implement "formative evaluation" procedures which could collect data about project effectiveness to be used by project decision makers.

In addition, the Experimental Schools program held a competition to select an independent organization to conduct educational research on the rural portion of the Experimental Schools program. In June 1972 Abt Associates Inc., an applied social science research firm in Cambridge, Mass., was awarded a long-term contract to design and implement an educational research project sensitive to the multiple objectives of the Experimental Schools program. The research approach of Abt Associates called for the study of these school districts through a combination of full-time participant observation within each district, periodic testing of students, and a series of interviews and other forms of questioning of students, administrators, and other community residents.

RELATIONSHIP OF ES/WASHINGTON TO LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICTS

In the spring of 1972, each of the ten small rural school districts began a five-year relationship with the Experimental Schools program in Washington, D.C. (ES/Washington), which established three time periods—selection, planning, and implementation.

The Selection Period (March 15-June 30, 1972)

For most of these school districts, the initial contact with ES/Washington began with the receipt of the Announcement in late March 1972. (In two instances, a district had responded to an announcement sent out during the previous March, but had been eliminated from the competition on the grounds that the district had too few students to qualify.) The Announcement called for the submission of a fifteen-page Letter of Interest by April 15th.

In the Letter of Interest, ES/Washington was seeking information about the readiness of the school districts to undertake a process of planned comprehensive change. It was also acknowledging that small rural school districts were not likely to have the ability to write formal proposals on short notice. "The intent of first requiring letters of interest and then paying for the development of a plan was to

increase the equity of the competition and reduce the costs to those who were not selected" (Rose, 1976).

The Letter was to address a series of topics. Of particular interest to ES/Washington were the responses of the applicant districts to the following instructions:

- Describe your current educational program stating present educational purpose and goals, the nature of the curriculum, and the present organization to accomplish stated purpose and goals.
- List and describe what you feel to be the most important strengths and resources available to your school district which would be most helpful in developing an improved educational program. Please rank them in order of importance.
- List and describe briefly what you feel to be the most significant weaknesses of your current educational program, ranking them in importance.
- Describe how you would change and improve your educational program, utilizing the strengths and resources you have identified in attempting to overcome your weaknesses. (Announcement, p. 7)

The Letters of Interest prepared by each of the ten selected districts provided considerable insight into their readiness for change. Each Letter addressed the topics listed above, yet each was unique in style and flavor. All letters sounded a common tone of frustration with the quality of education which these school districts were able to offer. In broadest terms, their problem was a series of interrelated "lacks"—lack of money, lack of trained personnel, lack of variety, lack of alternatives. Most of the school districts looked upon their human resources—people in the community and in the administration, the teachers and pupils—as their greatest strengths. Their common theme for change was clearly one of individualizing instruction and making it more responsive to pupil needs.

In many respects, the strengths of the school districts were also reported to be their weaknesses. Although the students, teachers, staff, and community were seen as resources, the same groups were also frequently identified as needing to be motivated, retrained, and more involved. The rural character of the districts was as often referred to as a strength (providing closeness to nature and to other people and an opportunity for wholesome activities) as it was called a weakness (resulting in isolation, stagnation, low funding, and a poor self-image). The change to which the districts committed themselves by applying for funding was welcomed and aggressively looked

for; at the same time, their Letters emphasized the importance of their traditional values, close family relationships, and stable populations.

The Letters of Interest were written hurriedly, no doubt because of the four-week deadline for their submission. They were also written for an explicit purpose—to respond to the perceived priorities of ES/Washington in order to obtain badly needed additional funding.

The Letters prepared by the applicant school districts were subjected to a complex, multistage review by the Experimental Schools program. Each letter was read and rated by at least two ES/Washington staff members. In addition, five external panels, each consisting of approximately ten members, were convened on a regional basis to review and rate overlapping samples of the Letters. From the resulting ratings, twenty-five “finalists” were selected and their Letters subjected to further review and rating by a committee of thirteen consultants who assembled for two days in Washington. Based upon the committee’s recommendation, three-member teams visited thirteen applicant school districts to obtain first-hand knowledge considered helpful in the site selection process.

Two groups of school districts were eventually selected for participation in the small schools project. Six districts were awarded one-year grants in order to plan a five-year project of comprehensive educational change, with a federal “moral commitment” that they would subsequently be funded for four additional years. Their planning grants included funds to begin project implementation on a pilot basis. Six other districts received one-year planning grants, but with the understanding that long-term funding would be conditional upon the results of their planning process. They were not awarded any funds for pilot implementation. Three of the five school districts considered in this volume (Jackson County, Arcadia, and Shiloh County) originally received long-term commitments; two (River District and Butte-Angels Camp) received only the one-year planning grants. Subsequently, all five were funded for the full five-year time period.

The Planning Period (July 1, 1972-June 30, 1973)

At the time the planning grants were accepted, the administrators of the ten rural ES school districts were not aware of the active role which ES/Washington staff members would play during the plan-

ning period of these projects. Within the National Institute of Education, the substantial grants to those school districts for the planning year and the virtual promise of large multiyear funding seemed to suggest that the federal government must exercise a responsibility to ensure successful launching of the projects. Over time, ES/Washington developed a concern that its survival as a federal program depended upon the ability of these school districts to produce plans which would reflect well upon its capabilities. Given the limited planning expertise which existed in most of these districts at the time they were awarded their planning grants (and the increasing vulnerability of ES/Washington within NIE), ES/Washington gradually became the "senior partner" in the local planning process.

The expectations of ES/Washington for the performance of these school districts during the planning period were communicated to them in several ways:

- A formal Grant Document was prepared by the contracts office of the U.S. Office of Education in June 1972 and subsequently accepted by the Board of Education within each ES district. The document made explicit the number of dollars available to the district during the planning year and discussed more generally the purposes for which those dollars could be spent.
- Appended to the Grant Document was a set of Guidelines for the preparation of a Formal Project Plan.
- A federal monitor (hereafter referred to as the ES/Washington project officer) was assigned to oversee the grant relationship between the federal government and each ES school district. Monitoring took a variety of forms and occurred through visits of school district staff members to Washington, periodic telephone calls, and letters and memoranda.

Although what was communicated by various ES/Washington staff members to their counterparts in the ES districts frequently varied, eight types of general expectations were applied to all ten districts:

Production of an acceptable Formal Project Plan. In order to remain eligible for long-term funding, each school district was expected to produce by June 1973 a Formal Project Plan acceptable to

the federal government. According to the Grant Document, the plan was to be no more than 100 pages in length. Although organized in a manner specified by the Guidelines, it was to be a *local statement* of comprehensive goals for the school district and of the procedures and resources necessary for the accomplishment of those goals over a four-year period. After the Formal Project Plan was judged acceptable, ES/Washington intended to contract with each school district for the implementation of the proposed changes spelled out in its plan.

Critical re-examination of assumptions in Letters of Interest. In the preparation of their Formal Project Plans, the districts were encouraged not to feel locked into assumptions or proposals made in their Letters of Interest. During site visits to at least six of the ten school districts (made in August 1972), an ES/Washington project officer informed school district administrators of ES/Washington's awareness that a certain amount of "grantmanship" (telling the "feds" what one believes they want to hear) went into many of the Letters of Interest. It was acknowledged that this was understandable behavior, necessary at the time to compete successfully for selection. The project officer emphasized that "the competition is over." The job now faced by these districts was to "think boldly about a brighter future for your community and its school system." The emphasis was upon starting the planning process "from scratch, if necessary," to produce a Formal Project Plan which "both you and the federal government can live with for four years" and an educational program which "the citizens of your community will want to continue on their own after the federal funds have been phased out."⁴ Although most districts were initially taken aback by such candor, all welcomed the autonomy it seemed to imply.

Broad participation of affected groups. There was a strong expectation on the part of ES/Washington (stated in the Announcement, reiterated in the Grant Document and Guidelines, and emphasized in telephone calls, correspondence, and site visits) that in identifying possible project goals (and in selecting among them) the leaders of the planning process must obtain broad participation from teachers, students, parents, and other citizens. In the course of their monitoring during the planning year, ES/Washington project officers generally encouraged the formation of formal advisory bodies with representatives from each of these groups. In no district, however,

did such a body function actively during the entire life of its project.

Prior approval by ES/Washington of budget and staff. ES/Washington was required by federal funding regulations to exercise scrutiny over expenditures and staff appointments. The Grant Document specified that all professional staff being considered for major roles in the project be "acceptable to the federal government" and that all anticipated expenditures for equipment of over \$200 receive prior approval. Although ES/Washington staff members considered such scrutiny to be a "routine requirement" for any funding relationship between the federal government and local school districts, its intensity was a novel experience for these small rural school districts and became a source of considerable tension between several of them and the federal government.

An iterative process of plan review and revision. ES/Washington staff members generally viewed themselves as partners with local officials in an iterative project planning process (Rose, 1976). The major product of this partnership was expected to be the Formal Project Plan called for by the Grant Document. The Guidelines specified the submission of a preliminary draft by December 15, 1972, and a final version by April 15, 1973. Although a similar process had been employed previously by the Experimental Schools program in connection with its urban projects, none of these small school districts was prepared for the extended process of review and revision which necessitated in some cases as many as four draft and continued well beyond the intended deadline. In the course of these deliberations, the respective rights and responsibilities of the federal government and of the various school districts often became a major issue. Quite frequently, federal officials questioned the willingness of local officials to engage in systematic planning, and local officials questioned the federal government's willingness to permit them to design and implement their own projects (Corwin, 1977).

A commitment to comprehensive change. The Announcement, the Grant Document, and the Guidelines all made explicit the expectation of ES/Washington that each of the school districts would produce a plan for *comprehensive* educational change. Although ES/Washington never prepared a detailed written explication of the concept of comprehensiveness, its staff members generally led the rural ES school districts to understand that to be comprehensive a project must:

- Involve all public schools within a community;
- Involve the total student population at all twelve grade levels;
- Involve all relevant subject matter areas;
- Involve a concern for: (1) *curriculum*, (2) *staff development*, (3) *community involvement*, (4) *organization, administration, and governance*, and (5) *use of time, space, and facilities*; and
- Be organized around a central theme.

Perhaps no aspect of the original design of the Experimental Schools program proved as difficult for these small rural school districts to implement as that of comprehensive change.

Formative evaluation of project progress. The Formal Project Plan of each of the ES school districts was expected to include a component concerned with the formative evaluation of project progress. ES/Washington expected that this component would, over time, help decision making within the ES school district become systematic, with judgments about the success of the other project components being made on the basis of relevant data objectively interpreted and fed back into the operational decision making of the project. The planning and implementation of the formative evaluation component, however, also proved to be particularly difficult for these school districts.

Contracting for plan implementation. While the funds for the planning year had been awarded as *grants* to the school districts, ES/Washington was required by NIE to *contract* with the school districts for the implementation of the Formal Project Plans. The budget levels were to be negotiated between the NIE contracts office and the local ES project leaders. As in any contract, both parties would bind themselves to "perform": ES/Washington to pay out funds at agreed levels and at agreed times, and the school districts to produce comprehensive educational change that had been locally planned and described in detail in the Formal Project Plans.

In June 1973, ES/Washington offered contracts to all six of the school districts which had been given long-term "moral commitments" the previous June and to four of the six districts which had been given conditional commitments. The two districts which were not offered contracts had been judged by ES/Washington staff members and their consultants as unsuccessful in preparing a Formal Project Plan conforming to the expectations of the Experimental School program.

The Implementation Period (July 1, 1973-June 30, 1976)

Although six of the ten school districts selected for long-term funding had been encouraged to begin pilot implementation activities during the planning year, and although some formal planning continued in all districts after the signing of the contracts with NIE, the three-year period from July 1, 1973, through June 30, 1976, was expected to be devoted primarily to implementation of the plans developed during the initial year. It was to be followed by a one- or two-year period phasing out all ES funding.

ES/Washington's expectations for the implementation period were communicated principally through the negotiation and subsequent signing of the contracts. Discussions of long-term funding began in January 1973 with the review of drafts of Formal Project Plans submitted during the planning period; for most of the school districts, talks continued well into the summer of 1973.

The typical contract document was approximately ten pages long. The formal expectations of ES/Washington were spelled out through a series of sixteen "special provisions," the most important of which incorporated the Formal Project Plan of each school district into a "scope of work" statement calling for the implementation of that plan. A series of "deliverables" was also called for, consisting of a final revision of the Formal Project Plan, a series of Quarterly Progress Reports, a series of Quarterly Financial Reports, and an Interim Project Report.

In August 1975, the Interim Project Report was redefined by ES/Washington to be the Contract Extension Document for each project. A first draft was to be submitted to ES/Washington on December 15, 1975, reviewed by the ES/Washington project officer prior to January 25, 1976, and then resubmitted in final form by February 27, 1976. All ten of the school districts submitted such a document and were subsequently funded for either one or two additional years.⁵

THE ES PROGRAM IN THE LARGER FEDERAL CONTEXT

The life of the Experimental Schools program at the Washington level was by no means untroubled. Almost from its inception, ES/Washington underwent a series of ups and downs within the larger federal bureaucracy; the pressures and constraints operating on

it were, however, not generally understood by the administrative leadership of the local school districts.

ES/Washington may have appeared to local officials to be acting in sometimes arbitrary, inconsistent, or even random ways, but its actions were often due to its relationship to the federal bureaucracy of which it was a part. This bureaucracy consisted primarily of the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) and two of its subordinate units, the Office of Education (OE) and the National Institute of Education (NIE). The history of the Experimental Schools program within the federal bureaucracy from December 1970 through June 1976 includes three time periods: (1) the early history of ES (while it was located in OE); (2) the early implementation period in NIE; and (3) the later implementation period in NIE.

History of the ES Program Within OE (December 1970-June 1972)

January 6, 1971 marks the beginning of the ES program's formal efforts to bring about change in schools of the United States,⁶ for it is when the first competition to select school districts for participation in the Experimental Schools program was announced. Dr. Sidney Marland had been appointed Commissioner of Education only two weeks earlier.

The ES idea did not, of course, spring full blown from a single individual. For about two years, ES had been talked about in the executive branch; plans for its implementation had been expressed by many prominent officials: President Nixon; Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the President's Special Assistant for Domestic Affairs; Robert Finch, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; and Robert Westheimer, Chairman of the Panel on Educational Research and Development of the President's Science Advisory Committee. The multitude of sponsors, however, did not signify a solid consensus for a single programmatic thrust. Rather, it reflected the fact that the ES idea meant different things to different people; that even before it had properly been started, the program had become a part of various power struggles, within the executive branch, within HEW, and within OE itself.

Nevertheless, Commissioner Marland took up the ES cause vigorously, it being one of the few new ideas available for implementation at that time. He appointed a young professor of educational administration at Harvard University as Director of the Experimental

Schools program. The program got underway with an allocation of \$12 million from Fiscal Year 1971 funds, available through the Cooperative Research Act (Public Law 91-380).

The announcement of the first competition seeking "Comprehensive Combinations of Promising Practice" was sent to 20,000 school districts and other educational organizations; 486 Letters of Interest were received and reviewed. In February 1971, two-month planning grants of \$10,000 were made to eight large urban school districts. Subsequently, three of these districts (Berkeley, California; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Pierce County, Washington) were chosen as ES sites in April 1971, and awarded 30-month grants for the implementation of the plans which they had prepared during March.

A second competition was announced on March 31, 1971, resulting in four-month planning grants of approximately \$35,000 each to eleven organizations, three of which subsequently received long-term grants (Edgewood Independent School District, San Antonio, Texas; School District of Greenville County, South Carolina; and the National Urban League, New York, New York).

In the winter of 1972, a concern developed within ES/Washington that the previous competitions had discriminated against small rural school districts—both because of the lower limit of 2,500 pupils imposed on those competitions and the necessity to prepare a sophisticated response rapidly. Therefore, a third competition, exclusively for small rural schools, was announced in March 1972. While the competitions were being designed, Letters of Interest reviewed, and selections made, the Experimental Schools program was located in the Office of Education. Planning was underway for its transfer to a new organization, the National Institute of Education, authorized by Congress in the spring of 1972.⁷

The Early Implementation Period of NIE
(July 1972-November 1974)

Although the decision to include the ES program within the new National Institute of Education had been made much earlier, its official transfer from OE did not take place until August 1972. At that time, ES became one of five major programmatic thrusts within NIE.

ES/Washington staff members rather quickly became aware that NIE would be a less congenial environment than the Office of Educa-

tion in which to administer their program. The leaders of NIE were skeptical of ES and other "inherited programs." They had wanted an extended period to plan and implement a new form of educational research before being held accountable for specific results. Required by HEW to assume ES and other ongoing programs, the new agency felt liable for the problems (and possible lack of success) of those programs, thus drastically reducing its "honeymoon period" as a new agency. NIE's Fiscal Year 1973 budget of \$110 million, authorized by the Congress in October 1972, was much lower than NIE desired, as were to be the FY 1974 budget of \$75 million and the FY 1975 budget of \$70 million. The continuation costs of the inherited programs (only \$25.6 million of the \$190 million originally anticipated for the ES program, for example, had been appropriated prior to the move into NIE) were quickly recognized by key NIE officials as a major threat to the ability of NIE to locate funding for its new initiatives (Sproull et al., 1978).

Later, concern arose about the specific methods of the ES program. Although ES had been inaugurated as a "bridge between educational research and actual practice" (a goal very much in harmony with that of NIE), the way in which that bridge was being built seemed to the leaders of NIE to include the expenditure of too many dollars at the local level. There was a strong sense within NIE that the mix of ES funds, of \$3 for subsidization of practice at the local level for every \$1 to support research on that practice, gave NIE too little research leverage for its large number of highly visible ES dollars. ES also brought into NIE a group of project officers who, to NIE leaders, seemed committed primarily to the facilitation of practice, rather than to research on practice. Thus, during the period in which ES/Washington was working with small rural school districts in the development of their multiyear plans, the basic assumptions of its approach to educational change were under repeated attack within its parent organization.

The first formal review of the ES program by NIE officials took place during November 1972. It led to a decision to hold no further ES competitions. Then, at the request of the Director of NIE, the Director of ES appointed an External Review Panel to evaluate the objectives and methods of all agencies receiving funds from the ES program—both school districts and research organizations. Panelists were organized into teams having responsibility for various local

projects and their associated independent research contractors. Their conclusions in February 1973 were mixed, but basically supportive of the evaluation effort. Shortly thereafter, an independent review was undertaken by the staff of the General Accounting Office (GAO) as part of its responsibilities to the Congress (Comptroller General of the United States, 1976). A draft report circulated in the spring of 1973 was highly critical of the performance of one of the research contractors to the Experimental Schools program and embarrassed NIE in its interactions with congressional appropriations committees considering the FY 1974 budget.

During the spring of 1973, considerable discussion occurred within NIE regarding the management of the ES program: whether the Director of ES had had the authority in 1972 to make the "moral commitments" of long-term funding which had been given to the rural districts during the site-selection period; whether the commitments applied to all twelve rural districts or to just six of them; whether any future legal commitments should be in the form of a *grant* (as was the case for the planning year) or as a *contract* (which would give NIE greater control over the expenditure of funds); and whether the legal commitment should be for the full five-year period originally planned or for a shorter period. Late that spring, a decision was made to reaffirm the five-year moral commitment to the ten small rural school districts that had demonstrated a willingness to continue their relationship with ES/Washington. But, despite the aspiration of ES/Washington when it was located in OE to award *four-year grants* to each of the rural school districts at the end of their planning year, within NIE it was able to authorize only *three-year contracts*.⁸

Although the details of the problems associated with the transition from OE to NIE were never formally communicated to school officials in the ten rural ES districts, many administrators picked up bits and pieces through various personal contacts and the more generalized professional network. During the winter and spring of 1973, ES project leaders in all districts wondered about the apparent inability of ES/Washington project officers to return telephone calls, answer correspondence, and review draft documents promptly. What they did not generally understand was that these project officers were often preoccupied with ensuring that this new program survive the transition from OE into NIE.

The ongoing tension between the leadership of the ES program and of NIE came to a head in the fall of 1974. At that time, NIE had just emerged from its second consecutive year of unfavorable funding action by Congress (Sproull et al., 1978). Both its proposed FY 1974 budget and a supplemental request had been poorly received. Its proposed FY 1975 budget of \$130 million was first cut by the House to \$80 million and then further by the Senate to *zero*. The budget of \$70 million which emerged from the Senate-House Conference Committee in November 1974 was viewed as inadequate by NIE officials to bear both the heavy continuation costs of the inherited programs and to provide for launching the new programs which NIE had been planning during the previous two years and which Congress, through its budget actions, seemed to be faulting NIE for not having already underway.

The NIE leaders put renewed pressure on the ES program to reevaluate its obligations to the eighteen existing local projects (and to the seven independent research organizations studying them) and see if resources committed to the ES program could be reassigned to the new initiatives planned within NIE which could not be implemented at the reduced budget level.

The Director of ES attempted to resist these new pressures as he had the previous ones. But external support for the ES program in its competition with other inherited programs for the limited resources had weakened greatly during the summer and fall of 1974 (Sproull et al., 1978). On December 6, 1974, the Director of ES was abruptly relieved of his responsibilities by the Acting Director of NIE and subsequently reassigned to a staff position in the Office of Education.

The Later Implementation Period in NIE (December 1974-June 1976)

At the time of the reassignment of the first Director of ES, the program included eleven additional staff members, several of whom were assigned only part time to ES/Washington: there was a Director of Programs responsible for monitoring the eighteen local project sites, with seven project officers working under him; there was also a Director of Evaluation responsible for monitoring the seven evaluation contractors and two project officers working under him.

The Director of Evaluation was appointed to serve as Acting Director of ES. The Acting Director could claim as his major exper-

tise the design and implementation of program *evaluations*, having also been an evaluation officer for five years with the Office of Economic Opportunity. But he could claim little expertise in the design or implementation of the programs themselves and readily acknowledged his lack of first-hand knowledge about public schooling. He exhibited little reticence to take an active stance toward the seven evaluation contractors to the ES program, but was unwilling to adopt the highly active stance of his predecessor toward the eighteen local project sites, a stance he had repeatedly questioned as Director of Evaluation. During this period, the posture of ES/Washington towards the rural school districts shifted from one of frequent advice and technical assistance to one of primarily monitoring to ensure compliance with contractual requirements (Corwin, 1977).

Shortly after the first Director of ES departed, the Acting Director of NIE acted promptly to assert his authority over the ES program and to make it responsive to the agency's new exigencies. An Experimental Schools Review Committee consisting of ten NIE staff members who were not affiliated with ES was appointed and held its first meeting on December 13, 1974, one week after the reassignment of the first Director. The Acting Director of ES was asked to prepare a "Mission Statement" for review by his immediate superior, who revised and forwarded it to the Review Committee on December 23rd. During January 1975, briefing materials were prepared by ES staff members for the Committee. On January 28th, a letter was sent to the superintendents of schools in the ES project districts informing them of the NIE review of the Experimental Schools program. During February, site visits were made to all eight urban sites and to four of the ten rural sites. Reports were prepared by each site visit team and forwarded to a Steering Subcommittee of the full Committee. The Steering Subcommittee met several times during March and prepared a draft report, which, after review and revision by the full Committee, was forwarded to the Director of NIE on March 28, 1975.

One of the major issues addressed by the ES Review Committee was whether the ES program should remain intact as an entity within NIE or have its various contracts assigned to other operating units (Doyle, 1975). The staff of the ES program argued strongly for the former, on the grounds that their ability to deal consistently with the various school districts required the continuation of a single program

office. Although their preference prevailed and the program held together, the ES program was subsequently assigned to a subordinate status within one of its formerly co-equal NIE programs. The eight staff members who had left the ES program during this period of great internal tension were not replaced. In November 1975, the Acting Director of ES requested and was granted reassignment as the project officer for several of the evaluation and local contracts.

By December 1975, the Experimental Schools program was largely a shell of its earlier self. The morale of the remaining staff members recruited by the first Director of ES seemed to have been badly shaken by his reassignment and the events of internal review and reorganization which followed it. The life blood of the relationship between the project officers and the ten small school districts had been the travel funds available for periodic visits to the sites. During this period, these funds were severely constrained by overall cuts within the federal government and by more specific cuts within NIE. At the time of the submission of the Contract Extension Document (February 1976), most project officers lacked both the funds to visit their project sites to verify first-hand the status of the projects and the ability to monitor the projects in other ways. In contrast to earlier periods, ES/Washington was far less interested in what was taking place in these small school districts. In April and May of 1976, contract renewals of either one or two years were offered to all ten of the rural school districts; thus all commitments for long-term funding made to these districts by ES/Washington staff members were honored. Since these contracts were the final ones to be awarded by the ES program to local school districts, they culminated an expenditure for the entire program (eighteen sites plus seven evaluation contractors) of only \$55 million of the \$190 million originally envisioned for this innovative federal endeavor.

CONCLUSIONS

The experiences of the five school districts to be presented in chapters 4 through 8 can best be understood when viewed within two important contexts: that of the Experimental Schools program itself and of the superordinate agencies of the federal government to which it was responsible.

With only a limited understanding of what was forthcoming, the

five school districts agreed to become "partners" with a fledgling federal agency (ES/Washington) in attempting to implement not only their own projects of local change, but also a new form of federal-local relationship. The essential elements of this complex federal agenda were:

- Federal facilitation of change at the local level in order to gain research knowledge on the process of planned change;

- An emphasis on a comprehensive approach to local educational change, as distinct from the more traditional piecemeal approach of past federal programs;

- A long-term commitment of federal funding as a necessary condition for expecting local school districts to attempt comprehensive changes, which they would then continue with local funds;

- An emphasis on federal facilitation of local aspirations, rather than local adoption of federal plans;

- An emphasis on rational planning at the local level, guided by input from a systematic process of formative evaluation, as distinct from the more ad hoc planning processes characteristic of most past change efforts; and

- An emphasis on broad-based participation in the planning and implementation of change.

NOTES

1. For a more extended discussion of the history of federal aid to local education, see Bailey and Mosher (1968, chapter 1); Berke and Kirst (1972, chapter 1); Campbell et al. (1965, chapter 2); and Kirst (1973).

2. See Doyle et al. (1976, pp. 27-42) for a more extensive discussion of the creation and early history of the Experimental Schools program.

3. See Doyle et al. (1976), Institute for Scientific Analysis (1976), and Reynolds (1976) for the final reports of the studies of the three projects selected during the first competition.

4. These quotations have been taken from personal notes made by the author during visits to six of the school districts in August 1972 with the ES/Washington project officer for those sites.

5. The distinction between funding for a one- or two-year phase-out period was unrelated to the quality of the Contract Extension Document. It was made simply to honor what came to be accepted within NIE as a "moral commitment" to four school districts for five years of funding *after* the decision to accept them as ES projects.

6. See Doyle et al. (1976, pp. 27-29) for a more extended discussion of the early history of the Experimental Schools program.

7. See Sproull et al. (1978) for a detailed discussion of the creation and early history of the National Institute of Education.

8. Some of the difficulty in mounting innovative programs at the federal level which are appreciated at the local level is highlighted in chapter 4; there the adverse reaction of school officials in River District to the three-year contract is described. Traditionally, federal agencies have had the authority to commit funds to local school districts for no more than twelve months. Although ES leaders never realized their aspiration to gain the authority to commit funds for the full duration of each ES project, they considered gaining the authority for three-year commitments to be a major victory. Such an accomplishment apparently meant very little to the school officials in River District who had been expecting a legal commitment at the end of their planning year of funds for the full five years of their project and felt betrayed when this turned out not to be the case.

REFERENCES

- Bailey, Stephen K., and Mosher, Edith K. *ESEA: The Office of Education Administers a Law*. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1968.
- Berke, Joel, and Kirst, Michael. *Federal Aid to Education: Who Benefits? Who Governs?* Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1972.
- Budding, David. *Draft Discussion Paper on Experimental Schools*. Washington, D.C.: Experimental Schools Program, 1972. (Original carries no title, author, or date. Facts of publication established in conversation with the author.)
- Campbell, Roald F.; Cunningham, Luvern L.; and McPhee, Roderick F. *The Organization and Control of American Schools*. Columbus, Ohio: C. E. Merrill, 1965.
- Comptroller General of the United States. *Report to the Congress: Experimental Schools Program—Opportunities to Improve the Management of an Educational Research Program*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976.
- Corwin, Ronald G. *Patterns of Federal-Local Relationships in Education: A Case Study of the Rural Experimental Schools Program*. Cambridge, Mass.: Abt Associates Inc., 1977.
- Doyle, Denis P. *Final Report of the ESP Review Committee*. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Education, 1975.
- Doyle, Wayne, et al. *The Birth, Nurturance and Transformation of an Educational Reform*. Portland, Oregon: Northwest Regional Educational Laboratory, 1976.
- Institute for Scientific Analysis. *Educational R&D and the Case of Berkeley's Experimental Schools* (Vols. I and II). San Francisco: Institute for Scientific Analysis, 1976.

- Kirst, Michael W. "The Growth of Federal Influence in Education." *The Uses of the Sociology of Education*, edited by C. Wayne Gordon. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973.
- National Institute of Education. *NIE: Its History and Programs*. Washington, D.C.: NIE, 1974.
- Reynolds, Larry J., et al. *Implementing Alternative Schools: Lessons from the Minneapolis Experience*. Minneapolis: Educational Services Group, 1976.
- Rose, Barbara E. Letter to Robert E. Herriott (September 27, 1976).
- Sproull, Lee; Weiner, Stephen; and Wolf, David. *Organizing an Anarchy: Belief, Bureaucracy and Politics in the National Institute of Education*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978.
- Sufrin, Sidney C. *Administering the National Defense Education Act*. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1963.
- Summerfield, Harry. *Power and Process: The Formulation and Limits of Federal Educational Policy*. Berkeley, Calif.: McCutchan, 1974.
- Timpane, P. Michael. "Federal Aid to Schools: Its Limited Future." *Law and Contemporary Problems* 38 (Winter/Spring 1974): 493-512.

River District: A Search for Unity Amidst Diversity

Donald A. Messerschmidt

River Unified School District*—first settled by railroaders and coal miners, famous for cattle and sheep ranching, beef and wool production, big geographically, small in population, isolated from the mainstream of urban America—is a land at once austere and beautiful. Spring County, of which it is a part, is a wide open land of “far horizons,” of “tranquil largeness, prodigal, remote . . .,” as a local poet has put it (Clough, 1954, p. 56). This is a land of contrasts, of challenge, of tradition and conservatism, and of change.

The Experimental Schools (ES) project came to River District in June 1972. Coming in the midst of great change, it brought changes of its own. The school district, a union of five formerly autonomous rural districts each comprising distinct and independent communities, had only been formed in January. Unification challenged the strongly held value of local control and had been resisted for three years. Once accepted, however, local school officials turned their energies toward effecting a strong and lasting unity of diverse and disparate communities and educational interests. School adminis-

*Throughout this book all persons and places associated with the Experimental Schools program and its rural projects have been given pseudonyms.

trators and the board of nine trustees perceived the ES project at the start as a potential help in smoothing the administrative transition and in cementing patron support for the reorganized educational system.

These developments were accompanied by regional social and economic changes as well. A resurgence in the local coal mining industry and growth in uranium mining, coupled with expansion of lumbering, tourism, and recreation, were creating a boom-like atmosphere in River District which contrasted markedly with recession in other parts of America. The influx of hundreds of new miners and their families suddenly raised the demand for housing, utilities, social services, and new and larger schools. These socioeconomic developments also brought new patron concerns, an enlarged tax base, and a growing miner constituency to what was a predominantly ranching area. Their effects had to be faced in school system planning.

Economic growth and school system consolidation provided local educators with numerous opportunities for innovation. ES project funds, in conjunction with local planning activities, were viewed as a possible answer to local needs—as a catalyst for unity and a forum for change.

Much of the energy for implementing the ES project in this district was expended at the administrative level, and administrators had much more influence on the project's outcome than any of their subordinate staff in the schools and classrooms. Hence special consideration is given in this narrative to administrative culture, planning, and action as they influenced ES project implementation efforts, and to certain aspects of community-school and federal-local interaction.

OBJECTIVES OF THE LOCAL ES PROJECT

Experimental Schools project planning and implementation in River District reflected locally perceived educational needs and both internal and external constraints and difficulties. The Formal Project Plan of 1973 lists five goals:

1. *Career education:* To provide additional educational opportunities for students in order that they might discover and develop interests, attitudes, abilities, and aptitudes which will fulfill future occupational requirements and responsibilities.

2. *Special services:* To provide special services so that each student might better understand and adjust himself to the physical, social, and psychological world in which he lives.

3. *Cultural education:* To provide for greater exposure to cultural experiences for each student and the community.

4. *Curriculum evaluation and coordination:* To implement an ongoing evaluation tool that will give direction, meaning, and coordination to all phases of the curriculum.

5. *Community involvement:* To provide for more effective community participation in the schools.

The first of these goals, career education, was given priority, while the fourth, to the degree that it espoused curriculum coordination, was virtually ignored. The second, special services, came to mean guidance counseling almost exclusively, while the third and the fifth, cultural education and community involvement, were redefined and redirected over time. Each goal was to be evaluated in light of the five facets of comprehensive change listed by ES/Washington in the original announcement, namely, curriculum, staffing, instructional materials, organization and administration, and community involvement. But in River District, the various goals and facets were not given equal weight or importance.

The project's goals reflected four outstanding local concerns: (1) the deficiencies of rural education in terms of practical career preparation for youth, (2) the contingencies of isolated rural and small town life resulting in limited exposure to the fine arts, (3) a locally perceived need for greater articulation between the communities and their schools, and (4) an initial desire to unify, or at least coordinate, the consolidated district's educational and administrative operations.

The style of project planning and implementation also reflected the contemporary contingencies wrought by local socioeconomic growth. Considerable effort was expended in the beginning to draw members of the district's three major constituencies—miners, ranchers, and townspeople—into the planning process and to meet the needs of a majority of students. By the end of the first year of implementation (1973-74), however, the goals of involving the citizenry and of coordinating programs had been modified and redefined as idealism concerning the nature of the new district wore off and as

more pragmatic and immediate objectives emerged. A large measure of trial and error characterized the ES project which, in retrospect, seems to have been a necessary aid to district officials trying to draw the diverse and decentralized school units of River District together.

Aside from these internal factors, the history of the project reveals a degree of conflict over the issue of federal control. The relationship between the "locals" and the "feds" reflects the cultural distance between a western, rural school system and an eastern urban bureaucracy. Together, in a partnership of sorts, they set out to effect the not very well defined goal of comprehensive educational change. Differences in understanding and in operational style, however, created a dynamic and occasionally disruptive tension between them. There was never a complete convergence between local and ES/Washington understanding of the overall concept of ES. Considerable differences existed on the issue of general aid for comprehensive educational change. An appreciation of those differences must begin with the history of River District and its educational system.

THE COMMUNITY SETTING

Formal public education in Spring County began in 1869. By 1883 there were eleven rural and town schools, widely scattered and uniformly small. The number peaked at thirty-five at the turn of the century, then fluctuated somewhat and leveled off at twenty-six districts during the 1930s. It was reduced to eight through many consolidations in the 1950s and 1960s. These consolidations were frequently volatile social issues, as they contradicted what an early observer has characterized as a "cherished . . . illusion of 'local control.'"

In 1969 the state legislature passed a mandatory school reorganization law which set in motion the final drive toward reducing the total number of districts in the county to two. River District in the eastern half of the county and its counterpart in the west, Mesa District, began formal operations in 1972. That was also the year that River District applied to be an ES project site.

Four distinguishing features of River District had a bearing on its ES project:

1. Its immense size, approximately 4,300 square miles, which is comparable to the size of the state of Connecticut.

2. Its sparse, widely scattered, but fast-growing population. In 1970 there was less than one person per square mile, but by 1976 the population had grown to nearly 1.5 per square mile, or to an estimated 6,000 persons, with expectations of its doubling by 1978 in response to mining industry growth.

3. The variety of its physical environment and related economic base. Mining in the north of the district has become the dominant local industry. Ranching, historically dominant and geographically expansive, is second in importance. Lumbering, tourism, and recreation in the south, and small service industries and town businesses throughout the district, are growing, the latter especially as they serve the mining boom. One service industry of great and growing economic importance is, of course, the school system itself.

4. The number and widely scattered nature of schools. The district has twelve schools: eight elementary (grades kindergarten through six), and four junior-senior high schools (grades seven through twelve). There are eight designated attendance centers (i.e., eight places with one or more school facilities) located in seven of the district's nine towns and on one isolated ranch.

For convenience, the district may be divided into two regions, north and south. They are differentiated in terms of geography, economics, and population.

The northern sector of the district has six towns (Union, Finn, Wister, Rim, Cow Creek, and Marathon), all of which are directly affected by the energy resource development industry (coal, uranium, and oil). While almost all of them were founded specifically in response to the development of mining and railroading (as early as the 1860s), almost all are affected to varying degrees by the expansion of the ranching industry as well. This northern region encompasses three of the five former autonomous school districts and provides the district with the bulk of its tax base and the majority of its population.

The southern sector of the school district encompasses two former school districts and three towns (Spring Creek, Copperton, and Dunker). It is a predominantly riverine ranching and farming region, although Copperton was once a bustling copper mining town. Spring Creek is the largest and most cosmopolitan of the three settlements and is a major ranching service center and residential town. By comparison, Copperton and Dunker are much smaller and quite paro-

chial. Both Spring Creek and Copperton have an elementary and junior-senior high school.

THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

School district unification and its accompanying administrative reorganization involved a continuing process of readjustment and reformulation of system goals and organizational ideals and structure, spread over several years after 1972. No schools were closed and no bus routes were changed as a direct result of unification. Rather, reorganization in this instance was administrative and involved the creation of some new jobs and the modification of others. Administrative centralization was the initial thrust in this process, although, as we shall see, decentralization of certain administrative responsibilities later became an important issue.

The first steps in administrative centralization were achieved after a district-wide school trustee election early in January 1972, an election which involved a large and widely representative slate of candidates. The central office at Spring Creek was established, a superintendent and an assistant superintendent were appointed, four administrative area principalships were designed, and an administrative council was created to coordinate district-wide operations.

Internal Organization

The board of trustees is comprised of nine members, two representatives from each of four trustee election areas, and one elected at large. The board's jurisdiction is policy making, but trustees also take an active interest in district administration generally. They are typically hard-working people, meeting frequently in regular and special sessions, devoting long hours, and thoroughly discussing major issues (such as the ES project) in an attempt to achieve consensus. They have considerable say in district affairs, but there has been no evidence of factionalism or politicking. Board members generally view each other as peers. Since 1972 the majority of members have been ranchers, and a few townspeople, but no miners. Nonetheless, board members feel that they represent all segments and constituencies within the district.

The school board has exercised considerable power through its policy decisions, but the tone for the entire school district is set by the administrators, especially by the superintendent and the assistant

superintendent, whom the trustees appoint. The two former independent superintendents of Spring Creek and Union area schools were appointed as the new district's first superintendent and assistant superintendent, respectively. They occupied the top of the organizational pyramid.

The new superintendent became the direct and primary formal link between the school board on the one hand and the outlying administrative area principals, and school staffs on the other. His duties included serving as chief executive officer, advisor and counselor to the board, fiscal officer, and general overseer of staff, classroom operations, patron-school interactions, and school plant maintenance.

The assistant superintendent was made directly responsible to the superintendent and through him to the board. He has had considerable input in decision making and in the supervision of district operations, and has appeared to be more of a cosuperintendent than a subordinate. His primary responsibilities were designated as personnel and curriculum and included the direct supervision of all federal programs in which the district might become involved. In keeping with the latter responsibility, the initial assistant superintendent was designated to oversee ES project planning in 1972. When he left the district in October 1972, he was replaced by a temporary planning director, but it was not until July 1973 that a new assistant superintendent and a full-time ES project director were employed.

The superintendent and assistant superintendent serve as the organizational representatives of the local school district to outside persons and agencies, such as local public authorities, nearby universities and colleges of education, and state and federal officials. They also served as the organization's formal representatives to ES/Washington and its officials.

Four administrative principals were appointed, serving immediately below the superintendents in the organizational pyramid. They replaced the independent superintendents of the former districts of Union, Wister, Spring Creek, and Copperton. Marathon, the fifth former district, has not shared equivalent status, but has been administered instead by a head teacher responsible directly to the superintendents at Spring Creek, a political stratagem designed to allow Marathon a modicum of the independence it previously enjoyed as an autonomous district.

The four administrative principals and the Marathon head

teacher were assigned to supervise the instructional programs, plant operations and maintenance, pupil transportation, hot lunch programs, local school budgets (the superintendent oversees district-wide budgeting), employees, and record keeping of all the schools in their respective administrative areas. In addition, each administrative principal also became an elementary school principal, and the administrator at Copperton, the second smallest of the former districts, became principal of the high school as well.

Three high school principals were placed immediately subordinate to the administrative principals at Union, Wister, and Spring Creek. Each was a full-time administrator with no teaching duties.

Teachers and other professional personnel, such as librarians, guidance counselors, and speech pathologists who have sometimes shared time between schools, completed the organizational scheme. Three classroom teachers were appointed head teachers to assist the administrative principals in the outlying schools at Cow Creek and Rim and at the Copperton elementary school, but with a minimum of administrative responsibilities.

At the beginning of the 1975-76 school year, there were 123 teachers and other nonadministrative certified personnel, plus nine administrators, for a total of 132 certified personnel employed by the school district. The number of teachers in any one faculty group ranged from one at a remote one-room ranch school to twenty-one, excluding the principal, at the Spring Creek junior-senior high school. The district enrollment was 1,428 students, grades one through twelve.

The administrative council became in 1972 a key organizational unit within the district. Its members interacted closely with both the teaching staff and the trustees in the operational scheme of the district. Between 1972 and 1976 council membership fluctuated, but always included the superintendents and administrative principals. The Marathon head teacher, ES project director, and instructional materials center director frequently participated in it, and the high school principals and elementary head teachers were invited on occasion. Biweekly council meetings were rotated throughout the district.

The council has provided a forum to air concerns which have district-wide significance. On the one hand, the council has planned and coordinated interschool activities and has been a link between the central office and the individual schools. On the other hand, it

has served as an advisory panel to the school board; policy and procedures are discussed and proposals are framed by the council for consideration by the trustees. In public meetings the superintendent and assistant superintendent have acted as intermediaries between the council and the school board. School board directives on policy and operations are passed downward through them to the council for discussion and implementation. Council proposals and recommendations are passed upward, in turn, through the superintendents to the trustees. Most proposals originating in the administrative council have appeared to be readily adopted by the trustees in public forum, with little controversy and only occasional slight changes. The school board has exercised far more authority in district policy and operational decisions than this might imply, however, and proposals have not usually been sent to them which they, as a body, would likely reject. In practice, controversial issues are settled or modified through informal means, well away from public view and well in advance of formal school board meetings. This has given the trustees and the administrators a public image of consensus and unity of purpose. Consequently, on the surface at least, there have appeared to be few problems in the administration and operation of River District.

In summary, the administrative principals and the superintendents, independently and as a council, have served as brokers and gatekeepers, both within the district and between the district and the outside. By communicating and controlling information and interpreting ideas, they have either encouraged or stifled innovation and change. As such, they have played a key role in the implementation of the ES project, and it is on their performance that this study is focused.

Relationships with External Agents of Change

Prior to unification and the almost simultaneous application to ES/Washington in 1972, the school districts in Spring County had been involved to varying degrees with externally induced innovation through participation in federal ESEA (Elementary and Secondary Education Act) and NDEA (National Defense Education Act) entitlement programs. Their experiences with these programs have had important bearing on the application, planning, and implementation processes, and on the final outcome of the River District ES project.

The federal aid which came to Spring County schools in the middle and late 1960s followed an important period in the state's history in which school districts were prohibited by law from receiving certain federal matching funds for education. The state legislature had imposed the ban in 1961, reportedly out of resentment over the long-term trend toward greater concentration of power in the nation's capital. This feeling was part of a more pervasive concern over latent forms of economic and bureaucratic "colonialism" by which the state's economy and government were locally perceived as undesirably subordinated to an eastern establishment. When the ban on aid-to-education was lifted in 1965, superintendents across the state exercised their grantsmanship abilities to secure millions of federal dollars in support of local school system projects. In what became River District, the superintendents of the Union and Spring Creek districts led all others in the procurement of federal aid dollars. In 1972 it was these two formerly autonomous superintendents who were appointed as the new superintendent and the first assistant superintendent of the unified district. They were primarily responsible for River District's successful application to ES/Washington.

One of the most important of the ESEA entitlement projects in Spring County schools during the late 1960s and early 1970s was one which led to the development of the county-wide educational media center. This project was supported by ESEA Title III funds and was shared jointly by several of the county's then autonomous school districts. When federal support for it was phased out, financial responsibility for the center's continuation was assumed jointly by the districts involved, including the former Spring Creek district. In 1973 the media center was permanently moved to Spring Creek town from Mesa District. The center is one of the few federally funded projects in Spring County which was maintained by local initiative beyond the period of federal support. As such, it serves as a model of good management based on felt need, strong local interest, and adequate financial support. It came to play an important part in curriculum development generally and in the implementation of the River District ES project in particular.

Simultaneously with local ES planning in 1972-73, the media center, in conjunction with the Spring Creek junior high school, became recipients of a joint federal-regional experimental educational television (ETV) satellite project. A major component of the ETV

project was career education programming for classroom use. This gave strong impetus to planning the ES career education component already identified as a priority goal.

In addition to these outside granting sources, regional colleges and universities and the state Department of Education had been utilized for years to assist small local projects. One nearby community college, for example, had helped with adult education, and the state university had made the resources of its music, theater, and art departments available for occasional local programming. During ES project implementation, these resources and others were again called upon in support of cultural and community educational goals.

FIRST CONTACT WITH ES/WASHINGTON

In mid-March 1972, approximately two months after River District was unified, the Announcement about the Experimental Schools competition for small schools arrived at the superintendent's office. The ES concept was extremely attractive to district administrators. It came at an opportune time and seemed to fit local needs. An assessment of the new district's educational needs had just begun, and ES was perceived as a vehicle through which further needs assessment, planning, and implementation of a unified new educational program could be achieved. The project's longitudinal scope, financial incentive, and explicit encouragement of innovation and change might help focus and enhance the overall unification process, as would active citizen involvement, a stated objective of the overall Experimental Schools program. The project's experimental nature, its origins outside of the district, and assurances of "no strings," as locals put it, seemed to allow a certain detachment and flexibility for trying out new ideas without threatening cherished traditions or local authority structures. The administrative outlook was, in short, one of conservative optimism.

On the other hand, the school board expressed pessimism and doubt about the proposed project. The board's attitude reflected the state's long-term distrust of federal involvement in local affairs. Federal programs always had strings or hidden aspects, they felt, and agreements made with one bureaucrat were subject to renegotiation when he or she was inevitably replaced. There was considerable discussion and debate about the ES project's possible effects and its

probable impacts, but when it came to voting to allow the superintendents to proceed with application, the trustees voted seven to one (one absent) in favor.

The assistant superintendent was given the primary responsibility for preparing the required Letter of Interest. That Letter, dated April 9, 1972, was an impressive document, clear in style, candid in discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the new district, and honest in appraising the need for change. It expressed the district's willingness to spend some of its own resources on innovative projects in educational change, and it stressed community involvement in planning and a philosophy of flexibility and individualized instruction. School officials later noted that it was "well written, well received, and extensively used as an overall guide" to planning. The final paragraph of the Letter of Interest summed up the school district's goals and desires for change in 1972:

In summary, we would like to develop . . . an educational program based on individual and local need, interest, and initiative and yet with district-wide impetus, planning, coordination, fiscal control, and evaluation. We would want a program which fully uses local community resources to meet locally defined needs and yet when possible without duplication of effort and facilities among the various communities. Our program would be one that would meet the needs and interests of all children, youth, and adults and would use time, facilities, resources, and talents of people effectively and efficiently. The program would be based on flexibility, change, and growth as a result of continuing evaluation of the needs and interests of children, youth, and adults and the effectiveness of the program. We are convinced that [River District] is a unique situation with the necessary prerequisites where the development of quality education for all can be obtained through planning, effort, and funding, and this within a quality environment.

THE PLANNING PERIOD

On June 29, 1972, a telegram arrived from ES/Washington announcing a one-year planning grant of \$46,500 which would allow River District to develop the ideas described in the Letter of Interest. River District was one of the six "conditional" districts and was told only that there was a "strong possibility" of further funding as an ES site in 1973. In July the superintendents and one trustee flew to Washington to meet with ES officials to discuss the research, evaluation, and documentation components of the project. At that meeting the idea of comprehensive change and the process of preparing and

writing a project plan were discussed in detail. School officials returned home quite euphoric about the prospects of the ES project, as is evident in the following comment written by the superintendent:

We were pleasantly surprised to find that there are no guidelines and that *in this project we will be able to do what we want to do, not what someone else thinks we should do*. The only restrictions are that proposed programs be comprehensive and are within the ability of the district to finance if successful, when the federal support is phased out . . . (emphasis added).

The administrators quickly designed a detailed strategy to meet the December 15 deadline for the first draft of the plan and the February 15 deadline for the final draft. The school board immediately authorized the assistant superintendent to be the planning director and appointed a local teacher to assist him as a full-time "documentor" of all project-related activities. At the same time, the board urged the administrative principals to begin working with community groups to promote the project. In August an ES/Washington project officer and a consultant visited the school districts. They suggested seeking help for needs assessment from the state university, using "town meetings" and informal "coffees" as ways of encouraging citizen involvement, and forming immediately an ES project advisory committee of local citizens.

The proposed advisory committee would guide, structure, and eventually focus the district-wide planning process, then serve as an advisory body for the remainder of the life of the project. Some administrators favored this ES/Washington proposal, but the school board was opposed. Several trustees had had bad experiences with citizen committees in the past and others disliked formal citizen involvement in educational planning on principle. The board was working to operationalize the newly unified district and felt that for the moment, at least, the interests and responsibilities of such a committee would overlap its own. The issue was debated, then shelved for several months.

Similarly the board opposed university involvement in the project. Although initial contacts with university people were made and their interest solicited, a long-term contract with university educators was never formalized. Latent apprehension about involving outsiders of this type in local assessment processes seems to underly the three reasons overtly stated: (1) that the cost was too high relative to

anticipated returns; (2) that graduate students might come, whose main interests would be data for dissertations rather than local needs; and (3) that it was logistically unsound for the consultants to commute the 200 miles round-trip over potentially hazardous mountain roads.

Meanwhile, however, a variety of other methods were employed to involve the local citizenry in planning. At town meetings and coffees, school officials introduced the ES project concept to interested audiences. They discussed the need for citizen ideas and help, recorded scores of suggestions, and fielded questions about both the project and recent unification. The ES project was also discussed in student council meetings, during school visitations, on radio programs, in newspaper articles and letters, and through more personal contacts. By one account, over 500 people were contacted in more than seventy-six meetings during the planning year.

These concerted efforts served to unify community interests in a common objective and resulted in considerable citizen input in the needs assessment process. In November the planning director summarized these efforts to the school board. The list of suggestions received was divided into "New Programs," "Improvements in Programs," and "Services," and included such items as vocational and on-the-job training, recreation, environmental and cultural programs, mental health and guidance, sex education, school nurses, adult education, individualized instruction, improved programming in sports and athletics, and special education including speech and reading therapy. Because of the vastness of the school district and the cost of duplicating curricular efforts in the widely separated schools, mobile units were contemplated as ways of delivering curriculum programs such as specialized occupational training (e.g., welding, plumbing, and electricity laboratories). Some suggestions reflected the concerns of a particular constituency. The mining townspeople of the north expressed a strong interest in vocational programs, while the more cosmopolitan residents of Spring Creek expressed more academic concerns.

Five of the suggestions were eventually chosen as ES project goals—vocational or career education, as it came to be called, cultural education, community involvement, special services, and curriculum evaluation and coordination. Of the five, career education took precedence.

The April 1972 Letter of Interest had identified career education as one of the greatest needs in the new school district:

The curriculum in the schools . . . at this time is generally an academic one and based on traditional concepts and organization. There are some attempts to develop occupational programs geared to the needs of students and the availability of work within the communities. The most notable of these [is] a welding program developed . . . in conjunction with the mining companies . . .

The administrators who wrote this statement did not mention the traditional vocational-technical courses already available at Spring Creek High School, the standard and limited array of business, home economics, and shop courses at Wister-Rim High School, or the popular "vo-ag" (vocational-agriculture) courses at Copperton High School. Despite the number of vocational education courses district-wide, many educators and parents were concerned about their quality and practicality, and about shortcomings of the overall curriculum which the new district had inherited. They questioned whether the existing curriculum was sufficiently functional to meet the practical career and occupational needs of a majority of students. They felt that the district was overemphasizing the traditional academic curriculum which steered pupils toward college. In 1971, of sixty-one students graduating from the four high schools, thirty-six enrolled in two- or four-year colleges; only a fraction were expected to graduate. It was widely felt that the public school system had become unresponsive to the many students who probably would not earn a college degree and would sooner or later enter the blue-collar labor market. These feelings blended with the growing national interest in practical career education at the time.

Documents summarizing community input listed vocational education as "the no. 1 new program suggested," as the "most often mentioned," and as having been "emphasized in all meetings." It was not simply additional vocational programming per se, but a demand for changes in the type, priority, and organization of vocational curricula that was being expressed. And an underlying theme in local planning documents was the need to develop a "concentrated district-wide effort" as the Letter of Interest originally put it (i.e., unified curricular planning which might link all schools together as a whole).

During the last quarter of 1972 and the first part of 1973, sev-

eral difficulties, both internal and external, arose to bar effective and efficient planning in River District. One source of internal difficulty was the decision to form an advisory committee.

As early as August, the possibility of organizing a committee of local citizens to assist in ES planning was discussed, but a decision was postponed by school board members seemingly reluctant to dilute their own responsibilities. And, as one member put it, "We'd had trouble with citizen committees before." He wanted to avoid more trouble now. But by November 1972 the necessity for a formal ES project advisory committee was more evident. The time had come to focus on specific objectives for the project and to prepare a draft plan for submission to ES/Washington by December 15. This task required a unified committee approach reflecting active citizen involvement. The issue was reintroduced to the board and early in December its members voted to allow an advisory committee to be organized. By then, the focus of planning had become sufficiently narrowed so that it did not seem as likely as it did earlier that the advisory committee would duplicate the responsibilities of the school board.

The new advisory committee was comprised of three representatives, two citizens and one teacher, from each of the district's five administrative areas. Its members were charged with two overall tasks. The first was "to be actively involved in the development of the project from beginning to end," and the second was to act as "contact sources" in each community "so that all community people might keep informed as to the progress of the project." Its major accomplishments over the following three months were the sifting and weighing of all the suggestions for ES, selecting and defining the five goals which were eventually chosen, and writing the plan.

Early committee meetings were run in an egalitarian manner, in an attempt to encourage full participation by all members. In this respect, committee members, like the school board trustees and the administrators, perceived themselves as a body of peers. In a short time, however, it was apparent to the ES planning director and to committee members alike that a formally elected leader was needed who could exercise authority to focus planning and to speed the process of writing the final document. A lay chairman, a man from Spring Creek, was elected.

Residents of Spring Creek and vicinity soon dominated the

planning process (as well as the committee's role in implementation of the project after it was funded in 1973). Most members of the committee came from Spring Creek and Copperton—the temporary planning director and his replacement, the lay chairman, the most vocal and aggressive committee members who were assigned to prepare key sections of the plan, and those members who stayed with the committee the longest, until its dissolution in 1974. Likewise, the school board and the central administration were controlled by persons who maintained their residences and offices in the southern sector of the school district, a fact which led to allegations of Spring Creek predominance in district affairs.

A second major source of internal trouble was the departure of the initial assistant superintendent who had taken on responsibilities for ES planning. He took a leave of absence for personal reasons in October 1972 and formally resigned in January 1973. By local assessment, his leaving resulted in a temporary loss of momentum in planning at a "most crucial time." His temporary replacement was the administrative principal of Spring Creek schools (who was in turn replaced, in the interim, by the local high school principal). Not until July 1973 was a permanent ES project director appointed and a new assistant superintendent employed.

There were also two interrelated sources of external difficulties. The first began during the winter of 1972-73, and the second surfaced the following summer. Both involved ES/Washington staff members.

In November 1972 a new ES/Washington project officer was assigned to monitor the River District project. She took a more active and direct interest than her predecessor and in early December visited the site for a first-hand look at local affairs. At that time she and the local administrators discussed a project theme which emphasized individualized instruction. Following her departure, however, local planners formulated a different theme, one more reflective of immediate operational concerns. It allowed for the development of "an educational program based on local need, interest, and initiative yet with district-wide direction and impetus in planning, coordination, fiscal control, and evaluation."

The ES/Washington project officer's immediate response to their changes was negative, and in a subsequent letter she explained that, as the central theme stood, it was "a statement of method of

coordination rather than a statement of focus for the development of an educational program." It did not indicate goals for planning specific programs and its implications for comprehensive change were unclear.

From the local perspective a thematic "statement of coordination" was both timely and responsive to local sentiments about unity amidst diversity. But under pressure from ES/Washington, the advisory committee agreed to a compromise theme which gave primacy to neither "unity" nor to "individualized instruction." As presented in the project plan, it read: "The development of a community-involved educational program that emphasizes a future-oriented learning environment for each student and his individual needs." What bothered local officials more than the wording of this one-sentence theme was the underlying issue of federal versus local control. Having to do "what someone else thinks we should do" was becoming a central concern.

By now local officials began to realize that the ES/Washington staff was going to have considerably more say about the content of the project plan than they had anticipated. During December and January several queries to the project officer about content and procedures for the plan went unanswered, and local frustrations began to mount. Finally, in late January, as the plan submission deadline was approaching, River District requested more time. At first the request was refused, but shortly ES/Washington extended the deadline for all rural sites from February 15 to March 30. That deadline was met by the submission of a 78-page plan accompanied by a five-year budget of \$596,000.

In early April the project officer called from Washington to say that a team of special ES consultants would be arriving in the district *the following morning* at 8:30 a.m. to conduct a final on-site evaluation of the proposed project. She asked that meetings with a wide range of district personnel be scheduled. Local administrators were astonished at the timing of her request, but they did their best to comply. The consultants met with the few administrators, teachers, and trustees who could be contacted and brought together on short notice in such an extensive school district.

The consultants' verbal evaluation was complimentary to the site and the plan. They indicated that the district would hear within the week concerning project approval. Furthermore, they were

understood by local officials to say that final negotiations in Washington would be "on objectives and details, not on dollar amounts," implying that the proposed budget was reasonable and would probably not be challenged or significantly changed. A few days later the ES/Washington program director wrote to announce the award of full five-year funding and to congratulate the district on a fine job of planning. He mentioned that the budget might be "scaled down" a bit, and in a subsequent phone call he reportedly mentioned a budget reduction figure of 4 percent. Negotiations now appeared to be perfunctory; steps toward full project implementation could begin.

Local optimism was premature; it was now that the second external difficulty began. What barriers the district had surmounted to finish planning were minor compared with what lay ahead. Misunderstandings, tensions, conflicts, and frustrations came to plague subsequent negotiations and the final preparations for implementation. Serious and unexpected difficulties arose between the "locals" and the "feds" which took precedence over all else and which adversely affected subsequent project events.

In May 1973 the superintendent, the temporary planning director, and the incoming new assistant superintendent flew to Washington to negotiate the formal ES project contract. They went with the understanding that their plan and budget were essentially acceptable to the ES/Washington staff, that any changes would be small, and that they were negotiating a contract for the full five-year period called for by their plan. They were quite unprepared for what happened.

In Washington ES officials informed them that they were being offered a contract for \$361,351 for *three* years instead of the expected \$596,000 for five years and that the two final years of funding would be contingent on renegotiations in 1976. Furthermore, they were told that their plan was inadequate and that major portions of it required rewriting.

The local officials apparently misunderstood government negotiation and funding procedures and had not been sufficiently informed by ES officials about what to expect, for they seemed genuinely surprised and perplexed by the turn of events. What was apparently standard procedure in Washington—negotiating a project in two parts, 60 percent funding for the first three years and the remaining 40 percent later—was interpreted locally as an unwarranted

cut of 40 percent overall. Their low level of trust toward ES/Washington at the time contributed to their suspicion that this arrangement meant that ES officials were backing away from earlier verbal assurances about easy negotiations and full funding.

The River District schoolmen returned from Washington with none of the euphoria with which they had earlier begun the planning year. Back in the district, they expressed the belief that they had been misled, that their budget had been arbitrarily cut, that the formal criticism of the plan had been unnecessarily severe, and that ES/Washington directives on how to improve the plan were vague. The whole tone of the Washington meeting bothered them. They felt that it was dominated by the bureaucrats and that they themselves, as the ultimately responsible party, had little to say in the final decisions. And although they were told that two more years (and the remaining 40 percent) funding would be considered in 1976, they remained apprehensive and cynical about any further negotiations with Washington.

A question they asked many times in the next months was how they were expected to implement the project under such unexpected conditions. They never received a satisfactory answer. "Confusion" is how they later categorized the difficulties which began in May 1973 and which continued over the summer and well into the first full year of implementation.

ES/Washington staff members identified two major problem areas in the district's plan. One dealt with administration of the project and the other with staff workshops. It was the district's intent, as defined in the plan, to employ a full-time ES project director to be adjunct and subordinate to the assistant superintendent. Under the facet of "organization and administration," the plan stated that the director "will report directly to the assistant superintendent and will work cooperatively with the administrative principals." More specifically, his tasks involved general administrative supervision of the project, including budgeting, reporting, establishing cooperative efforts among staff, planning inservice training, and maintaining community involvement. Then, after three years, or by the end of the 1975-76 school year, the duties of the director were to be incorporated fully into the duties of the assistant superintendent.

The director's role, responsibilities, and authority relationships fit within an organizational and administrative structure which had

coalesced during the year of intensive reorganization following unification. The assistant superintendent retained ultimate authority over the ES project, assisted by the project director. The superintendent was left virtually free of project affairs to devote his full attention to other district operations.

These administrative arrangements were unacceptable to ES/Washington. The project officer told the district that the proposed authority structure did not reflect requisite changes in administrative organization and would have to be modified. Only the superintendent himself could be the "project director," she said, and project leadership could not be separated from the primary leadership of the district as a whole.

Such change in the organization of the school district, however, was unacceptable to the school officials. Administrators and trustees alike resented this outside advice, which appeared to totally disregard district administrative policy and established lines of authority. So, despite the controversy, a project director and a community education coordinator were hired to work under him. Given numerous constraints on the time and energies of the superintendents that summer, constraints which the "locals" felt the "feds" did not appreciate or understand, an ES director and coordinator were considered essential additions to the staff if the necessary groundwork for project implementation in the fall of 1973 were to be completed in time for the start of classes. The director was immediately assigned the task of making final preparations for two scheduled ES summer staff workshops. Meanwhile, the controversy over his role was unresolved and would emerge again later.

The two staff workshops, one in career education and one in cultural education, were the second problem identified by the ES/Washington project officer. These workshops were given high priority in the district. They were to involve the largest number of teachers and administrators possible and were designed to formally orient them to ES project goals and classroom implementation strategies. Outside resource persons had been contacted and had committed their time and expertise to the district. The workshops would give the ES project in River District its kickoff.

ES/Washington staff, however, had serious reservations about them. They had gone over the workshop plans, found them wanting, and announced that requisite funding for the workshops would not

be allocated until better plans were prepared. The new assistant superintendent spent an entire weekend in July reworking them, but the ES/Washington project officer still refused to accept them, and the workshops were cancelled.

When advised by the district personnel that failure to hold the career education workshop in particular would likely weaken the initial implementation efforts, the project officer suggested rescheduling it for early in the school year. The superintendents declared that unfeasible, for given the length of time the workshop required to be effectual and the need for a majority of teachers to be present, district schools would have to be closed. Instead, the career workshop was postponed for an entire year until the summer of 1974.

In August the debate with ES/Washington over project administration resurfaced. This time the overall program director of the Experimental Schools program, the man to whom the project officer was accountable, entered the controversy. From his Washington office he telephoned several of the River District trustees (school board members) to discuss the matter of project leadership. The trustees interpreted this approach as a deliberate attempt to alienate the board from the administration and to circumvent normal decision making procedures in the district. They refused to talk privately with him and invited him instead to come to Spring Creek to attend the next public school board meeting. There the issue could be publicly debated and, if necessary, a proper vote taken. He accepted their invitation and came on August 7 and 8. Both public and private discussions were held, on the basis of which the superintendents felt that the issue was finally going to be resolved in the district's favor. But although they understood that the position of project director could remain subordinate to the assistant superintendent as planned, the ES/Washington program director informed them by telephone a few days later that that was not his understanding. A terse and sometimes tense debate was carried on by telephone off and on during the rest of the month, but the issue was never formally resolved. Instead, a sudden reassignment of the ES/Washington project officer monitoring River District was announced from Washington in early September. With that change, the district entered a very different, and ultimately much better, working relationship with the federal agency, as actual implementation of the project in the schools and classrooms was about to begin.

THE IMPLEMENTATION EFFORT

The confusing events of the summer of 1973, which led to workshop cancellation, the angry debate with Washington staff, and the appointment of a new ES/Washington project officer, also led to visible anxiety in the district over the future of the project. If the project was going to succeed at all, it was felt, new strategies would have to be formulated on site. The new ES/Washington project officer made her first visit on September 17 to attend the regular school board meeting. She put aside the conflicting issues of the immediate past and announced that she was determined to establish a new and better working relationship between the district and the federal agency.

Center stage was then given to the immediate problem of project implementation without adequate staff preparation. Administrators and trustees talked at length about various contingency strategies; and although they did not eliminate any components of the project, they did agree informally (i.e., by consensus without voting) to commit the district to career education as the "no. 1 priority." They said that they were determined to avoid a "shotgun approach" and that the district should only pursue those immediate goals which had reasonable chances of success. To that end, it was decided to formally implement career education only in the elementary grades during the first year, and to endorse it for implementation in the junior-senior high schools during the following year, 1974-75, concomitant with the start of the career education project involving experimental satellite-based ETV.

Cultural education was also encouraged for implementation to the degree that the citizens' advisory committee members, ES project staff, school administrators, and teachers could comfortably incorporate it into their schedules. The cultural education component was primarily conceived of as expanding the fine arts curriculum and increasing the amount of "cultural exposure" available to students and residents by bringing professional performers and artists to the district. It was not considered necessary to hire a full-time cultural coordinator; rather, the community education coordinator was assigned to oversee and help administer the program.

Community participation was intended to encourage citizens to engage in meaningful dialogue with school officials. This goal had

already been realized in part during the planning phase. Now it was to be further implemented by focusing on community education (i.e., the opening up of public school facilities to meet local social needs) and by offering a variety of special interest classes for all interested persons, young and old.

The special services component had been adequately implemented over the summer by placement of full-time guidance counselors in three of the four administrative areas and by the employment of special speech and hearing teachers. Guidance counselors, like classroom teachers, were perceived to be directly responsible only to their school principals, and the ES project director was not allowed to exercise authority over them. Their roles, however, were defined to include the active endorsement of career education at all grade levels, one through twelve, and they were likewise expected to assist the director in carrying out administrative and research operations integral to the project.

Finally, curriculum evaluation and coordination were considered to be ongoing processes under the direct supervision of the assistant superintendent. For the moment, at least, they would be given little formal attention in the context of the ES project.

The First Year: 1973-74

Actual implementation started out, then, with the ES project director and coordinator responsible for only three of the five components: career education, cultural education, and community involvement. Progress toward meeting these goals during the first year of implementation was recorded primarily in terms of the number of new programs developed in the schools and communities of the district. But, as we shall see, the nature of leadership also came to play a significant part in the acceptance of the project and in its long-range "success." So did the amount of financial and temporal investment required of the district and the administrators. A few administrative principals, high school principals, and even head teachers, viewed the ES project almost from the start of its implementation as an extra and sometimes annoying responsibility. With generally little input into planning it and without the pre-implementation workshops to encourage them, their interest in and understanding of ES was modest at best.

During the first year several small career workshops were con-

ducted for individual school faculties, which, although ostensibly coordinated and directed by the ES project director from his office in Spring Creek, owed much of their success to local staff planning and to their tightly focused formats. Some teachers considered them useful for enhancing skills and learning new ideas for "doing" career education in the classroom. They were not unlike the small workshops which the formerly independent districts had conducted in the past; they had local commitment and local flavor. However, some administrative principals took exception to what they perceived to be overzealous behavior on the part of the ES project director, and it wasn't long before the director had alienated several administrators. Thereafter, working relationships in the project between outlying school administrators and the central office were further strained.

By March 1974 nine major events intended to provide "cultural exposure" had been sponsored in the district, including song, dance, and instrumental performances and the appearance of guest artists and poets in the classrooms. This component found strong support from the media center director, who had supportive material in the center at her disposal, and from a small nucleus of interested patrons and teachers, many of whom were from Spring Creek.

The community-education aspect of citizen participation met with the greatest success. It had high citizen involvement, low financial investment by the district, distinctive leadership, and a large number of adult classes. This was the only component headed by a full-time coordinator; but given constraints on his time and the logistics of the district, he could introduce community education only to Spring Creek and Copperton at first, followed later in the year at Union. He was a young, energetic man who set about with vigor to organize classes such as photography, art, recreation, upholstery, and surveying. They were taught by volunteers and were well attended. Community education was enthusiastically received by the administrators, too, in part because it was virtually cost free, was run by persons other than themselves, and was a boon to public relations.

During the year participation of the citizenry in the River District ES project changed. The advisory committee was split into two parts, one for career education and one for cultural education. Gradually, input from active citizens declined and was replaced by passive participation in evening classes. Administrators and teachers alike felt uncomfortable with lay advice in the actual implementation

process. But the citizen committee system, in addition to its public relations function, served to demonstrate to ES/Washington staff that the mandate to involve the people was being honored (although during one site visit that year the project officer openly questioned its effectiveness). It was retained for its nominal image, if not for any real or active role in the local decision-making process.

Federal-local relationships improved during the year. The project officer who had been monitoring the site since September 1973 was replaced early in 1974 by another official who similarly desired to maintain good rapport. The new project officer monitored the site without interruption until October 1975, a factor which allowed some stability and enhanced good federal-local relations. He had significant effects both on district staff morale and on project implementation, especially in the development of an evaluation component.

Unlike his predecessors this project officer was a westerner, a point in his favor. He was also an experienced educator and could relate easily with River District personnel and educational system affairs. He tended to disassociate himself from the image of an ES/Washington bureaucrat, an image which "confounds rather than complements," he said. He was a gifted story-teller and frequently recounted personal experiences to district staff which emphasized his appreciation for local autonomy and hard work, both highly regarded values in River District. In his dealings at an official level, he was active but unabrasive. He frequently used the term "partnership" when referring to federal-local relationships. His performance fits Gallaher's (1973) model of a "pragmatic advocate" who strives to work *with* rather than to do things *to* and *for* a target population. He was concerned with creating a climate conducive to acceptance through an understanding of the system, parts of which he may have intended to change. As a result, this fourth ES/Washington project officer was respected and admired and was given more credibility and trust locally than any other outsider related to the project.

Credibility and trust were unfortunately not characteristic of relationships between district administrators and the local ES project director. By spring his role had been modified to gradually relieve him of ES responsibilities; and in June 1974, when his contract expired, he was replaced by a second director, the former community education coordinator. The second project director remained at that job until June 1976.

In summary, the first year of implementation began with serious problems and was plagued throughout with many frustrations and internal antagonisms. School officials later characterized the first year in critical terms: early difficulties in funding had resulted in a "loss of momentum," citizen committees met "for no real purpose," teachers were disgruntled, and administrators were alienated from the project director. (More than one teacher remarked on the lack of project leadership, and later the second project director candidly commented that there was "no program" either.) As the school district reported to ES/Washington in 1976: "After nine months of this, administrators, teachers, and patrons were discouraged and in some cases hostile toward the project."

The Second and Third Years: 1974-76

The long awaited ES summer staff workshop, postponed since 1973, gave the project's second year of implementation a better start. It was held during July 1974 in a picturesque mountain setting east of Spring Creek, and it attracted approximately half of the school district's teachers, all of the administrators, and a few school board trustees and patrons. Career and cultural education were the primary foci, and outside experts were featured, including satellite ETV technologists from NASA in Washington, arts and humanities professors from several western universities, advisers from the state Department of Education, and an area industrialist. Out of this workshop came two major additions to the project.

One was a system of awarding \$50 mini-grants to district teachers who designed creative and innovative small projects for classroom or school use. These mini-grants were of two types: (1) those funded out of the ES budget and directly related to the project goals, and (2) those which fell outside of ES project jurisdiction and were funded from the district's regular budget. The mini-grant concept was interpreted locally as an important step toward blending the ES concept more firmly into the overall educational system.

The second change was the expansion of an already existing humanities curriculum at Spring Creek High School and its introduction into the high schools at Union and Wister. It was an outgrowth of a humanities seminar at the workshop which stimulated high school teacher interest in curriculum development stressing art, music, and literature in the classroom. Humanities was not a formal part of the ES project plan, however, and was opposed as a district-

wide program by at least one key administrator. But with the perseverance of the superintendent and the teachers involved, it was soon incorporated into the ES cultural education component. Thereafter it received strong support and visibility; before the year was out, it was being pointed to, even by those who formerly opposed it, as a sure sign of "success" and "progress" in the ES project.

In the fall of 1974, four new local ES staff positions were also added—a part-time project evaluator, a part-time guidance counselor (for Copperton), a community education coordinator for the northern towns, and a district-wide project "facilitator." The two part-time positions were held by one person. All three new employees were brought into the district from outside and were required to live in towns other than Spring Creek in a conscious move by the administration to help defuse complaints of Spring Creek dominance and centrality. In January 1975, however, a new full-time evaluator was assigned to the ES office in Spring Creek in order to allow greater coordination between the project and the central administration of the district.

The new community education coordinator's role was intended to extend the successful program already begun in the southern towns to those in the north. Strong community interest and good organizational abilities gave the new coordinator a good start. In contrast, the person who served as the project "facilitator" experienced serious initial problems. The facilitator, a qualified teacher herself, was expected to serve as an "idea resource" for classroom teachers throughout the school district. She was to help them secure materials and to plan creative implementation of career and cultural curricula. The facilitator's role had its genesis at the 1974 summer workshop, but it was poorly conceived, ambiguously defined, and was ultimately abolished at year's end. The facilitator tried hard, but inherent difficulties defeated her: she was new to the district, hence unknown to the teachers, and her responsibilities fell outside the jurisdiction and control of the principals within whose schools she had to work. Early in the school year, she was also assigned to oversee preparation of the district's 1975 School Annual. That became her major contribution to district affairs, an activity entirely outside of the ES project. The following year she took a teaching position at Union Elementary School, but left the district at the end of the year.

Of the three new roles, the evaluator's was the most important

to the district. It has been called an "emerging strength" of the project. It was inaugurated at the urging of the fourth project officer during the summer of 1974.

Evaluation was not new to River District, but had traditionally involved only the testing of students and the judging of staff performance for tenure decisions. Now, however, district administrators and project personnel were being encouraged to introduce *program* evaluation, a task with which they had little prior experience. The original announcement of the Experimental Schools competition had directed the applicant districts to develop methods for evaluation and documentation "in terms of [their] own purposes and goals," and to incorporate them into the larger school system. It was up to the ES/Washington project officers to interpret what that meant on site and to "assist each selected project in developing an effective local procedure." The fourth project officer was most supportive of the district's trial and error methods of implementing program evaluation.

River District's first program evaluation effort began in the spring of 1974 under subtle pressures from the ES/Washington project officer. The local project director, supervised by the assistant superintendent, prepared and administered a Student Attitude Survey from which, it was hoped, baseline information could be obtained for further planning. The surveys were unscored for several months, and then, because of a lack of knowledge of what to do with the data, they were not interpreted until the following spring.

Meanwhile the part-time evaluator was hired in the summer of 1974. The person selected was not a trained evaluator but a former teacher whom district officials thought they could train. Her duties included documenting staff workshops and assisting the ES project director, and through him the assistant superintendent, in assessing various other components of the project. In a few months, she had collected and filed a large amount of data; but because of her inexperience, bad feelings she engendered among some administrators, and the district's own uncertainties about the utility of evaluation, she was soon replaced. In January 1975 a new and ostensibly more experienced, full-time data consultant was hired.

The title *data consultant* was chosen to formally replace *evaluator* because of local negative attitudes about evaluation. The data consultant had a Ph.D. in cultural anthropology and had previously

been employed in the district for a short time by the outside research team. Major factors that influenced her employment by the district were her immediate availability, her attractive personality, her research experience and competency, her familiarity with the district, and, not the least, her advanced degree. District administrators were quite proud to have a data consultant with a doctorate on their staff, and proceeded to nickname her "Doc."

Some of her immediate responsibilities were to score and interpret the student attitude survey and to comment on the advisability of conducting it again, to assess and interpret various pupil achievement test scores to the administrative council, and to assist the ES project director with staff and community surveys. Her main responsibilities, however, lay with the development of a comprehensive program evaluation plan. Over time she helped the director prepare a general assessment of the project up to 1975 in preparation for writing the final refunding plan for 1976-73. One of her personal objectives was to help district officials understand the potential value of evaluation data in decision making. Her efforts were generally well received, although she acknowledged that performance of her role was often very frustrating, especially when the superintendents and administrators seemed reluctant to take some of her observations and ideas seriously. Nonetheless her role was tacitly supported by most administrators, the trustees, and the ES/Washington project officer, and was made all the more important when the state Department of Education announced that all school districts in the state were to have a formal evaluation plan in operation by the fall of 1976. She stayed with the project until June 1976.

During the second and third years of the project, efforts were made to implement all five of the district's project goals as initially stated or subsequently modified. The scope of career education and of special (guidance) services, for example, was expanded, while cultural education, curriculum evaluation and coordination, and community participation goals were reconsidered and then changed in significant ways.

Career education was formally introduced into the high schools in 1974-75 in conjunction with the one-year ETV career education project. Programs originally broadcast to a satellite receiver at Spring Creek were reproduced by means of videotape and rebroadcast in junior high school classes district-wide. In addition, special broad-

casts on topics of community interest were received one evening each week. The citizens of Spring Creek were invited to view them, but attendance was disappointingly low.

Special services were augmented that year by assigning the new part-time guidance counselor to Copperton. In the following year, 1975, she was replaced by a new employee who served as a counselor there and also provided district-wide psychometric services.

Programs of cultural education continued in 1974-75 much as they had begun earlier, with fine arts performances within the district, and some student travel to cultural events outside the district. But although the "cultural" goal was expanded by further development of the humanities curriculum and some specific additions, such as the formation of a community choral group and the production of an arts festival in Spring Creek, the "cultural exposure" aspect soon began to lose the support of administrators. They clearly favored the more traditional approach of the humanities program, which confined cultural education primarily to the classroom where it was directed by teachers and where it required less budget and administrative involvement. By October 1975 school administrators had decided to discontinue cultural education ostensibly "because of the distance involved in getting programs into the schools." They reported to ES/Washington in 1975 that "the superintendent and school board have decided [that] cultural education will continue to be a district priority" apart from the ES project budget.

The goal of citizen participation also changed significantly during the second and third years of implementation. As community education grew in popularity, the number of classes was increased, and the scope of the program was expanded to the entire district. Community education continued to be considered locally the most "successful" of all project implementation efforts. It had good leadership, favorable public relations, and required only moderate funding. However, the amount of citizen participation devoted to advisory activities and its support by the administration had declined markedly. By the fall of 1974, there were only a few individuals acting in an advisory capacity and they had serious reservations about the usefulness of their efforts. In consequence, their support dwindled, and the committee system was discontinued.

Curriculum evaluation and coordination still lay virtually unattended. Evaluation, to the extent that it achieved high priority in

the project, had been concerned mostly with aspects of the project other than curriculum. The initial goal of "district-wide coordination" of curriculum planning was being reconsidered, in the light of a growing reluctance by the superintendents to exert strong central authority in this area or to "lay the law down" to geographically scattered administrative principals.

Early in 1975, in a project assessment report prepared by the local ES director for the administration, the project was likened to a mosaic fitted with bits and pieces, but with no clearly discernible image. There had been a lot of activity in selected classrooms and schools over the year, and a lot of energy had been expended in the project at the administrative level, but very little coordination of effort, unity of purpose, or district-wide identity with the project was evident.

The fourth ES/Washington project officer made similar observations during a preliminary meeting regarding project refunding the following October. For example, he bluntly categorized a list of sixty-four career education courses (only 4 percent more than were available in 1972 and reputedly representative of progress toward a comprehensive and expanded program of instruction) as nothing more than an elaborate "laundry list" without form or structure. He admonished the superintendents and the local ES project director to reconsider the structure, coordination, and unity of purpose of the project before submitting the final draft of their refunding plan in 1976.

The problems he noted reflected two developments: rapidly declining interest in the ES project by some administrators from outlying attendance areas and difficulties encountered in trying to centralize school district operations. Some centralization had been successfully accomplished as early as 1972, particularly in the areas of budget, personnel, and policy making, but concern for an erosion of any more local control—a long-cherished value in River District—particularly in curriculum programming, persisted among the administrative principals. By 1975 resistance to change was increasingly obvious in the way that district organization in general and the implementation of the ES project in particular were being conducted.

In April 1975 the administrative council faced the issue of subordinate versus central control head-on and voted to formally decentralize control of ES project budgeting and programming throughout the district. Thereafter, full responsibilities for these categories rested

with the administrative principals, and the project director was relegated to being a record keeper. A broader and stronger statement about decentralization, including the category of evaluation, subsequently appeared in the 1975 draft and the 1976 final refunding plan:

... attendance areas are individually developing programs to meet local needs in accordance with project goals and objectives. The administrative principals are taking the primary responsibility for project planning, implementation, and evaluation so that the project is better integrated with [their own] school programs.

Decentralization had great meaning in the context of comprehensive organizational and administrative change, and it was potentially one of the most important actions taken during the three-year implementation period of the ES project in River District.

CONCLUSIONS

Two notions about the possible unifying role of the ES project in River District were implicit in its April 1972 Letter of Interest and in the 1973 Formal Project Plan. One was its potential as a catalyst for unity in a context of a very recent school district consolidation, an immediate need for significant administrative and organizational restructuring, and a concern for patron support and participation. The other was its role as a forum for change, i.e., its timeliness and convenience as a vehicle for the experimentation and educational innovation necessary to effect some sort of unity. Furthermore, during the course of ES project planning and implementation, three distinct issues emerged: federal involvement in local educational affairs, the nature of local project leadership, and the district's overall and continuing commitment to the ES concept. There is no doubt that the project has served well as a forum or vehicle for change. Many new ideas were introduced and tested; some were redefined, and others discarded. They have already been described, and little more needs be said. Rather, these concluding remarks will be restricted to the concept of "unity" and to the themes of federal involvement, leadership, and commitment.

Catalyst for Unity

It is too early to say whether the ES project effected, or at the least encouraged, any sort of lasting unity among the disparate com-

munities and patron interests in River District. Initial and active citizen participation in planning promoted patron unity of a sort, but two subsequent events were counterproductive, and have at least neutralized it. One event was the gradual increase in concern over the loss of local "say" in the educational process in the face of centralization of authority and citizen involvement at Spring Creek, and the other was the devolution of the citizens' advisory committee system after the planning phase was over.

The central administration countered the first of these concerns in 1974 by strategically placing three new ES project employees in towns other than Spring Creek. It handled the second issue, citizen involvement, quite differently. Shortly after the apparent collapse of the committee system, the ES project director assessed both citizen and administrator interest in re-establishing committees to evaluate the project and advise on reformulation of goals for the 1976 refunding proposal. He concluded that citizen interest was, at best, ambivalent, but the interest of the superintendents and administrative principals was overwhelmingly negative. Past experience had shown that, without administrative support, the committee system would likely fail again. The idea was quietly dropped, and the refunding plan was written with minimal citizen input.

The 1976-78 refunding plan presents this change more as a redefinition of citizen involvement than as an outright abrogation of it. It reflects a conversation of October 1975 when the ES/Washington project officer asked, "How are you obtaining community involvement?" The superintendents replied, "Through community education." The district's primary responsibility to patrons was "service," said the assistant superintendent, not active "involvement" or citizen advice or "input."

The role of the ES project in encouraging internal administrative cohesiveness and organizational unity generally, and curricular or programmatic unity in particular, raises other issues. In the context of River District, "unity" should not be confused with "uniformity" or "oneness." What was apparently intended by school district officials and planners from the start, but which was never clearly stated, was the coordination of general educational purposes and procedures, not replication of structures or creation of identical programs.

Each of the five former districts had a long history of independence and autonomy and strong leaders who embodied that

independence and who staunchly defended the value of local control. Each administrative unit had identifiable needs which reflected a particular local context and constituency. And each local administrative leader asserted his unit's independent spirit in ways which at times proved counterproductive to an administrative union symbolized by centralized operations.

The goals of River District's project reflect a general misunderstanding of the type of comprehensive change project which ES/Washington planners originally had in mind. The choice of such components as career education, special services, and cultural exposure, and the way in which they were implemented, reflect the kind of categorical and noncomprehensive change packaging ES/Washington was trying to avoid. Part of the problem lies in trying to implement national goals at a cultural distance from local schools. Misinterpretation of goals is bound to occur.

The overall effects of a project such as LS in River District are difficult to assess because they are invariably beset with problems involving both the initial formulation and subsequent evaluation of goals. One problem in interpreting social policy programs arises because "the less precise the formulation of goals . . . , the more difficult it is to see if the program is achieving its goals" (Denton, 1975).

River District officials did not see the problem as one of fuzzy intentions so much as one of varying definitions and interpretations. "Progress," they wrote in the refunding plan, "is not a concrete phenomenon. The original . . . goals and objectives are subject to different interpretations. Assessments of success may vary according to one's perspective." Most public interpretations on site ranged from "we've done all right" to "we could have done better," but they never went so far as to imply failure, although some suggested considerable discouragement.

Federal Involvement, Leadership, and Commitment

There is no question that the nature of the federal involvement in the local project has had serious repercussions, both negative and positive. Early conflict and confusion during planning and immediately prior to implementation in 1973 have been described by all parties as disruptive and counterproductive, although not all agree on the cause of the trouble. The assignment of project officers who were "pragmatic advocates" to monitor the site from September 1973

through October 1975 had relatively constructive and positive results. Although local officials never quite regained their former level of euphoria over the project, they nonetheless allowed that the fourth project officer who stayed with the district the longest was trustworthy and more of a help than a hindrance.

Just as relations with ES/Washington fluctuated, so did internal relations between project directors and district administrators change over time. By 1976 relations deteriorated to the point that both the role of the director and the continuing commitment of the district to the project were brought into question. During the first two years of implementation, the project director had regularly attended administrative council meetings and had cast his vote on important issues. Early in 1975, however, during a crisis in administrative priorities and project affairs, he was temporarily barred from council proceedings and was reinstated only when someone pointed out that the trustees had defined the council to include him. In April council members voted to decentralize project authority, effectively integrating the director's former responsibilities with their own local duties. In October 1975, after preliminary refunding talks had been held with ES/Washington staff and the local administrators felt sure of final funding, the director was quietly "disinvited" from attending most further council meetings by the assistant superintendent. Thereafter the ES project as a discussion topic all but disappeared from the printed administrative council notes. The director's role had become so amorphous, and the director himself so disillusioned, that he resolved to leave. Inexplicably, at the same time, the position of project director was extended in the refunding plan for another full year beyond the 1976 cut off date indicated in the 1973 project plan. Despite this, in April 1976 the second project director tendered his resignation effective the following June. The data consultant did likewise.

Working relationships between the first and second project directors and the district administrators had never been especially good, although the second director had done the better job of establishing and maintaining rapport. For one thing, both directors suffered from an inexcusable failing in local educators' eyes—they lacked teaching or administrative credentials. Furthermore, their role was never well defined, especially concerning the director's authority or power to administer ES affairs. By tradition, authority in River

District was seldom delegated and from the start the assistant superintendent intended to exercise the final word in project decisions. Hence he occupied the pivotal role in the project and held ultimate authority and responsibility over virtually all local aspects of it.

Why did administrative commitment to the project steadily decline in River District from the early planning days when euphoria and support for it were running high? The answer has at least three parts. For one, only the administrative principal of Spring Creek was ever fully engaged in project planning. The other principals played relatively minor parts, and the second assistant superintendent, who oversaw the entire implementation process, was not even present during the planning year. Without a strong, initial involvement in development of the plans and without strong central leadership to mobilize support from all quarters, their intrinsic commitment to the project was weak.

Secondly, nonfulfillment by ES/Washington staff of October 1975 promises for "quick" project refunding, followed by the resignation of the fourth project officer and several months of ambiguity about his replacement, and concomitant rumors about the reshuffling of program priorities within the larger bureaucracy of which ES was a part, led some local officials in 1976 to wonder if ES/Washington was any longer able to monitor the site from a position of strength. Perceptions about those matters, whether realistic or not, undoubtedly weakened local commitments to ES.

As a third consideration, the moderate level of refunding for 1976-78 had considerable impact on the maintenance of a *continuing* commitment of local officials to the ES program. River District, as a relatively wealthy district by rural standards, has enjoyed a high level of support from land and industrial taxes. The regular budget for FY 1975-76 was 3.3 million dollars. (By FY 1978-79 it had reached 5 million dollars.) The ES budget, negotiated in May 1976, for the final two years of the project, 1976-78, was \$113,091.00 (\$81,145.50 for 1976-77, and \$31,945.50 for 1977-78; the latter not guaranteed). ES funding for these two final years was only half the amount originally "cut" from the five-year budget proposed in 1973, confirming earlier suspicions that the bureaucrats were indeed hedging on assurances they had given to district administrators at that time about full funding. Furthermore, the final funding figure was less than 2 percent of River District's expected operating budget for

the 1976-78 period, a relatively modest amount considering the program of comprehensive educational change originally envisioned for this project. Combined with all else that occurred in the attempted implementation of this project, the modest budget was insufficient to make River District administrators give the continuation of the ES project a very high priority.

REFERENCES

- Clough, Wilson. "Antelope Creek." *Brief Oasis*. Denver: Swallow Press, 1945.
- Denton, Trevor. "Unmeasurable Programs or Unacceptable Goals: The Dilemma of Goal Formation in Social Policy." *Human Organization* 34 (1976): 398-99.
- Gallagher, Art, Jr. "Directed Change in Formal Organizations: The School System." *Cultural Relevance and Educational Issues: Readings in Anthropology and Education*, edited by Francis A. J. Ianni and Edward Storey. Boston: Little, Brown, 1973.

Jackson County: Local Norms, Federal Initiatives, and Administrator Performance

C. Thompson Wacaster

In the Jackson County schools, a rural Deep South system, the performance of educational administrators significantly influenced the planning and attempted implementation of an Experimental Schools project. Their performance reflected the social environment in which they lived and worked. That environment included well-established social and cultural systems, a structural context represented by the school system itself, and, since 1972, a federal agency remote from Jackson County in miles as well as in expectations and expertise. The story of the Jackson County Experimental Schools project consequently focuses on how accommodations by educational administrators, not only to local values, norms, and beliefs but also to initiatives from federal program personnel, facilitated or hindered the process of planned educational change.

OBJECTIVES OF THE LOCAL ES PROJECT

Between July 1, 1972 and August 1, 1973, the Jackson County public school system came to recognize that it had a number of "weaknesses and unmet needs." These were described in a document entitled "A Comprehensive Plan for Educational Reform," a formal

Experimental Schools project plan prepared during that period by administrators, teachers, school district residents, and consultants. The problems were: (1) student underachievement; (2) a high retention of underachievers; (3) a high dropout rate; (4) low average daily attendance; (5) limited curriculum offerings; (6) lack of student preparation for employment; (7) limited parental interest in and understanding of educational needs; (8) limited parental support for educational programs; and (9) inadequate educational finances. In light of these weaknesses and needs, the Jackson County ES project would be:

... a coordinated program involving parents and community, students and school personnel to initiate new strategies and redirect efforts and utilize resources for the purpose of improving the quality and relevance of education for all pupils.

With this overarching theme for the project, the plan went on to identify four major project components. (1) Under community involvement, an ES project advisory committee would be established, consisting of school system "patrons" (i.e., "parents, residents, taxpayers, and registered voters"). The committee was described as: "... a promising means to improve communication, promote understanding, disseminate information, encourage participation on the part of citizens in understanding the schools' efforts and otherwise contribute in identifying unmet needs of pupils." (2) Under curriculum reform, the educational offerings in the school system would be evaluated, leading, it was hoped, to the development of a common curriculum for all schools in the system. The new curriculum was to include programs in career education, early childhood education, and health care and physical fitness. (3) Under staff development, members of the instructional staff were to be the primary actors in curriculum revision and in the design of the new programs. They were viewed as: "... the principal means for implementing the various [other] program components and developing the capabilities within the schools for improving the quality of education." (4) Finally, a management study, to be "conducted under the direct auspices of the superintendent," was to examine: "... all aspects of the school operation, finances, personnel, utilization, plant management, educational programs, relations with state and federal officers, and planning

for the future." On the basis of the study, recommendations were to be made for increasing the school system's efficiency.

The ES project plan stated that the overall responsibility for project implementation rested with the Jackson County Board of Education, but that the administration of the project was the responsibility of the superintendent. With the exception of the management study, however, the superintendent was to "delegate detailed responsibility for program planning and development and implementation of the various components described in the proposal" to a "Committee for Planning and Development" (consisting of all system principals), an ES project coordinator, and ad hoc administrator-teacher task forces. In short, the system's administrators were to be key actors in this attempt at educational change.

THE COMMUNITY SETTING

The Jackson County school district, located in a Gulf coast state, encompasses 85 percent of Jackson County's land area and 55 percent of its population. School district boundaries also include virtually all the area of four of the five "supervisory districts" around which Jackson County government is organized. The school district's 4,234 white residents are distributed across all four supervisory districts; the 1,672 black residents are concentrated in two of those districts, though not a majority in either. Two plywood plants are the largest employers in the school district, but the school system ranks just behind them. In addition, it is the only major employer for residents with college degrees. During the 1971-72 school year, the system provided jobs for eighty-eight teachers and administrators, fifteen teacher aides, seven secretaries, sixteen lunchroom workers, four janitors, and more than twenty-five bus drivers.

Yet jobs are scarce in the school district and in the county, and those that are available pay relatively low salaries. Consequently, 35 percent of the county's employed labor force in 1970 worked outside the county, primarily in a nearby urban center and defense facility. The average 1969 family income in the school district was \$5,750, even with 651 females in the labor force of 1,875. Of the 1,409 families in the school district in 1969, 30 percent (including many black families) were below the federally calculated poverty level.

Social Organization

Affiliation with a *family* does not simply mean identification with a nuclear group. It also involves relationships with an extended kinship system that in more than one instance is said to number over 300 persons. Families typically live in what local residents call *communities* (what rural sociologists would call neighborhoods) or in the school district's two towns. In the *towns*, too, large numbers of people are kin to each other or have known each other most, if not all, of their lives.

Some communities are predominantly white, others predominantly black, and a very few are mixed. In towns, blacks tend to live together in sections which whites label "the Quarters."

The *school district* provides another basis of social organization. Residents identify themselves as belonging to one of the three *attendance areas* into which the district is divided and to one of the four supervisory *districts* of county government lying within the school district.

Cultural Norms

For most residents, affiliation with their extended family is highly valued and carries with it a set of obligations, especially an expectation that family members will help each other in time of need. This norm of helping also operates in the larger social setting of the school district. It is accompanied by a strongly held norm of reciprocity. That is, when help is extended, there exists a clear expectation on the part of both parties—though almost never stated—that the helped person will reciprocate when needed. In associations and friendships of long standing, these norms cut across racial lines.

A norm of equal treatment also operates in the school district. Residents of a school attendance area expect their elementary and high schools to receive at least the same money, materials, and services as the schools of any other attendance area. A similar expectation holds for the supervisory districts of county government as well as for the school district's two towns.

Residents, especially white residents, strongly believe in local control of government. This idea often expresses itself among whites as criticism of federal agencies and programs. An extreme statement of this position was made by a local resident when he visited the halls of the county courthouse: "I wish they'd take that HEW and burn

them people in the bottommost pits of hell!" Even in the face of such sentiment, participation in federal programs is increasing among whites, though often accompanied by complaints about federal guidelines and by statements that the only reason for complying is to receive a fair share of funds which otherwise would go to blacks or to other parts of the country.

Belief in white superiority and supremacy is widely held, although passions on this point have recently mellowed. School integration was accomplished in 1970 under a voluntary plan negotiated with HEW and implemented virtually without incident.

Blacks and whites value civility and conviviality. They also give great weight to personal liking in both their informal and formal relationships. If a well-liked person has some personal or job-related problem requiring the cooperation of others, or if by virtue of his job he must make onerous demands on fellow workers, then he'll find them willing to "help you out," to "work with you." In short, in Jackson County personal appeal secures acceptance (or at least toleration) and induces cooperation.

Playing politics is also an accepted way of life. It's a way to get a job. Blacks and whites alike take it for granted that "politics" are involved in nearly every governmental decision. As one lifetime resident and long-term school administrator put it, "Jackson County is like any other institution, I guess. All of them are eaten up with politics."

THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

The County Schools

The organization of public education in Jackson County and other rural areas of this Deep South state was changed by the state legislature in 1953. Prior to that time, the separate black and white schools in the county typically housed grades 1-12 and constituted a "single-school" system. Each had an elected board of trustees and a superintendent appointed by its board. The superintendent also served as principal for both the elementary and high school grades. There was, in addition, a five-member county board of education selected in a mass meeting of the trustees of the various school systems in the county. A county superintendent of education was elected by the voters every four years. These county-level positions,

however, had virtually no authority over the school systems in the county. Their primary function was to serve as intermediaries between the local school systems and county or state government.

Under the new organization of education enacted by the legislature in 1953, two school systems were created in the county. One (Bolton Separate School System) served the county's largest town; the other (Jackson County Public School System) served the remainder of the county. With the creation of the Jackson County Public School System, twelve single-school systems (nine white and three black) were merged into one. A popularly elected, five-member county board of education (one member from each of the county government's five supervisory districts) was created to govern the county system and assume virtually all the authority formerly vested in the boards of trustees of the single-school systems. The county board had the legislative authority to organize schools, erect buildings, make regulations concerning operation of the school system, appoint all school personnel with the exception of the superintendent, approve the budget, and monitor the administration of the budget by the superintendent. The members of this board of education were to serve six-year staggered terms. Candidates for board positions were required to be registered voters. In addition, to run for the board position representing a given supervisory district, candidates had to be residents of that district. Only voters in the district were permitted to vote on those candidates.

The position of county superintendent of education was continued but with its authority and responsibility substantially increased. The superintendent was to serve as executive secretary to the board of education and chief administrative officer of the school system. As such, he prepared the school system budget, nominated personnel to the board for employment (the board itself could not nominate but only exercise its power of appointment over nominations made by the superintendent), implemented board decisions, and otherwise attended to the day-to-day operations of the school system. He was assisted in his duties by a bookkeeper, a secretary, and one bus mechanic.

The county superintendency remained an elected four-year office after 1953 as it had been before. To run, persons had to be residents of the county for two years, have a bachelor's degree, a teaching certificate, and four years' experience as either a teacher or an administrator.

Under the 1953 statutes the five-member boards of trustees of each of the twelve separate school systems were retained but only as "custodians" of the elementary-high school "attendance centers," as the 1-12 combinations were then labeled. According to the state attorney general, these boards possessed "no official policy-making authority." In practice, however, these local boards had whatever authority the district school board wanted to delegate them. Thus, in addition to settling questions about the use of school facilities and seeing to it that school facilities were maintained, the local boards of trustees were asked after 1953 to indicate formally each year to the superintendent and the district board whether the principal and each instructional staff member should be renominated for employment (the state has no tenure provisions) and their preferences concerning persons to be nominated to vacant positions. The school board also expected principals to confer with local trustees on any matters out of the ordinary affecting the school.

Changes in Organizational Structure: 1953-1972

During the two decades following this reorganization, additional changes were made. Between 1953 and 1965, the three black, elementary-high school attendance centers were consolidated into one and housed in a newly constructed school building located at Wooten in the east central portion of the county. Also during that period, six of the white elementary-high school attendance centers were closed. Their pupils were assigned to the three remaining ones in Wooten, Tylerville, and Tallabutchie.

Attempts at further consolidation, however, were blocked in the mid-1960s. Plans for the construction of a single, white, elementary-high school attendance center for the district to be located at Tylerville, the county seat, were scrapped because of intense opposition from residents of the Wooten and Tallabutchie school attendance areas.

Subsequent to the passage of the 1965 Federal Voting Rights Act, the district school board acted to change the process by which school board members were elected. Candidates for a board position still were required to be residents of the supervisory district represented by that position; but all voters of the school district now voted on each candidate. While some district residents report this change to have been a power play by the board's then dominant white coalition to maintain itself in the face of a challenge by other

whites, the practical effect was to make it unlikely that a black, who under the new federal act could more easily register to vote and therefore qualify to run for office, could be elected to the board from those supervisory districts with substantial black population. (In 1976, school system officials independently sought a state attorney general's opinion on this matter and, as a result, planned to return to the pre-1964 electoral process for board members.)

Under the terms of the 1970 integration agreement, the one black elementary-high school attendance center became Wooten High School. The formerly white elementary-high school in Wooten became Wooten Elementary School. Though the schools were on separate campuses, a single, integrated board of trustees was established with jurisdiction over both. Boards of trustees at the other district schools were integrated as were the instructional staffs. Twenty-seven percent of those staffs were to be comprised of black teachers, a percentage corresponding to the percentage of black residents in the school district. The administrative positions in the school system apparently were not subject to this ratio; however, a black (with full-time teaching and coaching duties) was appointed vice principal at Wooten High School, and the Title I directorship was also filled by a black.

During the late 1960s and early 1970s a number of new district-level positions were added to the district office staff. The position of elementary school principal was established to help handle the larger schools that resulted from consolidation. The advent of the ESEA programs and other federal projects prompted the creation of project directorships. Finally, for a brief period during the early 1970s, the position of curriculum director was created to cope with educational problems that had become more visible following integration. A highly trained white person with a cosmopolitan background and previous experience with federal programs was brought in to fill that position.

Schools, Curriculum, and Instruction

After integration, the Jackson County school district consisted of three attendance areas, each served by an elementary school and a high school. In two attendance areas the elementary school and high school were located on the same campus. In the third the schools were one mile apart. During 1971-72 the elementary schools aver-

aged 275 students and twelve teachers while the high schools averaged 245 students and fourteen teachers. The only vice principalship in the system was at Wooten High School.

As had been the case prior to integration, school staffs in the early 1970s seldom interacted in regard to curricular matters (though a brief exception to this situation occurred during 1971-72 at the instigation of the newly appointed curriculum director). Consequently, no uniform curriculum operated across these schools. At the elementary level, the various curricula were loosely organized around language arts, math, science, and social studies. Remedial reading was available through a Title I program, with additional remedial instruction becoming available in 1972 through a three-year Right-to-Read grant secured by the superintendent and new curriculum director. (Many white teachers, who readily admitted being almost overwhelmed by the reading difficulties of black students they encountered after integration, welcomed the Right-to-Read program.) Music was offered, but there was virtually no organized physical education.

In the high schools, curricula were organized around English, math, science, and social studies. Courses were also available in business and vocational/occupational education, but these courses had small enrollments. They were drawing from small student populations, competing with academic courses for graduation requirements, and suffering as well from a lack of instructional materials. Physical education at the high school level consisted of practice for interscholastic team sports; students not on teams were relegated to "pick-up" games.

No uniform pattern of instructional organization existed in the Jackson County schools. Because of scheduling difficulties due to the relatively small number of students in each school, teachers taught subjects in their area at more than one grade level. Some teachers, too, were asked to teach in two or more areas. Four and five preparations a day for teachers were not uncommon. As a strategy for survival under these conditions, many high school teachers relied almost exclusively upon class textbooks or workbooks not only as curricular guides but also as sources of daily lesson plans.

During the 1971-72 school year the two principals at Tylerville, at the suggestion of the curriculum director and with her help, attempted to develop and implement an open space, nongraded, individualized instructional program. It was discontinued at the end of

the year because of intense community opposition. Also during that year and through the work of the superintendent and curriculum director, the school system received a three-year Title III grant for the establishment of a center to develop innovative curriculum materials in the district.

Principals, Roles, and Authority

Most of the principals who administered Jackson County's six schools were either natives of Jackson County or married to natives. Outsiders for these or other administrative positions were hired only: (1) when no one locally held the proper certificates; (2) when hiring an outsider might favorably dispose some other influential outsider; or (3) when some crisis in the school system, such as integration, required a special skill or background not available in the district. In 1972-73 two principals were outsiders, three were natives of the district, and one was married to a native.

Principals usually had been educated within the state and at colleges or universities near the district. In 1972-73, five of six were male and had been coaches at one time or another, with a substantial portion of their coaching and teaching having been done in the Jackson County schools or adjacent systems.

Principals chiefly supervised the routine operation of their schools. They scheduled classes; they disciplined students; they dealt with parents; they oversaw lunchroom and other accounts; they scheduled and supervised athletic events; they supervised the bus system for their campuses; they supervised and/or personally performed maintenance of buildings and grounds; and they sought out, interviewed, and recommended to the superintendent teachers for employment. On orders of the school board, they even taught at least one class (some elementary principals taught three) so that their salaries could be financed by state rather than local funds.

Principals were given a great deal of autonomy in the operation of the schools by the superintendent, who believed principals should have the authority to operate their schools as they saw fit as long as they met state accreditation standards, complied with board of education decisions, and handled the paperwork needed by the central office for local, state, and federal reports and accounting procedures. Indeed, autonomy was a norm in the school district, possibly an organizational heritage from preconsolidation days as well as a reflec-

tion of residents' strongly held expectation for local control of education and government.

It is not surprising, therefore, that during the 1971-72 school year, as in earlier years, each school had a different curriculum. Nor should the curriculum director have been surprised at the resistance encountered when she began removing bolted-down desks as a first step toward an open space, nongraded, individualized program at a second attendance center, without first discussing the idea with principals there. The high school principal dispatched her with a bellow and an order to leave the building.

Educational Finance

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, funds for the operation of the Jackson County school system came from local, state, and federal sources. For example, the system's 1971-72 budget was \$1,006,478 (which amounted to an expenditure per pupil in average daily attendance of \$727.83, and provided an average teacher salary of \$6,032). Local revenue provided 20.79 percent, state allocations amounted to 54.43 percent, and federal contributions made up the remaining 24.78 percent.

Even though the county government regularly approved a tax levy at the highest millage allowed by state law, the district's small tax base meant that the local contribution to the school system budget was small. Over the years the Jackson County superintendent, Thomas Hinton, had consistently sought ways to obtain additional revenues for the school district. One way was by securing federal programs.

FIRST CONTACT WITH ES/WASHINGTON

In March 1972 Mr. Hinton and the district's recently appointed director of curriculum, Margaret Waxen, were casting around for additional federal programs for which the school district might be eligible. As the superintendent recalled: "We needed to expand educational services for our people. We [were] unable to pay for those services within the funding we were already receiving." Mr. Hinton felt that federal programs could serve noneducational functions as well. Long active in the Baptist Church, he was (as more than one school district resident described him) a "Christian gentleman." He

liked to help local people. One way to help them was by means of federal programs. As Hinton viewed it, each federal project had the same impact on the district's economy as "a small industry." Each brought jobs into the district and therefore not only provided economic benefits to "our people" but also meant they didn't have to go outside the district for work.

Securing federal funds and thus creating new jobs also served a political function for Hinton. Judicious appointments to new jobs meant members of particular families gained access to money, which was scarce and valued in the school district. In addition, the appointment of local people to these positions helped maintain valued family ties. By making judicious use of his authority to recommend individuals for employment, the superintendent would either repay past support from key families and friends, or otherwise maintain and extend the base of support for himself as well as his professional ideas and activities. Key families and persons became obligated to him because he had, after all, "helped them out."

Hinton consequently was delighted to come across, in a federal publication, the phrase "select group of rural schools" in a program description. A letter of inquiry was dispatched to Washington. A document dated March 10, 1972, and entitled "Experimental Schools Program: Announcement of a Competition for Small Rural Schools" was returned. It outlined a Letter of Interest school districts should prepare by April 15 if they wished to apply for an ES project. The superintendent subsequently delegated the preparation of the Letter to the curriculum director who, because of time constraints, wrote it without soliciting ideas from other school personnel or district residents.

The document that Margaret Waxen prepared and dispatched to Washington on April 10, 1972, addressed first a host of queries concerning school system and community characteristics. It then cited a "crash needs assessment program" undertaken in the Jackson County schools after voluntary desegregation in 1970. This survey (conducted by the curriculum director) revealed critical deficiencies in reading at every level. The average reading achievement level for grades 2 through 12 was 2.05 grade levels below grade placement. To remedy this problem, the Letter of Interest proposed a "continuous progress, individualized, nongraded program" that would involve the development of an individualized curriculum and of learning mate-

rials "appropriate to the reading level, comprehension level, and modality of learning needs of the pupils." Standing in the way of the implementation of this program, which was already being attempted in the Tylerville schools, were three "critical weaknesses":

1. Lack of trained personnel to meet the needs of individual students;
2. Lack of financial resources to provide the needed staff development programs; and
3. Lack of materials and equipment.

The document noted, however, that the school system did have a number of "resources and strengths" to bring to bear on its educational problems. The most significant resource emphasized was "informed parents" demanding "a more relevant and productive educational system." Personnel from the state Department of Education and the State University were also mentioned as "vital resources." Finally, "the most significant strength and resource available" was "the faculties and staffs of the Jackson County Schools . . . [who] have struggled valiantly to overcome what have often seemed to be insurmountable obstacles.

On May 25, a site visit was made by ES/Washington personnel, which included meetings with the school board, school personnel, and local residents. Shortly thereafter, the Jackson County school system was selected as one of the rural Experimental School sites and awarded a \$91,000 one-year planning grant effective July 1, 1972.

THE PLANNING PERIOD

In early July, Mr. Hinton flew to Washington, where he met with ES/Washington staff members. He subsequently received a document entitled "Scope of Work," stating the tasks which Jackson County personnel would be expected to perform during the planning period.

Early Planning

During a meeting with principals on August 1 dealing with matters related to the opening of school, Hinton briefly reviewed Jackson County's selection as an ES site and noted that later in the sum-

mer each principal should appoint a committee to develop a "comprehensive" ES plan for his school. Each committee was to be comprised of school staff members and residents of the school's attendance area. The superintendent stressed that committee membership should be a "cross-section" of each attendance area's social, economic, and racial composition.

A week later the ES/Washington project officer visited the school district. In a meeting with the superintendent and principals, she discussed ES/Washington expectations for project planning.

Other than these events, the first two months of the planning period had no project-related activity—for two reasons. The first was that both the superintendent and the principals were involved in activities necessary for the opening of school on August 20. In a system where there was no district maintenance crew, no purchasing agent, no transportation director, no personnel director, and no pupil personnel director, all the tasks associated with such positions fell to the superintendent and principals. A second reason was that a financial crisis arose for the school system during this period that was attended by extensive legal and political conflict. This conflict, which involved the superintendent on one side and a majority of the school board along with a high school principal on the other, was to continue throughout the following school year. It consumed enormous amounts of the superintendent's time and energy.

One immediate casualty of this conflict was the curriculum director. A supporter of the superintendent, Mrs. Waxen engaged some school board members in a verbal battle during a late summer meeting. As the superintendent recalled, "She told them what she thought. She made the board mad, that coming from a woman and all. . . . She's one of those persons who won't back off and take it from another direction." Already unpopular with many school staff members because of her abrasive and highly task-oriented manner ("She didn't speak to people and couldn't care less if she didn't"), the school board majority asked for Mrs. Waxen's resignation. "That communist from Florida," as one school board member described her, left the district the following week.

Organizational Arrangements for Planning

In September, project-related activity started again. On September 5 Mr. Hinton received a letter from the ES/Washington project officer. It included a reminder that a draft of the Formal Project Plan

was due December 15 and a set of questions the project officer would like answered in the first quarterly report. These questions clearly indicated the importance of planning to ES/Washington and provided cues for organizing the planning efforts. The superintendent had copies of the letter made and forwarded to the principals, along with a cover letter asking them to take appropriate action and report back to to him.

During the week following receipt of the superintendent's letter, principals appointed ES planning committees at each school, indicating to members that they would be paid for their services. Committee membership typically consisted of the principal, members of the board of trustees for the school, the district board of education member within whose supervisory district the school attendance area lay, teachers, and parents.

The superintendent himself set out during this week to secure an ES project director. Albert McPhail, the person selected, was a thirty-two year resident of the school district and married to a life-long resident, who in turn was a member of one of the largest extended families in the school district. For virtually all of those thirty-two years, the new project director had been a teacher and administrator in the Jackson County School System. He was also a long-time friend of the superintendent and a person who, according to the superintendent—and unlike the former curriculum director—could “get along” with everybody.

On September 14, nine days after receipt of the ES/Washington project officer's letter, the superintendent wrote the Jackson County ES project's first quarterly report. He stated that during the last quarter, planning committees had been formed at each school, a project director had been appointed, and “discussions among the board of education, principals, superintendent, and community members” had taken place concerning project planning and objectives.

Reorganization for Planning

On October 10 the ES/Washington project officer responded by letter to the quarterly report:

Project Direction and Coordination

Getting a director on board and inviting both staff and community participation in planning committees at the building level were important first steps for the project. There remain, however, several critical questions concerning the coordi-

nation and direction of the project which need to be addressed immediately. First, we understand the importance locally of relying heavily on each of the school communities for decisions regarding the four-year plan. We also recognize that the three communities are quite independent in many respects and that preserving their independent identities is a continuing concern. On the other hand, as we discussed at some length during the meeting with the principals in August, it is also understood that there is likely to be substantial overlap of plans among the three school communities. There is a pressing need to work out a way in which the three community planning efforts will be coordinated, both through the remainder of the planning time and as part of the design for operating the project. One way might simply be to have each school community designate two or three people to serve on a district-wide coordinating committee. You may want to choose another way of solving this problem. Nonetheless, some mechanism must be established for actually producing a comprehensive district-wide plan, for making substantive and budgetary decisions, for deciding when and how consultant help would be useful. As we see it, this is a real working assignment, not an advisory one. Second, and closely related to the questions of coordination, is the question of direction. The report indicated that Mr. McPhail has been appointed by the board as project director, but it did not spell out what responsibility and authority he has in that capacity. Has he been designated the authority to make decisions affecting what will or will not be part of the plan? Does he have the authority to allocate and approve the expenditure of funds from this year's grant? Is he responsible for actually writing the plan? What is his relationship with the Board of Education? the superintendent? the principals? If you have such a job description worked out already it would be helpful to have a copy. If not, it is probably something which is necessary if he is truly to serve as a director of the project.

In the weeks that followed, Hinton and McPhail addressed only the first of these two issues. The organization they devised to produce a "comprehensive, district-wide" project plan retained the individual school ES planning committees. In addition, the "district-wide coordinating committee" concept was lifted from the ES/Washington project officer's October 10 letter. Fifteen members were to serve on the district committee. The committee members were to be selected from the school ES planning committees, five members being named from the combined membership of the elementary committee and high school committee of each attendance area. The high school principal and the elementary principal were to be included among the five. The superintendent and the project director were to be *ex officio* members.

Preparing the Project Plan: The Work of the Local and District Committees

With the December 15 deadline for submission of a first draft of a plan for the Jackson County ES project barely two months away, the local school committees began meeting in early October to develop ES plans for their schools. Though no one was officially designated chairman, each principal served in that capacity.

The district coordinating committee held its first meeting on November 6. According to the minutes of the meeting, the superintendent served as temporary chairman until a permanent one could be elected from the group. A white district resident subsequently was elected chairman of the committee and a black teacher selected as its secretary. Hinton then reviewed the major points in the planning year's "Scope of Work" document. He went on to state that the task for each school ES planning committee was to develop an ES project for that school. The district coordinating committee was to take these locally initiated projects and "incorporate them into one program on the district level." Hinton elaborated what he meant by that in describing the ES project plan for the district that must be developed by December 15. That plan should include a statement of the "major theme" of the district project, and that theme "was to be broad enough to include the projects of all the schools in the district."

Mr. Hinton also suggested that Dr. Boyd Campbell, a long-time educator in the state, who had participated in the selection process for the rural ES sites, be hired as a consultant "to write up" the plan that would be submitted to Washington. The ES project director, McPhail, would be available to work with Dr. Campbell if the committee and the district school board approved Campbell's appointment. The director would also work with the local and district committees in their planning sessions.

On November 21 the county coordinating committee met for the second time. Dr. Campbell was introduced to the group. He said that he would accept the position of consultant only with the understanding that he was to work with the committee in developing the district ES plan but that he himself would not write the plan. He then conducted a question and answer session to "determine the problems of the schools" on which, he said, the ES project should be

based. Subsequently the committee recommended to the school board that he be employed as a consultant.

With his appointment approved by the school board, Dr. Campbell returned to Jackson County in early December. He had prepared a statement of a suggested theme for the ES project:

Theme: Approach a solution to the educational problems of the Jackson County School District as developed by the Coordinating Committee on November 21, 1972. They are as follows:

- (1) Inadequate finances.
- (2) Low level of pupil achievement.
- (3) Limited curriculum offering.
- (4) Limited interest and understanding by citizens of educational needs.
- (5) Limited parent support.
- (6) Limited job opportunities in Jackson County.

He also had drawn up a list of thirty-eight goals for the project. He turned all of this material over to the ES project director.

On December 7 the ES/Washington project officer visited Jackson County. During her meeting with the district ES coordinating committee, the project officer stated, "Comprehensiveness includes absolutely everything that has to do with education in Jackson County." She also indicated again that there should not be separate projects for each school, a point that upset several principals.

In spite of the ES/Washington project officer's injunction, the following week project director McPhail took Dr. Campbell's three-page statement of theme and goals, had them typed exactly as the consultant had written them, added a budget *only* for the planning grant year (one that had been worked out by the ES/Washington project officer and the superintendent the previous summer) and attached to these the separate ES plans from each school—plans that all had been completed *prior* to the November 21 meeting of the district coordinating committee at which educational problems were identified. This document was then sent off to Washington.

ES/Washington Response to the December 15 Plan

The ES/Washington project officer returned the Jackson County draft on January 20, 1973, with copious annotations. She stated bluntly that in her view the plan did not meet the criterion of comprehensiveness, did not identify an overall theme for the project, and

did not contain a clear, precise statement of project goals and the concrete objectives indicating how those goals were to be achieved.

Preparing the February 15 Plan

With the February 15 deadline for the next—and presumably final—draft of the plan near, Dr. Campbell and additional consultants secured by him returned to work with the project director and the district coordinating committee. Albert McPhail was heard frequently during this and subsequent planning periods to make statements like: "If they'd [ES/Washington] just tell us what they want, then we'd know what to do." It is not surprising, then, that the format used for the February 15 plan was the "Scope of Work" document received from ES/Washington the previous July. Each statement in that document concerning what should be included in an ES plan was quoted. Immediately following each quote was a statement of Jackson County's response. Included in these responses were project components either common to the December 15 plans from each school or components that all principals and school ES planning committees were willing to accept from one or another of the December 15 plans.

Two months passed before any word concerning the fate of the February 15 plan was received. When word came—almost a month after ES/Washington said feedback would be provided—it came during a visit from the ES/Washington project officer. On the basis of the two drafts of the project plans submitted to date, she had concluded that Jackson County administrative personnel simply did not have the training or experience necessary for the preparation of the kind of plan ES/Washington expected. Though she did not express that judgment to Jackson County personnel, she did arrange to bring with her an educational consultant from Florida. She notified Superintendent Hinton that the two of them would visit the school district on April 18 and 19.

The project officer and the consultant, Dr. James Patrick, arrived in Jackson County on Wednesday morning, April 18. During the course of their meetings with the superintendent, project director, district coordinating committee, and the school board, a number of criticisms of the February 15 plan were made.

The project officer believed that the plan was too expensive, especially because of the new personnel it required. She was con-

cerned that the Jackson County school system would not be able to continue the new positions at the end of the ES funding period. She felt the plan identified local needs but did not strongly document their existence and did not show clearly how its components would meet these needs. Further, she maintained that the plan was not comprehensive enough. Finally, she felt that some sections of the plan did not provide sufficient detail.

The project officer then suggested that Dr. Patrick be invited to serve as a consultant for the revision of the plan. He, in turn, suggested that a committee, to be called the Committee for Planning and Development and to be comprised of the six school principals, be formed to rewrite the plan. He would work with this committee to get the plan revised in time for a mid-May submission to the project officer. (The May deadline had to be met in order to have the plan properly evaluated before final negotiations between ES/Washington and Jackson County commenced in early June for funding the next three years of the project.)

The school board approved the appointment of Dr. Patrick. The Committee for Planning and Development was organized and began to function when Dr. Patrick returned to Jackson County a few days later. One of Dr. Patrick's first acts was to suggest a new format for the project plan. This format, accepted by the committee, ran as follows:

- I. Introduction—theme
- II. Profile of Jackson County
- III. Weaknesses and unmet needs
- IV. Goals and objectives
- V. The comprehensive program
 - (a) Organizational plan
 - (b) Community involvement
 - (c) Staff development
 - (d) Curriculum reform
- VI. Evaluation

Each principal chose a part of the plan on which he or she would like to work, with one of the two principals not tied by kinship to the school district choosing the early childhood program of the curriculum reform component, an area in which she possessed considerable

expertise. Between May 1 and May 4 the principals gathered information for the items and funneled them to Dr. Patrick, who rewrote them and compiled them in time for the May submission.

Contract Negotiations

Mr. Hinton and one of the principals flew to Washington in early June to negotiate a contract for the Jackson County ES project. In two days of meetings, the ES/Washington project officer and program director indicated that a number of revisions and additions to the Jackson County ES plan were still necessary. The changes that were to be made by the local people subsequently were specified in the contract submitted to the Jackson County superintendent on June 25, 1973. All changes had to be completed by August 1. Provisions for the administration and governance of the project were to be revised; also, procedures were to be devised for developing the career and vocational components of the project and for expanding development efforts during the second year of the project to all areas of the curriculum offered by county schools.

During the course of the negotiations, the ES/Washington project officer also made it very clear that Albert McPhail would have to be replaced as Jackson County's ES project director. She felt he simply did not have the skills necessary to manage the implementation of the project plan. In addition, she and the ES/Washington program director insisted that the superintendent assume the title of project director with McPhail's position being renamed "project coordinator." This would clearly label the superintendent as the local school official responsible for implementation of the project.

Preparing the August 1 Plan and Other Events

June and July were eventful times in the life of the Jackson County project. Dr. Patrick returned to help prepare the summer staff development plan and work with the principals in revising and expanding the ES project plan. In regard to governance and administration of the ES project, Dr. Patrick wrote that ultimate responsibility for implementation of the plan lay with the Jackson County board of education, although the responsibility for administering the project was the superintendent's. He was, however, to delegate that responsibility (with the exception of the implementation of the management study) to the Committee for Planning and Development.

That committee "should provide a cohesive influence upon the Jackson County schools through effective communication and uniformity of effort." The project coordinator would serve as the committee's secretary and perform his or her activities "in accordance with the planning and direction provided by the Committee for Planning and Development." Finally, "the major efforts to accomplish the purpose set forth in this proposal will depend upon the participation and involvement of staff." Thus, components of the ES project plan "that require research, selection or the preparation of teacher guides, workbooks or other instructional materials will be undertaken by task forces made up of selected school personnel actively engaged in the program area."

Meanwhile, Mr. McPhail (the former project director unacceptable to ES/Washington) was to return to the newly reestablished position of district driver education teacher in the coming school year—a position he very much liked. After a lengthy search, the superintendent recommended Mrs. Clarette Clark (a native of the Jackson County district, a member of a large extended family, and a former teacher and elementary principal in the school system) for the newly created position of project coordinator. This recommendation was accepted by the school board and the ES/Washington project officer. Those principals who knew her welcomed her appointment because they believed she was not only capable but someone with whom they could work. Mrs. Clark assumed her duties July 27, just as the "Final Operational Plan—A Comprehensive Plan for Educational Reform" had been completed by Dr. Patrick and was being typed for its August 1 submission.

On August 10, 1973—ten days before the opening of school—the superintendent received formal notification from the ES/Washington project officer that the plan submitted on August 1 had been approved.

Project Planning and Management: Summary and Conclusions

During the thirteen-month planning period, numerous actions were taken by local administrators in regard to managing project planning and managing the project once it was planned. Their actions clearly were influenced by two sets of standards, one held by local residents and school people, one held by ES/Washington personnel. Since their actions had important consequences both for project

planning and implementation, it is important to summarize them and make explicit the standards that influenced them.

In the view of the Jackson County superintendent, the ES/Washington project officer's September 5, 1972 letter concerning the ES project's first quarterly report indicated three actions desired by her: (1) the position of project director should be created; (2) an organization for project planning should be established; and (3) positions for school district residents and for teachers should be included in that organization. This letter thus clearly indicated the importance ES/Washington attached to planning and provided cues for organizing the planning effort. The letter also alerted the superintendent to the fact that the ES/Washington project officer was monitoring the project. Given the various uses to which he could put federal education dollars—expansion of education programs, community development, and maintenance of his own political strength—and given the importance of *any* supplemental money during this year of fiscal crisis, it is not surprising that the superintendent immediately initiated activity that sought to respond to his perceptions of the letter's cues.

The events surrounding the creation of the position of ES project director exemplify the two kinds of demands the superintendent was trying to satisfy. Creating the position was an attempt to conform to ES/Washington's expectations, but the selection of Albert McPhail to fill it was clearly a response to expectations operating in the school district. McPhail, liked in many quarters, would gain acceptance locally for the ES project. Knowing local norms, he could prevent conflict. And the appointment helped out a friend, one who was a member of a large and thus politically important extended family.

With McPhail's appointment the superintendent was in effect building a constituency for the ES project as well as securing someone with the social understanding and experience necessary for working with school people and residents in the school district. What McPhail didn't possess, however, were technical skills for project planning. Or, rather, he didn't possess a planning technology recognized and deemed acceptable by the ES/Washington project officer. Because she so assessed McPhail's capabilities and because of the importance ES/Washington attached to planning, the project officer arranged for an outside consultant to be imported into Jackson

County. He was to initiate, coordinate, and, when necessary, perform himself activities intended to produce a project plan. Such activities included: (1) the identification of problems faced by the school district; (2) the formulation of project goals logically derivable from the problem statements; and (3) the description of project components intended to accomplish project goals.

Furthermore, the ES/Washington project officer later caused McPhail to be replaced as project director. However, in making the reassignment the superintendent was able to place McPhail in an instructional slot which he highly desired, thus forestalling resistance from McPhail's colleagues and relatives to the ES project that otherwise might have resulted.

Jackson County's initial organization for project planning, devised by the superintendent and McPhail, involved the creation of a committee at each of the system's six schools. This action conformed to past school system practice and signified to local persons that the resources of the ES project were being allocated equally among attendance areas. Including principals, teachers, and attendance area residents on the committees indicated that Jackson County understood ES/Washington's expectation for community and staff participation in project planning. The broad-based participation, plus the fact that committee members were paid for their work, helped create a constituency for the ES project and undoubtedly helped reduce any ideological disquiet the presence of a federal project might have produced. After all, as the project director noted, "Ten dollars [the wage for committee members per meeting] is a lot of money in a poor school district like this."

A system-wide coordinating committee was established in response to the ES/Washington criterion of comprehensiveness for local projects. The superintendent's and project director's decision to have each school attendance area equally represented was a response to the norm of equal treatment for each area.

The inclusion of all principals in the membership of the system-wide committee (each had been included on the separate school committees) indicated the importance that the superintendent and project director attached to the principals' acceptance of the project. Placing principals in project decision-making positions in which their objections to emergent project plans could be voiced respected the norm of the autonomy of principals and helped ensure their acceptance of whatever plan was finally developed.

In sum, the superintendent and project director scrupulously abided by local norms as they attempted to conform to initiatives of the ES/Washington project officer. Undoubtedly this attention helped account for the lack of conflict during the planning period and lack of resistance on the part of school system personnel and community residents to the project.

Organizational arrangements for project management written into the August 1, 1973 ES plan also conformed to ES/Washington expectations. The suggestion by the second ES/Washington consultant to establish a Committee for Planning and Development and later to give that committee the key position in the project's administrative structure was prompted by the criterion of comprehensiveness. As the consultant had written in the August 1 plan, such an arrangement "should provide a cohesive influence upon the Jackson County Schools through effective communication and uniformity of efforts." This organization for project management, however, ignored the existing organizational structure. The unanticipated consequence that resulted is a part of the story of the Jackson County ES project's implementation effort.

THE IMPLEMENTATION EFFORT

The period from August 1973 through June 1976 is remarkable for (1) the relative lack of project-related activity undertaken by the superintendent and the Committee for Planning and Development and (2) the difficulties experienced by the new ES project coordinator (Clarette Clark) in the development and implementation of project components.

The project contained four major components. The *community involvement component* called for the popular election of an ES project advisory committee to be comprised of twelve school district residents, four from each attendance area. The ES project coordinator was to keep that committee apprised of project plans, solicit its reactions to those plans (especially in regard to whether the plans met student needs), and pass along the committee's views to the Committee for Planning and Development, the superintendent, and, as necessary, the school board. She also was to help the advisory committee publish a project newsletter for distribution to all school district residents.

The *staff development component* called for the project coor-

dinator to work with the Committee for Planning and Development to devise staff training activities necessary for implementation of other project components. Training activities were also to be offered to improve teacher or administrator performance generally, whether or not that performance was directly related to project components. Although some areas for staff development—such as use of audio-visual techniques in classroom instruction—were identified, no detailed staff development plans for any topic were included in the plan.

The *curriculum reform component* required an evaluation of the curriculum and the subsequent creation of a common curriculum for all schools in the county. It did not spell out, however, the procedures to be followed in conducting such an evaluation. This component also made reference to a health and physical fitness program, each to be developed and implemented as part of the district-wide curriculum. The specifics of the health and physical fitness program were to be developed by a health and physical fitness coordinator (yet to be hired) and the career education program by task forces of teachers and administrators (yet to be appointed). The portion of the ES plan dealing with the early childhood program did provide specific program goals, activities believed relevant to accomplishing those goals, and job descriptions for teachers and aides. A list of materials and equipment needed for the program also was attached. Further development of operational plans for the program would take place under the direction of a head teacher, who also would serve as one of the regular early childhood teachers. The plan additionally provided for a delay of six weeks in the start of the program, with the time between August 20, 1973 and October 1, 1973 to be used for development of operational instructional plans, purchase of equipment and materials, renovation of classrooms, and organization of classroom equipment and materials. The fourth project component, the *management study*, was to be entirely the superintendent's responsibility.

The project coordinator found that she was also expected to develop an evaluation component for the project to determine whether project objectives were being realized. The ES project plan gave no details of any such evaluation program but called for the immediate plan of consultants to develop the program.

After several readings of the plan, the ES project coordinator

became disturbed. The overall plan seemed vague to her—and enormous. Where should she begin? How should she begin? What she discovered over the next two and one-half years was that she could not count on much help from either the superintendent or the Committee for Planning and Development in answering these questions.

Lack of Project-Related Activity by the Superintendent and the Committee for Planning and Development

Thomas Hinton took seriously the portion of the project plan that limited the superintendent's direct involvement to the implementation of the management study. Beyond that study, his project-related activity included counseling the project coordinator when asked about project problems, presenting ES project matters that required board approval to the Jackson County Board of Education, and meeting with the ES/Washington project officers on site. When asked about ES project matters, Hinton typically would point to the pile of papers on his desk, explain that he had to deal with the responsibilities of his office, that he believed in delegating responsibility for the school system's educational programs to his principals (whose acceptance of such programs he saw as essential to their successful operation) and to program directors, and that questions concerning the ES project therefore could best be answered by the ES project coordinator or the principals.

The principals, functioning as the Committee for Planning and Development, also did not involve themselves actively in further project planning and implementation after the final project plan had been submitted and accepted. They met in their capacity as the Committee for Planning and Development during site visits from ES/Washington personnel, but very infrequently otherwise. The project coordinator, however, was careful to clear with principals any new initiatives she or others planned in regard to the project. This she did by polling them individually or meeting with them during their regular end-of-month session with the superintendent to discuss current school system issues.

Throughout the implementation period principals consistently reported how much work they had to do. In addition to performing their multiple regular duties, the principals were involved individually in activities of the task forces developing ES project components. Three principals served on the management study task force, three

on the curriculum development task force, three on the health and physical fitness task force, and one on the evaluation task force.

With the superintendent busy taking care of the duties of his office and delegating program responsibilities to his subordinates, and with principals burdened by task overloads that worked against their assuming major project management responsibilities, the new project coordinator found that she alone was responsible for the task of managing a major effort at educational change over the next two and one-half years. Hers was not simply a task of arranging the conditions necessary for implementation of an operational plan, but also one of initiating and coordinating developmental activities (e.g., organizing and coordinating the work of the task forces) in regard to the district-wide curriculum, the health and physical fitness program, the career education program, and the project's evaluation component. She also had to cope with all the project's paper work: quarterly reports for ES/Washington, administration of the project budget, and preparation of written materials developed by the various planning committees. At several points during the two and one-half years, Clarette Clark found she simply couldn't do all she felt needed to be done, a fact she came to attribute not only to the scope of the tasks confronting her, but also to what she identified as her lack of ability as an administrator.

Toward Project Implementation

In spite of these barriers, some components of the Jackson County ES project were implemented during the two and one-half years following completion of the August 1, 1973 project plan.

The Early Childhood Education program. The early childhood portion of the August 1 plan was unlike those for other components in that it made specific statements concerning program goals, activities, and roles. In addition, it allowed a six-week period for operational planning and other program preparations, including inservice training in early childhood curriculum and instruction to be provided by consultants from the State University. Bimonthly workshops to be arranged by the head teacher, held on school days, and without students present, would permit further "planning and sharing of ideas." She would also arrange for any workshops and conferences "necessary for the maintenance of good teaching methods and techniques." For performing this administration role, the head teacher would be paid an additional \$400.

After contract negotiations in June had been completed, and thus with the knowledge that the ES project plan was accepted (pending revisions), the principal who had prepared this portion of the plan asked to be an early childhood teacher and head teacher for the program. Both the superintendent and other principals believed her a sound choice for those positions.

During the next months the head teacher and early childhood teachers in fact performed in accordance with this plan. The six weeks prior to October 1, 1973 were used for planning, inservice, and classroom preparation. The head teacher was able periodically to arrange with her principal for a substitute and visit and observe the other early childhood classrooms. On the basis of those visits and discussions with teachers, in which problems were uncovered or topics of interest identified, she planned appropriate workshops. If arrangements for the workshops for some reason or another were believed to require approval of individual principals, the Committee for Planning and Development, the superintendent, or the school board, the head teacher either secured that approval or asked the project coordinator to do so.

In the next two and one-half years the early childhood program developed extensive support among school district residents, school personnel, and school board members. Of fifty-two *residents* asked by project personnel in the fall of 1975 to rank project components that should be continued at local expense after federal funding terminated, forty-two placed the early childhood component first while eight ranked it second. Of forty-three *teachers and administrators* who completed the same survey, thirty-two placed the early childhood component first, and six placed it second. Also in the fall of 1975, school board members to a man reported widespread support for the component among their constituents; stated (with only slight variation in phrasing) "I couldn't vote against kindergarten even if I wanted to—which I don't"; and subsequently voted unanimously to continue the program with local money at the conclusion of the federal project.

The career education program. Implementation of the career education program, however, did not occur as quickly or as effectively as implementation of the early childhood program. While the ES project plan was being developed, there was no one in the Jackson County school system with extensive experience or training in career education. The ES project plan simply called for the establish-

ment of a career education program by means of creation of teacher task forces. These task forces, to be appointed by the superintendent after consultations with the Committee for Planning and Development, subject to the approval of the school board, were to develop a career education curriculum during the fall of 1973 for grades 4, 7, and 10. A series of seminars would be held to acquaint the school system staff with these locally generated curriculum materials. The materials would then be introduced into the classrooms at the start of the second semester of the 1973-74 school year (January 2, 1974). The process would then be repeated for grades 5, 8, and 11 (with the materials to be introduced into the classrooms at the beginning of the 1974-75 school year) and later for grades 6, 9, and 12 (with the materials to be introduced into the classrooms during the second semester of the 1974-75 school year). Teachers were to be paid five dollars an hour for their work.

Task forces were appointed, and they met during the fall of 1973. Their efforts soon floundered, however. In fact, development of the career education program languished until August 1974. At that time the second ES/Washington project officer (appointed in the spring of 1974 to replace the previous project officer who had resigned) pointed out, during a site visit to Jackson County, that there appeared to be no career education program in the school system. By this time the project officer had also reached a number of conclusions concerning the Jackson County ES project. He believed principals were devoting too little time to both directing the project and working for its implementation. What's more, he had concluded after meeting with the superintendent, principals, and project coordinator, that there appeared to be little "leadership potential" in the school system for the project.

On the basis of this assessment, which he did not explicitly state to local personnel, the ES/Washington project officer suggested to Hinton and to consultants from the State University (who had been working with other project components) that someone be hired who could help spark "leadership potential" in the system. He also insisted that this full-time, resident consultant should be hired as an adjunct professor at the State University but be paid by the Jackson County ES project. (Such an arrangement, he felt, would not only provide the consultant "status," but also make him less subject to demands on his time from local administrators for non-project-related activity.) All agreed to this arrangement.

Fortuitously a person with extensive experience in school administration, management training, community education, and career education applied to the university for employment during the late summer of 1974. After a trip to Washington for review and approval by ES/Washington, Jeffrey Carlson was hired for the Jackson County position in October 1974. Later in the fall of 1974, after piecing together the history of the project and becoming involved in other project-related activities, he assumed responsibility for developing the career education program. The idea for this arrangement had emerged in the course of his discussions with Clarette Clark, who felt she had no expertise in the area and was otherwise extremely busy.

Carlson subsequently called a meeting of the Committee for Planning and Development to discuss with the principals tasks that might be included in the development of a career education program. He then combined their suggestions with those of his own in a developmental plan which the committee subsequently approved. Carlson's next step was to write a letter to each task force teacher requesting him or her to serve on the career education task force.

The initial meeting of the career education task force in January 1975 was scheduled by Carlson, and teachers were notified by mail. Agenda items for the meeting also were developed by the consultant. The primary question was: "What should the tasks of the group be during the remainder of the year?" During the meeting, task force members made suggestions, as did Carlson. At the end of the meeting—as was the pattern in subsequent meetings—Carlson asked what needed to be done at the next meeting and when it should be held. After the meeting he wrote on a standardized form he had prepared who had met, when, where, and a brief summary of what had transpired. This he filed in a career education folder, one of a set of folders he had established for each project component, in order to keep track of component activities and thus, among other purposes, facilitate preparation of the ES project's quarterly report.

From January on into the spring, the career education task force met frequently, usually after school, sometimes during the school day. If the task force met during the school day, then approval from principals was secured for task force members to be away from school and arrangements for substitutes made. On the one occasion when the ES/Washington consultant failed to notify principals in advance of a task force meeting during school hours and

solicit their approval, several task force members were unable to attend the meeting.

In the spring and summer of 1975, the task force developed a plan for a 4-12 career education program. This plan provided a definition of career education as the term would be used in the Jackson County school system. Program objectives for grades 4-6, 7-9, and 10-12 were listed. Activities to use in achieving those objectives were specified. Lists of career education materials already bought by the ES project were provided and the location of those materials in the school system noted. Finally, a list of local speakers representing a variety of jobs was included.

Soon after completion of this plan, the ES/Washington consultant, Carlson, resigned. Task force members subsequently distributed copies of the career education plan to all Jackson County teachers and administrators during one of the preschool workshops in August 1975. During the thirty minutes allotted to career education on the agenda, task force members reviewed the process by which the plan had been developed and discussed the plan itself. Teachers were then asked to incorporate the career education activities described in the plan into their subject area instruction.

Though the task force had decided during the previous summer to develop during 1975-76 a means to determine whether the career education plan was being implemented, no such evaluation mechanisms were developed. In fact, the task force met only once during that period and then in regard to other matters. The project coordinator and principals, when asked if teachers were providing career education instruction in 1975-76, stated that some were and some weren't.

ES project management. In suggesting in August 1974 that a full-time consultant be hired, the ES/Washington project officer was primarily concerned not with the success simply of the career education component but of the entire Jackson County ES project. His role, as project officer, was "to monitor the contract and be sure the government is getting its money's worth. . . . I have a responsibility to see that goals are met." In August 1974 the project officer noted that he had been hired by ES/Washington because he knew something about schools and thus could provide technical assistance to local projects—but had found he could not do that by long distance. Jackson County, he felt, needed such assistance:

I do want them to succeed. . . . Right now they just don't have a planning process I can see. Plans, to me, require specific objectives and time lines that will move them along toward achieving those specific objectives. That's all very, very vague [in Jackson County] now. . . . So, on this trip I was trying to see if there was anyone in the school system who could pull things together or give things a boot in the rear.

Since he did not find any such person or persons in Jackson County, the project officer suggested to the superintendent and to the head of the consultant team from the State University that a full-time consultant be hired for the project. The consultant's primary task would be, as the project officer put it:

. . . to assume some kind of leadership for the components of the project not on his own but in conjunction with local people. In doing this, I hope he uses his skills to develop the administrators' skills for planning. . . . As new programs are developed, he will provide leadership to ease the way for these programs into the actual curriculum of the district. I can see him leading teachers' meetings and explaining things. . . . He's also the main man in organizing project committees, in planning meetings. He doesn't make decisions, he helps other groups make decisions.

The person hired for the job, according to the ES/Washington project officer, was "the right man at the right time. I couldn't believe it." This was Jeffrey Carlson, who came to the Jackson County system in October 1974, and had had extensive experience in providing management training to educational administrators and federal bureaucrats. He held a doctorate in community education and also was knowledgeable about career education. In fact, immediately prior to the Jackson County appointment, he had been involved in the development of career education programs in rural Florida school systems. He was a native of Florida, but had grown up in a rural area of California, where he had also been a teacher and administrator. He had applied to the State University (and thus was available for the Jackson County position) in order to be nearer his wife's family, who lived some ninety miles from the university.

From October through December 1974, Carlson spent most of his time working with the project coordinator, Mrs. Clark, to develop an in-house management procedure for the project staff. To do that, he first discussed with her the elements of project management and then designed work experiences for her. These elements he subse-

quently summarized as the following steps and posted a copy at each desk in the ES project office:

Procedural Steps for Managing Project

- Step 1. Assess needs in relation to project goals.
- Step 2. Develop management objective sheets:
 - a. State management objective.
 - b. List activities to meet management objective.
 - c. List resources needed for related activity.
 - d. List cost to actualize related activity.
- Step 3. Post activities on Management Calendar
- Step 4. Make "Things to Do List" in reference to sheet activities and resources (see Step 2).
- Step 5. Plan logistics for actualizing meeting:
 - a. Reserve place for meeting.
 - b. Send letters or notices of activity to all participants.
 - c. Prepare agenda, directions, etc.
- Step 6. File material from Step 2 and Step 5 in the cumulative file folder for the appropriate component.
- Step 7. Record the results of all activities and inform all concerned.

From January 1975 through the following June, Carlson became involved in the management study, took major responsibility for preparing the project's quarterly reports, and participated in planning the development of a project evaluation component.

The plans for the establishment of the project evaluation component called for the creation of a seven-member evaluation team to be comprised of one teacher from each school and one principal. After its appointment in January 1975, this team, along with the project coordinator, received instruction in evaluation and planning from a staff member at the State University. Regular class sessions were held, giving university credit, with the content of the classes tailored specifically to the Jackson County situation. Thus, the members of the evaluation team received instruction in basic evaluation procedures and in planning techniques that could be used in developing an evaluation program. Finally, they were asked to apply what they had learned and design an evaluation program not just for the Jackson County ES project but for virtually all aspects of the Jackson County school system's operations.

In July 1975 a substantial business opportunity opened for Carlson in his wife's home town. He resigned at the end of that

month to accept it. As subsequent events proved, his training of the ES project coordinator was extremely effective (as was the training that she received in the evaluation classes).

During the late summer of 1975, the ES project coordinator received from the ES/Washington office a "Contract Extension Document Outline." This outline identified the topical sections to be included in the plan for the Jackson County project's final year of funding. The plan was to be completed by December 15, 1975.

What occurred during the fall of 1975 stood in marked contrast to the process required for the preparation of the August 1, 1973 ES project plan: The project coordinator designed, initiated, and coordinated the preparation of all aspects of the extension plan—a feat she herself felt would have been impossible without the training in project management she had received from the ES/Washington consultant and the State University professor. Conducting a problem assessment and securing other information by surveys of residents, teachers, administrators, and school board members, she wrote a first draft of the plan. Mrs. Clark then took the plan to Washington in December. There, a few additional suggestions for revision were made, but the plan as a whole was approved. Returning to Jackson County, Mrs. Clark wrote the final draft. The "leadership potential" of at least one member of the Jackson County ES project's management component had been substantially increased.

CONCLUSIONS

An examination of Jackson County's implementation efforts reveal several important barriers to the development of the kind of administrator performance necessary for effecting educational change, and suggests ways in which these barriers, rooted in the social environment, could have been removed or otherwise compensated for.

The Committee for Planning and Development was established and given managerial responsibility for project implementation in order to help assure (as the first ES/Washington consultant saw it) that the Jackson County ES project would be comprehensive. This arrangement for project management, however, ignored the existing organizational structure of the school system (while, perhaps unintentionally, accommodating organizational culture by respecting a

norm concerning principals' decision-making prerogatives). That structure, primarily because of the financial condition of the school system, did not include district-level positions from which principals could obtain substantial support services. The necessity to perform tasks that in some school systems are carried out by district-level personnel, as well as having to manage the day-to-day, year-to-year operations of the school, created a task overload for principals. This condition, in turn, interfered with the principals' ability as a group to give direction and impetus to ES project implementation.

The ES project coordinator also suffered from task overload, but for different reasons. The criterion of comprehensiveness that had guided the development of the Jackson County ES plan was ambiguous. As the first ES/Washington project officer had explained in the fall of 1972: "Comprehensiveness includes absolutely everything that has to do with education in the Jackson County school system." But "everything" apparently was an illusive concept for the persons involved in project planning. Consequently, they developed a project plan that called not so much for comprehensive change as it did for piecemeal change on a massive scale: a community involvement program, a staff development program, a system-wide curriculum development program, an early childhood program, a physical education program, a career education program, and a management study. In addition, the plan that was developed did little more than name each component and state its goals. The project plan, with the exception of the early childhood component, simply did not spell out the operational details of the various programs. Consequently, the project coordinator, with whatever help she could get from principals, was not faced simply with initiating and coordinating the implementation of the numerous plan components. She needed first to organize developmental processes for those components lacking operational plans so that there would be something to attempt to implement.

The planning and implementation effort confronting the formally designated managers and especially the project coordinator of the ES project was large and complex. The events of the planning year, as well as the judgments of the two ES/Washington project officers and even the Jackson County's ES project coordinator herself, indicated a lack of an appropriate technology in the school system for such an effort. On the whole, ES project administrators lacked a set of beliefs and techniques that facilitated planning and implemen-

tation of change—a finding not surprising in a school system where pay scales are low and where, as criteria for the selection of administrative and other personnel, kinship, friendship, and politics are at least as important as demonstrated competence.

These barriers to effective administrator performance in regard to project planning and implementation on the part of formally designated project managers were removed or compensated for in a variety of ways. Creation of new organizational positions resolved the problem of task overload. The ES project plan established the position of head teacher for the early childhood education program and assigned to it responsibility for managing the planning and implementation of that program. The initiative of the ES/Washington project officer established the position of full-time ES/Washington consultant for the project. To this position was eventually assigned the responsibility for the planning and implementation of the career education program. By thus increasing the size and complexity of the organization, the development and implementation of the two components were no longer dependent upon the performance of the Committee for Planning and Development. Therefore, even though task overload existed and persisted for those on the committee, the creation of new positions enhanced the chance that activity necessary for planning and implementing the two components could occur.

The creation of the position of the full-time ES/Washington consultant helped resolve the problem of task overload in another way as well. Some tasks formally assigned the ES project coordinator were assigned to the new position, lessening the inordinate demands on the time and energy of the project coordinator.

The establishment of the structural conditions within a school system to permit the performance of activity necessary for project planning and implementation, however, does not ensure that such activity will occur. An effective technology for planning and implementation must also exist. The story of the Jackson County ES project indicates three ways such a technology can be built into the organizational positions that have been "structurally freed." First, as the case of the early childhood education program indicates, a person from within the system who already possesses the requisite expertise may be placed in the appropriate organizational location. Such persons, however, were apparently rare within the Jackson County

school system because of the low salary schedule and the criteria used in hiring.

Secondly, a technology for educational change may be imported into the appropriate positions, as was the case in the career education component. The second ES/Washington consultant certainly possessed skills and knowledge for managing the planning and implementation of the career education component. Such persons willing to live in a rural area such as Jackson County, willing to work for the wages available, and willing to remain there (the ES/Washington consultant remained for less than a year) may be difficult to find. In addition, outsiders may not be familiar with local norms and values. No matter how competent in skills for planning and implementation, a person who fails to observe local norms and values may find what he or she attempts rejected—as was the case with the system's first curriculum director.

Finally, local persons already occupying positions strategically important for the management of the change process may be trained in the appropriate technology. The ES project coordinator received this type of training from the second ES/Washington consultant and from the State University professor in a course specifically tailored to the needs of the local ES project and its personnel. Significantly, the present ES project coordinator is a native of the school district. She is aware of its norms and values, is tied to it by kinship, and is likely to remain in the school system.

Butte-Angels Camp: Conflict and Transformation

William A. Firestone

Your attitude is "damn the children and full speed ahead!"

—The Superintendent

If he had so much as looked at me when he said that, I would have been in the next day to get out of my contract.

—A Teacher

School people are often loath to discuss old conflicts. As one teacher pointed out to me: "People learn from the past, but they don't like to be reminded of it." "Dredging up the past" can rekindle old divisions and endanger a staff's ability to work together; yet the analysis of these painful events is necessary for understanding and controlling the change process. Although members of a school system are cooperators in a common enterprise, they are also competitors for scarce resources who often seek to impose their own educational goals on the system. While this rivalry does not necessarily lead to conflict when efforts are made to innovate, it does so often enough that those responsible for providing leadership in change efforts must be prepared to deal with such strife.

Early implementation of the Butte-Angels Camp ES project was marked by an acrimonious dispute centering on the goals and man-

agement of the project, a dispute that threatened it with early extinction and cost the superintendent, the prime innovator, his job. The causes of this dispute included earlier conflicts in the district, a poorly organized planning effort, underestimation of the difficulties of implementing change, and nonsupportive monitoring from ES/Washington; running through all these issues was resistance to the concentration of influence in the superintendent's office. Redistribution of authority within the district at the end of the first year facilitated the project's transformation; shared influence allowed many teachers to attempt new ideas they had considered trying for many years. Simultaneously, however, the goals of the project became diffuse and its focus lost.

This chapter describes the transformation of the Butte-Angels Camp ES project: how financial constraints motivated a search for outside funds and what conflicts preceded implementation; how the initial response to the Announcement from ES/Washington committed the district to a direction for change not generally supported by the staff and how planning raised tensions by offering a promise of staff influence that teachers felt was never realized; then, how obstacles prevented the ES project from starting, what conflict followed, and how the conflict was resolved.

OBJECTIVES OF THE LOCAL ES PROJECT

The Butte-Angels Camp ES project was designed around the central theme of "personalized education" which, according to the project plan:

... considers the academic, social, emotional and physical needs of children. . . . A determination is made as to the needs, readiness . . . and interests of the child. A personalized program is then designed for the child. . . . Diagnosis and prescription are the vehicles to implement personalized education.

This theme would be considered operationalized if the staff developed an interest in maintaining warm personal relations with students and developed the ability to specify clearly student needs and means for meeting them. The theme is consonant with the thinking of the mainstream of American educators who emphasize the importance of "meeting individual needs," and most of the specific intervention strategies chosen are borrowed from the field of clinical

treatment of specific learning disabilities. Project leaders saw the essence of the innovation as applying a learning disabilities approach, as codified within the district under the label "diagnosis and prescription" (d/p), to normal children in the regular classroom. The plan and budget included numerous elements: a consultant to train staff, teacher aides, the purchase of new materials, time for curriculum development, a new self-evaluation unit, and a revised system of governance. The leaders used the central theme of d/p to integrate these diverse activities, personnel categories, and expenditures into one project, and the implementation of d/p became the focus of efforts to promote or resist the ES project in Butte-Angels Camp.

The superintendent had been stressing the importance of personalized education since the fall of 1970 when the staff of the Butte and Angels Camp school districts were brought together to plan for the consolidation of the two systems into the new Butte-Angels Camp district. Teachers were divided into twenty-two curriculum area or grade level groups and asked to develop five-year plans for program improvement. The superintendent's views were outlined in a centrally devised and widely circulated statement of district philosophy. It prescribed that "the objectives of the Butte Public Schools are to attain the cooperative development of the physical and mental processes so that each child may appreciate his total worth" and defined "Individualized Study" as:

Planning so that the teacher spends less time in formal "oration" and more time with smaller groups, and . . . with individual problems. Individualized programs are not tracking processes.

Individualizing received a mixed response in 1970. Twelve groups of teachers discussed ways to "individualize education," but the meaning of the term was unclear. One group even recommended tracking, and a North Central Association accrediting report stated that some department plans were not in harmony with the district philosophy. More important than opposition was the interest of teachers in a variety of other changes. Nine groups recommended developing a vocational program and eight wanted more aides. Many ideas came from only one group, including recommendations to offer home economics courses to boys, to create a mathematics curriculum coordinator with the time and authority to enforce uniform instruc-

tion in that area, and to shorten the junior high school day. Teachers thought in terms of their own special areas and were unable to plan in the system-wide terms that would be implied by ES/Washington's conception of comprehensiveness.

Yet these curricular ideas would not die. Many were introduced during planning for the ES project though very few appeared in the Formal Project Plan. Conflict during implementation concerned advocacy of these subsystem interests nearly as much as resistance to personalized education. Conflict resolution involved the use of federal funds for a variety of teacher-initiated programs and the de-emphasis of d/p after the first year. This change was ratified by the plan for the last two years of the project which called for the appointment of several curriculum coordinators and did not stress (but did not drop) d/p.

THE COMMUNITY SETTING

The Butte-Angels Camp district is located in a mountainous western mining area about 400 miles from the nearest major city. It was settled in the 1870s when the discovery of precious metals sent prospectors pouring into the area. Almost overnight the boom town of Angels Camp grew to 10,000 people, and it quickly became as famous for its gunfighters and gamblers as for its mineral wealth. When a major vein was located in Butte, three miles away, mining operations were concentrated there. Within a year the Deep Down Mine was started, and a decade later it was the area's largest. As mining replaced prospecting, the single prospectors were replaced by men seeking stable work who usually brought their families with them. These miners were primarily European ethnics: Cornish, Slavic, and Scandinavian.

In 1905 Butte had 8,000 residents and Angels Camp had 4,400. Since then, population has declined, erratically at first, but more steadily after 1950. In 1970 the 9,900 people in the district were heavily concentrated in the two towns; Butte had 5,200 residents and Angels Camp 2,400. The European ethnic groups were almost completely assimilated, and the only minority group was the American Indians who moved in to work in the mine and made up about 2 percent of the population. Seven percent of the families in Butte and 13 percent in Angels Camp had incomes considered below the pov-

erty level, while 19 percent in Butte and 25 percent in Angels Camp made over \$10,000 a year.

The area is still dependent on mining. Three-fourths of the workers in Butte and one-fifth of those in Angels Camp are employed in mining, all at the Deep Down Mine. Angels Camp is the district's commercial center. In 1970, \$2 million was spent on goods and services in Butte and \$10 million in the neighboring town. Angels Camp is also the county seat, and its colorful history attracts a large tourist trade. In addition, there is logging and ranching in the district's outlying areas.

Since the turn of the century, district voters have consistently favored Republican candidates. Presently, 62 percent of the registered voters are Republican, as are all county and state officials and the area's congressman. Strong Republicanism is part of the area's general conservatism. Its hallmark is a low tax ideology that emphasizes the wasteful nature of all government, the proliferation of unwanted services, and their associated tax burden. This ideology is at the center of local resistance to the Environmental Protection Agency's attempts to get the mine and the two towns to stop dumping raw sewage and refinery wastes into the creek which drains the area. Similarly, when the county government reassessed property in 1974 for the first time in a decade and property taxes jumped dramatically, an ad hoc Taxpayers Association placed intensive and effective pressure on all local government agencies to reduce costs and lower taxes.

THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

The district was formed through consolidation in 1971. Enrollment had declined from a peak of about 3,000 in 1966 to just over 2,300 in 1973. That year, the students were served by 135 teachers and counselors in seven buildings. The high school was administered by a principal and an assistant principal. In Butte the Central Elementary School had one principal; the West Butte and Lincoln buildings had another. Lincoln was closed in 1974. The Angels Camp schools were divided into a 7-8 junior high with one principal, and an elementary school whose principal also supervised three teachers in two rural schools. The central office staff consisted of the superintendent, the business manager, and several secretaries. The number

of students and staff would shrink throughout the life of the ES project.

The proportion of seniors entering college dropped from 45 percent in 1968 to 29 percent in 1973, but the curriculum remained largely college-oriented. Community residents and staff felt that the curriculum did not help the many non-college-bound students develop marketable skills, although a small work-study program was growing.

Two major barriers to planned change in the district were financial constraints and a divided staff. Consolidation was mandated because of the near bankruptcy of the Angels Camp district; the Butte system had been operating on reserves for several years. Almost 70 percent of the district's territory is in a national forest and exempt from local property taxes. Although the U.S. Forest Service partially reimburses the district, the school board argued that these funds were insufficient—much less than would be received if the land were taxable. Moreover, only 15 percent of the district's operating revenue comes from state aid; this state ranks forty-ninth in the proportion of income coming from state sources. The district relied heavily on property taxes which, in spite of the Deep Down Mine in Butte, were insufficient. In 1974 it accrued a \$134,000 debt on a \$2 million budget. Attempts to get the county to change assessment practices to bring in more income were unsuccessful until 1974 when reassessments angered the Taxpayers Association. At one angry meeting an Association leader drew cheers when he told the school board: "I'm here for only one thing. I recognize that the schools are working on trimming their budget. I'm telling you that you may have to cut programs you think you can't cut." By the spring of 1976, the district was warning tenured teachers that some might not be rehired for the coming year. New programs were out of the question—except with outside help.

The central conflict before the ES project began was between a large minority of militant secondary (grades 7-12) teachers on one side and the superintendent and the school board on the other. They differed primarily over collective bargaining, but also over ideas about program development and the extra work teachers felt the superintendent demanded of them. Teachers did not negotiate for salaries in this state until the legislature passed a collective bargaining statute in 1968. Because of financial constraints, however, Butte-

Angels Camp teachers received smaller salary increases after negotiations began than they did before. Animosity peaked during negotiations in the spring of 1973, between the time when the district drew up its ES-project plan and when the final contract was drawn up in Washington. That year the Butte-Angels Camp Education Association (BAEA) asked that the base salary be raised from \$6,600 to \$7,900; the board refused to grant any increase. When an impasse was reached, an arbitration panel was established according to state procedures for collective bargaining in the public sector. This panel's authority was limited in that its recommendations were nonbinding. The arbitration panel recommended that teachers receive a small raise, but the school board rejected the panel's conclusion and granted no raise at all. Teachers believed that the superintendent, a member of the board negotiating team until 1974, had to share the blame for that decision.

Since the superintendent was also the driving force behind the ES project and because of the timing of the refusal to raise salaries in 1973, teachers objected to the ES project even before it began, as a letter from a teacher to the superintendent indicates:

Dear [Superintendent]:

[The ES project consultant] will never be able to come up with an in-service workshop that will undo the damage done to . . . the ES project by the Board's firm action. . . . The alienation of the teachers is too high a price to pay for the money saved by rejecting the Advisory Board's recommendation.

Do you remember the elation we felt when word was received that the project was funded? Can you imagine how *disheartened* we would have been if, after all our work, the letter had said, "We will not fund you. . . ." Our teachers have not been funded.

Even before those negotiations, the BAEA was dissatisfied with its ability to influence the board and began to run candidates for board elections. In 1972 it successfully sponsored one of its former teacher negotiators. Two more BAEA approved candidates were elected after the 1973 elections. Hence, when implementation began in 1973, teachers felt they had a more responsive board than previously; but their antagonism towards the superintendent remained.

The superintendent's backing of a series of special programs that demanded additional work from teachers increased staff animosity towards him. The Central Elementary teachers took part in an intensive self-evaluation, covering everything from building use to

staff quality, that was designed by the Association for the Evaluation of Elementary Schools and patterned on the accreditation evaluations used for high schools. The high school staff worked on a large, successful effort to win the Bellamy Award, named after the author of the pledge of allegiance, which was given to an "exceptional high school" in the state. The consolidation planning in 1970-71 similarly exacted additional work from teachers. On the eve of implementing the ES project, the superintendent was viewed by the faculty as an expert in getting outside funds and special programs; but as one principal pointed out a year later, his teachers had five special projects in seven years. They were tired.

The superintendent might have received more cooperation if he backed the teachers' special programs in return, but he refused to approve several, including a request for a mathematics coordinator and another to shorten the junior high school day. In 1972 a new bio-ethics course was started in the junior high, but teachers felt that more staff-initiated projects were rejected than supported. They became bitter when asked to help with another of the superintendent's programs:

[Project planning] started out with a . . . defeatist attitude since all of these departments had come up with this five-year plan for reorganization in which they totally reworked the things they were doing. . . . It seemed that if teachers themselves didn't just go ahead and really take action and do the things, they just didn't get done. And some [teachers] had a very bleak attitude.

In addition, many militant teachers objected to the new approach to teaching which the superintendent had been advocating since 1970. They argued that it devalued subject matter expertise and required them to play a role for which they had no training:

A lot of us felt . . . that we had no business . . . playing around in the personal lives of children and making diagnoses that involved complex psychological understandings that we didn't have, that took us out of our subject matter area. Subject matter was kind of dismissed as, well, inconsequential. . . .

These teachers were more interested in a change like introducing curriculum coordinators who could emphasize special subject matter competence and instruction. They also wanted a tougher approach to discipline, which was felt to be incompatible with a personalized ap-

proach. Interest in subject matter instruction and discipline were combined in a cry to "maintain standards."

There was also a decidedly personal element to the conflict with the superintendent. He and many teachers were born and raised locally. Before becoming superintendent, he had held other administrative positions in the Butte system; antagonisms developed previously followed him into office.

Militant opposition was centered in the predominantly male staff in the upper grades; in 1973 only 7 percent of the elementary teachers were men, a sharp contrast to the 59 percent in the upper grades. The split between the militants and conservatives was recognized by all school personnel and regularly registered through seating patterns at a system-wide faculty meeting where most women sat in the front of the room to one side while the men and some female high school teachers sat on the other side and towards the back.

Militants and conservatives argued openly about how compliant they should be to administration directives. For instance, my field notes of a meeting to decide if the BAEA would maintain its affiliation with the National Education Association show that:

Mrs. Gianelli started talking about what it means to be a professional. . . . This isn't complete, but she likened professionalism to democracy because in both you have to respect authority. In the latter you have to respect the Constitution, and in the former you respect your superiors. . . . Prinze objected to having obedience in the definition, and Mrs. Gianelli said it's not obedience. It's respect.

This disagreement, rooted in basic differences in attitudes, was reflected in responses to specific grievances that were mentioned. Several secondary teachers objected to the special projects the district had taken part in. They saw the extra work required as an illegitimate attempt to extend the teacher's job and felt that additional compensation was in order. The conservatives, in contrast, felt a teacher should be "willing to go that extra mile." The secondary teachers also strongly opposed accepting the board's refusal to raise salaries in 1973. They had wanted all staff as a group to return their contracts unsigned, but the primary teachers refused.

Differences between the two sets of teachers extended also to their willingness to propose new programs. However innovative individual elementary teachers were, they rarely proposed changes re-

quiring building or system-wide decisions as did teachers in the upper grades. Hence, the superintendent's coolness towards teacher-initiated proposals was most resented in the upper grades.

FIRST CONTACT WITH ES/WASHINGTON

Although the district's regular income would not support new programs, it did employ some people who were fairly adept at finding outside funding. One was the public relations director—a journalism teacher whose course load had been reduced many years ago so she could act as liaison with local media and community groups. She also had the time to write and follow up proposals. One counselor with entrepreneurial ability had previously developed and publicized a number of small special programs and had some experience in proposal writing. Moreover, since the district had a reputation in the state as being interested in program development, information on new funding sources was often relayed to local personnel.

In December 1970, while planning for consolidation was still under way, the Butte district received ES/Washington's first announcement from the state Superintendent of Public Instruction. A small group of proposal writers from within the district drew up an application which was submitted in January and May 1971. Because this proposal was highly descriptive and emphasized the district's financial plight, little room was given to explaining the changes that would be implemented. The emphasis was already on individualized education:

... the basic objective [of the program] is to develop a comprehensive child-centered education system to serve the needs of each individual child. . . .

Restating the goals for the new district, they include primarily a child-centered curriculum; individual instruction to meet individual needs.

The only concrete mechanism for child-centered instruction suggested in this application was mini-courses.

The first application failed but, in the spring of 1972, the district received directly ES/Washington's Announcement of its new program for rural schools. Once more a small group of proposal writers put together an application letter. This one suggested a wide variety of changes in curriculum and teaching practices—including expansion of vocational education and the district's partly developed

TV facility—but the central theme continued to be “individualized education.” The district philosophy was reported to be “that each child be allowed to grow individually, [while] recognizing special interests, abilities, and limitations so that each can experience success through school contacts and classes; the entire curricular program is directed towards individualized instruction.” The major innovation of the district’s ES project would come:

... by completely developing a program which would be *diagnostic and prescriptive* in nature for each child, in which children would never have to experience frustration through being forced to do work which is beyond their capabilities.

In order to implement such a program, prescriptive educators would be needed as well as diagnosticians on a pilot level. [Emphasis added.]

On June 30, 1972, the district received formal notification that it had been awarded a one-year grant of \$46,000 to facilitate planning for a five-year ES project.

THE PLANNING PERIOD

ES/Washington endorsed the theme of individualized education by awarding the planning grant, but it ensured a continuously important role in planning by withholding a firm commitment for long-term funding. This theme was only partly understood and not completely supported by the staff. Hence, during the stage when the superintendent had to devise a clear, workable plan, he had to gain the support of both the staff and ES/Washington.

To gain staff support, the superintendent wanted all teachers to participate in planning (ES/Washington had its own reasons for wanting community participation). To facilitate full involvement, he divided the staff into committees similar to those used during reorganization, and asked community residents to attend meetings at each school in the district. The elaborate committee structure offered the promise of considerable teacher influence, although it increased staff work and the problems of coming up with a coherent plan. Even so, the final plan did not include some of the ideas most important to teachers and the community. As a result, the planning stage increased resistance to the ES project without establishing a clear set of procedures to implement. How and why this happened appears through an examination of ES/Washington’s initial guide-

lines, the planning activities in the district, the final contract negotiations in Washington, and the results of planning.

Initial Federal Guidance

Preparation began when the superintendent and counselor went to Washington in July 1972 for a meeting at which representatives of all rural districts would meet the ES/Washington program director and learn about procedures for planning. Shortly afterwards, the district was assigned two project officers. The first project officer was more of a consultant on individualized education and program development and worked with the district until January 1973 when a plan to present to ES/Washington was completed. The second continued to work with the district until just before implementation began in September 1973. ES/Washington's staffing pattern confused the people in the district. They were not sure which decisions were being made by the ES/Washington program director or which ones could be made by the second project officer or where the first project officer fit in at all. Hence, it was difficult to know which ideas coming from ES/Washington were suggestions and which ones were orders. While the planning document was being written, contact between ES/Washington and the district was maintained by weekly phone calls between the first project officer and various people in the schools. In addition, the first project officer visited the district in August 1972, and both project officers came in November 1972.

During the fall of 1972, ES/Washington was sparing with its advice to the district. In commenting on a meeting between teachers and the project officers, one teacher reported, "The meeting did turn out to be a rather general meeting, and that had not been the intention. . . . No specific action was an outgrowth of the meeting." Initial guidance was low because, according to the Announcement, one of ES/Washington's purposes was to "make available the opportunity . . . to test new ideas for educational improvement which are developed in and for a small rural school setting." Yet ES/Washington did have some specific ideas about the criteria for a good project. The most important of these was comprehensiveness, and ES/Washington provided documents during planning to help define that idea (see chapter 3). Still, district personnel felt that ES/Washington never provided guidance adequate to facilitate the design of a comprehensive innovation. When asked if he knew what ES/Washington meant

by the term "comprehensive," the superintendent replied: "No, because I don't think they knew either. I think none of us knew. We were feeling for a definition."

A few less complicated criteria were adequately clarified for the district. These included stipulations that federal money not be used for the renovation or construction of facilities or major purchases of capital equipment, that the plan include provision for local documentation and evaluation, that community residents be involved in the planning process, and that planning activities be recorded.

Beyond those expectations, the district felt that ES/Washington had other criteria that were being kept secret. The superintendent remembers that it was:

... a very frustrating thing [for ES/Washington] to say that we have no guidelines and yet [for us] to be evaluated on a sub rosa set of guidelines that ... we didn't know but we found out later that they were evaluating on. ... If they'd just told us that to begin with, it would have been a lot easier than to try to outguess them all the time and wondering if we were getting the right things in. So what was supposed to be a proposal based on our ideas was indeed a proposal based on what they wanted. ... The thing that really bothered me was that we were playing games with each other, rather than just having them say we've got to do this because Congress has said this. ... Why not tell us that?

Local Planning Activities

The planning grant permitted the district to create two new sets of positions. First, the district added to its central staff an ES project consultant on individualized education. This man had a doctorate in educational psychology and ran a center for children with learning disabilities in a small city fifty miles away. He and the superintendent had met at area workshops and shared similar educational philosophies. It was hoped that through the ES project his procedures for working with children in a clinical situation could be adopted for use with all students in a school context.

To document planning activities, a chief documentor was chosen from the teaching staff and released from some of her regular duties. She and her assistants were among the staff's informal leaders and acted as informal liaison between their peers and the district's leaders. Besides contributing written records, they put forward teachers' ideas when they could.

Community and staff participation came through a series of

large meetings, but these were flawed by unclear descriptions of the ES project theme and in the role of participants. The theme was not clearly stated because the project leaders tried to anticipate ES/Washington's needs while their own ideas were constantly changing. For instance, during planning, they shifted from the use of the phrase "individualized education" to "personalized education." This change, made to adopt a phrase used by teachers and parents and remove the prevalent idea that students should be isolated for treatment, merely increased the initial cynicism with which the staff met the program: "Every couple of years we get new jargon, a word for the year. Every year, something new comes up." Project leaders were never able to clarify critical terms used to describe the ES project or indicate which educational practices it subsumed and which ones it did not. One said that:

The d/p process was never meant to be an individualized education program; . . . it's far more than that. Individualized education . . . is merely one way of meeting the needs of specific children. But the d/p process doesn't work . . . properly until . . . you're able to incorporate all these types of innovations in trying to meet the needs of children. For example, individualized education is one way of going at it; modular scheduling is another way of going at it. You can take programmed materials as a third way of going at it to meet the specific needs of a specific child.

If nothing else, this general description increased teachers' difficulties in knowing which of their ideas would not be built into the Final Project Plan.

The undefined role of teachers in the planning process is hinted at by the frequent but contradictory complaints from teachers of manipulation and lack of leadership. The following dialogue, recorded in the official minutes of the administrators' meeting in fall 1972 shows how the superintendent failed to lay out the staff's right to make decisions:

- Prin: When we do recognize a trend in the documentation, who makes the decision about what our program will be?
Supt: We have to change attitudes, individualize.
Prin: Who makes the decision?
Supt: Our faculty does this.
Prin: How are we going to do this?
Supt: We must all come to the same conclusion. We have some idea about where we should end up.

Prin: Who has determined we will have prescription and attitude change?

Supt: I have decided. We hope facts are so well grounded that we can come to no other decision.

Planning meetings were being used more to gain support for personalized education than to allow teachers to influence the ES project's general direction or build their own ideas into it.

Between October 4 and December 12, 1972, three sets of community meetings were held at each of the district's schools. One mother said the agendas covered:

... mostly the things [the superintendent] wanted to do. And I just have a notion that he was setting his program before us before he even called it that ... But he was also asking [for] opinions, and opinions he got by the bushel, I'll tell you.

In the high school and junior high school there was great interest in vocational education. Another mother reported: "The community is interested in vocational education. I've heard it for the twelve or thirteen years I've been here. They felt that only the top percent of students are educated." The consensus was that the curriculum over-emphasized college preparation and gave too little attention to manual and shop courses. In general, the community meetings became a forum for airing complaints about the school system, including such details as the selection of fifth grade cheerleaders and the advisability of keeping up a student lounge in the high school.

Three meetings were also held with teachers, but since the agendas were set by the administration, the militants in particular lost their enthusiasm. Said one: "It got to be that a lot of curriculum work was just ... sitting down and waiting until somebody made up their minds which way they wanted to go." At the first meeting on October 19, teachers were introduced to the importance of comprehensive planning for change and were then divided into groups like those used for curriculum planning during preparation for reorganization. They were asked to assess progress made in implementing the reorganization plans and to suggest what directions to emphasize and how ES money should be used. Working from the reorganization plans ensured consideration of "individualized education."

On November 27 the "personalized education" theme was presented along with a new statement of the district's philosophy. It included a list of eighteen goals, the first four of which were: "com-

prehensive planning, . . . the development of diagnostic procedures and prescriptive programs, . . . allowing students to grow as individuals but not in isolation, . . . [and] the development of a variety of educational approaches." Small group sessions were devoted to discussion of project goals.

On January 15, 1973, when teachers were asked to make their recommendations for the content of the project, their reports dealt extensively with personalized education and "diagnostic" and/or "prescriptive" teaching. Four groups requested workshops to clarify this approach, and three suggested that special personnel be hired to diagnose students and prescribe for them. Evidently teachers still did not understand or wish to be involved in the new venture.

Other recommendations were only loosely related to the project theme but reflected recurring staff concerns. The Central Elementary School fifth and sixth grade report concentrated on scheduling problems while that from Angels Camp advocated team teaching, which the Angels Camp principal had been trying to implement for some years. The request for a mathematics coordinator and other ideas from reorganization were also repeated. Requested materials to be purchased through the ES project included cassette recorders, projectors and dark shades, and new physical education equipment. This list suggests that teachers were seeking ways to facilitate their current educational approach.

Once the meetings were over, a small group was formed to pull the variety of staff suggestions into a single plan. The group included the counselor, the consultant, and the public relations director, and was closely supervised by the superintendent. The only "teacher representative" was the chief documentor. Community residents were unrepresented.

The District's Plan

The plan sent from the Butte-Angels Camp district to ES/Washington in the winter of 1973 was about 100 pages long, repetitious, and filled with description of the district's existing program. Although it was organized around the five facets of comprehensiveness defined by ES/Washington, the two innovations were the d/p process for implementing personalized education and the new governance system. The discussion of d/p focused on procedures for staff training and administrative changes which were believed to facilitate the

process, such as team teaching; but the essence of the new relation between student and teacher was not clarified, nor were the means for creating the new relation. The governance system was added to meet ES/Washington's interest in community involvement and changes in administration and governance. The new committees were described in some detail.

Staff suggestions received a mixed treatment. The vocational program, which became a crucial indicator to secondary teachers of their ability to influence the planning process and was also supported by the community, was not included. District personnel said that ES/Washington's refusal to purchase capital equipment did not allow the district to start the kind of program the staff wanted. Nor were the proposals for the mathematics coordinator and other changes desired by secondary teachers included. The most important items included were an aide program, which interested elementary teachers, the Angels Camp elementary principal's team-teaching project, and a plan suggested by counselors to revise their program. All these activities were loosely justified in terms of personalized education.

Contract Negotiations

On May 31, 1973, the superintendent, the counselor, an elementary teacher, and a school board member arrived at ES/Washington's home office to "negotiate" the final contract. District personnel expected a routine meeting to clarify details and fix the final dollar amount. Instead it was a harrowing experience that left them with a fear of ES/Washington that lasted until a new ES/Washington program director was named two years later. At one point, the first director's abrasive questioning of the school board member about technical jargon buried in the district's plan reduced her to tears. After the first day, the superintendent and counselor sat up most of the night trying to revise the plan.

ES/Washington's standard procedure at that time was to provide harsh critiques of draft plans. In addition, the agency distrusted the reporting of Butte-Angels Camp personnel and felt that their plan was unsound. ES/Washington thought the district had too many students for the rural competition. In 1971 the district had a few more than the 2,500 maximum; but the student population dropped the following year and, by the time implementation began in 1973, enrollment was down to 2,300. It continued to fall in later years. Still,

the agency basically approved the plan and awarded the district a three-year \$734,000 contract.

In approving the plan, ES/Washington did not tamper with the parts dealing with personalized education; but changes were required in ordering supplies, staffing, and evaluation. Teachers had hurriedly put together a long list of material they wanted to buy with federal funds; the list was never collated or edited. The superintendent did not realize that seventeen overhead projectors had been ordered until the ES/Washington program director informed him. The director insisted that materials be reordered the following fall, but not until a curriculum catalog of all materials in the system had been compiled in a form that would facilitate sharing among buildings.

The plan writers originally requested an ES project director because, they argued, the district's administrative staff was already overburdened. ES/Washington adamantly refused to allow such a position because it feared that hiring expensive personnel would divert program funds from the classroom. After much negotiation, an agreement that the superintendent would act as director and the ES project consultant would work in the district several days a month was worked out. ES/Washington reserved the right to review the aide program and summer inservice plans annually. Because the plan's discussion of evaluation was unclear and the district lacked the relevant expertise, ES/Washington insisted that the district hire an ES/Washington consultant chosen by the agency to draw up a detailed evaluation plan an untrained person could follow. This was done in the summer.

Staff Reaction to Planning

The ambiguous definition of the teachers' role in the planning process had raised hopes that they would have a significant impact on the general direction of the ES project. The conduct of the planning meetings dampened those hopes. A reading of the Final Project Plan suggested to teachers that they had much less influence than had been anticipated and increased both their distrust of the superintendent and their cynicism and resistance to the ES project. The militants especially saw the plan as an indication of their lack of influence. Said one:

We were never involved. What seemed to take place was that the documentation was there, and at some point last fall during the planning stage, the administra-

tion, namely [the superintendent], presumed that enough documentation had taken place to solidify the project and state what it's going to be, and from that point on, the project assumed his direction and overall control.

The feeling that the staff influence was minimal was widespread. In the fall of 1973, a survey indicated that 94 percent of the staff felt that the superintendent had a great deal of influence over project planning. The figures for the ES project consultant, ES/Washington, and teachers were 45 percent, 26 percent, and 15 percent, respectively. The staff felt that each actor named, except for teachers, should have less influence. According to the survey, 42 percent felt the superintendent should have a great deal of influence while 63 percent thought teachers should.

Teachers' orientations toward the ES project itself are more complex. This same survey shows that 70 percent of the respondents thought the project was "a good idea." Acceptance was pervasive, but not particularly strong. Militants informally referred to notices requiring attendance at paid summer workshops as "draft notices" and commented: "Here we are supposedly personalizing education, but we are getting mass indoctrination." Even the more conservative elementary teachers were not enthusiastic. One young woman, for instance, reported: "I was really excited about [the ES project]. I thought the others here were too, but some elderly teachers get so established. They were willing to cooperate, but [were] not excited about it."

The teachers' acceptance of the project was definitely affected by their perceptions of their influence during the planning period. Of the seventy teachers who approved of the ES project, fifty-four felt they had "some" or "a great deal" of influence, thirteen said "very little" influence, while only three said "none or almost none." Only one of the sixteen who did not approve of the ES project felt he had "some" or "a great deal" of influence. Finally, three felt they had "very little," but twelve said they had "none or almost none."

By seeming to offer teachers the opportunity to influence the content of the ES project through participatory planning, but then writing a plan that did not prominently feature their ideas, district leaders, partly in response to perceived pressure from ES/Washington, increased animosity towards the ES project and set the stage for the conflict during implementation.

THE IMPLEMENTATION EFFORT

In the fall of 1973, the staff's initial ambivalence was turned into resistance, leading to open conflict in the winter and spring of that school year. This section will examine major factors involved in the conflict, the reconciliation, and the redirection of the project.

Barriers to Implementation

The problem of control of the district, which became a project issue during planning, continued. It was accompanied by special problems of implementation including added work, confusion about what was expected, and lack of administrative support from principals and ES/Washington. The primary source of both the added work and the confusion was the d/p process, the central means for implementing personalized education. It came to consist of two parts: working with students and paper work. Each teacher was supposed to pick out a small number of students who would receive special attention. After observing the student in class and collecting available records, she would diagnose the student's problem, prescribe a course of treatment, and carry it out. To help the teacher organize her work with each student and provide a record of progress for ES/Washington, the teacher would fill out a "d/p sheet" for each student. These sheets included sections for raw data, a diagnosis, a prescription, and a record of treatment. They were to be examined periodically by the ES project consultant and principals, who would simultaneously train the teacher and help her improve her work. According to the district self-evaluation plan designed by the ES/Washington consultant, twice a year the district's "teacher evaluators," who carried out the plan, would collect a random sample of d/p sheets with the names of teachers and students removed for a blind evaluation of the quality of d/p work being done in the district.

The d/p process added materially to teachers' work. They complained that giving special attention to a few students and filling out the sheets took away from their regular classroom work and required longer hours of preparation. More important, teachers were confused about how to do d/p. During mandatory summer workshops in 1973, the ES project consultant had shown them how by providing sample cases for teachers to discuss, diagnose, and prescribe for; but when confronted with actual students, teachers were unsure what to do.

The d/p sheets that were supposed to provide some guidance were not available until after school had started. Then they added to the confusion. Teachers sought guidance on how to fill out the sheets from all available sources. The most frequent questions about the forms concerned the kinds of data and amount of detail to be included. Because they were aware that district authorities only evaluated their work as it appeared on the sheets, filling them out correctly became so important that suggestions were sometimes received as directives. For instance, a few days after the ES project consultant praised the inventiveness of a few teachers who had attached samples of student work to d/p sheets, another teacher indicated she was now "required" to include such samples.

Other questions arose. For example, in spite of official clarification that no teacher would have to fill out more than six or eight sheets, rumors persisted that many more would be required. Teachers were unsure which students to select for treatment. The process emphasized diagnosing problems, but the superintendent argued that d/p could be used with all students and that eventually every child in the district would be included. After some time, teachers discovered that they could prescribe for advanced students, but they remained unsure about how to treat "average" ones. In the upper grades, the teachers' multiclass schedules and courses of nine weeks duration created additional problems by reducing the amount of teacher contact with each student. Teachers wondered how they could get to know students well enough to diagnose a problem, especially a non-academic one, and find time to treat it.

Teachers also wondered how to use the individualized d/p approach in the classroom. In one training workshop, a teacher presented a "case," not of an individual, but of a whole class being disrupted by a small clique. The consultant said she could try the d/p process on several problem students at once, but he recommended that she pursue some other approach to solve that problem and only use d/p where discipline was not a problem. This advice suggests that d/p can only be applied to whole-class problems that can be reduced to those of individuals.

The problem of an individual versus the group more commonly took the form of conflicting student demands on the teachers' time. One teacher pointed out that, while she was filling out d/p sheets on a few students, she had to attend to others; and those who were not

in the d/p program resented the attention given to those who were. But the frustrations of d/p were worst early in the year and had disappeared by the fall of 1974, when teachers felt they knew what was expected.

The project governance system and the ES/Washington-mandated curriculum catalog also added to the teachers' work. All teachers were required to attend meetings of the Curriculum Development Committees (CDCs), and most also attended either meetings of the committees formed at each school for community input into project governance or those of the ES Project Advisory Committee. Proposals for change originating in the CDCs and community committees were forwarded to the advisory committee for approval before being sent to the school board or ES/Washington for final ratification. Reviewing the first months of implementation, one teacher said: "At first we had so many meetings I thought we were meeting instead of teaching." In addition, a few teachers in each school had to list all the books and curriculum materials in each department, recording title, location, and its use for d/p. This work was especially frustrating because guidelines for how to record information were unclear, the catalog was never organized on a district-wide basis as ES/Washington required, and teachers anticipated (correctly) that it would not help them find materials they wanted.

Implementation was complicated by lack of administrative support from ES/Washington and from the district. ES/Washington lost contact with the district during most of 1973-74. The second ES/Washington project officer left the agency in August 1973. A third project officer served from October through December 1973 and made one visit. Two ES/Washington staff members visited the district in February 1974, and a delegation from the district went to Washington in April. Until a fourth project officer, who would work with the district from 1974 through 1976, was appointed in May 1974, communication between the district and ES/Washington was haphazard, and project leaders were unsure whom to contact for help.

Haphazard communication also slowed the flow of federal money to the district. Although teachers had attended ES project workshops all summer, no money arrived to pay them, so in the fall the district had to pay them out of its own funds and hope it would be reimbursed later. The third project officer helped speed the cash flow, but as late as December 1973, ES/Washington was still \$22,000

behind in its payments schedule. ES/Washington also delayed the arrival of teacher-ordered materials to the district. After the curriculum catalog was complete, teachers had to submit the orders first made the previous spring, and most orders required ES/Washington's approval. The lack of a project officer and the district's fear of the agency after the negotiating session kept project leaders from pushing for quick processing of those orders, and materials did not begin arriving in the district until after March 1974.

Meanwhile, the principals did not share the superintendent's enthusiasm for the ES project. They indicated that they too were fatigued from earlier special projects and that the ES project added to their work. Their lack of interest was communicated to teachers, one of whom observed:

[The principals] are well-meaning individuals who happen to be caught in the middle of this situation, having to agree with the faculty's dissent about the project and at the same time, holding onto their jobs which means cooperating with [the superintendent]. They've expressed that themselves in informal conversations with teachers.

The superintendent devoted much of the fall administration meetings to exhorting principals to support the program vigorously.

One of the principals' main tasks was to help the ES project consultant train teachers to improve their skills in d/p. But the principals shared the teachers' confusion. They spent a great deal of time on the telephone "sharing each other's ignorance," as one of them put it. Their confusion added to teachers' work. One teacher, for example, recorded information on a child's d/p sheet, but her principal thought only test scores should be included, so he made her redo her sheets to follow proper form. When he found out that a variety of data should be recorded, he made her do them over once more.

Teachers might more easily have coped with their new tasks if they had help, especially from ES aides; but principals frequently and without warning assigned aides to substitute duty because their salaries were lower than the standard substitute wage and because they were familiar with the students. In the spring after teachers complained, this practice was forbidden. Raising the aides' salary also discouraged it.

The governance system and teachers' fears that the project was being used to covertly implement staff evaluation kept alive the con-

cerns about the superintendent's influence. Like the planning meetings, the governance system was described as a means for staff and community to propose changes in the district's program, but at first it was controlled by the administration. Four meetings of the Curriculum Development Committees were scheduled at the start of the year, and no arrangements were ever made for groups of teachers to call additional meetings. The agendas for those meetings were also set by administrators and had a constraining effect on CDCs. One teacher told a meeting of the ES Project Advisory Committee: "There was a difference between what we wanted to achieve [at CDC meetings] and what we were supposed to achieve, and we were uncertain about whether to go with what we wanted to do or what we should do." When the second CDC meeting became the setting for an open display of opposition to the project, all further sessions were cancelled.

Similar problems faced the ES Project Advisory Committee. The superintendent's descriptions of that body's authority were contradictory. At various times he said that every person had one vote, that he had veto power, and that "... this is where I get my ideas. We're all equal here." His ideas about the correct ways to make decisions and his habit of using groups with lay members as publicity channels led, in the first three meetings, to an emphasis on activities designed to educate committee members rather than to legislate. Among the educational activities he scheduled were a set of brainstorming exercises designed to demonstrate "proper decision-making processes" and how to fill out d/p sheets. He also arranged for a presentation by a book company salesman on new educational materials.

Two administrative procedures inhibited the development of the advisory committee's potential legislative function. First, the superintendent required that proposals follow a five-part format with sections defining the need for the new program, its goals, its objectives, the activities involved, and the means for its evaluation. Parts of two meetings were devoted to explaining this format. Second, proposals had to be submitted to the superintendent a week in advance so that he could have them circulated to members before the meetings. These requirements complicated the process of presenting new ideas and gave the superintendent procedural grounds for delaying the processing of some proposals without discussing their substance.

Finally, teachers feared that the ES project was being used to

bring about teacher evaluation. The first ES project consultant initially met some resistance from teachers who thought he was supposed to report to the superintendent. The people doing the project's self-evaluation work were named teacher evaluators because they were teachers taking extra duty, and some of the staff thought the name meant these people were to evaluate them. In January 1974 teachers feared the upcoming random evaluation of d/p sheets would be used to assess teachers. The d/p sheets do in fact facilitate teacher evaluation since an instructor's ability or compliance with the project can presumably be measured by counting the number of sheets he fills in and assessing their quality. Fear of staff evaluation was not ungrounded because the school board was pressing the administration to develop a system for that purpose, though the board wanted it based on classroom observation. Since the superintendent feared that task would compete with the attempt to implement d/p, he told principals to use their meetings with teachers to discuss their d/p sheets as evaluation sessions.

From Discontent to Conflict

By December, because of the initial problems of implementation, the district was in what the superintendent called the Christmas doldrums. Conflict began after New Year's and escalated until the school board and later ES/Washington became involved. The random evaluation of d/p sheets, which was explained to the staff in CDC meetings in January, was the first major issue. In the high school a teacher evaluator explained the evaluation process while emphasizing the elaborate precautions being taken to ensure that raters would be unable to connect specific sheets with particular teachers. He also passed out copies of the checklist used to evaluate the sheets; and because of the tension the subject aroused, he made a joke about how teachers could use the list to "grade" their own sheets. That got a few laughs, and even more followed when he encouraged teachers to read the evaluation plan by suggesting: "If you have fifteen minutes to spare and are really bored, you should read this section." When another teacher pointed out that her anonymity could not be maintained because she was the only one teaching her subject to high school students, the whole room broke into laughter, followed by nervous and derisive questions and more laughter.

When the superintendent got up to speak shortly afterwards, he

was furious. He castigated teachers for making light of the teacher evaluators who, he said, were trying to protect the staff. Several times he repeated that because teachers did not support the ES project, they did not care for students. "Your attitude," he concluded, "is 'damn the children and full speed ahead!'" and rushed out of the room.

The superintendent's speech put the high school in turmoil. The woman who had questioned the confidentiality of the procedure was in tears. Most teachers were incensed at the superintendent's outburst, and a couple said they had been near quitting during it. As word of the event spread through the system, it caused reverberations in other buildings as well.

In the following weeks pressure on teachers intensified. Because the Angels Camp Elementary School was both implementing a team-teaching system and believed to be the school most proficient in the d/p process, the superintendent strongly suggested that other principals experiment with teaming as a way to facilitate d/p. Simultaneously he modified the function of the form being used as an evaluation sheet by principals when they visited teachers to discuss d/p by stating that it was also to be used to satisfy the school board's demand for staff evaluation. The last part of the form asked for an indication of the teacher's attitude towards the ES project; and when high school teachers asked if their tenure depended on their attitude towards the project, they were told it did. This information was also spread to other buildings.

Shortly afterwards, the governance system was put to the test as teacher-supported ideas that the superintendent had previously vetoed were presented to the ES Project Advisory Committee. Because of the minimal amount of time for discussing teacher-initiated ideas at CDC meetings, these proposals did not come from those bodies. As an example, teachers in the junior high were trying, as they had since reorganization, to reduce the length of the school day as a way to reduce the building's discipline problems. In the fall of 1973, a new staff member suggested that a form of modular scheduling might solve the problem by breaking up the student's day and making it more interesting. The junior high school wrote up separate proposals to both shorten the day and implement modular scheduling in that building. Both were presented at the advisory committee's February meeting but not, as required, to the superintendent one

week in advance. At the meeting he asked a number of difficult questions about the relationship of the proposals to d/p and then announced a number of decisions on procedure and agenda that indicated these proposals would receive no action. The next day he scolded the junior high principal and the person who had suggested modular scheduling for developing those proposals. The superintendent's behavior strongly indicated that ideas he disapproved of would never receive advisory committee ratification.

By spring, support for the ES project had declined markedly from its early fall levels. Surveys conducted by the teacher evaluators in March and April 1974 indicated that 62 percent of all teachers "supported" the ES project but only 53 percent wanted it to continue. Sixty-eight percent were dissatisfied with their "participation in the policy-making procedures of the ES project." (These figures suggest that teachers were generally discontent with the ES project and especially unhappy about their influence over project decisions.) The comparable figures for teachers in grades 7-12 (grades where the militants were concentrated) were 59 percent, 45 percent, and 79 percent, indicating that most discontent was found in those schools.

Well before the nadir of staff support for the project was reached, conflict became intense enough to involve the school board, which included three members who had been elected with teacher support and a fourth who was friendly to much of the staff. Militant teachers informally told the board about the superintendent's outburst at the high school, the threats—received from principals but attributed to the superintendent—that noncooperation with the ES project would result in firings, and his refusal to hear the junior high school proposals in the ES Project Advisory Committee. Board members met several times with the superintendent and asked the school attorney to determine their contractual obligation to him. At the end of January, the board met privately with the principals and ordered them to take a more direct role in supervising teachers. The board also told principals and later, informally, teachers that noncooperation with the ES project alone was not sufficient grounds for dismissal. In March 1974 there was considerable speculation within the system about whether the superintendent would soon be fired. Although he was not, the board passed a number of resolutions reducing his authority, including one that endorsed the Project Advisory Committee, enjoined it to follow all its procedures, and directed it to

consider all proposals before it at the next meeting. At the advisory committee's next session, it passed the proposal to shorten the junior high day; the proposal was later ratified by the board. The committee also ruled that the junior high staff had the authority to rearrange its own schedule.

ES/Washington found out about these internal conflicts only in April, when a delegation from the district visited Washington and before the advisory committee acted on the junior high proposal. The ES/Washington program director ordered the district to reconsider its governance system and emphatically suggested that the size of the Project Advisory Committee—more than twenty people—be reduced to make it more efficient. When the fourth ES/Washington project officer arrived in May, district personnel strongly opposed reorganizing the advisory committee because it had acted favorably on teacher proposals, and they felt its size made it more representative. The project officer directed the superintendent to give teachers more advance warning about when planning for ES-funded summer work would start and to organize that work around teacher projects rather than using the format of uniform, mandatory workshops employed in 1973. About \$32,000 of the \$43,000 spent for summer work in 1974 went to teacher-initiated projects.

After the Smoke Cleared: 1974-76

During the second implementation year (1974-75), as a result of decisions made in the spring of 1974, the ES project ceased to be a divisive issue. Some work with d/p continued, but new, teacher-initiated activities were begun as well. By the fall of 1974, teachers grudgingly accepted the ES project and the d/p process. Activities that had caused much anxiety the year before became the source of bad jokes. According to my field notes: "Just before the random evaluation of d/p sheets in the winter of 1975, I saw a sign in 'the high school teachers' lounge that said, 'The notebooks will be picked up Feb. 14.' Underneath, somebody had written, 'Get to work, Pinze.'" Generally teachers viewed the project as a minor irritant rather than a major source of strain. Said one: "It's one more thing to worry about. It has little relevance to what I do, and it's a pain in the butt." Even during the first year, teachers had diagnosed and prescribed for a satisfactory number of cases. The evaluation plan specified that 25 percent of all students should be included in the d/p

program the first year, and that figure became a quota. In fact, 30 percent of all students were included the first year. Fifty-four percent of the students treated were in the six upper grades. Since those grades include 53 percent of the staff, it seems that, in spite of their opposition, the militants did their share of the project work. No comparable figures exist for the second year, but all but one teacher did fill out some sheets. On the average, teachers continued to work with about six cases each.

The d/p process was no longer an issue because teachers had learned how to do what was expected of them; but in doing so, a displacement of emphasis had occurred. Filling out the d/p sheets, which at first had been a means to guide teachers' work, became an end in itself. Because these forms were the only hard proof that teachers were using d/p, teachers could satisfy the demands of administrators by simply filling out the forms. The sheets themselves required very little work, eight hours over the course of a school year would suffice to complete six. When actually working with children, they could take shortcuts. One was batch processing, filling out a number of forms the same way. Such batch processing was an indication that students were not receiving special treatment and, indeed, that d/p had resulted in no new treatment at all. One elementary teacher working with a near-record fourteen cases explained her system to me:

- A: Since I teach math, all my sheets are on math; and most of them are on math facts. . . . About half the children have trouble with speed. The other half just don't know [those facts].
- Q: Are there any other children with the same problem that you haven't written down?
- A: Another fourteen are not quite as far behind. . . . I'm doing the same thing with them, but I'm not writing it down.
- Q: Does filling out the sheets help you work with those students?
- A: It doesn't help that much. Most of the time you know what you've got there anyway. . . . I'm doing the same thing with charts and grade books, and it's quicker.

Batching appeared in more or less extreme forms; but because it was hard to detect, it is difficult to know how common it was. Interventions with students took many forms, for example: using a blank keyboard typewriter in typing classes (a standard practice before d/p), finding ways to help students extend their attention spans, and,

on an individual level, asking parents to buy special glasses in a nearby city for a student with a complicated eye-brain coordination problem that the local optometrist had been unable to diagnose.

Meanwhile, a host of subprograms were starting under the auspices of the ES project. Some were designed to make personalized education in the district more effective. These included a committee to record all the original treatments that teachers were using, to organize them by the kind of problem to which they were applicable, and to provide this information in a useful form to the staff so ideas could be shared. In addition, a combination of ES and Title I funds gave support to special teachers for children with learning disabilities. Other activities had no relationship to the main theme of the project. For instance, in the summer of 1974 teachers used ES funds to revise a course on Indian culture, collect material for a junior high bioethics course by traveling to the Spokane World's Fair, and develop a career education program for the elementary school. Between the spring of 1974 and the fall of 1975, the ES Project Advisory Committee approved the use of ES funds for (1) a mathematics curriculum coordinator, (2) the construction of an outdoor classroom and the design of a K-12 environmental education curriculum, and (3) a reading curriculum coordinating committee, none of which were anticipated by the project plan.

The shift in emphasis from d/p to new subprograms resulted from teachers' continuing lack of enthusiasm with d/p, a shift in control within the district, and the ES/Washington project officer's interest in general facilitation of the project. Teachers argued that the emphasis on giving students individual treatment, central to d/p, was not new. To them the original aspect was the paperwork, to which they objected. Teachers at all levels made disaffected comments:

I've always done d/p. I just haven't written it down before.

It has caused more book work . . . more forms. You have to document what you are doing with the kids you choose to work with.

I dislike that part of teaching: meal tickets, lunch accounts. . . I put [d/p sheets] in the same category.

Throughout the district the major beneficiary of the first year's dispute was the new school board, which moved afterwards to con-

solidate its power. In 1974-75 the superintendent and then the principals were put on "accountability contracts," which made all raises contingent upon completion of specific duties. The superintendent took a year's leave of absence during 1975-76, and during that year the board announced that he would not return. The board's primary interest in the ES project was in getting financial support for the educational program. It was no more interested in d/p than in many of the subprograms initiated by teachers. After it forbade firing teachers who did not show interest in the d/p process, d/p was de-emphasized.

The fourth ES/Washington project officer was interested in what he called the general "renovation" of the Butte-Angels Camp district, not just d/p. He saw himself as a facilitator and said:

What I really try to do is to encourage [people in the district] and to stimulate them to do things once they say they'd like to do them. For example, with the librarian. . . . I said that, "If you have anything you would want to do, what would you do?" And she said, "Well, I'd like to tear this wall down so we could get . . . some microreading materials here. . . ." The building principal was walking with me at the time and he said, "Hell, that's a very easy thing to do. . . ." So he and the librarian got together for the first time I think in quite a while. . . . They've actually worked out a project and got it underway.

His outlook encouraged him to support any change ideas in the district regardless of its relationship to d/p and personalized education.

Only the ES project consultant continued to work towards the improvement of the d/p process with any effectiveness. He had always tried to sell d/p as a way to "professionalize" teaching and make it more satisfying by making teachers more effective. He never argued with teachers who disagreed with the idea; and by avoiding an authority role, he was never associated with threats to fire noncooperative teachers. Hence, reactions to him ranged from lukewarm to extremely positive. However, once assured that most teachers understood the mechanics of the d/p sheets, he began helping teachers with problem students. Even though he did so to help teachers refine their diagnoses, the staff was appreciative. Two factors limited his effectiveness, however. Once the board and administrators de-emphasized d/p, the teachers who disapproved of that part of the ES project could ignore his advice. In addition, he was constantly assigned administrative activities connected with the ES project, limiting his

opportunities to work with teachers individually. Still, almost all new ideas for working with students individually that entered the district through the project came from him.

CONCLUSIONS

Although the second ES/Washington program director once told the research project staff that the Butte-Angels Camp project was one of the agency's more successful efforts, the impact of the project was limited. The implementation of d/p resulted in minimal change in teaching approaches in the district. True, all teachers were filling out d/p sheets for some students. As so often happens, however, completion of forms which had originally been seen as a means to guide teachers' work with students and collect information on novel treatment strategies had become an end in itself. Unfortunately the only uniform impact of the attempt to personalize education was a small increase in teachers' paperwork. Teachers attracted to the ES project consultant's learning disabilities approach adopted some of his methods in their classrooms, but teachers who were more concerned with "maintaining standards," and saw his approach as a threat, could comply minimally with the new demands without making any changes in how they taught.

After the spring of 1974, the ES project supported a whole variety of smaller programs and allowed the faculty to implement ideas which they had been thinking about for years. This support represented a major change from the "comprehensive" and, implicitly, coordinated change discussed in the Announcement sent to the district in 1972. Yet by 1975 ES/Washington was happy to accept that kind of change. NIE's review committee for ES/Washington concluded in the spring of 1975 that:

[ES/Washington] had proposed one thing and produced another; [ES/Washington] had not delivered on the rhetoric of "comprehensiveness."

[The second ES/Washington program director] and his staff should be directed to identify the most promising themes emerging from the several sites for special attention.

In response, a thumbnail description of all ten rural sites written a year later by an ES/Washington staff member listed three new developments in Butte-Angels Camp: the use of teacher evaluators, the ES

Project Advisory Committee, and an environmental education program that teachers started during the project's second year. Hence, although the superintendent's and ES/Washington's original goals were at best only partially met, the funding agency was willing to consider the Butte-Angels Camp ES project a success.

The transformation of the Butte-Angels Camp ES project resulted from problems with the project's original design, a lack of administrative support, and the continuing struggle for control of the district. Project plans are inadequate if they are ambiguous at critical points or if they do not take into account the realities of the system to be changed.

Two points of confusion inhibited implementation of the Butte-Angels Camp project. First, ES/Washington never clarified what it expected of the rural districts. The sense that the agency had a "set of sub-rosa guidelines" and its failure to adequately clarify the meaning of "comprehensive change" created much guesswork during planning when project leaders tried to anticipate ES/Washington's requirements to get funding.

Second, the idea of diagnosis and prescription was unclear at first. D/p was conceived as a complex approach to teaching, but an approach is difficult to implement without thorough familiarization with both the philosophy behind it and the specific techniques it requires. Both philosophy and technology were provided by the ES project consultant over time, but the initial confusion frustrated teachers and added to their work. In response to the problems d/p presented, teachers invented strategies that emphasized paperwork aspects of the process at the expense of working with students.

The Butte-Angels Camp project did not take into account the loose organizational structure of school districts or the group nature of classroom instruction. Classes and schools are relatively autonomous units only loosely controlled from above. Moreover, elementary and secondary schools are not structured alike. Elementary school teachers are assigned primarily to a set of children; secondary school staff members to subject areas. Thus, teachers' training and work differ between the two levels. Furthermore, a district can tolerate considerable variation in teaching style at any level. There is normally little pressure to standardize teaching styles district-wide, and different definitions of good teaching flourish. Where comprehensive change involves an attempt to institutionalize a standardized teaching

approach, it encounters resistance from those with different styles. In Butte-Angels Camp, chiefly the secondary teachers resisted d/p, because their ideas of good teaching differed most severely from the new model and because that model provided problems for them. Moreover, the superintendent lacked the means to enforce compliance.

The ideas behind d/p were developed in clinical settings. The intervention strategies which the ES project promoted were designed to treat individual students, but they increased rather than minimized the teacher's normal problems of classroom management by demanding additional time. The major relief offered was additional manpower—aides—but they were not available to all teachers. With no suggestions about reorganizing classrooms to facilitate giving attention to individuals, project activities became an added burden, and teachers adjusted by finding means to reduce new demands.

Inadequate administrative support added to those demands while reducing their legitimacy. The shock of negotiating the contract in 1973 plus the later loss of contact with ES/Washington kept leaders from getting the money and authorization for new expenditures on which the project depended. The administrators' misunderstandings of the project added to the teachers' work while the principals' and school board's lack of enthusiasm for d/p watered down the superintendent's mandate to pursue this new approach.

The struggle for control was carried out largely within the district. Because ES/Washington lacked detailed knowledge about local conditions, it exerted its influence erratically. Its one attempt to mediate the dispute between teachers and the superintendent was ineffective because the district worked out a solution before the project officer arrived. Often the superintendent took the blame for actions that resulted from ES/Washington's behavior.

The conflict between the superintendent and militant teachers was a continuation of earlier disputes, but it was also directly inflamed by the management of planning and implementation. The problems of project design and administration added to the demands on teachers without providing new recompense, and the teachers showed their aversion to this situation. When the superintendent responded by threatening to fire uncooperative teachers, the staff felt he was using his authority illegitimately. Teachers appealed to the board, which supported them.

Attempts at staff participation made the issue of control especially salient. Participation may reduce resistance to change, but it does so by implicitly inviting normally silent groups to speak up. This possibility involves risks for already influential actors, who may find their own influence jeopardized. Yet if the new participants do not gain influence, they may feel that their participation is not real, and frustration may arise.

The superintendent initially established formal mechanisms for staff participation—planning committees and the Advisory Committee—but then tried to control them by vetoing ideas he disliked. His domination increased resentment to the ES project. The intervention of the school board and, to a lesser extent, ES/Washington, reduced the superintendent's influence over the teachers. Afterwards, teacher resistance declined dramatically, but the project moved in a new direction. Further development of d/p depended primarily on the ES project consultant's persuasive efforts. Simultaneously, as teachers began implementing their own ideas, the project became a congeries of small subprograms, and its central focus was blurred.

Arcadia: Local Initiatives and Adaptation

William L. Donnelly

Practical wisdom, fiscal responsibility, and local initiative have been characteristic of the Arcadia public schools during the 146 years of their existence. Relying on a positive evaluation of these qualities by the Experimental Schools (ES) program, Arcadia's educators applied for and later received ES funding. They were seriously concerned with providing a better educational service in a growing school system.

Those involved in the initial planning for the ES project were enthusiastic in their expectation that the federal funds would permit a successful upgrading of the school system. Their enthusiasm would be sorely tested, however, by the organizational conflict centering on a teachers' strike at the beginning of the first year of implementation; the planned changes would require adaptations to the bureaucratic educational environment within which the school system operated.

OBJECTIVES OF THE LOCAL ES PROJECT

The Formal Project Plan for Arcadia was comprehensive. It included programs for all members of the community from preschool

age to adulthood; the school curriculum was to be expanded; teaching was to become individualized and guidance-oriented; student services and guidance counseling were to be increased; student travel outside the school district and cooperation with the community were to become important innovations.

Improvement of interpersonal relationships among all persons concerned with the schooling process was considered to be one of the two key concepts of the plan. It was identified as "humanizing," and constituted a continuous thread through all of the major goals of the plan. The second key concept was called "individualizing." It referred to efforts to break down the traditional classroom instructional method by permitting students to work at an individual pace, although still assigned to grade and class sections.

The plan called for modifications of the existing school system rather than drastic reorganization. No major changes were proposed in administration and governance of the district, nor in the rules and regulations by which the system operated. The external structure was to remain intact, while alterations were made to the internal operating components. An ES/Washington consultant who visited the site during the second year of implementation efforts described the program as "the renovation of a school district." What was happening, he said, was analogous to remodeling a house: improving the electrical and plumbing system, painting and papering the walls and ceilings. Such changes improve the appearance and functioning of the house, without altering its basic structure or shape.

THE COMMUNITY SETTING

Arcadia is frequently described as a "nice place to live" by residents who recount with pride the friendly, cooperative spirit of the inhabitants, the cleanliness of the land, the quality of the schools, and the moderate pace of life compared with the more frenzied pace of urban life. The school district draws its name from the village of Arcadia which is located at the confluence of the Little Elk and LaSalle Rivers. The village was founded in 1828 by an enterprising miller who saw the water power potential and constructed a flour mill to serve the farmers then settling on the nearby fertile prairie.

Located in the Midwest, thirty-five miles south of a medium-sized city, the district encompasses an area whose residents are em-

ployed in both agriculture and light industry. While agriculture has recently become capital-intensive, employing fewer workers, industry has expanded, gradually employing more workers. The arrival of new industries has coincided with greater population mobility and has brought new residents to the school district. Mobile home and recreational vehicle factories have been set up nearby. They require a large number of unskilled workers and usually pay higher wages than other industries.

Many of the local residents recently migrated to the area from West Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, and Arkansas, hoping to escape the poverty they had known at home. They have contributed to a population growth of more than 26 percent from 1960 to 1970.

Old time residents call these newcomers "southerners" and criticize them for living in substandard housing and for introducing problems to the area. The expansion of the schools, the new occupational roles, and the trend to rural nonfarm residence have all been part of new social developments in the community, brought on by the large in-migration. The ideals of the small town have collided with values and beliefs introduced from the outside. An economy of local businesses has been threatened as national corporations located factories in the area. Civic service to the community has diminished as residents have found other options for their free time. The highly valued striving for achievement is seen as disappearing among the youth, being replaced by a concern for happiness and a life without "hassles." Community autonomy has been further threatened as federal and state regulations have been placed on a multitude of local functions, including government, health, public welfare, and education.

The reduction in the number of farmers in the area coincided with an increase in the number of persons employed in industrial and service occupations. By 1970, only 5 percent of the residents of the school district earned their principal income from farming, while nearly 50 percent were employed in manufacturing. Yet the school district continues to be influenced by its agricultural heritage in values and attitudes, even though the majority of residents no longer are farmers.

Residents of the school district in 1970 measured slightly below average for the state in most socioeconomic index scales. The median:

number of years of school completed for all persons over twenty-five years was 12.0, while the state average was 12.1. Median family income in 1969 was \$9,700, and 8.2 percent of all families were living on incomes below the poverty line. These figures compared unfavorably with state averages of \$11,032 for median income and 7.2 percent of families with income below the poverty line.

THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

The Arcadia public school district covers 110 square miles of level-to-rolling agricultural land and serves a population of 5,200. The heart of the district is the village of Arcadia where all school buildings and most of the educational services available in the district are located. Separate from other political boundaries, the school district covers parts of seven townships in portions of two counties.

Irregular boundaries resulted from the annexation of twenty-two ungraded rural schools during the 1950s and 1960s. These annexations more than tripled the number of students attending, from 506 in 1950-51 to 1,612 in 1970-71. Before 1950, most students lived in the village; at present, one-third of the students live in the village and the other two-thirds live in the surrounding townships.

The rapid increase in enrollment forced the district to build two new elementary schools and a high school between 1952 and 1967. The original multiclassroom school building, constructed in 1927, continues in use as the middle school.

Governing the Schools

Most residents are not actively concerned with the operation of the schools, except on those occasions when a controversial issue arises. They do not feel competent to make decisions about the organization and financial operation of the school district, and such matters are left to the professional administrators. School elections usually produce only light interest among the electorate. Until the 1970s, most school board members lived in the village, reflecting the advantage enjoyed by village residents of living in proximity to the schools. Since the 1950s, however, one and sometimes two farmers have continuously served on the board, as the influence of those outside the village increased.

As the school district expanded during the 1950s and 1960s, the tight bonds between the schools and the village community loosened. Some residents of the former rural districts transferred their school interests to the Arcadia district in an effort to maintain some control in the education of their sons and daughters. These parents had formerly been involved in the direction of the ungraded country schools and, when annexation occurred, they worried that their interests would be ignored by the village-dominated school board. As residents outside the village gradually became more interested in school board membership, the balance shifted so that only two of the seven members of the 1975-76 board were residents of the village.

The school board meets twice a month to consider policy and budgetary issues. Closed sessions are rare, although board members frequently discuss school-related issues at parties and other social events. Aside from one or two newspaper reporters, board meetings are usually held with no additional residents in attendance. Until 1975 the meetings were held in the superintendent's office, thereby creating, for many residents, the impression that public attendance was not encouraged. Some residents still believe that these meetings are not open to the public. Since 1975 seniors in a government class have attended board meetings. Because of crowded seating, the board decided to move its meetings to the high school library, which is several times larger than the superintendent's office. The move was not publicized and has not led to attendance by adult residents.

The School Administration

A superintendent of schools, hired by the school board, is the executive officer of the district with primary responsibility for daily operation of the school district. He has an administrative staff consisting of three principals, the ES project coordinator, and the community education director, the latter two positions having been created by the ES project.

All of the administrators have master's degrees in education, and the superintendent has a doctorate in education. Salaries for administrators are below statewide averages, even though it is acknowledged that they have more responsibilities and work longer hours than most other administrators in the state.

The Teaching Staff

Each member of the professional teaching staff is accredited by the state Department of Education. All teachers in the system have baccalaureate degrees from accredited colleges and universities, and 16 percent have master's degrees in education or counseling. Teachers' salaries are also below statewide averages. The staff is young, with the average age near thirty-two years.

Most teachers, like the administrators, have received their post-secondary education in the state. The largest number attended a regional university in a nearby city; 45 percent have received one or more degrees there, and many teachers continue to work toward advanced degrees.

Educational Goals and the Curriculum

Many residents over the years have recognized the achievements of the district in preparing college-bound students, but many also found fault with the school system for not meeting the needs of those students who find school not challenging or who have no higher educational goals. The problem of how to serve technical students has become more important in recent years as the school district has annexed country schools and, at the same time, needs of the students have multiplied.

The curriculum and teaching techniques are influenced by the views of the residents and reflect their belief that the schools should concentrate on the three R's and do away with the innovative "frills." Self-contained classrooms and traditional teaching and grading are characteristic at all grade levels, although many of the teachers employ innovative personal styles that modify the basic pattern.

The Students

The schools enrolled 1,672 students for the 1975-76 school year, an increase of only 4 percent over the previous five years. More than 96 percent of the students are white; most come from working-class backgrounds.

Several high school students participate in a work-study program, spending part of their school day in class and the remainder working in local industries and retail businesses. In contrast, Arca-

dia's schools offer no courses in agricultural education, something school administrators attribute to little student interest.

Students participate enthusiastically in the athletic programs, and the participants are highly esteemed in the school and community. Student government operates as an extracurricular activity with little effective voice in school policy and operation. Consequently, participation in student government carries less prestige than excelling in athletics.

In recent years, over 40 percent of the graduates have enrolled at nearby universities, colleges, community colleges, business schools, and trade schools. No records are available on the number who complete such schooling, although the dropout rate is thought to be high.

The Financial Resources

The proposed budget for the 1975-76 school year lists estimated expenditures of \$1,895,475, up more than \$600,000 from the 1971-72 budget of \$1,291,491.57. The district has always been known for fiscal responsibility, and the school board places high priority on efficient budget management. The school tax rate totaled 23.5 mills for the 1975-76 school year, four mills below the state average. The financial burden on taxpayers has actually decreased in recent years from 27.2 mills in 1968-69 to the present rate, which is at least one mill lower than nearby districts.

The voters approved bond levies in 1953, 1956, and 1964 to pay for the construction of new school buildings. In those years building costs were lower, so that Arcadia's debt retirement burden is less than one-fourth of the state average. Some buildings have been constructed or enlarged without needing to ask the taxpayers for additional funds, through shrewd management of general operating revenues.

Local property taxes make up more than 35 percent of the annual revenues. State school aid constitutes almost 45 percent of the budget, and is based on an equalizing formula which provides a greater proportion of aid to poorer districts. The remaining 20 percent of the budget is obtained from federal sources and miscellaneous revenues.

Integration with External Educational Agencies

The school district interacts with federal, state, and county educational agencies, as well as other nearby school districts, several

universities and colleges, and various educational service organizations.

Arcadia receives federal funds for a remedial reading program for vocational education, a hot school lunch program, and the ES project. Additional funds are received through the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act administered through an agency of the county government.

The state Department of Education assumes overall responsibility for certification of teachers and statewide guidelines for curriculum. Those responsibilities are channeled through county intermediate school offices which provide services and support to individual school districts within the county, including liaison with the state department, the coordination of teacher certification, and special educational programs.

Access to Information

Communicating information about the schools to the residents is a problem. There is no local newspaper or radio station. The district is served by a wide range of news sources, but they all originate in other communities, from small-town newspapers to those serving major cities; from a radio station serving a city of 7,000 to those serving the major cities; plus several television stations. The problem is not one of isolation from news and information outlets, but that the district is overlapped by so many competing media.

Communicating with school district residents requires use of several of the commercial media. Emergency school closings are announced over several radio stations to assure broad coverage; news articles about the district are published in several newspapers to reach everyone. (One benefit is that people living in nearby communities are likely to be aware of Arcadia school activities.)

Communications within school buildings, as well as to parents, are maintained through printed bulletins and a public address system. The printed bulletins list events for the week and short news items of interest to the staff, parents, and students. Announcements of special events or changes in the daily schedule are announced through the public address system. Perhaps the most rapid means of communication, however, is through the "grapevine" between staff members and students.

FIRST CONTACT WITH ES/WASHINGTON

Arcadia first heard of the Experimental Schools program in March 1972, several days before the week-long spring recess, through the Announcement sent out by ES/Washington. After receiving the letter, the superintendent, noted for his budgetary skills and ability to attract outside funds, notified his three principals and a high school science teacher who had several years before successfully applied for a federal grant for an outdoor laboratory. This small group worked during the recess, gathering information and writing the Letter of Interest.

Although the superintendent provided the initiative for the application, most of the writing was done by the high school science teacher. He had a reputation for being one of the most resourceful and innovative teachers in Arcadia. He was also widely recognized for his ability to establish rapport with students. During his nineteen years of teaching in Arcadia, he had initiated numerous projects which expanded the school program.

The timing of the receipt of the Announcement from ES/Washington was fortunate. The week-long recess afforded the teacher and administrators time to prepare the Letter of Interest. If the notice had been received during a busy part of the school year, it is possible that no one could have spared the time for such an effort.

The Letter of Interest described problems which Arcadian students had, including their negative self-perceptions and attitudes:

Many students have a low self-concept as evidenced by low scores in this area on the statewide assessment tests. They have negative or apathetic attitudes toward school, the administration, most teachers, other students, and education in general. They have little faith in themselves or others and are generally pessimistic about life, their future, and their fellow man.

The Letter continued by linking these student attitudes with problems in the schools:

These attitudes show up in excessive truancy, dropouts, pregnancies, and minor vandalism and misconduct in school. These students experience little success in school, feel that they are rejected, that no one cares about them and they charge teachers with only caring about the "good" kids and showing favoritism to them. Most of these students lack any definite goals, so there is no adequate way of measuring their achievements and satisfactions.

The findings from the attitude assessment study were the only systematic data about student attitudes prior to the planning for ES, and the district was fortunate that the results of the previous year's state assessment test were available for incorporation into the Letter of Interest.

The fifteen-page Letter described the school district, its location, facilities, size, staffing, and various statistical indicators. It also described various programs and strengths of the district as well as the problems. In writing the Letter, only a small group of staff members were involved, but there was no effort to limit discussion or ignore other staff members or residents. Rather, the application deadline limited the potential for broader involvement in this first planning phase.

In June 1972, the district was notified by ES/Washington of the award of a one-year planning grant and the possibility of continued program funding. During the summer months the superintendent made plans for the fall, when he would begin to organize the staff for the planning year ahead. A week before the opening of school, the teachers were informed of the award and of the efforts all would have to make to plan successfully a five-year project.

THE PLANNING PERIOD

One year was allowed for the development of the Formal Project Plan. Beginning with the opening of school in September 1972, administrators, teachers, school board members, pupils, and residents were involved in developing and writing that plan. Most of the \$99,000 planning grant was used to pay ES project leaders, teachers, and consultants. The planning year ended successfully on June 23, 1973, with the award of a three-year contract for \$715,614. Funding for the fifth and final year was to be negotiated at a future date near the end of the fourth year.

Some teachers and administrators remember those first months during the fall of 1972 as a time of high-spirited cooperation. Committees of teachers and residents formed, planning sessions focused on specific curricular areas, some staff assignments were made, and efforts were begun to inform the public. Later, that enthusiasm faded as the planning was tempered by the demands of ES/Washington for a formal document, and as teachers began to fear that they were not involved in making decisions.

In September 1972, committees of interested teachers were formed to work in the areas of mathematics, reading, learning problems, early childhood education, business education, vocational opportunity, recreational activities, music-humanities, penmanship, humanizing, self-concept, school-community relations, and exploration of previously untried curricula. Teachers made individual decisions whether to participate in planning the ES project and which, if any, committee to join. Many of the committees were composed of teachers sharing similar teaching responsibilities. For example, of the four members of the committee on music-humanities, three were music teachers.

By early November, eighteen committees had been formed. Seventeen were chaired by teachers and one (transportation) by a resident. Each committee was responsible for developing specific sets of goals and suggesting methods for achieving them.

Early in the autumn of 1972, an inservice advisory committee was established to provide direction and guidance to the ES project during the five years of funding. The committee was composed of representatives of the students, faculty, administration, and residents. It met only during September 1972 and was never operational; its functions were not clearly defined, and the members never developed a clear set of objectives. Its existence fulfilled a specification in the original Letter of Interest, but its objectives were smothered by the interests of the ES project leaders in curricular change.

The entire administrative staff and sixty-five of the seventy-six teachers were involved in one or more committees. About two dozen parents and residents and a dozen pupils were involved as members of these committees, including the ES project advisory committee, which was responsible for overseeing the entire planning process. This supervisory committee met until May 1973, although it provided no guidance after February 1973. The creation of the ES project advisory committee satisfied another demand by ES/Washington for an overseer committee. Although it functioned effectively for six months, the time-consuming efforts to modify and rewrite the Formal Project Plan focused the decision-making responsibility on the ES project leaders and the committee was eventually forgotten. Neither the ES project leaders nor the committee members made efforts to continue its role and significant community involvement ended at this point.

Visits to Universities and Other School Districts

During the planning year substantial efforts were made to learn about new practices in other school systems. Teachers and administrators visited other districts and two state universities to observe innovative educational programs.

The superintendent also established contact with superintendents at other ES sites. During the early months of 1973, he attempted to schedule a meeting among the superintendents of the six districts then participating in the ES program. However, this effort was discouraged by the ES/Washington project director, reportedly because of his fear that interaction among the sites might lead to contamination of the individual programs.

Consultants

Consultants were hired to assist the district in planning the overall program, as well as to design specific components. A group of consultants at the regional state university was involved in developing the total plan, in writing up the formal document submitted to ES/Washington, and in designing the local ES evaluation. Other consultants in various specializations were hired to assist with particular programs.

One of the most successful consulting relationships developed with an institute for research on early childhood. The "perceptual" component of the ES project was directed toward development of a physical education and testing program in the early grades to improve motor skills and thereby help eliminate learning difficulties. Consultants from the institute conducted workshops to aid teachers in identification and correction of the problems. Several staff members also visited the institute for further study. This relationship also led the school system to form a long-term relationship with an architect associated with the institute to develop improved learning environments. When he learned that Arcadia planned to build a new middle school, he became interested in the plan and eventually designed the building with suggestions from students, staff, administrators, and the school board. The most innovative part of this project is that middle school students helped plan the building and high school students will construct part of it. The architect has received many inquiries from around the nation about this project, because of the unusual approach in which students are actually involved in "helping to build their own educative environment."

Writing the Plan: Frustration and Compromise

The Formal Project Plan was prepared by the ES project leaders and outside consultants with the assistance of the committees and submitted to ES/Washington on December 15, 1972. It was subsequently reviewed by consultants to ES/Washington who requested changes.

Waiting for a response from ES/Washington concerning the acceptability of the final draft signaled the beginning of a new phase in the relationships between the school district and the federal agency. After months of planning and struggling to write a document which contained the hopes of many for a program of change, anxiety arose as the district awaited judgment from policy planners in Washington. It took the form of questions such as: "Is [the ES/Washington program director] really able to judge our needs here in Arcadia?" "What degrees does [the ES/Washington project officer] have which qualify her to make decisions about our schools?"

The month of January 1973 brought these issues to the forefront when the ES project leaders received a formal critique and response to the plan. The communications from ES/Washington indicated overall appreciation of the efforts made by the staff to develop a totally comprehensive plan for innovative change in the schools. However, the response also indicated that the plan needed substantial reorganization. Four basic criticisms were made: (1) the goals were not related to the proposed methods for changing the program; (2) the proposed changes lacked integration and conceptual organization; (3) the goals for the guidance approach to teaching would be difficult to accomplish; and (4) the intended goal of individualizing instruction was not consistent with the use of methods focused on "remediation." Finally, one reviewer downgraded the plan for showing little in the way of specifics tailored to the particular character of the Arcadia district.

The school administration and the ES project leaders discerned two different kinds of criticism in ES/Washington's response. ES/Washington appeared to be asking for greater precision in the writing of the proposal. This kind of criticism was acceptable. But Arcadia personnel also concluded that ES/Washington was criticizing the plan as being overambitious. Such criticism, through written and telephone communications, seemed to be an indication of prejudice against the capabilities of the rural school system; local pride was challenged.

The ES project leaders, eager to activate their program, believed further refinements of the plan were a waste of time. The requests for revisions without accompanying directions disappointed them. Furthermore, the prospect of rewriting the plan was frustrating to the Arcadia staff; based upon their prior experience with funding agencies they had expected the first draft to be accepted. The first ES/Washington project officer assigned to the site failed to alleviate the confusion and frustration. The subtle suggestions which she offered, but never clarified, produced anxiety in the ES project leader assigned to rewrite the plan. Uncertainty about exactly what was required in the document continued.

Following the submission of the second draft of the plan in mid-February, the ES/Washington project officer visited Arcadia to inform the local project staff that a "complete rewrite" would be necessary because of the lack of specificity and organization of the document. This second rejection convinced the superintendent and the ES project coordinator that ES/Washington was trying to force the plan into a framework which was compatible with the needs of Washington bureaucrats rather than with the original objectives of the Letter of Interest. Moreover, the superintendent was angered because he believed that the original concept of the ES program, emphasizing local initiative, was being threatened.

While willing to have the plan reworked into a more organized and conceptually consistent form, the superintendent and the ES project coordinator were dismayed at the prospect of having to modify it to suit the desires of outsiders—Washington burraucrats—and by doing so possibly cause the plan to become less acceptable to residents of the school district. They were also concerned about the extra costs involved in each of the rewriting tasks. The requirements for rewriting added unbudgeted costs to the project and required explanations to the school board. Most importantly, it forced the ES project leaders to devote considerable time to the task of rewriting the document, time, they believed, which could be better used in developing programs, organizing teachers, involving pupils and residents, and instituting pilot programs.

By the middle of April 1973, the first ES/Washington program director realized that the ES project leaders in Arcadia were exasperated and sent an ES/Washington consultant to assist in completion of the plan. The consultant conveyed the hope that the ES project leaders would concentrate their document on those five components

which were most thoroughly planned, and delay plans to activate eight other components. The ES project leaders, angered by this suggestion, asserted that they were competent to activate all components of the plan and that the only problem was the unwillingness of ES/Washington staff members to provide direct help and suggestions for preparing a final draft of the plan.

The consultant was apparently convinced of the competence of the ES project leaders and their desire to activate all components of the plan. He communicated those views to the ES/Washington program director with his recommendation that the entire plan be approved. His report also included a criticism of the ES/Washington staff members for failure to be consistent in their communications with the Arcadia ES project leaders.

The consultant's visit and his subsequent report had a significant effect on the ES project leaders. His criticism of ES/Washington gave them added confidence in their proposed project. Subsequent telephone conversations with the ES/Washington project officer convinced them that her superiors had told her to iron out the communications difficulties. She invited the ES project leaders to Washington for a discussion of the plan "page by page, if necessary" and to discuss a preliminary budget. The ES project coordinator and his assistant accepted the invitation, but the superintendent declined, indicating he would not participate until the final budget was negotiated.

Sweet and Sour Success: The Planning Year Ended

In late May 1973 the ES project leaders went to Washington for final negotiations and to sign a three-year contract. They emerged from that session confident that they had been treated less harshly by ES/Washington than had other districts. They also believed that the third draft of their plan, submitted on May 11, 1973, was more sophisticated and complete than those of most other participating districts. Actually, they were required by ES/Washington to rewrite their plan once again, and this fourth version was forwarded to Washington on August 15, 1973, eight months later than the original date anticipated by the ES project leaders.

Support for the ES project was easily won from the citizens who already supported the superintendent and his efforts to improve the school system. A positive attitude toward the project quickly

developed among members of the school board, PTA leaders, the Rotary Club, and others who were kept informed of the progress of the planning document.

Confidence in the ability of the school district to implement the plan was perhaps exemplified by the statement of one board member: "We would have done most of these things, anyway. The money [ES funds] only helps us to do it." Some of those involved in the planning of the ES project shared this confidence, although others believed that without the ES money none of the plans would be implemented. Most residents of the district, however, looked upon the project as merely another educational program. Despite the superintendent's efforts to inform the public of the goals and the large amount of federal funds which would be used to achieve those goals, few recognized the potential of the project. The traditionally conservative political nature of the district contributed to a fear among some that the ES project represented another intrusion by the federal government into local affairs.

The early enthusiasm of the teachers had dwindled substantially by the end of the planning year. The change of attitude was brought on by four interrelated circumstances: (1) few teachers were involved in project decision making—communications between ES/Washington and Arcadia were almost completely limited to the ES project leaders, including the administrators and two teachers who had been given minor administrative jobs; (2) teacher suggestions and ideas were generally being ignored; (3) teachers believed ES activities would interrupt "normal classroom activities"; and (4) teachers believed that they would be assigned extra duties without additional compensation.

Teachers had willingly volunteered many hours of their time in developing the project components, without compensation. Yet they were later to complain that much of their work was disregarded by the administrators. Rewriting the proposal three times caused many of the original ideas and suggestions to be modified or abandoned. The teachers claimed that their work was replaced by the suggestions of administrators simply "because an administrator had a different idea."

For instance, most teachers in the district repeatedly recommended a full-time coordinator of media services to enable effective utilization of the extensive audiovisual resources of the school dis-

strict. These requests were repeatedly turned aside by the administrators, who sought to avoid adding another person to the payroll. The audiovisual coordination responsibilities were divided among several employees, adding to their existing duties. Teachers complained that this "piecemeal approach hampered and restricted our whole AV program."

As the planning year progressed, the teachers' concerns became aggravated; they became increasingly worried that the administration would assign them additional work responsibilities. One teacher described the situation this way: "... the main concern was not with pay for volunteer work but with pay for mandatory work. The teachers simply wanted to get paid for *required* work *beyond* their normal workload." Teachers wanted to be paid for all work which they considered "required," that which the administrators ordered them to do. They claimed that they were still willing to volunteer beyond their regular duties, but volunteer work would have to be on activities the teachers wanted. They made a distinction between those work-related activities which they did voluntarily for the benefit of students, school, or community, and those which administrators declared to be for school or community benefit.

Teachers, administrators, and the school board did not share common definitions of what was educationally beneficial. Their differences were long standing, but they were aggravated by the planning year of the ES project and soon led to conflict.

THE IMPLEMENTATION EFFORT

The Arcadia ES project was scheduled to begin with the opening of schools in September 1973. The contract was signed on June 23, but the final draft of the project plan was not approved by ES/Washington until late August. This late approval was described in a quarterly report to ES/Washington as a handicap:

The events of the first quarter (June 11 to September 15, 1973) were influenced most heavily by the fact that the contract between [Arcadia] and the National Institute of Education was not finalized until the week of June 25. Actually, major rewriting and formal negotiations were still in progress during May and June.

As we were initially anticipating a contract by April, our plans for the summer, 1973 emphasized a concentrated inservice training program for the

school staff. As it became more evident that a contract would not be ratified before the end of June, we were forced to modify our inservice plans for the summer. Teachers and other staff who would have been available for inservice proceeded with plans for vacations and summer employment.

As a result of this situation our rate of progress during the first quarter has been significantly slower than we initially planned.

Whether that delay had a significant effect on implementation is moot because the Arcadia teachers began a strike at 8:30 a.m., September 4, 1973, the very hour when the new school year was scheduled to begin. Seventy members of the Arcadia Education Association (AEA) voted to "withhold services."

The teachers and board had failed to reach agreement on several issues, including salary, the group medical insurance carrier, personal leave time, preparation time for elementary teachers, and compensation for work performed by teachers outside the regular school day. This last item revolved around the teachers' demand to gain some control over their roles in the ES project. The board insisted on retaining the responsibility for determining when teachers would receive extra-duty pay for participating in ES activities.

The strike brought tensions in the school district to a boiling point. In the past, disputes between teachers and the school board and its school administrators had always been kept out of the public view. For the first time, the district's residents were confronted with visible conflict in the schools. The news media gave high priority coverage to the strike. In addition to television coverage by stations in nearby cities, NBC sent a crew to cover the strike for the *Today* show and the *Evening News*. Nearby radio stations broadcast a news release issued by the board, warning the teachers that unless they returned to work, they would be fired and an entire new teaching staff recruited.

This threat infuriated the teachers and united them in their determination to lessen the power of the school board. But the board was determined not to tolerate what they defined as an illegal action by the teachers. Both sides displayed inflexibility in their public statements, thus increasing the hostile feelings between them.

During the strike, the ES project coordinator was pressed into duty as the spokesman for the board and administration. In this capacity he answered all incoming telephone calls to the schools and issued statements to residents and the news media about the position

of the school board. He issued the statement which threatened the teachers with mass firing and abruptly ended the rapport he had established with many teachers during the planning year. His actions during this period have been described by one teacher as "probably the most devastating single event of the dispute." Prior to the strike, most teachers viewed him as a friendly and supportive educational innovator. Afterward he was seen as an administrator, part of the enemy camp, and many teachers felt betrayed by his actions.

One week after the strike began, the school board held a regular meeting, attended by nearly 500 residents, including fifty-five of the seventy-seven regular teachers employed in Arcadia. It had hoped to persuade those present that the teachers' demands were unreasonable and that its last offer to the teachers constituted a just settlement of the contract dispute.

The majority of the residents who voiced opinions during the meeting, however, criticized the manner in which the board had handled the negotiations. Most of those who spoke from the audience questioned the tactics of the board and urged them to settle the strike and reopen the schools.

An agreement was reached at the meeting to obtain the services of a fact-finder to mediate the contract dispute and determine conditions for a new two-year contract. His decision would be binding on both sides.

The teachers returned to school the following morning. There were no further interruptions for the remainder of the school year. The fact-finder, a professional negotiation specialist and professor of labor relations, was appointed shortly and conducted meetings with both sides. After a series of such meetings, he finally issued his compromise settlement terms in January, four months after the strike. Participants on both sides acknowledged that the terms favored the school board. The teachers were disappointed. With some grumbling, they accepted the terms and signed a two-year contract, ending one of the most acrimonious events ever to occur in Arcadia.

A Rough Beginning

At the conclusion of the one-week strike, the ES project leaders made efforts to begin the implementation of some of the project components. They began with those which could be implemented with minimal contact between administrators and teachers. Both

sides continued throughout the school year to avoid unnecessary interactions. Teachers carried out new functions related to the ES project with much less enthusiasm than had been evident a year earlier. Distrust and fear of retribution were widespread.

Throughout that first year, the ES project leaders avoided group meetings with the faculty. No meetings with the high school staff (the most militant of the four school staffs) or the complete staff of the district were held to assess the ES project. The superintendent was embittered and remained entrenched in his office, seldom speaking to teachers. The principals found it difficult to keep open communications with their staffs. The project coordinator discovered how deeply the teachers distrusted him. In his own words, "It was a *very* tough year."

The teachers complained of the lack of communications from the superintendent regarding the ES project. "Not *once*," said one, "did the superintendent meet with the complete staff to assess ES progress, give encouragement, ask questions, or provide any leadership in development of programs." This lack of communication was interpreted by many staff members as lack of interest in ES progress on the part of the superintendent, or a residual resentment from the negotiations dispute. Never one to press for open familiarity with his teachers, the superintendent became more isolated during that year, and teachers and principals both expressed concern about the effect of his reclusive behavior on staff morale.

Highest priority for implementation was given to the math and reading components because only minimal staff training was required to put them into operation. These components had been well planned and were heavily invested with new equipment and instructional materials. Since teachers would not be required to spend extra-duty hours in planning, a potential trouble spot remaining from the strike was avoided.

The reading component was established to provide individualized instruction, with a system designed by a nationwide firm to combine classroom instruction and a reading "laboratory." Using new equipment and books, students were to continue to receive reading instruction in the classroom, which would be supplemented by visits to the reading lab.

Other project components were not so easily activated. The wilderness program had been designed to acquaint sixth graders with

a challenging obstacle course in a nearby wooded area. It was expected to improve their self-concept as well as to give them a semi-primitive camping experience. Planning for this component was delayed, expenditures for equipment were not approved, and no implementation occurred until the second year. The project was to be part of the responsibilities of the newly created guidance coordinator position. But the superintendent had been unsuccessful in efforts to employ an individual for this job, and it was to remain unfilled through the first year. Planning and implementing the component would also have involved teachers in extra-duty assignments. Because of the tension remaining after the strike, situations involving extra work were avoided when possible.

By the end of the first year, the ES project leaders reported that some implementation had occurred in all but one of the thirteen major project components. That was qualified by the statement that many components were not as successful as had been originally hoped.

In attempting to implement additional curricular changes, certain teachers in each building were given release-time assignments, permitting them to use one or more hours each week for planning and developing further implementation of curricular changes. These teachers later would be called "teacher-coordinators." In this capacity they were responsible for coordinating efforts in their own building for a specific curricular component. They were also responsible for filling out a form each quarter detailing progress and problems encountered. These forms were collected by the local ES evaluator and then became the major data input for quarterly contract reports submitted to ES/Washington.

Later Implementation Efforts: Pluses and Minuses

During the second year of implementation, 1974-75, efforts were directed toward the humanizing components of the project. A guidance coordinator was hired and given responsibilities for developing and coordinating inservice programs to "help the teachers achieve a guidance approach to teaching." He was also responsible for developing the wilderness program, and for serving as a half-time guidance counselor to more than 400 students in the Middle School.

During the school year the guidance counselor developed and scheduled thirty-six hours of inservice training for the teaching staff,

using consultants from two state universities and a consulting firm from the largest city in the state. He organized a committee consisting of teachers, administrators, a member of the school board, a student, and a consultant from the regional state university, who met on several occasions to plan and coordinate the inservice program. Almost all of the teaching staff participated in the inservice programs—they were paid to do so. The local ES evaluation indicated that teachers were favorably impressed with the program, although some sharply disagreed with this conclusion.

The high school science teacher who had written the original Letter of Interest to ES/Washington and had helped to develop the ES project, as well as advocating the theme of "humanizing," opposed the way in which the components were carried out:

The humanizing aspect has not been effective at all. The two or three workshops were not the right kind—having someone just to lecture to us. We have enough people and resources here in the system. We need some chances to interact among ourselves about some of the problems. The basic weakness of the whole program is that it was initiated and the ideas developed by a very small group of people. They didn't arise out of a consensus of the larger group. . . . The humanizing aspect is by far the most difficult part of Experimental Schools to implement. The amount of humanizing would be the same even if Experimental Schools had not come here, because some teachers are concerned about students as people—others are not. Those who are will deal honestly and humanely with students with or without outside funding or programs.

The humanizing efforts received a major setback when the guidance coordinator resigned at the end of the 1974-75 school year and moved to a university to continue graduate studies.

Resignations of two administrators also affected the program. At the end of the first year, 1973-74, the middle school principal left to accept a similar position in another state. He had been the most willing of the three principals to accept the ES innovations within his school. At the end of the second year, the high school principal, who was openly opposed to many of the ES components, resigned to accept a position as superintendent of a nearby school district. The principal of the elementary schools also sought jobs in other districts, but was not successful. At the end of the first year of implementation efforts, the superintendent was reported to be a "prime candidate" for a similar position in the largest district in LaSalle County, although he denied it publicly. He was not hired for that position,

and other ES project leaders were openly relieved that he would remain to lead the ES project.

The position of guidance coordinator was filled by a high school teacher who had recently completed a master's degree in counseling. He was able to concentrate more of his time on counseling students because the other "humanizing" elements of his job were reduced in scope by the ES project leaders. Efforts to reform teachers through inservice training were generally diminished. Most new teachers were hired for their potential to be firm on student discipline, rather than for a predisposition toward a "guidance approach to teaching," which had been called for in the ES plan. The middle school principal openly sought to hire male teachers to replace female teachers who departed, stating that he believed that the students needed more male role models and the supposed stronger discipline methods which he felt male teachers were likely to use.

After an unsuccessful search outside the system for a high school principal, a young math teacher in the high school was selected over the ES project coordinator. His experience as varsity basketball coach and his credibility with students and faculty were important factors in his selection. A year earlier, the middle school principal had been hired from outside the system. Both worked to develop better communications with the teachers.

By the end of the second year of implementation, all components of the plan had been activated. Many had undergone substantial revisions during the two years, as teachers and administrators made continuing efforts to improve those found unsatisfactory. The third year of implementation was accompanied by increased stability in program operation and administration.

Many components of the ES project had by now gained momentum—they were regarded by some teachers, especially those involved as teacher coordinators, as integrated parts of the school curriculum. Those who had never taken an active part in the ES project and new teachers hired within the previous year were less likely to understand the purposes of the ES project or to be actively involved in the various components.

Teacher coordinators continued to serve as observers and reporters for local project evaluation. They assessed their individual components quarterly and completed brief forms which then became the basis for reporting to the school board and to ES/Washington.

But they did not serve as department heads, except in the high school, and had no responsibilities for supervision of other teachers.

Morale among teachers improved significantly in the months following the strike, although an adversarial relationship between teachers and administrators persisted. Decisions were still made by the principals and especially the superintendent, but teachers were more likely to attempt to initiate changes without first securing administrative authority. The teachers showed greater willingness to try new methods and increased their assertiveness to preserve the autonomy of the classroom; the administrators seemed more willing to grant them greater independence in carrying out their responsibilities.

Concentration of Authority To Make Decisions

Before the ES project began in Arcadia, the administration of the schools was in the hands of the superintendent and three building principals. They presided over the four school buildings in the district and made all decisions with the approval of the school board.

The ES project established two administrative positions. The ES project coordinator was responsible for planning and implementation of the project, and the community schools director was responsible for the adult evening program. In addition, the ES plan called for two other positions which were filled by teachers, although the superintendent required the incumbents to attend all administrative meetings. The guidance coordinator, who served as the middle school guidance counselor, was also responsible for developing, implementing, and supervising a system-wide guidance program. He also coordinated "humanizing" inservice for teachers and developed a wilderness program for sixth graders. The local ES evaluator, a half-time position, was given responsibility for evaluating programs and disseminating that information to the decision makers of the system.

Two of these positions were not filled until the second year of implementation. The guidance coordinator was hired in August 1974, and the community school director in October 1974.

All six administrators, plus the guidance coordinator and the local ES evaluator, conducted weekly meetings in the office of the superintendent. These meetings covered a wide range of issues, including staffing changes, discipline of students, interscholastic athletics, and planning and development of all ES components. Changes

in the curriculum, textbooks, and other educational materials were discussed before approval was sought from the school board. This administrative council had the power to approve or deny changes requested by teachers. Although teachers could appeal directly to the school board, it was unlikely that the board would approve a teacher's request unless recommended by the administrators.

A power struggle quickly developed during the first year of implementation, as the three principals sought to reinforce their importance and to use every opportunity to demonstrate that "normal" operation of the schools as conducted by the principals should continue to have priority over ES functions. The principals subtly attempted to define the ES components as *additions* to their existing systems of operation, while the ES project coordinator spoke of the comprehensiveness and all-inclusive nature of the ES project. The ES project coordinator defined his project as the school curriculum and, during the first year of implementation, began to eliminate the use of the name "Experimental Schools" as a label for the changes occurring in Arcadia. He wanted to retile the entire program as "changes in curriculum."

Before the ES project was initiated, the three principals and the superintendent were described by one principal as "a tight group." The two senior principals felt that, when the ES project coordinator was first hired, he believed his own status was higher than that of the principals. On several occasions, the two senior principals were angered when he circumvented their authority by involving teachers in ES related activities after permission had been denied by the principals.

Most of the conflict between the principals and the ES project coordinator occurred during the first year of implementation. By the beginning of the second year, the elementary and high school principals believed they had regained control of their respective buildings. The ES project coordinator concentrated on the middle school, and the middle school principal permitted him to do what he wanted. The high school principal observed: "During the second year of implementation the elementary principal and I were left alone to run our own programs. Out of that, the elementary principal and I gained more authority than either of us had expected. The superintendent usually ruled in favor of us if there was a question with the ES project coordinator."

By the end of the third year of implementation, the ES project could be described as a partial success. Conflicts were submerged and the project was at least orderly. Many of the project components had been absorbed into the curriculum, so that teachers and administrators could not isolate ES project effects from those which would have existed anyway. This integration was considered a sign of success, because the ES project leaders openly preferred to reduce the separate identity of the components. They also claimed success in the inservice training of teachers toward the humanizing goals. Some teachers and administrators, however, did not agree that the humanizing efforts had been successful. No solid data existed to support either argument.

One other measure of success, as pointed out by the ES project leaders, was that the program appeared to have a momentum of its own; many components did not require the constant attention of the ES project leaders. Many teachers disputed this claim, however, noting that the administration of many of the components was being neglected and that teachers' requests for support and materials in some programs were ignored.

Despite these disagreements, activation of the ES project components continued throughout the third year of the four-year plan. In December 1975 the ES project leaders produced an Interim Project Report, as called for by the contract with ES/Washington, detailing the successful implementation of most parts of the original plan. That report has been used as evidence that the overall project was a success and was part of the basis for a decision by ES/Washington to provide the promised funding for its fifth and final year.

CONCLUSIONS

Implementation of the ES project in Arcadia occurred under less than ideal conditions. Meeting the requirements of ES/Washington had serious consequences for the project. The original Letter of Interest had been written under a severe deadline. If time had been available to involve more staff in the initial planning, the objectives might have been significantly different. Later demands to rewrite the formal plan three times caused the ES project leaders to focus their efforts on satisfying bureaucratic requirements for proposal writing rather than on locally oriented efforts to organize the project. Nego-

tiations with ES/Washington regarding the plan document continued for months beyond the expected completion date. The ES project leaders blamed the federal agency for causing a delay of inservice activities planned prior to the first year of implementation.

The first year of implementation began with a teacher strike, the first in the district, and the hostility resulting from that action affected the entire ES project. During that year the ES project leaders moved cautiously to implement various components of the project. Those parts least likely to increase hostility and most thoroughly planned were implemented first. Through the perseverance of the ES project leaders and some teachers, all major components of the project as originally planned were implemented by the middle of the second year.

The ES project plan had established goals for changing the instructional processes, but had neglected to consider the potential for discord inherent in the centralization of authority. The introduction of new instructional approaches amplified the existing incongruity between the functional autonomy sought by the teachers and the bureaucratic standardization sought by the decision makers. The teachers saw the ES project as another imposition on their limited autonomy, while the school board endeavored to avoid any loss of decision-making authority.

The ES project plan had not been concerned with modifying the existing authority structure, and the teachers did not make demands during the planning year to instigate such changes. Later, they boasted that the project would not be a complete success without them. The collective bargaining and strike activities revealed that the teachers perceived their own positions as lacking power. Their demands focused on gaining basic elements of status, including relationships with those having authority, improved salaries and benefits, and adequate preparation time.

Groups within an organization do not seem willing to give up power and will continue to exercise it until challenged. The strike was a challenge to the existing distribution of power. In reaction to the teacher demand, the ES project leaders instituted the role of teacher coordinator, which involved several teachers in the implementation and formative evaluation of the ES project components. The teachers, while continuing to carry out classroom responsibilities, were also responsible for coordinating and documenting activi-

ties within their respective areas. Their decision-making processes were not significantly altered, however, as the new teacher role functioned primarily as a liaison between the teachers and the ES project leaders.

The ES project plan was one of gradual change, emphasizing innovative strategies believed to be complementary to the status and structure of the schools. The community is conservative and changes viewed as too progressive would not have been acceptable. It is likely, therefore, that if the ES project had outlined a radical revision of the school structure, it might have failed completely following the strike. Because the planned changes were not drastic alterations of familiar practices, the teachers and administration were able to begin implementation despite fractured relationships.

The ES project plan was originally developed to bind together the administrators, teachers, school board, and residents in an effort to improve the schools. That was found to be an unworkable union. Instead, the ES project became a model of change directed by administrators and with the sanction of the school board. Teachers participated, with some foot-dragging and complaining about administrative control, although no overt sabotage was ever employed. Teachers characterized the project as designed by the administration and responsive to the prevailing expertise of external consultants and subtle pressures from ES/Washington. Many teachers did not have a sense of proprietorship about the project, although they continued to profess interest in its goals.

Judgments about the relative importance of components and the success of implementation varied between teachers and administrators. Teachers more frequently expressed interest in the humanizing elements of the project, which were difficult to implement, and presented perplexing evaluation problems. Administrators showed preference for curricular change and individualized instruction. Buying educational equipment, establishing new courses, and fitting students to programmed or mechanical instruction devices are more familiar techniques and more easily evaluated.

The different interpretations of teachers and the ES project leaders about the success of the project reflect their disagreements about methods of accounting for educational success. "Humanizing" is a very subjective process of interpersonal relationships between teacher and student. It is ultimately judged by the successful growth

of students into happy and productive adults. It cannot be adequately measured by any known accountability techniques, and it places ultimate responsibility on teachers to do what they most want to do. Contrasted with this "soft" concept, the administrators prefer to measure "hard" facts of success, as evidenced by achievement test results, which require standardization and control of instruction.

ES project leaders credit local origination of the various project components as being a prime reason that most have been integrated into the curriculum. Most project components, however, were not radical changes from the earlier curriculum and have not generated widespread interest among community residents. Since the planning year, residents have not been involved in making decisions about the ES project. Some parents accepted invitations to observe demonstrations of the project's successes, but few ever understood the basic goals of the project or questioned the validity of the ES project leaders' claims for success. The early demise of the ES project advisory committee has not been seen as a detriment to project operation.

Although most residents have not been involved with the ES project, the school board has continuously provided support for most of the ES project. On several occasions, the board has provided financial assistance to components begun with ES funding, but found to be in need of additional funding.

Continuity of the ES project leadership has also been a stabilizing element. Although two of the three original principals and the original guidance coordinator left the school system, the superintendent, the ES project coordinator, and the local ES evaluator remained with the project from its early planning stages. The high school science teacher who, with the superintendent, wrote the original Letter of Interest, continues to teach in the high school. Along with several other teachers, this central group maintained continued commitment to the project's goals and inspired others.

The first three years of implementation were also significant for the "hands-off" policy of ES/Washington, although the prior planning year had been frustrating to the ES project leaders. Local leaders conceived of the ES project as one that would be locally developed and controlled. ES/Washington had suggested improvements in the planning year; some had been accepted, others rejected. ES project leaders and the school board were determined not to allow outsiders to gain control or have a dominant influence. Many inter-

actions between ES project leaders and the ES/Washington staff and consultants demonstrated this intent of the local residents not to be overrun by the outsiders.

When an ES/Washington visitor came to Arcadia, he or she was presented with a busy schedule of visits, interviews, and dinner meetings. As much as possible, the local residents always attempted to maintain control of the visit. Both of the ES/Washington project officers assigned to this site quickly learned the necessary protocol: gentle persuasion and well-timed suggestions would be accepted, but heavy-handed outside advice would be quickly rejected.

The response of this school system to the opportunity for change has been complex. Initial response to the ES concept was enthusiastic and brought cooperation from teachers, administrators, school board members, and some parents. Unexpected factors, however, often interfere with the best of plans. The conflict between teachers and the school board had significant effects on the implementation of the project. As the hard grind of planning and implementation eroded the initial enthusiasm, the underlying organizational conflict began to surface and became intertwined with the conceptualizing of the project. After the strike, the commitment to the project continued but without the earlier spirit of cooperation. As implementation continued and the project became integrated with the existing structure, the atmosphere of distrust gradually faded. Although the enthusiastic cooperation of the early months never returned, the commitment of some administrators and teachers to the goals remained.

The experience of Arcadia is that curricular modifications were implemented despite the setbacks of the organizational conflict. The "humanizing" components were less successful, although it is not clear whether they would have been achieved if there had been no strike by the teachers. The idealistic hope of humanizing was never realized, and the challenge to create a unique and distinctive approach for a rural school system was never attempted. What remained was an increased willingness to experiment with small changes. The ES project leaders did not start out to build a new school system; they kept the old structure and made renovations to the interior. In the midst of organizational strife, all continued to live in the old house, renovating when possible.

Shiloh County: A Matter of Agendas

Charles A. Clinton

Community demands for an improved quality of life led Shiloh County, a rural school district in the South, to undertake several programs of change. Some of these focused on finding new sources of revenue, others on obtaining accreditation through constructing new schools, renovating existing ones, and introducing curricular changes into the classrooms. By the end of this process, what had been an inadequate school system was acclaimed locally as a superior one. Change had occurred in Shiloh County, but it bore little resemblance to what was contracted for by ES/Washington.

OBJECTIVES OF THE LOCAL ES PROJECT

The goal of the ES project in Shiloh County was to implement an individualized program of "diagnostic instruction" in all classrooms. Diagnostic instruction was defined as teacher knowledge of students' needs and learning styles (diagnosis) prior to structuring learning opportunities appropriate to those individual needs and styles (prescription). To attain this goal, a major strategy and several different tactics were proposed.

The major strategy called for the creation of paid inservice training sessions in which consultants told teachers how to individ-

ualize instruction and what devices existed for achieving this. The tactics included the insertion of both packaged and teacher-created materials into the instructional program, the integration of both of these into a set of instructional strategies that focused on individualization, and heavy administrative pressure for classroom implementation.

This pressure was summed up by the project coordinator: "For years teachers have said what they could do, if only they had the materials. We got them the materials." The rest of the responsibility was with the teachers. The superintendent would offer teachers limited support. As the project coordinator said to me, "What you do is provide the time, money, and the threat."

"I thought you were going to say leadership."

"I think I did."

Surrounding this major strategy were objectives whose achievement would support the major goal. Barriers between school and community were to be lowered by including community members in the planning stage of educational reform, getting them to participate in joint community school projects, and having them help evaluate the system's progress in altering classroom behavior.

New curricula were to be developed. Teachers were to be trained in using them and were to be given support services for the difficult and new art of diagnosing students' physical, psychological, social, and learning problems. To help spot any unforeseen problems in the reform effort, a system of formative evaluation was to be set up which would provide information early enough so that problems could be dealt with before they became entrenched and hard to uproot. To achieve all of this, the school system's management would also, of course, have to be reorganized.

THE COMMUNITY SETTING

Shiloh County possessed an agricultural economy from its founding until the mid-1960s. For years, population had declined in the county and residents called their communities "second class" because people left them for better places. Decision makers wanted to stem the population decline by improving the quality of life so that older residents would remain and newer residents would be attracted. The problem was how to do so.

A solution appeared in the early 1960s. In Cuba Landing, a

small town (in 1960 the population was 610) in the county, the city council became aware that federal tax codes could be manipulated to create local resources. In 1963 the council issued \$50 million worth of municipal industrial bonds to provide construction money for a firm interested in locating nearby. The governing body of all Shiloh County followed Cuba Landing's lead in 1967 with an issue of \$142 million of these bonds. Bonds brought industry and industry brought people: the 1970 census showed the county had gained 1,750 new residents over 1960. Emigration was at an end and immigration began.

Dramatic as this reversal of population decline was, it did not fully meet local expectations. Seventy percent of the work force commuted. The reasons for this were a housing shortage in Shiloh County and a desire by the new workers for the amenities of a more urban environment, especially a sound educational system. Education became the focus for the effort to improve the quality of life in Shiloh County.

THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

The schools of Shiloh County needed to change because they were adapted to a constricting past, not an expanding present. At the time of industrialization, there were five schools, four elementary and one consolidated high school. Each was in a district represented by a board member whose kinsmen and neighbors both sent their children to school and served as teachers or nonprofessional personnel.

Ties between friends and kinsmen were often stronger than the authority of a principal. County folklore recalls that a Cuba Landing elementary teacher took her children into the school yard during hot weather. Her principal took exception and posted a rule requiring all classes to remain indoors. His rule was ignored and he forced the issue. The principal lost. He was not a native of the county, but the teacher was. Both she and her husband had attended twelve years of school with one board member. "We take care of our own," say county residents.

With the community able to exert such strong pressure, board members had to value consensus in decision making. This was achieved through informal debate between board members and their

constituents. After this process, trial ballots were cast. If consensus was present, a decision was made. If not, the decision was delayed.

An illustration of this began in 1965 during the debate surrounding the possible construction of a new middle school. The superintendent advocated the construction, and three board members concurred. Two members were opposed. They wanted a new high school and renovation of the existing structure as the middle school. The issue was not settled until new board members were elected, and the superintendent was replaced by an advocate of the high school plan. Then the decision was unanimous, but it had taken until 1971 for the board to come to an agreement.

Financial support for the schools also needed strengthening. Long-term emigration had eroded the tax base; every part of the system was affected. Older board members tell of borrowing money to cover expenses until state education aid checks arrived. One board member once proposed closing the schools until the budget balanced. The superintendent countered with a strong financial argument: state money was based on student attendance; closing school meant less state money. The schools stayed open.

Nevertheless, fiscal resources for support of the schools kept diminishing. In 1965 the state legislature decreed that all property would be assessed at full market value. But it also froze tax income at 1965 levels. Despite increased assessments and a local boom from industrial expansion, the county schools were on a fixed income. The \$50 million Cuba Landing expansion, for example, brought sixty students to the Cuba Landing Consolidated Elementary School, but even the new homes built by their parents did not produce additional money.

The financial situation hit bottom with the \$142 million expansion of industry. It flooded the county with new residents, many of whom had school age children. Between 1960 and 1970, general population increased by 25 percent while school enrollment was up by 81 percent. The schools were overwhelmed.

The school administration adapted in two ways. First, costs were cut. Needed renovations were delayed. County natives with some college training were recruited as teachers in the hope that family ties would offset comparatively low salaries. Instructional supplies were doled out. As one board member said, "The sixties were hard times."

Second, the board tried to obtain funds from sources other than the property tax. In 1966 the legislature gave school districts the option of imposing two 10 percent increases in local property tax rates. The board did so, but the increase did not meet local needs. For example, in 1969 assessed valuation increased nearly \$8 million, yet the tax rate decreased 21 mills because of the 1965 ceiling on tax revenue. The loss of income was partially offset when industry signed an in-lieu-of-taxes agreement with the schools which provided \$25,000 per year.

Then in 1966 the legislature gave school boards the option of imposing a tax on utilities use. The county board subsequently proposed to do so, but it ran into opposition. Industrial spokesmen objected, arguing that their firms would furnish most of the revenue, that the tax would make the county less attractive as an expansion site for industries, and, finally, that the tax would jeopardize the in-lieu-of-taxes agreement.

The opposing views were brought out in a series of public meetings. One of these produced an important confrontation concerning public education in the county. Industrial spokesmen said that county residents did not know what they wanted in their schools, what was needed, or how to achieve either. Industry, through its spokesmen, offered to commission an independent study of the schools to determine what the problems were and how to overcome them.

The offer was accepted, but in the meantime the board levied the tax. This produced two lawsuits. Industry, the plaintiff in both suits, argued in the first suit that the schools could not use money raised by the utilities tax to construct new buildings. In the second suit, its position was that imposition of a utilities tax voided the in-lieu-of-taxes agreement. Industry lost both suits.

The school survey was conducted in 1969 by a nationally known management consulting firm. It found Shiloh County's system to be in generally poor condition, reflected in its minimal accreditation. The survey report contained several recommendations: the board and the administration should take a positive and innovative role in improving the schools through gaining improved accreditation, hiring qualified personnel, creating a flexible organizational structure, utilizing lay volunteers, lowering pupil/teacher ratios, buying more library and audiovisual materials, implementing an im-

proved guidance program, and fielding a stronger, individualized instructional program. Other recommendations called for a new middle school, renovated and modernized instructional spaces, fireproofed buildings, mobile units to alleviate overcrowding, a consolidation of existing elementary schools, and more community participation in the schools. Financial recommendations could be summed up in one phrase—find more dollars, whether additional support came from local, state, or federal sources. Local people agreed with this last assessment. "We didn't need another survey. We needed money to run our schools."

The 1970-71 school year was unpleasant. Teachers across the state went on a wildcat strike that affected Shiloh County; the superintendent had a fatal heart attack. A search for a new superintendent was begun. He had to have building experience because the board saw lack of space as the greatest problem facing the system.

The search was hampered by the lack of qualified applicants. No local administrators had building experience so the board turned to outsiders. Only two of these had proper credentials and one was a reluctant candidate—willing to take the position, but not at the salary offered. The one who was selected was willing to take a salary cut. When asked why, he said, "I came here because I saw an opportunity." This was defined as transforming an inadequate program into "the best system in the state."

The new superintendent quickly discovered the school survey performed by the management consulting firm and began using it as a blueprint for change. In early board meetings, he recommended an increase in beginning teachers' salaries so that good younger teachers could be recruited; the renovation of two elementary schools; and the construction of a new high school that featured semi-open space. To complement this semi-open space, he recommended that the school year be altered in the secondary grades by converting from a semester system to a series of nine-week courses featuring student selections. This was the beginning of his efforts to achieve a flexible, more individualized instructional program.

The board concurred in the recommendations. Its new superintendent was taking a positive and innovative role in improving the schools. A board member said, "When we found [the superintendent], all we had to do was sit back."

In addition to making these changes, the superintendent urged

the seven elementary teachers with less than a bachelor's degree to retire. All did so. This met with board approval. As one member said, the new superintendent deserved credit because "some of the older teachers thought they were running things." Teachers described this event differently. "He will roll over anybody if it helps him," said one.

FIRST CONTACT WITH ES/WASHINGTON

While state and local funds were available to build new schools and recruit beginning teachers, the school system allocated no funds for getting new instructional technology and retraining older teachers. A possible source for funding these appeared in March 1972. A circular titled "Announcement of a Competition for Small Rural Schools" crossed the superintendent's desk. The circular was from ES/Washington and was designed to solicit Letters of Interest from small rural schools interested in planning and implementing locally designed programs of comprehensive educational change.

The superintendent seized this opportunity. First, he contacted the state Board of Education, and was assured that the board would support the effort. Then consultants at nearby universities were contacted. Each offered to help the school district. Then the superintendent approached his local board. It would take \$200 to write a quality Letter of Interest. Would the board authorize the expenditure? The board would. Then the superintendent approached his teaching staff. He wanted to raise teachers' salaries and bring in more instructional equipment. The only way this could be done was through securing federal money. The competition for small rural schools was such an opportunity. Would the teachers support this program? All of the teachers voted to do so.

Then the superintendent chartered a small airplane and flew to the state university with the Announcement and the relevant information. Consultants there put together a quality Letter of Interest and the document was forwarded to ES/Washington.

The Letter is itself an interesting document. It indicated that diagnostic instruction, a teaching strategy that focused on a student's needs, interests, and abilities, would become the theme of Shiloh County's effort. To ensure that this new teaching strategy would be-

come the dominant mode in the classroom, the school needed additional personnel, equipment, and materials. To indicate the depth of local support for this endeavor, the Letter made use of the turmoil within the county and the schools by counting these as strengths:

1. A young, professional administrative and instructional staff dedicated and eager to change.
2. A community that is becoming aware of the inadequacies of the present school system and has shown a readiness to become involved in improving the system.
3. An enrollment and environment small enough to encourage total community involvement in improving the quality of the schools.
4. An improving financial structure that should enable the incorporation of the costs associated with massive school program change.
5. A progressive Board of Education that recognizes that educational improvement means more than just adding to the present program.

This Letter turned a neat trick: what had been relevant conditions beyond the control of the administration (staff, community, and finances) became resources that would aid the school system to achieve comprehensive change.

The Letter masked a major disagreement that would become clear later. The consultants who wrote the Letter were experts in the idea of diagnostic instruction. In their view, attitudinal change preceded changes in habits: a teacher had to *want* to change classroom treatments before the changes could become routinized. The superintendent was less concerned with attitudinal change. To him what was necessary was to put equipment in the hands of classroom teachers and allow change to occur. This was consistent with the assumption made in the report of the consulting firm: change the formal properties of the school system, and assume that this would make a difference in the habits and attitudes of teachers and students.

Shiloh County's Letter of Interest secured funding. ES/Washington considered the entry "to be of such educational significance for small schools in rural areas to warrant selection." That it showed such promise can be traced to the superintendent's choice of writers. For, as he said of the ES project, "It's bullshit put together by master bullshitters." And diagnostic instruction is "what any good coach does. It's what any good teacher should do. Besides, it's the in-phrase. It's where the money is."

THE PLANNING PERIOD

The period of formal project planning lasted a year and was marked by four kinds of events: (1) the establishment of two ES project coordinator positions to help manage the project; (2) public satisfaction with changes in the schools; (3) a style of advocacy alien to Shiloh; and (4) an adversary relationship between the superintendent and ES/Washington.

Project coordinators were selected by the superintendent from local personnel. He initially selected two, but soon, saying they had "no faith in me," returned them to their previous duties. He appointed two new project coordinators who had expertise in reading instruction and guidance counseling, but none in educational change. This did not bother the superintendent. He wanted project coordinators who were "loyal to me." The second two were. Before becoming project coordinators, they had occupied adjunct positions in the school system, and their new duties isolated them further from the staff. They were located in the central office and maintained contact only with the superintendent. From the beginning, the project coordinators worked in a vacuum, sustained as part of the system only through the superintendent's authority.

Public satisfaction with the proposed changes in the schools was high. In November 1972 an article in a local weekly newspaper noted that all of the changes recommended in the school survey, save one, were being met. Community participation was still low. "This is the hardest area to implement," the superintendent said. Attempts to involve the public included publication of articles in local and regional newspapers, news announcements over the radio, and distribution of a teacher newsletter. "Still we fall short," he said.

This failing was due to the superintendent's style in advocating change. The style native to the county emphasized allowing subordinates the chance to influence decision making during planning so that all actors would have a stake in seeing change implemented. The discussion on the board's decision to build a new high school illustrates the county's way of advocating and implementing change.

The superintendent's style emphasized controlling events through doing things to, or planning for, people, rather than consulting with them on their needs. He had a desire to transform an inadequate school system, a blueprint for change, public support, a board

that followed his lead, and a philosophy of leadership. "One man's got to do it," he said.

This demanded that the system respond only to the superintendent. He sought to insulate the schools from outside intervention and to control the internal course of events. This became apparent in his method of involving the community. He informed county residents of the changes that were occurring, but he did not ask for their recommendations. This brought him into conflict with ES/Washington.

ES/Washington demanded community influence in planning. The superintendent tried to control this in two ways. First, he arranged for ES project consultants to explain the project to community groups. Then he asked these groups for recommendations. Two of the recommendations did become part of the ES project: students were to perform at national norms on achievement tests, and a diagnostic center would offer specialized services to children with problems. Both these recommendations were in accordance with the superintendent's desire to create "the best system in the state."

ES/Washington became aware of the superintendent's style through reading the first of four drafts of the project plan, submitted on September 15, 1972. The response of the ES/Washington's project officer was:

When and how does the public get to *influence* the status of the project? . . . It is absolutely vital to the success of the project that there be substantive, two-way communication with community about the plans. Community should have the chance to be in on the planning not just to hear about it after the fact . . . I fail completely to understand the purpose served by Dr. [an ES project consultant's] presentation. . . . Why should he (or any other outsider) be explaining the problems and goals of education to parents? . . . Since the mode of communication was presentation and then question and answer, there was little chance for discussion . . . most of the questions . . . raised cannot rightfully be answered by an outside consultant. . . . There was not one question that was answered directly, as at least one person in attendance suggested at the end of the meeting. . . . We [ES/Washington] simply reiterate what we have said before . . . , that the best experts on Shiloh County are in Shiloh County and they are the ones best qualified to determine what help is needed.

The superintendent's reaction was to instantly comply with what he saw as ES/Washington's demands, because he feared that failure to do so would lead to contract cancellation. The ES project

consultant was escorted to an airport and placed aboard a plane bound for his university. The consultant's perception was that he had been fired. This was not the case. The superintendent needed consultant expertise, but he could not let ES/Washington know that he was getting it. His strategy was to separate ES project consultants from community events and let future reporting demonstrate this.

This strategy had consequences for planning and for writing the second draft of the project plan. The superintendent was caught in a trap. He had to create an ES plan, but could not use consultants to unify the document. He also needed to involve the community, but no longer could he use Ph.D.s to try to control community influences.

The superintendent's ES plan of December 15, 1972, tried to meet ES/Washington's complaints and, in doing so, overwhelmed his staff. The plan was not completed until the early morning of December 15 and a project coordinator hand-carried the document to the offices of ES/Washington. On January 24, 1973, a belated letter gave another critical response:

Your draft was reviewed by staff as well as a group of people from around the country. . . . We are compiling in this letter some of the major . . . comments . . . and are returning with it a copy of your plan containing marginal comments that should be useful in reviewing your plan prior to its February 15 resubmission. . . .

The sections of the plan on central theme and goals are very confusing . . . vague and general statements about the realities of education and life recur intermittently. The reference to realities is seen more as a catch-phrase, than a consistent, concise, useful theme that would help coordinate and integrate the plan

The plan at present, is a collection of loose ideas, not an integrated, tightly woven plan. . . . Although the theme states the great importance of community involvement . . . the section on community is one of the weakest. . . . There is contradiction between statements made in the section on administration and governance about decision making and those in the section on community. . . . These areas . . . need to be spelled out concretely— who does what, why, when, and where. . . . We look forward to the receipt of the final plan on February 15.

The February 15 plan did not meet these criticisms. This was pointed out during a March visit to the county by the ES/Washington project officer. However, she did not mention the plan until twenty minutes before departure. Then she criticized the plan and left—without saying how to meet the criticisms. A project coordinator later

said: "Had we been funded, I would have told [the project officer] what I thought. As it was, I kept my mouth shut," because a public show of site independence might jeopardize further funding.

The superintendent's private reactions to ES/Washington's demands were derogatory. Community influence in decision making was not essential. "Let's be realistic. People judge a school on how the football and basketball teams do, how the band marches, and on how their kids feel when they come home." ES/Washington did not understand this. They were "kids playing games." He added: "They're theorizing, I'm implementing. There's a big difference."

This attitude toward ES/Washington was echoed by the project coordinators. They referred to the criticisms of the plans as "impossible demands" and said they received no constructive help from ES/Washington. "They were always in conference when we called them."

ES/Washington was aware of these feelings. In September 1973, three months after Shiloh County gained long-term funding, an ES project officer visited the site and said: "We have a reputation and we deserve it. If anyone was going to shoot us, it would be [the superintendent]." But recognition of past behavior did not change Washington's way of operating.

Even though the final plan had been accepted, ES/Washington questioned its evaluation section. Shiloh County proposed to document change by asking people if change had taken place. The ES project officer asked how this perceptual data could demonstrate actual change. "I pose this as a question because I'm not an evaluator. I don't know what measures are available." She indicated that an answer to this question was mandatory and that Shiloh County had only a year and one-half to demonstrate that it could implement what it had planned. Achieving success within this time would be crucial in negotiations for further funding.

THE IMPLEMENTATION EFFORT

The period of attempted implementation consumed sixteen months, from August 1973 through November 1974. The goal was to start diagnostic instruction in all classrooms. The strategy called for creation of paid inservice sessions that allowed ES project consultants to instruct teachers on new teaching strategies and ways of

using them. The tactics also included using packaged and teacher-created materials in the classroom, the absorption of these into a teaching style that focused on individual student needs prior to assignments, and the superintendent's demands that inservice knowledge have an effect on classroom behavior.

These sixteen months were marked by growing teacher hostility and differential success in achieving classroom changes. During the planning period the superintendent's style had been one of planning for people. Now it shifted to doing things to people. In an initial address to his teaching staff, the superintendent acknowledged what had happened in the past: "The weakness of this project is that there has not been enough teacher input." A shift in style was then indicated: teachers were to read the final ES project plan because, "this is a blueprint and this is going to be the way we operate the schools."

The speech continued. "I've been told fifty times that it can't be done. But we will do it. . . when I came here, I told them I'd give them the best system in the state in four years. When we got the federal money, I dropped it to three. This is my third year."

A conflict developed between the superintendent and his staff. In early fall, 1973, the superintendent accused his teachers of not properly attending to their duties. At a meeting in October 1973, a teacher publicly contradicted this. The superintendent walked out on the meeting, saying, "If you don't like the way I'm running things, go to the board."

Reaction of the two participants to this encounter was different. The superintendent's private comment was: "I've been bragging them up for two years. Telling everyone how young they were. The truth is they're sloppy and lazy." The teacher's reaction was to go privately to board members and ask that the superintendent's power be curbed. But there was no support for such a cause in 1973.

Teachers tried another tactic in the spring of 1974. A delegation of teachers appeared at the April meeting of the board to seek redress for a set of grievances against the superintendent. The board heard them out, but supported the superintendent. Still, after the delegation left, a board member said, "This thing is getting out of hand."

Teachers continued to lobby board members. By the summer of 1974, two of the five board members had been converted to the teachers' cause. But, thinking of a firm three-person majority, a

teacher said: "You need three. I mean one's got to be a cousin, you got to catch one stealing. . . . You need three. You can't have any wobblers."

Without the third board member, teachers relied on peer solidarity. This showed at the inservice session that preceded the 1974-75 school year. In his opening address to his teachers, the superintendent said, "I assure you that we are in for a brutal year." But his speech did not have the desired effect. As one teacher said, "Did you see their faces? They're not listening anymore."

The superintendent knew this. Prior to the inservice session, he had said, "You can't use people like I do without it catching up." After the session, he said that teacher reactions had ended his dreams for creating a "first-class school system" in the county. "I'm whipped and I don't whip easily," he said.

This was confirmed in one further attempt by the superintendent to assert his authority. A principal was told that he was responsible for his teachers' behavior. If teachers continued to resist the superintendent's directions, the superintendent would reassign the principal and replace him with an administrator who could control a staff. When teachers learned of this, they gave the principal a unanimous vote of support and hosted a luncheon in his honor the next day.

The superintendent's admission that he could not create a first-class school system in the county reflects the differential success of the ES project components. For example, a packaged reading system for grades 3-8 was successfully implemented, but the outcomes were a disappointment for teachers. A second component, the integration of new technologies into the methods of diagnostic instruction, was the least successful of all the innovations attempted in the ES project. The reasons for this differential success in implementation seem to rest in the technology of each program. Where adequate technology was absent, implementation was least successful.

The reading system was introduced to teachers during an inservice training period that preceded the 1973-74 school year by consultants who, as teachers and principals in other school districts, had implemented the system. They had absolute faith in their system. Instead of being a philosophic approach, their innovation consisted of a systematic technology. A management system coordinated the materials contained in a host of different reading programs. It also

diagnosed individual student reading needs, placed students at individual reading levels, and prescribed individual assignments.

The consultants explained that the success of the system demanded four conditions. First, all materials had to remain in one location in each school. Second, students and teachers had to learn how to operate the management system. Third, teachers had to learn all of the system's materials. Fourth, teachers had to alter their view of classes. Traditionally, teachers saw classes as composed of students whose performances fell along a bell-shaped curve. Now they had to view the classroom as composed of: (1) individual students, (2) individual diagnoses, and (3) individual prescriptions. The consultants promised that meeting these conditions would raise achievement test scores in reading to national norms.

Initial teacher reaction to the reading system varied. Some teachers were apprehensive. "It'll be tough, but we'll do it," said one. Others were hostile and thought the method stifled the child. "I hope all the creativity that has been bottled up in reading comes unleashed in my classrooms." Still others were terrified. Said a teacher new to the system: "I don't even know how to teach reading yet." Isn't that a scream? Monday I'm going to get sixty kids and I don't know how to teach them. I could cry."

By the 1974 Christmas break, the reading system had been successfully implemented. Teachers were prescribing individual assignments to individual students. Furthermore, reading consultants asked a county teacher to become a company consultant, to help other schools implement the system. Finally, reading consultants advised teachers in other schools to visit the reading center in the county's middle school because it was "the best-run system in operation."

Successful implementation did not mean that there were no problems. Teachers reported that the new program brought with it some difficulties of its own. As one said: "They say this system is teacher-proof, but I can lose a child for days." She then contrasted the new system with the older, self-contained classrooms. "We all feel like we're missing something." That something was the personal contact between child and teacher.

Furthermore, achievement test scores were below those of the previous year. Teachers learned of this during the inservice training period that preceded the 1974-75 school year. An ES project consultant said: "We backed up. Our results show that we backed up."

This last result generated teacher hostility. One teacher told the ES project consultant: "We grade the students with a letter grade, then we, the teachers, are graded by the achievement tests. Our kids, and therefore we, fell down." Another teacher commented privately: "I work as hard as any teacher. But to learn you're butting your head against a stone wall—it makes me want to go somewhere else."

The attempts to implement diagnostic instruction also generated teacher hostility. Teachers saw diagnostic instruction as a philosophic fad, whose practical consequences entailed a loss of teacher authority and greater student freedom in classrooms. They were apprehensive: "I'm afraid we'll lose the kids."

This attitude was supported by appeals to the "real world." An elementary teacher commented: "You can't let a child do what he wants to do. When you get a job, you can't do what you want. You do what you have to." A secondary teacher agreed: "Nobody gets to do their thing outside."

During the 1973-74 school year, inservice sessions focused on diagnostic instruction. Little, if any, knowledge gained from the inservice program was implemented in classrooms. Then, in the fall of 1974, teachers were introduced to a record-keeping system that demanded information on individual students' learning styles, cognitive needs, reinforcement patterns, assignments, and outcomes. The superintendent said that using the record system would guarantee that diagnostic instruction was used in every classroom. Teachers said that the system was "a symbol of frustration."

An ES project consultant returned to Shiloh County for an inservice training session in October, 1974. The inservice session pitted teachers against outsiders. The ES project consultant asked secondary teachers a question, but no one responded. The consultant asked: "How do I turn you off so fast? Do I sound like a Sunday school teacher?"

A teacher moved his hand.

"Do you have a question?" asked the ES project consultant.

"No. I've decided it's the best policy not to ask," said the teacher.

"Why do we have to write down so many things?" asked another teacher.

"One of the reasons is that most of the teachers in the past have planned only one activity for the entire class," said the ES project consultant.

A teacher pointed out that she always planned different activities for different children in her classes and kept the records in her planning book. She showed the planning book to the ES project consultant. Several teachers then told the ES project consultant that they were tired of hearing what was wrong with the county's teaching staff. Teachers routinely did the things that were being called for, but were not getting recognition for this. The ES project consultant said that many things were done well in the county's schools and apologized for not mentioning them. At least one teacher was not satisfied with this. She said that teachers had no need for consultants who were in the county only for the money provided by the ES project.

The consultant asked how many teachers were using the mandated record-keeping system. No one was. "I came here assuming that everyone was complying with the agreement we made last August. One thing I learned tonight is to make certain I know what's going on before I make a damned fool of myself," said the consultant.

By this time, teachers were pointedly ignoring the ES project consultant. He said that he would advise the superintendent that the teachers were not willing to continue with the project and that the system should withdraw from the ES program. "It's pretty embarrassing to stand here with your bare face hanging out," he said. The inservice session came to a close, and the consultant later said, "I can't work like this."

Teachers were satisfied with the results of this encounter. One said: "We ran [the ES project consultant] off. We gave him both barrels." Another said that withdrawing from the ES program was a good idea because it would mean the end of weekly inservice sessions. "Look at what you're gaining. Two hours a week."

Teacher reactions led the superintendent and his ES project consultants to try another strategy. A group of teachers judged by the superintendent to be successful diagnostic instructors were chosen as ES project leaders. However, a meeting between the ES project leaders and the ES project consultants showed that the end of diagnostic instruction was at hand.

"Where do you go from here?" asked a consultant.

"I hope nowhere," said an ES project leader.

One ES project leader later said that even this limited response

was a mistake. His peers had advised him: "Don't rock the boat. Don't tell them you don't know how to do something."

While planned educational change in Shiloh County was near an end, an *image* of successful change was beginning to appear. The county's high school applied for admission to the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools and, after a site evaluation by an accreditation team, was granted membership. An ES/Washington project officer was on hand during the evaluation and later commented to the board: "You've come a long way in a short period of time. But today was a capstone." The ES/Washington project officer went further. Of all the rural sites in the Experimental Schools programs, Shiloh County was "a success story." This image was further developed when a program about the county's educational system was shown on statewide television. Thus, 1970's "inadequate" system had been transformed into 1974's "superior" one and was gaining state, regional, and national acclaim.

Change continued beyond 1974, but of a different type. Teachers finally converted a third board member to their cause. The superintendent quickly accepted a position in another system. His replacement was a local principal, chosen to meet one mandate. As a board member said: "This thing is running me crazy. We've got to settle down. We've got to get this system settled down. It's our duty to do so."

The new superintendent understood this mandate. Teachers commented that the 1975-76 school year was a very relaxed time. A project coordinator told the ES/Washington project officer that the county's schools had "gone to sleep" by the spring of 1976. The ES/Washington project officer agreed after visiting one classroom. He said the teaching there was such as if change had never been attempted.

Other people, however, gave other evaluations. A principal said that he did not know if the schools were offering a superior education program, but "we got people thinking we are and that's the main thing." An industrial spokesman agreed when he said: "A lot of people are moving here that wouldn't have moved here five years ago. I think the image of the schools in the last five years has completely changed." And this was what the decision makers in the county wanted, a school system that would attract new residents rather than repel them. Thus, the schools were not only achieving

national, regional, and state acclaim, they were also granted local recognition as a superior system.

CONCLUSIONS

The story of Shiloh County illustrates how a desire to improve the quality of life led to transformations in the county economic base and then in the educational system. To achieve these changes, local decision makers in government and two successive school superintendents found ways of increasing revenues: municipal industrial bonds were issued, the school system increased real estate tax rates, an in-lieu-of-taxes agreement with industry was reached, a utilities use tax was imposed, and the district successfully competed to be an Experimental Schools project.

The local program of educational change contained several different components. All of these were guided by the findings of the independent survey of the system that was made public prior to the recruitment of the second superintendent. These recommendations were to raise accreditation by improving instructional space, teacher quality, guidance counseling, and instructional programs. Money was available for building and teacher recruitment, but not for buying instructional equipment or retraining older teachers. Money for these came with the ES project.

The evolution of the ES project went through several stages. The first was planning. It saw the superintendent assume a style of change advocacy alien to the county and at cross-purposes with ES/Washington. While ES/Washington's influence was felt at this stage, the superintendent was reasonably successful in retaining autonomy. As he said, "I handled ES/Washington until we got the money."

The second stage, attempted implementation of planned instructional change, took sixteen months and was marked by three factors. The first was a change of direction as the superintendent moved from planning for people to doing things to people. A resulting change in style was publicly acknowledged in his opening address to the initial inservice session and continued throughout the implementation period, exemplified by his demands that the teaching staff properly attend to their duties and by his threat to manipulate principal assignments.

The second factor during the implementation period, differen-

tial change in instructional strategies, revolved around the presence or absence of technology. The reading system was rapidly implemented in grades 3-8 because its management system coordinated a host of different reading programs into a usable instructional device that gave individual diagnoses and prescriptions. The success of such early implementation was illustrated by classroom observations and consultant perceptions. That the actual outcomes of implementation strayed from the promise is a different matter; the important thing is that the insertion of a new mode of learning technology temporarily led to a completely new form of actual behavior in classrooms and met the 1970 school survey's recommendation that the system should field an individualized instructional program.

On the other hand, diagnostic instruction failed to be successfully implemented due to the lack of adequate technology. Teachers saw diagnostic instruction as a philosophic fad which, if implemented, would offer students greater classroom freedom at the expense of teacher authority. They thus resisted this program and when a technology, the record-keeping system, was created and imposed, the teachers rebelled. The ES project consultant who bore the brunt of this rebellion acknowledged the problems inherent in this approach to instructional change during an inservice session held in August, 1975. "It would be tremendous if you and I could function as physicians. Our problem is, unlike a physician that treats a single illness, we treat an entire child. No one can teach you how to do this because no one knows how."

But implementation of diagnostic instruction per se was not the reason for including it in the ES project. The superintendent saw the goal of diagnostic instruction as the bait that would secure money to purchase additional instructional materials for his system. He viewed diagnostic instruction as: "the in-phrase. It's where the money is." The ES project consultant acknowledged this. He talked with ES/Washington and had learned that "without diagnostic instruction, this project would have never been funded."

The third factor, teacher hostility, began with the superintendent's forced retirement of noncredentialed teachers and escalated with his attempts to intervene in classrooms. Through the 1973-74 school year, teachers used various tactics to curb the superintendent's power. Initially, these did not meet with success, and teachers relied on peer solidarity to stymie both the superintendent

and his surrogates. By the end of the 1974-75 school year, teachers had gone beyond the confines of the school and influenced three board members. The superintendent was encouraged to find another position, and his successor was chosen to settle the system down. He was successful in meeting this mandate.

However, the school system—as distinct from the ES project—was a success. Membership in the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools demonstrated it. The statewide program on educational television confirmed it. A rising rate of immigration validated it. After passing through several stages of change, the system stood as improved and had the credentials to demonstrate its new standing. To assess planned educational change in Shiloh County, one must think of the processes of change as a matter of agendas: local demands for an improved school system led people to exploit a variety of new resources, but local agendas would always prevail. If the new resources carried troublesome goals with them, the resources could be employed to meet local agendas and the goals discarded. And regarding the superintendent who brought about these improvements, county residents freely admit that “we used him.” He was one variable, among many, that allowed decision makers in Shiloh County to meet the desire for an improved quality of life.

PART III

Interpretations and Recommendations

9

The Management of Educational Change Efforts in School Systems

James Kent

Of the many tasks administrators of public school systems are expected to perform, they generally find that instituting needed reforms in their organizations is one of the most challenging and difficult. In attempting to introduce major changes into their schools, they encounter extremely complicated, intellectually demanding, and very time consuming problems. Furthermore, they frequently find that, in addition to having to deal with complex organizational and educational issues, they also must constantly keep in mind the political realities of their communities and school districts.

Much can be learned about conditions that facilitate or impede the change process by considering the experiences of those who have been involved in them. The five Experimental School (ES) case studies presented in chapters 4 through 8 raise many important questions about, and provide many useful insights into, the nature of educational change processes at the school district level.

Many circumstances influenced the outcomes of these change efforts. My task is to focus on school district and community factors that had an important bearing on the major developments that occurred in the ES-funded projects of comprehensive change introduced in River District, Jackson County, Butte-Angels Camp, Arca-

dia, and Shiloh County. My examination of this complex issue will undoubtedly be influenced by my own personal experiences, two of which should be made explicit at the outset. The first is that, as the superintendent of schools in a small community, I have encountered problems similar to those that confronted the school administrators in the five school districts in their change efforts. The second is that, from 1971 to 1975, I was centrally involved in the administration of an ES-funded project in a large city and had to cope with many of the same issues encountered by local officials in the five case-study districts:

As a consequence of my experiences with efforts at educational change, I have arrived at several conclusions that may have a bearing on my analysis of the five case studies. They also need to be made explicit. The first is that change strategies that do not take into account the special attributes of their school systems and communities are doomed to failure. Every community has its own set of values, beliefs, expectations, and evaluative criteria, and their importance to change efforts must be fully recognized. H. L. Mencken once said: "There is a solution to every problem: simple, quick, and wrong." While valuable ideas about educational change may emanate elsewhere, the specific educational changes to be made and the strategy to be used to bring them about in a particular school district need to develop locally. In short, they need to be tailor-made for the particular community in question.

My second conclusion is that, if we are to make significant strides in our change efforts, we will need to break out of our traditional patterns of thinking. As Gross noted in chapter 2, the professional literature is replete with examples which indicate that superintendents in general and other middle management educators "generally have provided little or no leadership to the educational change process in their school system." If we are to succeed in our future educational change efforts, we must adopt new ways of thinking; we need to acknowledge Toffler's (1970) observation that "successful coping with rapid change will require most of us to adopt a new stance toward the future, a new sensitive awareness of the role it plays in the present" (p. 4).

My third conclusion is that the manager of a process of educational change must understand that, in designing a calculated strategy, a wide variety of factors can operate to facilitate or block the

intended results. Acknowledging, then, that the change process is complex, we now turn to the circumstances that in my judgment had the greatest impact on the developments that occurred in the five school districts.

LOCAL GOALS AND THE ES CONCEPT OF COMPREHENSIVE CHANGE

In all five school districts, the projects lacked clearly stated goals on which consensus had been achieved within each school community and between the local school district and ES/Washington. Furthermore, local project personnel were never able to obtain a clear statement from ES/Washington about how it defined "comprehensive change," a concept that was fundamental to the objectives of the Experimental Schools program. It is important to know that significant change in the meaning of this concept occurred during the 1960s and that its redefinition bears on the change efforts of the five school districts. During the early part of that decade, comprehensive change was viewed as a *general* approach to school improvement at all grade levels on all fronts—curriculum reform, staff development, and teaching methods. It constituted an effort to move away from the standard textbook, self-contained classroom model with fixed time schedules in schools and single grade level organization of students. In the early 1970s, however, the concept, as exemplified in the Experimental Schools program, assumed a goal of general school improvement and focused on the process of achieving that goal. The leaders of the ES program further assumed that this process would require the introduction of a rationally conceived combination of promising practices in concert. This strategy, it was assumed, would more likely produce lasting change than the earlier "piecemeal" approach.

To implement the new concept of comprehensive change, ES/Washington expected school districts to combine a number of inter-related promising practices of their own choice in such areas as school organization and governance, curriculum development, formative evaluation, broad-based decision making, and teacher training. Central to the ES idea was the notion that such changes would be in pursuit of some specific vision of "better schooling." The evidence presented in chapters 4 through 8, however, reveals that local offi-

cials in the five school districts did not recognize or take seriously ES/Washington's concept of comprehensive change in the design of their local ES projects. The superintendent in Butte-Angels Camp had in mind only a vague image of "personalized education," while in River District the superintendent simply delegated the preparation of the ES project plan to his subordinates. Using the authority of an existing school survey prepared by a management consulting firm, Shiloh County's superintendent pushed his district in the direction of "diagnostic instruction." Arcadia's chief administrator wanted the project in his school district built on the concepts of "individualizing and humanizing" education. Jackson County's superintendent permitted various consultants to propose a project of "continuous pupil progress" based on nongraded, individualized instruction.

The behavior of these five superintendents suggests that they had little understanding of the ES/Washington concept of comprehensive educational change. Their view was the traditional one of the 1960s. Furthermore, they perceived ES as "just another federal educational program" whose auspices could be utilized to obtain substantial federal funding for resolving the pressing *fiscal* problems of their districts. This discrepancy between the way ES/Washington and the local school officials conceived of the Experimental Schools program was a major reason why so many of these projects experienced such great difficulty in their relationships with federal officials.

The largely passive roles played by the boards of education in the five school districts reflects a further lack of understanding of the goals of the ES program. The local boards were primarily concerned about red tape, problems with the Washington bureaucracy, and fiscal aspects of the projects. They showed little awareness or understanding of either the concept of comprehensive change or of the goals their superintendents hoped to achieve with funds from ES/Washington.

In addition, from the outset of their involvement in the ES program, the *specific* goals of each local project were vague. Local leaders apparently took little time (even after their districts had been awarded one-year planning grants) to ask hard questions about the end results they hoped to achieve in five years or to consider how the desired outcomes could be obtained in an optimum manner. Since the lack of clearly stated and generally accepted local goals was a major shortcoming of the change efforts in each district, in retro-

spect it appears that local educational officials should have obtained formal analyses of the basic problems of their school systems, perhaps through a needs assessment survey. Initial diagnosis of this type could have assured that the change efforts were being directed at basic problems. They would also have provided systematic opportunities for principals and teachers to participate in deliberations about the allocation of the financial, technical, professional, and related resources available to support the change efforts.

The case studies provide little evidence that the educational administrators in the five school districts attempted to involve their local communities to any extent prior to the initial efforts at project definition. An additional shortcoming of their performance was their inattention to establishing procedures that could be followed and specifying who would develop the various activities designed to achieve the overall goals.

PLANNING PROBLEMS AND CONCERNS

Educational administrators frequently act as though the concept of planning had little relevance to their work. The case studies indicate that local officials in the five school districts were unable to meet the five-year planning requirement of ES/Washington. Their districts therefore did not design well-conceived planning processes that involved members of their school community in this important initial phase of their change efforts. One of the innovative and excellent features of the Experimental Schools program was its provision of an extended planning period for the projects it supported. Local districts have long complained about the lack of time and money at their disposal to plan programs properly before they attempt to implement them. However, although ES/Washington provided substantial one-year planning grants, the local school districts either experienced serious difficulties in designing viable plans or largely ignored this essential activity, except when pressured to do so by ES/Washington.

Like most educational officials, the local ES administrators were not trained in the skills and techniques of long-range planning. Those with such training generally lacked the kinds of data about their school districts essential to such planning. The planning year in each of the five school districts can perhaps best be characterized as

one of false starts and unrealistic expectations. This is evidenced by the initial euphoric feeling of local officials who had visions of long-term federal funding that would contribute substantially to their annual school district budgets. Their unrealistic views can be attributed in part to the expectations conveyed to them by federal officials. When the local districts began to suspect deception they vented their growing frustrations on ES/Washington. None of them seemed to be aware that a well-conceived planning process was essential if their projects were to have a reasonable chance of succeeding over the long term of five years, especially in view of their confusion about the concept of comprehensive change and their failure to develop specific goals at the outset of the change efforts. Local administrators not only began the projects with little vision of the "better schooling" that a comprehensive change process was to produce, they also failed to use the planning period to involve themselves, their staffs, school boards, and community members in a process which could generate such a vision. These conclusions are based on the following evidence from the case studies.

The initial enthusiasm of teachers in Arcadia eroded substantially by the end of the first month of their implementation efforts as a consequence of their ambiguity about their ES project and of a bitter teacher strike. Three revisions of a project plan had to be prepared and the belated approval of the final plan by ES/Washington caused the cancellation of the initial and vital summer workshop for the faculty. In Shiloh County, planning was largely in the hands of the superintendent who took the ill-fated tack of "one man's got to do it." The planning effort in River District was under the tight control of a council of administrators that systematically froze out direct input from students, parents, teachers, staff members, and consultants. In Butte-Angels Camp, faculty disenchantment with the local project arose from the strong-willed control of the planning process by the superintendent. In Jackson County, the superintendent, an elected official, used the planning grant to dispense jobs to friends and to build his political base. Reacting to pressure from ES/Washington, he subsequently agreed to hire an outside consultant to develop the district's plan. This development largely precluded obtaining necessary input from local faculty, staff, parents, and citizens.

Some of the major deficiencies of the planning efforts were at-

tributable in part to the insensitive, erratic, often contradictory, and frequently unreasonable manner in which ES/Washington dealt with the local districts during the one-year planning period. The case studies show that the local officials lacked important planning skills, but the federal officials were generally insensitive to the need to develop their capabilities in this respect *in ways which built upon local strengths*. Local officials were constantly concerned about the "hidden federal game plan" that they perceived as lurking beyond each ES/Washington telephone call, letter, or site visit. The experiences described in the five case studies reveal that there was a basis in fact for their misapprehensions, despite the rhetoric of ES/Washington that the school districts' plans were to be locally determined.

Shortcomings in the performance of the ES/Washington project officers, however, were matched by those of the local educational officials, especially the superintendents. They did not develop rational plans that contained timetables, checkpoints, feedback loops to relevant school and community groups, and a clear specification of the desired results. The case studies reveal little concern for formal needs assessments during the planning period or for the design of a program of systematic feedback during the implementation period. In short, the evidence reveals many weaknesses in the planning process. These conditions served as serious obstacles to the development of a consensus among school and community members about how they would define comprehensive change, how they would identify specific project goals, and how they would later know if those goals were being achieved.

IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS AND CONCERNS

Before the implementation phase of any major change effort begins, mechanisms need to be developed to cope with potential obstacles and other problems identified during the phases of project conceptualization and planning. It is essential to anticipate the types of problems and concerns, noted in chapter 2, which can be expected to arise in the change process, for example, role overload, risks perceived by participants, role ambiguity, inflated expectations, and the unavailability of required instructional materials. Those who direct efforts to change schools not only need to identify potential barriers to change which can arise during the implementation period, but also to design strategies to cope with them.

After potential implementation problems have been identified, the following kinds of individuals and groups that will have important roles in this critical phase of the change process need to be specified: school board members, the superintendent, central office support staff, principals, teachers, staff, parents, students, tax-paying citizens, federal officials, and others. The identified barriers to implementation need to be examined by these groups and they should be requested to propose strategies to cope with them. In addition, their meetings should permit each participant to learn new roles and to communicate more effectively with one another.

Although school districts participating in the Experimental Schools program were given wide latitude by ES/Washington in the design of their training programs, the five case studies reveal that little or no attention was given to developing training programs for groups other than faculty. This oversight reflects the failure of the change efforts to obtain broad citizen involvement and participation, another major reason why large-scale projects so often break down. With respect to the teaching faculty, the training programs that were developed were not planned to take place over the full five-year period of ES funding. They were generally one-shot affairs. A well-implemented innovation can be expected to endure beyond the termination of outside funding—an important objective of the ES program—only when it has had the continued support and involvement of the faculty throughout the implementation period.

An important question raised by the five case studies is how school administrators can gain the continuing support of faculty members for the changes they will need to make in their classrooms. In Jackson County, the planning and development committees excluded teachers. The curriculum development committees existed only on paper in Butte-Angels Camp. Conflicts between ES/Washington and River District forced the cancellation of its workshop planned for the summer prior to the first implementation year. Teacher input into its curriculum workshops appears to have been minimal, and an ongoing staff development component never existed. In Shiloh County, the superintendent's style resulted in considerable teacher hostility toward him and eventually resulted in his resignation. One of his tactics was to inform faculty members about staff development programs that the school district had designed for them without any consideration of their ideas and suggestions. It is not surprising that no imaginative or coherent staff development plan

or process developed there. Arcadia did make a serious effort to establish broad-based committees in its planning activities. However, teachers were turned off during the planning year because many of their ideas were not accepted by the project's leaders; in addition, they were vexed because they were not paid for the additional time they devoted to planning activities.

The five case studies strongly imply that, in implementing change efforts, local school administrators need to give careful attention to establishing staff inservice training procedures that are both ongoing and responsive to the immediate needs of classroom teachers. Teachers involved in change efforts need time to plan, revise curriculum, discuss their problems, try out new techniques, and rethink their instructional practices. ES/Washington recognized these needs. It emphasized the importance of continuing staff development for teachers, teacher aides, support staff, and principals; it also stressed the need to involve the community. The five school districts, however, were not successful in their efforts to implement the staff development and community involvement aspects of their projects.

Able school administrators recognize that "time is money" and, therefore, that mechanisms to develop the skills of their staff are essential when personnel assume new roles in innovative curriculum efforts. The managers of the five ES projects followed rather traditional approaches to staff development: curriculum committees were organized, summer workshops scheduled, and consultants employed. They failed to consider ways to use project funds to free faculty members from their classroom teaching responsibilities on a regular and sustained basis, even though other school districts that participated in the ES program pioneered efforts of this kind. In the Minneapolis project, for example, several innovative models of staff development were used. One was based on the creation of a teacher center that controlled curriculum development funds assigned to faculty, aides, and parents. The center allocated funds on the basis of an assessment of faculty needs, ES project goals, and board of education policies. A second reorganized the students' day in two schools so that their faculties could work together each morning on inservice training activities. A third approach was to develop a community-day model, under which parents, university student-teachers, high school students, aides, and community volunteers took over a school once each week, thus freeing classroom faculty for inservice programs.

Each of these procedures helped to overcome the obstacle of teacher "role overload" so prevalent in the start-up period of most change efforts.

To institute innovations of high quality is an arduous and time-consuming responsibility. If tasks are left to chance, assigned only during summer vacation periods, or heaped on top of the regular daily preparation and teaching loads, performance of high quality is not likely to occur. The staff development activities in the five school districts generally were not planned systematically. This shortcoming greatly hampered their efforts to institute locally designed comprehensive educational change.

PROJECT SUPPORT PROBLEMS AND ISSUES

The logistical support offered by local school officials to a major educational change effort requires close examination throughout the life of a project. They need to raise questions of the following kind: Are the necessary educational supplies and equipment available when they are needed? Do payroll procedures and personnel hiring practices need to be modified in view of project needs? Are new communication channels needed to keep the entire faculty, support staff, school board, and citizens informed about project plans and developments? What types of systematic feedback procedures are needed so that information about project performance will be made available to key decision makers? How will changes instituted in particular schools affect the activities of personnel in other schools? What mechanisms should be established by district personnel to work effectively with such cooperating parties as universities, state departments of education, regional service agencies, and officials of the funding agency? What local budget support should be committed to innovations? Are outside consultants needed, and if so, how can their skills be maximized? Through posing and dealing with these and related questions about project support tasks during a change effort, local officials can materially contribute to the achievement of its objectives.

If a major change effort is to be successful in the long run, many "publics" in the school district must support or accept the new initiatives of the school district. School board members and central administrators must give strong moral support and commit resources.

Support of this kind is most evident when commitment of local funds is made to innovative projects for the period following the termination of external funding. It provides assurance to principals, classroom teachers, and citizens that there is strong local support for the new project, not just pious local and federal rhetoric about it.

Another critical financial issue confronting the five school districts resulted from the insistence of ES/Washington that local districts plan to assume the entire costs of the project after the federal funds had been phased out in five years. Part of the continuing difficulties ES/Washington staff members experienced in their negotiations with local officials involved the determination of whether local districts would be able to support an innovation on their own after the period of federal funding was over. The case studies also revealed that local administrators largely ignored the following critical question with respect to each of their ES programs: how does a school district, committed to a major reform effort over a five-year period, design its budget to reflect the priorities emerging from the change effort in a way which ensures its continuance after federal funding is terminated?

My own experience with federal and local funding practices leads me to suspect that both sides mismanaged the budgetary planning and procedures essential for implementing an ES-type comprehensive change strategy. ES/Washington funding decisions appeared often to be made by whim, partly because of the turnover in ES/Washington project officers and NIE administrators. The changeover in funding arrangements for the ES program from grants to contracts in 1973, and the curtailment of federal funds available to the ES program after it was transferred to the National Institute of Education, limited the flexibility of ES/Washington in its relationships with the school districts. Even the laudable federal innovation by ES/Washington of making five-year advanced funding commitments to the selected school districts—an innovation acclaimed by local school officials around the country when it was announced in 1970—was later viewed by the school districts as problematic since they questioned whether the commitment would survive the transition of the ES program from the Office of Education to the National Institute of Education. These and related federal problems appreciably undermined local efforts to take seriously the ES/Washington requirement to

engage in long-range planning and budgeting. But what about the other side of the coin?

The case studies show that most local officials resisted or did not even consider committing local funds to the ES program until forced to do so by ES/Washington officials. It appears as if they were simply attempting to "milk the federal treasury," for they apparently gave little time or attention to working through a long-term local budget commitment to their ES projects. The result of their lack of initiative in this matter was that federal officials resorted to the use of fixed percentages and other arbitrary standards to determine funding levels for each project. The unwillingness of school district officials to assert leadership in coming to terms with critical financial issues is one of the most troublesome aspects of these five ES projects.

Other mechanisms in addition to planning and budgeting need to be employed in the management of educational change efforts. One is "formative evaluation," the development of procedures to provide feedback to school district officials of important information about the progress of their project. The guidelines for the ES program specified that such a procedure should be an integral part of each project. However, the case studies reveal that apparently very few formative evaluation activities were undertaken by local officials to aid them in their decision-making processes. To deliver effective support services, it is essential that provisions be made to monitor instructional environments and to determine what services are necessary. Procedures need to be established for assessing the extent to which performance is congruent with desired behavior and program goals. Furthermore, the monitoring of instructional effects needs to be viewed as an *ongoing* activity.

The apparent lack of attention paid to formative evaluation raises the question of whether each project in fact had such a component. The information available from the case studies provides few indications that they did. In consequence, local officials were unable to tell whether their projects were moving towards their various instructional and allied goals. Furthermore, the absence of a functioning formative evaluation component largely precluded local decision makers from taking the remedial steps required to deal with their numerous implementation problems.

PROBLEMS OF SHARED DECISION MAKING
IN THE CHANGE PROCESS

A common characteristic of the five school districts was the reluctance of their school boards and administrators to involve members of their school communities in their change effort. None of the five ES projects appears to have generated broad-based local support or to have involved major community groups. In some cases local administrators devoted considerable time to erecting barriers to school-community participation; others simply ignored the issue altogether. A critical weakness of the ES projects was the failure of school officials to understand that the long-term success of their projects would be largely dependent on the establishment of a broad base of local *political* support. The ES program was based on the assumption that each participating school district would make a major commitment to the involvements of parents, faculty, principals, students, and citizens in project planning and governance activities. Each project was expected to develop mechanisms for such shared decision making. However, the superintendents and principals in all five school districts apparently opposed meaningful participation or permitted only token involvement. They preferred to protect their own vested interests and powers.

Political scientists in recent years have studied citizen participation in various types of programs. Arnstein (1969, p. 217), for example, devised the following "ladder" that denotes how varying degrees of citizen power may be institutionalized in a formal organization structure:

8 Citizen control	}	Degrees of citizen power
7 Delegated power		
6 Partnership		
5 Placation	}	Degrees of tokenism
4 Consultation		
3 Informing		
2 Therapy	}	Degrees of nonparticipation
1 Manipulation		

When the five case studies are examined with reference to the existence of citizen and/or faculty decision-making groups, no instance of participation based on citizen control, delegated power, or partnership can be identified.

Evidently the local educational officials rejected, or had no awareness of, the manner in which the concept of authority has been redefined by many educators and laymen in recent years. The traditional view is that local boards of education constitute the ultimate source of authority for the determination of the educational policies of a school district. The authority of the board, it is maintained, derives from state government; it is viewed as the only body that is legally authorized to make policy for the school district. This point of view precludes local school boards from delegating their policy-making role; however, it permits them to delegate the authority to carry out such policies to professional educators—administrators and teachers—through the hierarchy of line and staff relationships in a school district. Under this formulation, a school board may, if it wishes, appoint citizens and teachers to *advise* it, but it is not bound to act upon their counsel or decisions.

A more recent formulation of authority views it as a "bottom-up" concept. The local "school-community" (principals, teachers, students, parents, and other citizens) is seen as the prime source of authority. This formulation assumes that it is difficult or impossible for administrators and members of boards of education to make policy for individual schools because of their remoteness from the teaching and learning that occurs in their school system.

These conflicting views of the sources of authority—the authority of rules and regulations derived from a legal source versus authority derived from participation in or closeness to the teaching/learning process—raises the classic political question: "Who shall make decisions that compel the allegiance of people?" Both views exist in our society. But, in my judgment, the traditional view as it applies to public education is outmoded because it fails to acknowledge that educators and the public must recognize and respect their interdependence and reciprocal obligations.

In stressing "participatory democracy," the ES program gave school officials a powerful justification to create vehicles for continu-

ous interaction among students, parents, faculty, and administrators, which would have permitted them to serve as problem-solving and information-sharing groups in their school-communities. Developments of this kind would have occurred if the professional educators in the ES districts had understood that they were dependent in numerous ways upon students and their parents. As Benne (1970, pp. 401-02) has stated:

An educator does not, because he cannot, command or physically coerce those for whose development he is responsible, be they called pupils or colleagues, to grow into manhood or womanhood. Nor can he enter their lives effectively to shape their characters and dispositions by making rules, however nice and complete, for the ordering of relationships in "the school." He does not operate to help others around him become more mature primarily by providing them with expert information and knowledge. His authority must operate in relation to a community process in which those being educated are involved as participants. He must work somehow as a co-participant in that process if he is to achieve authority and if his authority is to be educationally effective. It is only in the common life processes of those being educated that the active and effective medium and operating field of educational authority is to be found and constructed.

The school administrators in the districts described in the five case studies clearly did not subscribe to this point of view.

QUESTIONABLE ASSUMPTIONS OF LOCAL EDUCATIONAL OFFICIALS

Many aspects of the performance of the administrators of the local ES projects were based on assumptions that are highly questionable. Five of them can be readily challenged:

Assumption 1: That the educational change process is not closely interwoven with local political ramifications and implications. Nothing could be further from reality. Consider the events described in the case study of Jackson County (chapter 5). An extended kinship system prevailed and was well understood in both the white and black communities. The superintendent used the district's ES funds to expand his political power base among the county's families. The strongly held norm of reciprocity noted in that case study is akin to the politics of education practiced in many other communities across this nation today. The other case studies demonstrate that retaining

political power was "the name of the game" for both superintendents and school board members. The adversarial relationships that frequently developed between the school districts, the "feds," and vocal and political teacher groups also essentially reflected struggles for political power.

Assumption 2: That support from the board of education may be assumed for a major local change effort when external funds are available. The limited consideration of the role of school boards in the case studies implies that either board commitment existed throughout the projects (this was clearly an unfounded assumption in the cases of Shiloh County and Butte-Angels Camp) or that boards played only a minor role in them. It is both tenuous and dangerous to assume board support for a major change effort simply because external funding is available. Board members may accept the offer of external funds and still have serious reservations about the goals of the project, but even when they are centrally involved at the outset of a project, their support may fade as their membership changes or as they become aware of implementation headaches or unanticipated side effects. Furthermore, school boards must approve local funding to continue federally initiated projects, such as those sponsored by the ES program, and may balk at voting to modify the school budget to assume the continuation costs. The fact that local boards generally play a powerful political and budgetary role in their districts means that they must deal with a variety of local power brokers.

Assumption 3: That imparting the new attitudes and skills needed by teachers to implement a major change effort can be accomplished easily and quickly. The five case studies challenge this assumption. Not only were most staff development components poorly planned; they were also poorly executed. In River District, for example, the career education component was given top priority in the first year but, as time went on, support for staff development necessary to implement it disappeared, as eventually did the component itself. Furthermore, the second priority of the project, cultural enrichment in the curriculum, was never clearly defined or implemented in any coherent fashion. When the decision was made to emphasize it, no consideration was given to its implications for on-going staff development.

The five school districts generally ignored the possibility that new needs would emerge over the five-year life of their projects and that staff development mechanisms would be needed to respond to

them on other than an ad hoc basis. The local educational officials did not recognize that major barriers to change efforts will usually arise after an innovation has been introduced and that they must be dealt with effectively if the innovation is to be implemented successfully. The retraining of teachers is an essential component of most educational change processes. It is also difficult to accomplish. It must be given top priority *throughout* a change effort. To ignore it in the planning and implementation phases of an innovative effort or to assume that teacher retraining can be quickly achieved can result in the eventual abandonment of a change effort.

Assumption 4: That deliberate change efforts require little or no planning. Despite the fact that all five school districts were provided with sizable amounts of time and money for planning, they generally were unable or unwilling to involve many participants in sustained project planning activities. The valuable inputs that a wide range of participants could have made to projects were not utilized. In addition to teachers, administrators, and school board members, students, parents, and support staff need to be involved in initial and continuing planning efforts since their views and feelings about a project and their commitment to its goals will have a bearing on project success. They need to be kept informed about the activities of the project through its lifetime. More importantly, they need to be given a voice in decisions in which they have a vital stake.

An effective planning process also requires specification of a timetable, task assignments, lines of accountability for different components of the plan, and clearly articulated review and decision-making mechanisms. However, the ineffective planning in this respect by local school officials described in the five case studies should not be attributed solely to poor management at the local level. ES/Washington staff members clearly missed many important opportunities to assist local officials in obtaining more effective planning skills. Both the failure of local administrators to engage in systematic planning and of federal officials to assist them in developing the necessary planning skills were detrimental to the change efforts being undertaken.

Assumption 5: That broad-based staff and citizen participation in the change process is to be tolerated but is not essential to the ultimate success of a project. Most school administrators appear to subscribe to this assumption. It belies reality in the 1970s, however.

Public education is by definition public business. If changes are to be made in school systems, authority needs to be shared with parents and other citizens. Instead of reluctantly involving the public in a major change effort, local school boards and their administrators need to establish a variety of mechanisms whereby both citizens and school employees can have a voice in school affairs that are within their zones of concern. Faculty should be involved right from the start in attempted curriculum reforms, and parents and students should be involved in shaping the goals of a program of studies. The need to draw up guidelines for decision-making processes is particularly important because the quality of a decision and its perceived legitimacy will depend upon whether those affected were involved or had the opportunity to participate. Since the nature of authority in our society is tending more and more to reside on the grass roots level, local school officials must support and cultivate faculty and citizen participation in educational decision making within the overall policy framework of their school districts.

CONCLUSIONS

School officials in administrative positions serve in key educational roles. They can become leaders of efforts to improve public education or merely serve as keepers of the status quo. Based upon my reading of the experiences of the administrators involved in the five case studies, it appears that collegial rather than bureaucratic relationships will be most effective in working with faculty, students, and parents. The support of each of these groups and their commitment to educational reform are essential to the achievement of educational change. The best persons to devise and implement a change effort are the individuals who will be directly affected by the intended change or have an important stake in it. We need to move beyond the period in public education when, as in Shiloh County, administrators plan programs *for* people and do things *to* people. Such efforts are increasingly becoming counterproductive. What is needed in every change effort is a tailor-made strategy designed to resolve a particular problem or issue in a way pertinent to the district's specific educational setting and political milieu. Such a strategy for change should consist of diagnosis, definition, initiation, implementation, monitoring of instructional and support environ-

ments, monitoring of instructional effects, and provisions for stabilizing the program within the district over time.

As I have stressed, such a strategy for change needs to be rooted in the particular social and cultural environment of each community. The basic objective of this strategy should be to involve the adult population of the schools and their community in the planning of changes in the instructional program, in establishing the need to change, in providing local support for change, in obtaining the resources required, in legitimizing reform efforts, and in making the venture rewarding. All of these activities require collaboration among local school administrators, parents, the professional staff, and civic-minded adults. Local conditions need to be considered prior to developing, funding, or initiating a change effort. Organizational factors that can influence a change effort also need to be examined early, as well as the view of members of the school-community about the need for educational change. Key personnel need to be involved throughout.

Through careful deliberations and planning before embarking on major innovations, and by paying heed to the many lessons to be learned from the change efforts described in the five case studies, school administrators should be able to offer greater leadership to change efforts in their school systems in the future. Then perhaps, just perhaps, we will not be destined to repeat the story of their experiences, and our own performance will instead reflect that we have learned from them.

REFERENCES

- Arnstein, Sherry R. "A Ladder of Citizen Participation." *American Institute of Planners Journal* (July 1969): 216-24.
- Benne, Kenneth D. "Authority in Education." *Harvard Educational Review* 40, no. 3 (August 1970): 385-410.
- Toffler, Alvin. *Future Shock*. New York: Random House, 1970.

Consultation: Traps and Potentialities

Ronald Lippitt

I shall make some observations about the strengths and weaknesses of the consultation process as it was described in the five case studies of the Experimental Schools program. I shall also formulate guidelines for educational administrators who are wondering whether to employ consultants.

The term *consultant* as it appeared in the case studies covered a wide range of roles, including technical resource person, advisor, monitor, trainer, coordinator, counselor, advocate-defender, presenter, evaluator, and advisor-reflector. You might think that the way to judge the effectiveness of a specific consultation is simply to measure the performance of the consultant in one of those roles at a given time. But it is not. Rather, you must consider the nature and source of the contract with the consultee, the particular phase of the problem solving or change process, and the direction of the consultant-consultee relationship as it moves among the poles of dependence, interdependence, and independence.

SEVERAL INDICATIONS OF EFFECTIVE CONSULTATION

Whether or not the consultant or the consultation will be useful depends to a high degree on conditions under which the relationship

is initiated, the way the roles of consultant and consultee are defined, and the techniques and timing of the consultant in applying his resources.

The first indication is whether the potential clients came to him voluntarily. What brought them at this moment? Unfortunately, in these five case studies, we frequently find that the consultant was imposed upon an unwilling or unprepared consultee, who did not understand why he needed a consultant or what a consultant could do for him. Frequently a willing administrator imposed a consultant on an unwilling administrator imposed a consultant on an unwilling staff. Sensitive consultants, if they sense that the potential clients treat them with distrust, openly explore the possibility of a voluntary tryout period.

A second indication is whether the client system has been clearly defined. In many of the situations described in these cases, the client seems to have been a total staff or an administrator group or even a whole school-community system. But the initial meetings and subsequent contract seem to suggest that an administrator is the sole client. Failure to specify the client resulted in many of the problems in the working relationships when consultants tried to provide help.

A third indication is the degree to which there has been a two-way process between the consultant and the potential client in clarifying and working out a relationship. Often an administrator approached the consultant on his own authority, and his staff, having no equal voice, resisted. A consultant should not permit a repetition of this mistake in his own interactions. Consultant and client must have a mutual understanding of each other's expectations, commitment, goals, scope, and major functions.

A fourth indication is whether there are plans for transferring some of the resources of the consultant, who is outside the system, to personnel on the inside, so that what they learned will become a permanent part of the system. In these five cases, the consultant's help was rarely continued. It is unlikely that the consultants placed high priority on preparing and training internal personnel to provide the necessary follow-up.

The fifth indication is the balance between the consultant's advice or start-up service and his support functions during difficult transitional periods. A consultant can easily initiate action, but it is more important for him to stand beside his consultees when they are

"playing for keeps" with the behaviors and procedures which he has advocated, taught, or demonstrated.

A sixth indication is whether the consultant has introduced procedures to review periodically his working relationship with his client. No effective consultant depends merely on impressions and informal feedback to tell him how he is doing.

A seventh indication is the degree to which the consultant can help the client identify the steps toward a desired goal, map out procedures for seeing when the steps have been accomplished, and explain the appropriate celebrations as the steps are completed. It is depressing to be oriented primarily toward the discrepancy between "what we would like and the way things are," as opposed to a positive orientation toward recognizing and praising progress.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT CONSULTATION IN THE RURAL ES PROGRAM

1. In all five situations, ES/Washington failed to differentiate between monitoring, consultation, and information roles. It did not distinguish between supervising quality control, supportive helping, and supplying resource information. Some consultants have been able to mix the roles of evaluation, consultation, and resource expert, but doing so requires a high level of sensitivity and great clarity in the relationship. In our five cases, two-way communication between ES/Washington and local project leaders was conspicuously lacking.

2. One of the most important principles of successful educational change is that participants become active voluntarily after they have become exposed in one way or another to the new effort. But ES/Washington and local leaders, eager to meet the federal criterion of "comprehensiveness," required that everybody be ready to start at once and participate at the same time in the initial activities. They made it difficult for reluctant individuals to participate voluntarily and thus unwittingly fostered resistance.

3. The procedures which ES/Washington used to refer local administrators to consultants reflected a typical medical model of "prescribing what I know is good for them." Even in the medical context, this procedure has many weaknesses. In the context of organizational change, it is disastrous. He who refers must play a genuine third-

party role of helping the potential client to understand and accept the need for help and to accept a particular resource as desirable. He also interprets the need and situation to the potential consultant in order to ease the development of the new relationship.

4. In all cases local administrators lacked skill in recruiting consultants, working out meaningful contractual understandings with them, and bringing local personnel into the working relationship. The consultants were typically seen as limited tools of the administrator or as mechanisms to carry through a restricted training function for a group of teachers. No one knew why, when, or how to use a consultant.

5. Even the university-based consultants did not differentiate among the advocate role, the trainer-educator role, and the problem-solving, methodological helper role. The same consultant can play these roles at different times with the same client, but he must realize when he steps out of one and into the next. One of the consequences of the muddle here was the frequency with which consultants seemed to be trapped in a narrow perspective of what was needed from them in the project. As a result, they often performed only a small, specific function, which could be helpful only if the consultees were somehow able to fit it into the process at large.

6. Both ES/Washington and local administrators failed to differentiate between a consultant's expertise on particular educational innovations or procedures (for example, curriculum or individualization of instruction or diagnosis and prescription) and his expertise in the area of educational change. The methodology of stimulating and facilitating change and helping cope with resistance to change is a specific area of competence quite different from competence in various educational subject matters or procedures.

7. In most of the consultative situations, the consultants and consultees failed to recognize that a consultant-trainer, after introducing and advocating new ideas and procedures and behaviors, must have a specific design for follow-through and must support the efforts to apply the skills and procedures on the job. Every time energy goes into an effort at change, it is necessary to develop support system procedures. Yet, in educational change, this is probably the most neglected area of implementation. We do have several examples of support-system effort in the projects, but they are minor and inadequate.

8. Just as the projects reflect a lack of clarity in role definition for ES/Washington and its external consultants, so there is a lack of clarity in the roles of the internal agents. Staff members who were assigned to coordinate, facilitate, train, or support were almost always carrying a combination of supervisory, administrative, monitoring, and consultative duties. Overlapping responsibilities made it difficult to gain trust or credibility or legitimacy as a consultative helper and supporter.

9. In none of the five cases are examples given of the consultants initiating a process review of the consultation, or of the consultees initiating or requesting such a review. Without planned feedback and review, effective consultation cannot be developed and maintained.

10. Frequently a criterion of successful consultation seemed to be whether the consultant had helped the client "satisfy the feds" by helping get the funds, meeting external demands for "getting the community involved," conducting a mandatory workshop for all the staff, or writing up a satisfactory document. In this context, how would the consultant help the client focus on achieving important educational goals? The whole process seemed too often one of mutual collusion, rather than a committed search for genuine improvements in the quality of education.

DIAGNOSTIC OBSERVATIONS ABOUT CONSULTATIONS IN EACH ES PROJECT

A full critical review and evaluation of consultative roles and procedures in each of the five school districts is not possible here. Instead, a few differential characteristics of each situation that seem to illustrate important principles will be discussed. Critical points where consultation would have been of great value, but was lacking or not well used, will be noted.

River District

It is interesting that River District had a tradition of drawing upon university resources, but only for specific substantive enrichment projects such as music, theatre, or art, rather than for help in solving organizational or educational problems. Probably this is one reason why outside consultation was not considered as a possibility

in the very critical start-up phase when an effort was made to bring about collaboration between the polarized parts of the community—miners, ranchers, and townsmen. Failure to unite the community around a common educational cause was certainly a basic weakness which haunted the project throughout its existence. Skillful consultation from an outside helper could have been of significant value in this early phase.

The community saw outsiders as controlling rather than helping, and consequently resisted the outside consultant imposed by ES/Washington to help with planning and needs assessment. The distrust of outsiders was reinforced by the unscheduled visit of the ES consultants, who were seen as being there not to help the local school district but to provide evaluation to Washington.

Perhaps the most dysfunctional event in the life of the project was the cancellation of the summer start-up workshop because of the delay in the funding decision. Delaying the use of outside resource persons put an impossible load on the shoulders of the internal project coordinator whose role, as the report states, "was poorly conceived, ambiguously defined, and ultimately abolished at the year's end. . . . She was new to the district . . . and her role fell outside the jurisdiction of the principals." The promising plan to use a variety of volunteer ad hoc committees fell apart because there was no consultant to help the committees select leaders, agendas, and procedures for reporting. Later on, when the project leadership was decentralized and the principals were given authority, no one with skills in professional development spelled out their new responsibilities.

The case study implies that the momentum of the project had been lost because of the federal decision to provide very low funding for the terminal period. It is my belief that that decision had a very small impact compared to the total failure to mobilize leadership and consultative support procedures, including a structure for appropriate involvement of the teachers. The job of identifying and using appropriate consultation was a mutual responsibility of local leadership and the ES/Washington project officers.

Jackson County

There are several positive elements in the initial formulation of the plan for this project. For example, there was emphasis on staff development priorities, and on the use of ad hoc administrator-

teacher task forces for program development, as well as on utilization of consultant resources from the state Department of Education. Unfortunately, none of these promising ideas developed with any vigor.

A hopeful sign appeared when the initial outside consultant-educator, asked in the fall of 1972 to help draft the plan, met with the full district coordinating committee and verbally defined his role as an aid to the committee rather than as a writer. His skills did not match his intentions because the report indicates that he "drew up a list of thirty-eight goals for the project" and the project director "took the consultant's three page statement of themes and goals and had them typed exactly as the consultant had written them." The consultant created a problem of dependency rather than developing two-way teamwork and joint problem solving.

As in River District, we find a dissatisfied ES/Washington project officer imposing a consultant to revise the plan. Unfortunately the plan included no details of a staff development procedure and nothing specific about evaluation. Even the best consultant has difficulties in deciding the feasibility of his ideas without a working relationship with the insiders who are going to carry out the plan.

Two positive results are reported in this project. The well-trained, full-time project consultant who was hired in the fall of 1974 seems to have successfully trained the internal coordinator to carry on after he left, and a six-person team of teachers and administrators took a course on evaluation methods for credit from the university staff. There is no evidence of follow-up support for the team back on the job, probably because the course was a typical university course rather than a consultative contract.

In this very mixed picture of positive and negative elements in the consultative process, the conspicuous need was for consultation on goal setting and implementation. The administrators should have been provided with an overall perspective and the skills to give continuing leadership and guidance to a project that had great potential.

Butte-Angels Camp

Interestingly, an administrator-staff conflict during the planning stage simultaneously increased the resistance to change and lowered the commitment toward implementation. Clearly a consultant with third-party, conflict-management skills was needed. Unfortunately no one was available to help the administrators or staff members

understand the need for such a person. Guidelines for such projects can easily provide information and suggestions about typical issues in which consultation is necessary and suggest procedures for finding the type of consultant needed.

A peculiar distortion of the consultant concept appears in the comment that the ES/Washington project officer apparently helped local officials "outguess" Washington. One could hardly expect this sort of help to resolve communication problems between the school district and ES/Washington.

A little further in the report we find that "the agency distrusted local reporting and felt local planning was unsound. . . . ES/Washington insisted that an ES/Washington consultant, chosen by the agency, should draw up a detailed evaluation plan that an untrained person could follow." This directive certainly demonstrates a major insensitivity to appropriate and feasible consultative functions. First of all, no externally developed, detailed evaluation plan is likely to be accepted, and certainly no effective evaluation procedures can be used, by an untrained person who has no well-designed training opportunity.

Again, we find external consultants being led into the trap of conducting "mandatory summer workshops." It is clear in this phrase why the ES project consultant's "suggestions were sometimes redefined as directives."

In this project we again find consultants functioning as technical trainers with very limited follow-up at the point of application. "The principals' task was to help the consultant-trainer train the teachers to improve and apply their skills in diagnosis and prescription." Their intentions were good. "But the principals shared the teachers' confusion." As a matter of fact, the principals even reduced the support by reassigning ES aides as substitutes for the teachers while they were getting training. They were cheaper than regular substitutes.

Two typical problems were identified in this case study. The ES project consultant found himself meeting with resistance in his effort to work with the teachers because he was thought to be reporting to the superintendent. The confusion of an administrative-supervisory role and a consultant role can be dysfunctional in both responsibilities. The other problem is indicated by the comment in the report that the internal ES consultant was "constantly assigned administra-

tive activities connected with the ES project, which limited opportunities to work with teachers individually."

Arcadia

As we read that the objectives of this project put priority on the "improvement of interpersonal relationships and the individualizing of instruction," we recognize that success in achieving these goals will require special consultation and the development of a support system to help teachers and others experiment with behavioral change. The report indicates a very high level of involvement in the development of the Letter of Interest to ES/Washington and the widespread use of voluntary ad hoc committees, "some eighteen of them," to work on planning the project. These committees included community people as well as school personnel.

Consultation could easily have made the difference between success and failure. We find that the inservice advisory committee, appropriately representative, was "never operational, functions were never defined, members never helped to develop a clear set of objectives." And the ES project advisory committee, which was established to oversee the whole process, was "provided with no guidance after February" and just seemed to "satisfy another demand by ES/Washington." Assuming a desire to have these mechanisms work, a modest amount of skilled consultation on the techniques of planning and operating meetings could have provided the skills for the group to control and approve their own process of problem solving, decision making, goal setting, and action.

Two encouraging efforts were made during the planning process to secure consultation from peers. The teachers organized visits to other school systems where innovative projects had been begun. No initiatives like this were reported for the other projects. And the superintendent made an effort to meet with superintendents in other ES projects to exchange ideas. But, as an example of misguided and dysfunctional intervention, this effort of the superintendent "was discouraged by the ES/Washington program director because of fears that interaction among the sites might lead to contamination of the individual programs being developed by the sites."

At several stages of the project, the Arcadians used consultation actively and successfully. They brought in, first, a group of consultants from the regional university who were involved in development

of the total plan and, later, consultants from one of the university institutes who conducted workshops which helped staff members follow up their training at the university.

This district summoned considerable strength in coping with what the educators perceived as undue control efforts from ES/Washington. They interpreted ES/Washington's advice as "an indication of prejudice against the capabilities of the rural school system; their local pride was challenged." The local residents developed strategies "not to be overrun by the outsiders." "When an ES/Washington visitor came to Arcadia he or she was presented with a busy schedule of visits, interviews, and dinner meetings. The local residents always attempted, as much as possible, to maintain control of the visit." Evidently this posture had an effect because the report indicates that the project officers assigned to this site "quickly learned the necessary protocol; gentle persuasion and well-timed suggestions would be accepted, but heavy-handed outside advice would be quickly rejected."

What the participants needed was process consultation to help them cope with the frustration of dealing with pressures from the funding source. As frustration mounted, the enthusiasm of the teachers dwindled, and they began to regret the many hours of volunteer time which they had already contributed. They began to regard the project as required work and pressed for pay for the time devoted to it. The local team should have secured a consultant to help them work on their relationship with Washington personnel; as a third party, the consultant could have helped with direct feedback to Washington and convened meetings.

When "teacher-coordinators" were appointed in the buildings to help promote the project activities, they could have acted as decentralized consultants. But they were given no training for their roles, and they had no internal support system. Instead, they were given a load of paperwork. That is a sure way to kill a good idea.

Another failure to convert good intentions into actuality occurred in the effort to provide thirty-six hours of inservice training on human relations (the "humanizing concept"). The training seems to have been contracted to one consulting firm and two universities. An internal committee was responsible for coordinating the training, but what happened is reflected in the comment of one participant: "They just lectured to us."

Shiloh County

In this case a consultant was employed to "take care of the details of getting the funds"—to write the Letter of Interest. This routine, "\$200.00 well-spent," did a great deal to block the successful subsequent development of the project. The consultant employed by the superintendent to draft the Letter was an advocate of diagnostic instruction, the superintendent's favorite educational procedure. The Letter, he hoped, would justify the securing of technological hardware which would overcome the inadequacies of the teachers. The consultant did feel that the procedure they were outlining required basic changes in teachers' attitudes and skills. But precisely what changes were not explored or clarified. Subsequently the proposal generated conflict within the local staff, just as the superintendent's "go it alone philosophy" generated conflict with ES/Washington because he had not involved the community. Then the superintendent pleased Washington by securing another consultant, who involved the community in a series of presentations and discussions.

This project illustrates the weakness of trying to involve and start everybody at once in a change process. "Little if any knowledge gained from the (mandated) inservice program was implemented in the classroom." When the project consultant returned to Shiloh County for further inservice training sessions, "the inservice sessions pitted the teachers against the outsiders." Inservice training was scorned. One teacher said, "Teachers have no need for consultants who are in the county only for the money provided by the ES project." When "the consultant asked how many teachers were using the mandated record-keeping system, no one was." One inservice session came to a close with the consultant saying, "I can't work like this"; the teachers expressed satisfaction with the results of this encounter, one of them remarking: "We ran him off. We gave him both barrels." Withdrawing from the ES project, they felt, was a good idea simply on the basis that it would end the weekly inservice sessions. "We'll be gaining two hours a week."

It is important for the reader to remember that observations in this section have been focused on consultant roles and the consultation process, rather than on total analysis of project operation and accomplishments. Certainly there may be a significant relationship between using consultants and accomplishing goals, but it is also possible for successful work to get done by motivated and competent

people without the use of consultants. In all five projects, however, the process of educational change could have been greatly facilitated by better planning for the use of external and internal consultation from technical experts and peers. They could have provided substantive help both on content and on the procedures of educational activity, as well as on the process of planned change. The next two sections of this chapter summarize some of the guidelines that can be helpful in making sure that educational change is both successful and continuing.

GUIDELINES IN SEEKING AND USING CONSULTANTS¹

Many administrators have soured on the use of consultants because they have hired consultants previously and got negligible results, or observed unethical conduct by the consultants, or were stung by high fees, or were embarrassed by their own unreadiness—all of which may reflect poor selection or use of a consultant. As one analyst has observed: "Help is never really help unless and until it is perceived as 'helpful' by the person or group on the receiving end—regardless of the good intention or reputation of the helper or consultant."

What kinds of assistance can the outside consultant, the right one, be expected to provide? Typically a good consultant can:

- Perceive the client's situation accurately and deeply (for example, he will spot and test assumptions);
- Help define goals clearly;
- Help express and test alternatives;
- Provide a sense of reality;
- Confront sensitive areas of client stumbling blocks;
- Save the client time and resources;
- Reinforce the client's commitments to change;
- Teach others to perform change-support functions;
- Help improve the client system's health;
- Link the client's resources to other resources;
- Catalyze action within the client system;
- Divide a problem into manageable parts for client problem solving;
- Use and expand client resources.

In selecting a consultant, a client usually worries about the type, quantity, quality, and cost of work to be performed. Almost all administrators and leaders can use training or guidance somewhere, but they don't know how to look for help. Here are some typical activities in a competent search for a consultant.

1. The client should determine the nature and general scope of the project prior to contacting prospective consultants.

2. He should gather the qualifications of the potential consultants, make sure that they are relevant to his own project, and draw up a short list of qualified consultants.

3. He should meet with each serious candidate and discuss the project and each candidate's approach to it. All consultants should be asked to submit statements of how they might approach giving help.

4. References should be checked in depth.

5. The client should study the presentations of the consultants and assess their understanding of the problem, their approach, the probable benefits, and the fees. He should restudy the particular experience and ability of each consultant who has impressed him so far.

6. He should expect to enter into an exploratory or trial period of consulting.

Obviously not all of these steps are always possible, so the trial period often becomes a crucial first step for both client and consultant. Even if the steps are omitted, however, much more than that which occurred in our five case studies is possible. The ultimate requirement is understanding that successful consultation is two-way.

Turning now to actual performance, how can a client assess a consultant's approach to giving help? The consultative process is a personal relationship between people trying to solve a problem. Although the consultant is able to influence this relationship by being competent and articulating ideas clearly, he can be influential if he is simply accepted—that is, if the consultant has legitimized his role. Consequently the professional behavior of the consultant is of prime importance. Here are several guidelines in assessing a consultant derived from my observation and training of many consultants during the past twenty-five years:

1. Does the consultant form sound relationships with the client? Successful consulting is based on trust developed by effective interpersonal relations. Does the consultant allow time for exploring his relationship in sufficient depth so both parties feel that changes are possible based on developing confidence and trust?

2. Does the consultant create dependence on his personal resources? A responsible and ethical consultant does not make the client dependent on him or his methods.

3. Does the consultant focus on the problem? Beware of the consultant who so much wants to please everyone with his work that he glosses over problems and conflicts. Rather than confront the client with the kinds of corrective measures he might find hard to swallow—thereby endangering his own continued employment—the consultant dodges.

4. Is he nonjudgmental and tolerant toward other consultants and disciplines? A sign of an unprofessional consultant is his derision either of the talents of fellow consultants or of other disciplines. An effective consultant knows his own limitation and sees the values of other specialties.

5. Does the consultant respect the confidence of his clients? Another sign of a professional consultant is his ability to keep confidential his dealings with clients. A professional does not violate the confidence of individuals or organizations in talking with clients.

6. Is the consultant clear about his financial arrangements? One frequently finds an unprofessional consultant vague about his fee or the conditions under which he will bill his services. The ethical professional, on the other hand, sets ground rules for his charges so that a client knows what he will have to pay.

7. Does the consultant gain the organization's respect? Another trait of the unprofessional consultant is his attempt to go over the head of the staff person who brought him into the organization.

8. Does the consultant specify the skills he has which are pertinent to the problem? It is handy these days to be an expert behavioral scientist, knowledgeable in quantitative methods. Beware of consultants who seem to have all of today's desirable attributes. Be wary too of the consultant who unreasonably implies expansive knowledge and experience; his words may be venturing far beyond his actual abilities.

9. Does the consultant clearly inform the client as to his role

and the progress of his contribution? Often an unprofessional consultant will deceive the client into thinking that he is getting certain results from his work when, in reality, he is not.

10. Does the consultant express willingness to have his service evaluated? A nonprofessional consultant will refuse.

11. Does the consultant belong to a professional association? A professional resource person should have a means of continually upgrading his skills and knowledge, and a professional association helps keep one current. This criterion is a key point in evaluating any resource person.

CONCLUSIONS

Every educational administrator must mobilize internal and external human resources to carry on the process of education. To do his job well, he must alert his staff to the need for help and prepare them to receive it. He must also know how to locate and brief appropriate helpers and work out a clear two-way accountability contract. Some things are worth striving for, and once they are determined, an administrator must be ready to commit human resources and energies to them. He should ask:

1. Are there staff persons within the system who can be re-assigned on a part- or full-time basis to provide consultation?
2. Is the effort of such magnitude that a new full-time, permanent staff position is required (with a subsequent search to find someone to fill it)?
3. Is a temporary outside consultant, or group of consultants, the best way to get the help needed?

In our five case studies all of the superintendents should have:

1. Located an external resource person or group with capability in organization and staff development.
2. Discovered and reassigned, at least half-time, a current staff member to give internal leadership to the coordination of the project, joining the outside consultant and the administrators as part of the project leadership team.
3. Helped the outside and inside consultants recruit and orient

a representative "steering task force" from the relevant sector of the school system and its community and explain its function to the total system.

4. Provided the time and budget for the consultant staff member to participate in short-term training relevant to the anticipated requirements of the role.

5. Established a regular schedule of progress review sessions with the consultants, both internal and external, and with the steering task force. The agenda for these sessions would include decisions for additional specialist consultants (internal or external) in specific curricular or technical areas, as well as decisions about policy for project support, such as released days for inservice training for teacher participants and the method of recruiting volunteers or key community leaders.

No doubt many other decisions would emerge during the year, but the point is that the administrator would have a decision-making mechanism, a procedure for maintaining quality control, and an active inside-outside consultant team to deal creatively with planning, problem solving, implementation, evaluation, and publicity. Good intentions, adequate funds, and skilled personnel do not become productive without such a design for the identification and use of resources.

NOTE

1. A more detailed exposition of some of the ideas presented in this section can be found in Lippitt (1972).

REFERENCE

Lippitt, Gordon. "Criteria for Selecting, Evaluating and Developing Consultants." *Training and Development Journal* 26, no. 8 (August 1972): 12-17.

Strengthening Federal-Local Relationships Supporting Educational Change

Michael W. Kirst

This chapter explores federal-local relationships in reforming education through an analysis of the Experimental Schools (ES) program. The ES program is different from about 90 percent of the federal grants to local educational agencies (LEAs), because the state educational agency (SEA) does not play a role. Consequently, we are looking at interactions between only two levels of a complex three-level federal system. Many federal reformers have claimed, however, that the SEA is an impediment to change and that an ES-type relationship will provide a more fruitful arrangement for reform (Brademas, 1970). This would be true particularly for comprehensive change. Consequently, the ES program is an especially useful framework for viewing federally induced local reform because the "state middleman" is not in the picture.

My reading of the five case studies is that very little, if any, comprehensive change occurred. We need to understand the impact of federal-local interactions on this discouraging result. The perspective here is from the bottom up, or the local level looking up to the federal delivery system. First, we will describe the local problems attributable to federal sources, then analyze why these problems occur, and then turn to the locally generated problems that impeded

ES implementation. Finally, we conclude with short-run and long-run policies to improve the outcome of future federal efforts. The recommendations ought to assist both federal and local school reformers to devise future policies and procedures so that innovations are implemented and incorporated into local operations. It is the lack of this incorporation of innovation that calls for a major effort to discover what went wrong.

LOCAL PROBLEMS ATTRIBUTABLE TO FEDERAL SOURCES

Although the outcome of the ES program in the local areas results from both federal and local action (or inaction) combined, we are initially separating the issues by governmental level for analytical purposes. Since the federal government initiated the program, it is appropriate to sketch the prime problems stemming from that level. They are: (1) confused and overly ambitious goals; (2) inefficient and inflexible implementation policies; (3) delays in response to local needs; (4) strategic miscalculation to implement comprehensive change at the central rather than school site level; and (5) ineffective use of community participation.

Problems with Goals

The ES program is a classic case of multiple, vague, and somewhat contradictory federal objectives that leave LEAs confused about federal desires (see Wirt and Kirst, 1975, chapter 8). "Comprehensive change" is more a slogan than a concept to guide operations. Consequently, the LEAs could include everything and anything, and were never required to be very precise. Arcadia's goals were "humanizing and individualizing," Shiloh County wanted to "individualize diagnostic instruction," and Jackson County aspired to a "coordinated program . . . for . . . improving the quality and relevance of education for all pupils." In view of the ES desire for comprehensive change, there was apparently little federal assistance in scaling down overly ambitious local projects to meet local capabilities. In Jackson County, the ES project officer stated: "Comprehensiveness includes absolutely everything that has to do with education in Jackson County." Yet the staff and fiscal resources in Jackson County were limited, and it was obviously going to be difficult to keep consultants in that location for long periods of time.

The more organizations that are involved, or the more complex the substance of reform, the greater the difficulty of implementation. In Jackson County there were too many project components to be mounted in too many different schools. Moreover, basic and applied research gaps for meeting Jackson County's ambitious goals were critical, but ES/Washington apparently failed to raise objections.

Multiple and vague federal objectives also can make federal evaluation of local performance potentially capricious and arbitrary. Federal evaluators may single out particular dimensions of "a comprehensive effort" and say a program is not meeting federal intent. The case of Butte-Angels Camp is an excellent example of the impossibility of meeting all of the various federal expectations simultaneously.

Inefficient and Inflexible Implementation Policies

The ES program proceeded from the traditional federal position that a key part of successful implementation is to have LEAs specify goals, objectives, milestones, and timetables for accomplishment. Indeed, the federal government imposed many of its standard research-management procedures. Unfortunately, ES is an action program not oriented to research procedures. There was an ES/Washington expectation of sequence of actions and schedules, formal information systems, identification of key tasks, and so on. Many of these are concepts derived from business management. According to this approach, successful implementation relies heavily on paper compliance with these "good management practices" through progress reports and formal evaluations. Sometimes the latter are conducted by technically certified third-party evaluators.

In the business world the control of an activity requires that (1) key production variables be subject to manipulation; (2) there be information feedback for manipulating these variables; and (3) the information system be reasonably accurate. None of these conditions is present to any satisfactory extent in public education generally and in the ES sites particularly. Business firms use their financial accounting systems as a principal means of control and obtain vital information through sales and profits. The cases studied indicate that ES/Washington never had good information on what was happening in these rural areas, especially concerning the local problems and per-

spective. The long-distance flow of paper between Washington and the local sites on objectives and milestones of accomplishment gives an illusion of information, but not the reality. Moreover, the paper flow rarely gives Washington administrators the information needed for them to be helpful. Instead of sensing that Jackson County could not implement all it proposed and so suggesting revisions, the ES/Washington project officer apparently saw his role as one of assuring that the original contract was followed as closely as possible!

This implementation approach misses the concept of "mutual adaptation" described in a recent study of a large number of federal change-oriented projects (Berman and McLaughlin, 1975). Successful implementation requires mutual adaptation of the innovation and the organization, in which both change from their initial characteristics. That is, change is recognized as a slow, evolving process in which people "learn by doing," and there is no attempt to rigidly adhere to detailed plans set out in advance. The implementation strategies which promote mutual adaptation are continuous, on-line planning, locally developed materials, regular and frequent staff meetings, and practical inservice training linked to staff meetings—all of which involve teachers, those whose behavior the projects are ultimately aimed at changing. These findings are consistent with numerous other recent studies which advocate "bottom-up" rather than "top-down" strategies for change. In Arcadia, for example, there was a local adaptation of the original project goals and ES/Washington did not attempt to rigidly manage the program. Unlike River District, Arcadia was permitted to make those vital mid-course adaptations. In River District, ES/Washington even tried to prescribe who the project director should be.

Delays in Federal Response

ES/Washington was slow to respond or provide go-ahead assurances at critical points for local planning and implementation. In Arcadia, grant approval came through too late to make final plans for inservice training before the opening of school. River District had six different project officers, and Butte-Angels Camp had four. This made contact with ES/Washington haphazard, especially when it wanted to approve materials purchased in Butte-Angels Camp. Shiloh County complained they could not reach crucial ES/Washington officials by phone and were left uncertain as to how to respond to "vague" criticism.

School Districts Versus Schools as the Unit of Change

ES/Washington was committed to a district-wide comprehensive approach in these rural school districts despite its unsuitability for some local contexts. In River District, the recent unification of several previously independent school districts could not overcome local diversity. ES/Washington resisted local attempts to decentralize planning and operations. As the author of the River District case study noted:

Each of the five former districts had a long history of independence and autonomy and strong leaders who embodied that independence. . . . Each administrative unit had identifiable needs which reflected a particular local context constituency. And each local administrative leader asserted his unit's independent spirit in ways which at times proved counterproductive to an administrative unit symbolized by centralized operations.

Arcadia and Shiloh County are also excellent examples of the triumph of decentralized forces over centralized project designs. As the implementation time became longer, it appears counterproductive and fruitless for ES/Washington to have continued to advocate centralized comprehensive change.

Ineffective Use of Community Participation

It is striking that, despite ES/Washington's insistence, community participation was ineffective in every case. In River District, citizen participation quickly "declined markedly" and was discontinued. In Shiloh County, the superintendent did all the project planning himself and brushed off ES/Washington's attempts to have him include the community. In Arcadia, citizen participation for inservice training was "never operational; its functions were not clearly defined, and the members never developed a clear set of objectives. Its creation satisfied a promise in the original Letter of Interest, but its objectives were smothered." From the local perspective, the federal requirement for citizen participation was something to put in the proposal, but it was never clear or deemed necessary for project operations.

WHY DID THESE LOCAL PROBLEMS OCCUR?

Several major causes can be identified for the problems. Many of them stem in part from the overall Washington environment that slowly emasculated the federal ES effort.

The Political Context of Federal-Local Relations

The Experimental Schools program was shaped during the initial years of a new Republican administration. It was part of a philosophy expressed in President Nixon's 1974 education message:

An essential element in our effort to provide every American an equal and increasing opportunity for education is the development and dissemination of alternative education approaches through research. For too long we threw money at educational problems, feeling that bigger would mean better.

The Experimental Schools effort was part of a policy era of pause-and-reflect on educational reform after several years of large scale funding initiatives. It was linked to the ideas of Daniel Moynihan. In brief, overall policy was that education must be reformed before it could spend more resources effectively. Since we did not know what reforms "worked," we needed research and development (R&D) as a step prior to considering new or *expanded* federal grant programs. In essence, the nation must wait for new education methods *before* increasing educational resources (see Rivlin, 1970). Accordingly, Nixon slashed budget amounts for all kinds of categorical funds (libraries, guidance, equipment, etc.), but added for ES. This ES program also fit into the Nixon Administration's preference for grant consolidation and comprehensive programs. ES wanted to look at overall school system needs, not particular segmented issues. But this ran counter to the congressional reflex that the federal government needs to earmark certain national priorities. Moreover, as one Washington commentator remarked, "Every education category is some congressman's footnote in history."

Consequently ES started with the now-familiar top-level fanfare of consolidating "piecemeal fragmented" programs. It had high-level support in the White House Domestic Policy Council and was to be ushered in by a new commissioner, Sidney P. Marland. Hopes were high, and goals were somewhat grandiose. It is in this context that the original call for Letters of Interest went to LEAs. LEAs responded, but before full funding could be achieved, the Washington context changed drastically. These changes filtered down to the LEA level and had enormous impact on federal-local relations.

Moynihan and his associates who instigated the idea were shortly in faraway India. The whole program found itself in the hostile,

newborn NIE, cut afloat from any established Washington bureaucracy. NIE did not believe the ES fit its priorities or style. The ES research approach was not a controlled experiment with a tight comparative evaluation design. The program was buried in an organization with other goals. During the same period the ambitious Office of Education (OE) proposal for "educational renewal" rose and fell (Morrow, 1974). Renewal was to "bring together discretionary programs so that OE can respond better to the needs of schools" and be concerned with "problems, not programs." Renewal was intended to allow school districts across the country to apply in one application for the funds that previously flowed through a stack of small programs. In short, it had many of the same themes as ES. But Congress emphatically vetoed renewal and chastised its OE sponsors. Congress renewed its commitment to categorical grants and indirectly indicated its displeasure with ES-type approaches.

Changing Federal Policies and Inadequate Monitoring

In a short period the Washington political context for ES had turned from an idea with high-level support and enthusiasm to a small program buried in a new agency that wanted to reorient or eliminate it. ES was destined to be another marginal program that came and went in the shifting sands of Washington politics. It built no large-scale local constituency and did not concern the state lobbyists, such as the Council of Chief State School Officers, or governors. By bypassing all the established lobbies, it had no reservoir of support to offset the subsequent cuts in local ES budgets or inappropriate requests of LEAs made by NIE. Politically ES was mortally wounded before it even became operational—a short time even for Washington reform efforts.

The political context had enormous implications for federal-local relations. The changing of ES project personnel who oversaw or serviced the LEAs is symptomatic of internal HEW power struggles and declining top-level support. NIE's personnel system was in an uproar during its formative years. Bright, young people in Washington can smell the rapid decay of a dying program, and they move swiftly on to the next bold new federal venture. Because of the rapid turnover in federal project monitors, there is a lack of continuity in federal guidance. The philosophical dispute between the original ES program director and the research-minded NIE in part caused both

the delays in responding to LEA inquiries and the unclear federal policies and guidelines. Indeed, NIE finally viewed ES as a "sunk cost" to be written off—a commitment that it inherited from OE but could not fit into its emerging mold of research and development. The lack of organizational support resulted in inadequate ES/Washington staff or regulations to help the LEAs meet their own needs. The ES budget could not grow after its top-level sponsorship—Moynihan and Marland—departed. For LEA efforts, the ES budget was slowly cut back, and the momentum began to fade. This deterioration encouraged an LEA view typical of so many federal efforts—"this too shall pass"—that enhanced the natural LEA tendency to substitute their own short-term needs for the longer-term federal goals of the overall program.¹

Failure To Relate the Concept of Comprehensiveness to the Major Immediate Problems of Local Districts

Comprehensive change was Washington's top priority, but it was not congruent with many localities' views of their own needs. Indeed, in many cases ES/Washington's program orientation was a poor fit with LEA central missions. In River District, local people were primarily interested in unifying the formerly separate school districts. In Shiloh County, the superintendent wanted to use ES to enhance both the LEA's reputation for accreditation and his own career as an innovator. In Jackson County, the LEA needed more general financial resources for its educational program.

Federal policy makers need to identify and analyze the central problems and concerns of the local schools that will be involved in carrying out ES-type reforms. If ES-type objectives and the expected LEA behavior are incompatible, a change in the federal policy, a change in the organizations involved in the implementation process, or mutual adaptation is called for. To bring about mutual adaptation, a realignment of some combination of federal policies is needed to better mesh with the likely local operational behavior. If the modified ES-type policy still appears to run counter to the LEA central mission, then the federal government could set up a new implementing organization outside the control of the LEA (e.g., a contract with a community group). Experience with enforcement of top-down mandates upon a resistant education bureaucracy indicates a low

probability of success unless enforcement focuses on fiscal audits (see Berke and Kirst, 1972) or uses court rulings.

Failure To Understand Barriers to Local Implementation

The control procedures of ES/Washington project monitors—very brief visits to local sites, periodic progress reports, and refunding negotiations—were apparently insufficient to reorient local behavior toward comprehensive change. For example, the use of systematic formative studies had little or no impact on local project decisions or design. Even in River District, where the evaluation was a more integral part of the local program, the major revisions did not come from the formal evaluation. Such federal accountability techniques do not seem sufficient to overcome the organizational rigidity at the local level.

Hawley (1972) has analyzed several sources of organizational rigidity and lists the following impressive barriers: (1) the difficulties in measuring school outputs and the resistance to doing so; (2) the minimized impact of the people who leave a school (e.g., dropping out, academic failure, and teacher turnover do not lead to incentives for change in standard operating procedures); (3) distortion, mitigation, and diminution of the political demands which school systems must confront because of limited lay participation (parents and community groups); (4) the inadequacy of the internal communication networks of the local schools; (5) the diffuseness of educational goals and expectations from teachers; (6) personnel policies and practices that do not reward performance and constrain the input of new ideas; and (7) the absence of research on and evaluation of effective educational programs. These sources of rigidity are interrelated and reinforce each other. They result in routine work driving out non-routine work.

For our purposes here, it is important to realize that ES represented money for comprehensive change that was being filtered through the "rigid" local educational agency. Indeed, the efforts of federal leverage should extend to the point where the child actually comes in contact with education services—the classroom. Therefore, the crucial question becomes: "Has ES altered the process of education in a large number of classrooms?" Then you have answered the question of whether the services purchased with ES funds re-

sulted in comprehensive change. The cases suggest a negative answer.

Emphasis on School Districts as the Change Unit

ES assumed that it could spread comprehensive changes more or less through all the schools in a system. This assumption oriented its posture toward federal-local relations. For instance, ES/Washington discouraged separate projects for each school in Jackson County. Butte-Angels Camp administrators, partially because of confusion regarding the expectations of ES/Washington, deliberately discouraged bottom-up initiative from school staff during the planning year. But much recent implementation literature stresses the school as the optimal unit for change (see Goodlad, 1970; Sarason, 1971). This is consistent with Rowen's findings that consensus is unlikely throughout an organization, so we must rely on entrepreneurs in the mid-levels of the organization.

Bottom-up initiatives rarely occur through spontaneous independent convergence of many independent actors on a new course of action. Apparent initiatives of this kind are more likely to result from the activities of "entrepreneurs" who may be located at any of several places in the system—not excluding the top—but not likely at the lowest levels of agencies, who inform, persuade, proselytize, coopt and perhaps ultimately succeed in creating a "movement." Clearly doing this takes perception, energy, talent, motivation, and at least a modest amount of money—ingredients not often in combination. (Rowen, 1976, pp. 6-7)

It is important to examine in detail the thesis that the school should be considered as the optimal unit for change, because it implies a relationship between Washington and LEAs different from the one ES/Washington attempted. The orientation of this alternative in federal-local relations would be to enhance planning in individual schools, and differentiation in programs. There would be no "one best system" for comprehensive change in all schools of a district. ES aspired to change the technology, structure, and culture of an entire school district. Such comprehensive change can occur in "pockets"—particularly schools—but, as demonstrated by the five case studies, not throughout the school system. As Goodlad (1975, p. 112) concluded: "The school with its principal, teachers, pupils and parents is the largest organic unit of and for educational change."

A Rand study, which examined agents of change, emphasized

the necessity of involving teachers in all aspects of the innovative process, and also pointed to the importance of the principal, termed the "gatekeeper of change" (Berman and McLaughlin, 1975). While recognizing the legitimacy of focusing on a school building as the unit of change (the same project could be implemented very differently in different schools within the same district), the Rand findings contain another crucial lesson: support from the district significantly enhances a project's chances for success. The attitudes of administrators in effect tell the staff how seriously they should take project objectives, and there are countless practical ways in which district support, commitment, and assistance can sustain the efforts of participants engaged in the difficult and often painful process of innovation in a particular school.

Consequently, ES/Washington should have focused more extensively on support services from the central office for the school sites, including inservice training and assistance to program planning techniques, to implement various bottom-up changes. Instead, ES/Washington helped the central offices impose uniform changes on reluctant school sites. California's Early Childhood Education (ECE) program has just the opposite orientation to administrative delivery. A recent report by the Stanford Evaluation Consortium describes ECE as follows:

The ECE program, passed by the Legislature in 1972 and implemented in 1973-74 school year, is the clearest manifestation of the department's attempts to reform its own management and to stimulate school site change. Rather than being intended as a specified instructional program, ECE is intended to be a process of planning, participation, and evaluation conducted at the individual school site. Parent and school staff formulate and pursue school level objectives within broad educational components required by the department. The incentive structure designed by the department to reward districts with successful ECE programs requires planning and process evaluation as well as "product" evaluation on the extent to which schools have attained their objectives. Most important, the evaluation rating of schools in a district by the department determines whether that district will receive expansion funding for all other schools. The department's commitment to conduct on-site audits of all first year ECE schools represents a substantial change in the relationship between local school districts and the department. Thus, the department seeks to simultaneously maintain greater accountability over funding programs in local school districts, while encouraging school site personnel and parents to take greater responsibility and initiative in program planning, implementation, and evaluation. (Berke et al., 1976, pp. 15-16)

Since the five cases presented in chapters 4 through 8 of this volume were about small rural LEAs, it is especially interesting that ES ran into such school site resistance to a uniform central plan for comprehensive change (see especially the cases of River District and Arcadia).

The argument that uniform school policies are undesirable is based in part on the growing alternative school movement (Fantini, 1976). Parents have different preferences for different styles of education, as evidenced by the recent growth of both traditional and open schools. Children also learn best under different teaching styles. Not all teachers can be enthusiastic or are technically equipped to implement a particular instructional system. The Shiloh and Butte cases are excellent examples of the "one best system" being undesirable from an instructional viewpoint and the tendency of the general school system toward maintenance.

Federal Prescription of the Type of Community Participation

ES/Washington insisted on community participation in all ES projects. Several of the LEA planning documents were sent back by ES/Washington demanding more specific mechanisms for community advisory councils. In view of this strong federal pressure, it is noteworthy that community participation was ineffective in all five LEAs. None of the community advisory councils appears to have exerted discernible influence on any significant policy. Federal education authorities were clearly unable to impose community influence from the top down. The failure suggests a need for reconsideration of the federal-local relations on this issue. There should be no dogmatic stance or insistence on maintaining forms of citizen participation which prove to be a waste of time and resources.

In all five cases the performance of community-based advisory groups reveals highly uneven results. In Shiloh County, the superintendent was so opposed that the concept never had a chance. Only in Jackson County was a community-based advisory or decision-making group established prior to ES. In none of these rural areas was there an articulation of political demands by lay interest groups. What we know about the type of participants in such advisory councils suggests ES/Washington was engaged in a fruitless policy. Indeed, research on school advisory groups demonstrates that opening the door to participation does not result in a flood of new participants (see,

for example, Stromquist, 1976). Interest in education is a specialized concern, with strong appeal among people in education-related fields and of higher socioeconomic status (SES) who have demonstrated a previous interest in voluntary education activities. These people rarely appeared in the rural ES sites. In a case study of a high SES California LEA, Stromquist (1976) estimate only about 10 percent of the participants in parent advisory councils had never previously been active in educational affairs. Similarly, Florida advisory councils seem to have stimulated participation by an unrepresentative elite rather than by the cross-section of school constituents reformers had hoped for. A study by the Florida legislature indicated participants in school advisory councils tend to be high income and highly educated (Florida Senate Education Committee, 1974). Median education is a college degree, four years above the state's median of 12.1 years of education. Apparently the Florida councils are less skewed in terms of race than class; blacks are reportedly serving in proportion to their total statewide population.

Is the lack of representativeness due to a faulty mechanism for selecting members? In most Florida councils, members were selected by school principals, who may have a bias towards educated and presumably influential members of the community. It is possible that election of representatives rather than appointment would provide a better cross-section of the community. The National Committee for Citizens in Education (1975) has advanced a plan for educational governance that calls for election of school site councils in order to increase representativeness and avoid the criticism that members are "dominated by the appointer" (pp. 221-22). And there is the matter of accessibility. If school advisory councils are to attract people other than the traditionally active elite, more attention will have to be given to such practical problems as scheduling, training for participation, and transportation.

Representativeness is only one issue. What is the proper role which school advisory councils should play in decision making? When councils serve in an advisory capacity and are attached to the office of a school administrator, "they tend to degenerate into the traditional pattern of participation. Since the new councils exist almost exclusively where administrators bear the final legal and social responsibility for any actions taken, over time the councils will find that they are viewed as useful only by administrators who agree with

them" (Reed and Mitchell, 1975). It is not surprising that many school administrators are unprepared both psychologically and technically for sharing decision making with parent councils. In such situations, support for the councils from the central administration can be a crucial lever for enhancing the council's influence.

Governance plans in federal ES-type programs may hold promise for making the educational system more accountable to its clients. State and federal governments can stimulate the idea but, as we have seen, there are serious implementation problems. Even where mandated, the actual practice of parent advisory groups varies significantly from district to district and even among schools within a district. Unfortunately, there is little empirical evidence to suggest which models of parent participation are likely to prove most effective in various institutional settings, or what types of implementation strategies would make them useful. The time is ripe for comparative research that seeks to identify what works and what does not. What little we do know suggests that the rural ES sites were among the most unlikely of circumstances. For one thing, with the exception of Jackson County there was a lack of established lay interest groups and little prior involvement by individual citizens. For another, the LEA information system was not attuned to the needs of any of the groups. For another, the political culture discouraged impact on policy by lay groups. Future federal programs should analyze the LEA context and adjust their expectations and contractual requirements accordingly.

Local Conditions That Hindered Implementation

The Rand study on agents of change stresses the importance of local motives when seeking federal grants for predicting the probability of implementing federal objectives:

This interaction [between local motives and federal objectives] in particular settings defined initiation processes that we found could be characterized into two ideal types: opportunism and problem solving. The contrasting motivations that characterize these different initiation processes continued to play a pervasive role in the implementation and thus in the outcomes of the innovations.

Projects generated essentially by opportunism seemed to be a response to available funds and were characterized by a lack of interest and commitment on the part of local participants—from district administrators to classroom teachers. As a result, participants were often indifferent to project activities and outcomes, and little in the way of serious change was ever attempted—or occurred.

The problem-solving motive for projects emerged primarily in response to locally identified needs and was associated with a strong commitment to address these needs. Federal funds were viewed as a way to support the local situation—one which often broke new ground in local educational practice. (Berman and McLaughlin, 1975, p. 9)

The five case studies provide us with considerable insight into local motives. Both River District and Arcadia displayed much of the problem-solving motive. In River District, the LEA initially saw the ES program as largely in concert with local desire to unify the district. A number of problems arose, but parts of the ES effort were incorporated into the district's ongoing operation. In Arcadia, the district was committed to some of the ES components before the ES competition was announced. Parts of the project were incorporated through incremental additions to the Arcadia curriculum. Shiloh County stands out for its largely opportunistic motives. The new superintendent saw ES as a means to provide more instructional supplies and personnel into a financially starved LEA—in effect, general aid. He did not particularly care about the diagnostic instruction that was featured in Shiloh's ES application.

Although federal shortcomings may be a major headache, the LEAs themselves have often been a large part of the overall problems. There is no way that Shiloh County could have successfully implemented its stated intention (individualized diagnostic instruction), given local conditions there. No change in federal personnel or procedures could have made much difference in Arcadia after the locally generated teacher strike. Furthermore, substantial personnel turnover is a reality for many rural districts. In Arcadia and Jackson County, for example, key personnel left during the critical implementation stage.

SHORT-RUN SOLUTIONS TO FEDERAL-LOCAL PROBLEMS

Short-Run Solutions at the Local Level

Even though the federal government operated its ES program questionably, local school personnel could have taken action to increase the chances of implementing change. The ES rural districts appear to have been more intimidated by federal project officers than their big city counterparts (see Berke and Kirst, 1972). They waited for federal clarifications of instructions even when the delays

were caused by turbulence within the federal agency. In River District and Arcadia, these delays were acute. Urban school officials might have quickly contacted their congressmen and tried to change or hasten federal decisions. A key function of Congress is as middleman between local constituents and the federal bureaucracy. Letters from congressmen have first priority in federal agencies. A simple congressional inquiry as to "why decisions were taking so long" is more effective than numerous phone calls to ES/Washington or to other federal officials. But rural districts are less likely to have specific contacts with congressional staff. Such staff members could have been located, then briefed on the entire ES situation in the local area and encouraged to make their own inquiries or to work through the local representative. An invitation to the congressman or his staff to visit the local ES project might also have led to a better working relationship with ES/Washington.

ES/Washington discouraged any collaboration or meetings among the rural ES superintendents. The old adage of strength in numbers applies to federal-local relations—so does divide and conquer. A common list of complaints by ES local project directors could have been sent to the ten Congressmen and twenty Senators from the ten rural ES sites. This would have been a message NIE could not ignore despite its low internal priority for ES. The essence of politics is coalition, and the ES sites with their geographic spread had more political power than they realized or utilized.

It is also possible that consultants can play an important intermediary role between ES/Washington and local sites. Ideally these consultants would have the mutual trust of ES/Washington and local personnel and not be viewed as the agent of one or the other (see Lippitt's discussion of this point in chapter 10). But rural LEAs may not know many consultants. ES/Washington sent consultants to the sites who played useful, but ephemeral, roles (see the Jackson County case). Sometimes a consultant can become an "honest broker" or mediator who interprets the local situation to the feds, especially since there is always some distance when two parties are negotiating for funds. A consultant employed jointly by the ten rural ES sites could have interceded with NIE to stress the local impact caused by delays in federal funding. A consultant to Jackson County less associated with ES/Washington initiatives might have had greater credibility when explaining the inappropriateness or impossibility of

ES/Washington's expectations for comprehensive change in that school district. Consultants need not be university people or "experts." Rural LEAs should consider pushing the federal government for approval of consultants who are practitioners from other rural areas who have extensive on-site experience with rural schools. The ES cases indicate a need for a pool of rural consultants who are knowledgeable and experienced and considered peers by the local school and lay people.

Short-Run Solutions at the Federal Level

The five case studies demonstrate that various LEA actors and subunits (e.g., teachers, central administrators, principals) have different objectives. Beyond the minimal objective of obtaining federal money, there is not much of an incentive or sanction from the top down to adjust behavior in order to coordinate efforts. In Shiloh County and Butte-Angels Camp, the central administrations tried to threaten the teachers with loss of tenure or promotions. The results were nonimplementation. Teachers have a "pocket veto" on educational change when the classroom door closes.

In Arcadia, the principals redefined the project as incremental additions to their own preferences. Organizational theorists could have predicted that members of a large school organization would choose a limited, suboptimal goal. Even the original common objectives in Arcadia were forgotten over time, emasculating the original ES conception.

The need for consensus suggests the potential of bottom-up change from the school site, as opposed to top-down change from the central office. Again the California ECE program is interesting because of its different approach, stressing school site reviews by management and review teams (MARs) and bottom-up accountability techniques.

A MAR team (usually two to four people) is made up of state, county, and local (from outside the area) educators, including administrators and classroom instructional experts. In ES these could have been other rural educators and laymen. The MAR consultants complete two forms during their site visits: one is used to assess compliance with federal and state laws and regulations; the other, a program quality review instrument, assesses the quality of the total program on a 0-5 scale. The program quality rating form, which is sent to

schools in advance, reviews (1) program planning, implementation, and evaluation (emphasizing the process through which these functions are carried out); (2) the instructional program (emphasizing individualization, development of student self-concept, multicultural); (3) health and auxiliary services; and (4) parent participation and community involvement.

A study by the Stanford Evaluation Consortium found that schools had often done their best to implement the MAR team's suggestions immediately (Berke et al., 1976). The majority of changes stimulated by MAR visits were in the areas of curriculum, parent participation, and individualization of instruction. One district evaluator reported:

The MAR visit got the parents excited about their school because somebody was coming from Sacramento to see it. They [the teachers] organized a "MAR" visit by the county people the second year when they didn't have a regular MAR.

The esprit de corps generated by preparation for the review reportedly lasted well beyond the day of the MAR visit, and the Stanford group contends that this was an essential factor in implementation of the MAR consultants' recommendations.

Schools in the California Early Childhood Education (ECE) program take the monitor-and-review process seriously because it is linked to the mechanism for holding districts accountable for the schools' performance—school site funding rather than district funding. Under ECE, expansion to additional schools in a district—which would generate an additional \$140 per pupil—depends on demonstrating that ECE plans have been implemented in schools already in the program. The MAR ratings are by far the most heavily weighted factor (appropriate fiscal expenditures and test results are the other two) in determining a district's chances for expansion. The weighting of these three factors in the first year of the program was 70 percent, 10 percent, and 20 percent, respectively. (There are provisions for weighting outcome measures—test scores—more heavily in each successive year of a school's involvement in the program.) In short, making the program expansion within a school district contingent on performance of participating schools may cause districts both to exert pressure on schools to implement their own plans and encourage central district offices to provide the kind of support the school sites need. Such an approach might have been more effective than those used by ES/Washington.²

Retaining the expansion funding incentive, it might be possible to stimulate district support more directly by developing two levels of accountability, focusing on both district level and school level functions. (The present MAR does involve an audit at the district level, but this is primarily for fiscal purposes.) A district's application for ES-type funding, in addition to describing school site plans, would outline specific commitments the district would assume to facilitate change (e.g., develop inservice capabilities in individualized instruction; set up programs for ES school personnel to visit each other's schools to exchange ideas; set up programs to train parents to participate in planning; assist schools in formative evaluation; and waive district regulations, when necessary, in areas of scheduling, personnel utilization, etc.). In addition to judging implementation at the school level, a MAR-type team would assess the extent to which the district had carried out its responsibilities to the schools.

Despite the apparent influence of the MAR visits in improving school programs, this device may contain an intrinsic contradiction: can outside evaluation be used for judgmental purposes (to determine future funding) and also be effective as a means for providing constructive feedback? There is a confusion between evaluation and "helping." School personnel may attempt to impress the visitors rather than be open to discussing recognized problems and how best to deal with them, or they may too readily accept criticism and make changes because the MAR-type team represents a threat to future funding. There is also the possibility of role confusion for the visitors. The viability of the system will depend both on characteristics of the evaluators and the local institutions. According to the Stanford report:

Some districts which received ratings lower than they had anticipated (or were denied expansion funding) expressed hostility toward the department. They felt betrayed by the MAR consultants, who, they had believed, were coming to the school to help them. (Berke et al., 1976, p. 34)

In summary, the accountability mechanism in the ECE program merits consideration for use in federal discretionary programs such as ES:

1. Focus of planning and evaluation at the school level, rather than at the district or central level.

2. Accountability criteria generated in part from the bottom up, involving principals, teachers, and parents in the process (e.g., in an ECE school people may choose among several standardized tests for evaluation purposes).

3. Accountability criteria emphasized program implementation with limited weight attached in the initial years to test results. Evaluation should look for evidence of the types of processes which support mutual adaptation.

4. On-site visits by monitor-and-review teams with feedback to school staffs and communities.

5. Expansion funding tied to high-level performance of schools already in the program. More schools in the same LEA are added if previous ones are succeeding.

These procedures would only be appropriate for federal-local grants (bilingual, ESSA, etc.) where the federal involvement is similar to the state-local relationship in ECE. In the large-scale programs involving federal, state, and local parties, SEAs would *not* tolerate such direct federal involvement with individual schools, and appropriate adjustments would have to be made.

SCHOOL REFORM: THE LONG-RUN APPROACH

The ES program is another in a long list of reforms at the federal and state levels. Since it is unlikely to be the last federal one, some lessons from the past may be useful in guiding subsequent efforts.

Schools have five main functions, and any reform will affect each differently (which is one reason all major reforms are controversial).³ The five are:

1. Socializing, bringing children from the family into a "mini-society" that foreshadows the world of work in the larger society.
2. Sorting people out for different future roles, by grading test scores, teacher evaluation. Some will drop out of high school, some will go to work right after graduation, others will go to college or professional school.
3. Training in knowledge and skills.

4. Encouraging personal attributes such as creativity, self-reliance, ability to communicate.
5. Safekeeping (custody, or child-sitting and care).

It is not easy to perform all of these five functions to everyone's satisfaction, and progress is always difficult for several reasons: the diversity of cultures and values; variations in district size from a few hundred to more than 1,000,000 students; isolation of teachers in their classrooms (with teacher training conducted by schools of education whose faculties are not necessarily committed or qualified to prepare people for reform in varied school districts); unfamiliar requirements of accrediting and testing agencies, federal aid restrictions, and complex state laws; competing political pressures; or the inertia of a large bureaucracy.

Despite these obstacles, there has been no shortage of reform efforts. A recent survey found fifty-two major reform efforts given funds in California from 1958 to 1975, with projects ranging from instructional television to class-size reduction and school district mergers (Kirst and Pincus, 1975). This parade of reforms has led many educators to be skeptical; they come to believe of any reform: "This too shall pass—quickly."

What has been learned from all this activity, much of which is frustrating? Educators, legislators, and officials have discovered that added money alone is not sufficient; that one-shot isolated devices like team teaching or flexible scheduling are ineffective; and that reforms cannot be put in standard packages and imposed from above.

The ES experience and other similar efforts suggest specific guidelines that promise greater success:

—There is no one best approach to schooling. Different students have different needs, and the road to basic skills (or to any other goal) may run in indirect ways; for example, through drama, geography, or physical education. Therefore there is no one best reform, such as the ES comprehensive approach. A variety of approaches is needed to meet the variety of public preferences and pupil needs that arise for each of the five major functions of schooling.

—Variation in school size and student characteristics can best be accommodated by reforms that encourage flexibility at the individual school site for budget, curriculum, personnel, and evaluation. Uniform "solutions" cannot be implemented by regulations from

Washington or central school district offices. Parents and students must be able to choose among curricular approaches at one school or at different schools, and in the higher grades students should be able to work in educational settings that may be on or off the campus.

—Teacher isolation can be offset by techniques used in California's Early Childhood Education (ECE) program. There, teachers and parents plan instructional approaches together and are held accountable as a group.

—Local schools need to be released from many needless outside restrictions such as mandated pupil/teacher ratios, loss of state aid for off-campus programs, and child-labor laws that inhibit cooperative programs with businesses. Another such restraint is created by provisions and customs that make it difficult for older children to take on responsibility and gain self-esteem by teaching younger children, and make it nearly impossible for laymen with specialized skills to act as teachers.

—School administrators now spend much of their time juggling the needs of different interest groups without much progress toward reform (see the Shiloh County and Arcadia cases). Through training and staff development they should focus much more than they do now on working with these groups to build coalitions that will promote steady progress toward specific educational changes.

—Teachers and administrators now receive salary increases on the basis of seniority and university course credits. Instead, they should be rewarded for participation in change efforts like ES and for training that is specifically keyed to the needs of individual schools and districts. State funds for teacher training (which now go exclusively to universities) should be funneled in part through local school districts so that they can use the funds to encourage universities and district staff to focus on specific school site needs.

—Educational reform must be based on the support of educators. Planning and implementing changes will never be successful unless teachers and principals are involved all the way. School-site governance—flexibility at the local level—is just one step in a larger process of enlisting staff energies in changes they understand and believe in.

As long as society is in flux, working out its values by conflict and reconciliation, then school reform must remain a trial-and-error process, proceeding with little proven theory or conclusive data. Pub-

lic schools are largely reflections of society. Therefore, there can be no single best solution now; both the quest for reform and the frustrations that accompany it are the mirror of our nation's search for a new consensus.

NOTES

1. This issue is discussed further in the special number of the *Teachers College Record* on "Making Change Happen" (vol. 77, no. 3, February 1976). See, for example, Women's article on New York City's Experimental Elementary Program (EEP), which concluded that \$40 million was absorbed "for business as usual."

2. The writer acknowledges the assistance of Gail Bass, Rand Corporation, in this section.

3. The writer acknowledges the assistance of John Pincus, Rand Corporation, in this section.

REFERENCES

- Berke, Iris, et al. *The Impact of State Mandated Evaluation Procedures upon the Educational Programs of Local School Districts in California*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Evaluation Consortium, 1976.
- Berke, Joel, and Kirst, Michael. *Federal Aid to Education*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1972.
- Berman, P., and McLaughlin, M. W. *Federal Programs Supporting Educational Change* (vol. IV). Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1975. R-1584/4HEW.
- Brademas, John. "The Case for Categorical Aid." *The Politics of Education*, edited by Michael Kirst. Berkeley: McCutchan, 1970.
- Fantini, Mario (ed.). *Alternative Education*. New York: Doubleday, 1976.
- Florida Senate Education Committee. *A Report on School Advisory Committees*. Tallahassee: Florida Senate, 1974.
- Goodlad, John I. *The Dynamics of Educational Change*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970.
- Goodlad, John I. "A Perspective on Accountability." *Phi Delta Kappan* (October 1975).
- Hawley, Willis D. "Dealing with Organizational Rigidity in Public Schools: Theoretical Perspective." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1972.
- Kirst, Michael, and Pincus, John. "School Reform: The Hunt for Consensus." *Los Angeles Times* (August 17, 1975).
- Morrow, John. "The Politics of Federal Education Policy: The Case of Educational Renewal." *Teachers College Record* 76, no. 1 (September 1974): 19-38.

- National Committee for Citizens in Education. *Public Testimony on Public Schools*. Berkeley: McCutchan, 1975.
- Reed, Donald B., and Mitchell, Douglas E. "The Structure of Citizen Participation: Public Decisions for Public Schools." *Public Testimony on Public Schools*, edited by the National Committee for Citizens in Education. Berkeley: McCutchan, 1975.
- Rivlin, Alice. "Education, Politics, and Federal Aid." *The Progressive* (October 1970): 31-35.
- Rowen, Henry. "Some Key Factors in Policy Implementation." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, San Francisco, April 1976.
- Sarason, Seymour. *The Culture of the School and the Problem of Change*. Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1971.
- Stromquist, Nelly P. "Antecedent and Concurrent Conditions of Participation." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, San Francisco, April 1976.
- Wirt, Frederick, and Kirst, Michael. *Political and Social Foundations of Education*. Berkeley: McCutchan, 1975.

Designing Federal Policies and Programs To Facilitate Local Change Efforts

Hendrik D. Gideonse

The Small Schools Project of the Experimental Schools program (hereafter referred to as ES/SSP) provides important lessons regarding the federal role in facilitating educational change at the local level. Many of these lessons should be studied carefully by members of the Congress and of the executive branch; but there is much which can also be learned by those responsible for providing leadership at the local level. For, in the final analysis, policies and programs developed at the federal level must make sense to and be accepted by those at the local level responsible for their implementation.

The lessons from ES/SSP fall into a number of areas. Some of them have to do with the manner in which federal policies and programs are developed. Some of them pertain to the way in which such programs are staffed and managed. Some of the lessons have to do with the very conceptualizations which underpin efforts to ground and facilitate school reform. Finally, some point to the possibility of developing specific programs at the federal level.

A thorough examination of the material in chapters 3 through 8 leads to a number of broad conclusions best stated at the outset. One of these is that ES/SSP appears to have had a considerable range of outcomes. For reasons of space, varying authorship, and dramatically

different sites and circumstances, it is difficult to emerge from a reading of these case studies with the completeness of data and the exacting comparability a policy analyst might desire. Nonetheless, it seems clear that the federal government's purposes in launching ES/SSP were only partially fulfilled. That is because what the project set out to test was not in fact installed in any of the sites; none of the local projects, in the final analysis, seem to have met all the criteria specified in the original program announcement.

Although the local school districts participating in ES/SSP failed to meet initial expectations (and certainly in the annals of federal support for educational innovation, ES/SSP has much company in that respect), the project nonetheless proves to be of considerable value. For example, it is clear that the schools did change, although not in the manner or to the degree desired by ES/Washington. More importantly, the intensity of the documentation and the encouragement of innovative approaches to research and evaluation mean that for the first time it becomes possible to look at the experience of an entire federal education program. It matters little that ES/SSP was relatively small in size as federal programs go (\$12 million), lasted only six years, and was created administratively under broad legislative authority (the Cooperative Research Act as amended) that allowed as much discretion as any program head could desire. Since ES/SSP was aimed squarely at producing significant change at the local level, it commands the attention of policy analysts interested in the improvement of education as well as those in positions of leadership at the federal, state, and local levels.

This chapter is divided into four major sections. The first briefly sketches out two sets of assumptions on which the program appears to have rested and briefly reiterates the goals of the program. The second section summarizes what happened from the perspective of federal policy and program. The third section, based primarily on the materials presented in the case studies, but drawing also on materials available to me as a result of my service in USOE's National Center for Educational Research and Development at the time of the birth of the parent Experimental Schools program, focuses on some explanations of why it happened the way it did. A concluding section draws lessons for the future development of federal policy and programs aimed at facilitating efforts at local change.

ASSUMPTIONS AND GOALS GUIDING ES/SSP

The chapters presenting the federal context for the Experimental Schools program and the five case studies suggest that several different kinds of assumptions were operating at the federal level. Some of them have to do with the role of the federal government in facilitating change. Some of them were stated explicitly in launching the program. Some were tacit. Not all the assumptions proved to be congruent with one another as will become apparent later on in the chapter. All, however, may be fairly said to have been present at the inception of the program.

Stated Assumptions

The first set of assumptions to be presented here are those which were explicit in the program announcement or in the materials prepared in connection with budget justifications on the basis of which Congress approved appropriations to launch the Experimental Schools program.

A first assumption was that *prior attempts at purposeful change based on research and development had not been successful* (see chapter 3 and House of Representatives, 1969, p. 887). Dramatic breakthroughs had not been achieved, and new initiatives were felt to be necessary.

A second assumption was that *the reason for the lack of impact of prior efforts could be found in the piecemeal or segmental approach to the development of innovations*. These prior efforts had focused on such things as the development of improvements in teacher education, curriculum, the organization of classrooms and schools, and educational media. Evidence collected in the course of developing each alternative component might have indicated its superiority over existing practice, but the complexity of the interacting variables appeared to counter the beneficial effects of the program components as a whole.

A third assumption, therefore, was that *if schools could combine tested innovations into comprehensive packages, the effects would be multiplicative*.

A fourth assumption was that *incentives would have to be created to encourage school systems to undertake a comprehensive*

program of innovation. The Experimental Schools program was designed with this specific end in mind.

The fifth and sixth assumptions bear on the question of replicability or generalizability. It was felt that it was important that the *program be designed to have an effect beyond the sites it funded.* Therefore, *support provided to a district should only be substantial enough to bring about the change desired, but should not be required beyond the experimental stage or the district had to be willing to assume the extra cost at the end of the project.* This assumption was designed to counter the well-understood objection to so-called "lighthouse" schools, perceived by practitioners to be nice but unachievable "back home" where the rich support which the demonstrations enjoyed would be lacking.

A seventh assumption was that *local initiative was necessary to engender the kind of commitment required to make the project a success.* Studies of local change made it pretty clear that changes could not be imposed from without unless there was a real commitment at the local level to the innovation.

An eighth assumption was that *the proper unit of change in a rural area was the entire district.* This represented a change from the rationale for the parent program, Experimental Schools. The bulk of the public justification for this program aimed at the argument that the proper focus for innovation was the school as the entity where resources such as curriculum, staff, instructional strategies, and pupil mix could be flexibly coordinated to achieve the best learning outcomes. For ES/SSP the assumption was broadened to encompass entire districts.

A ninth assumption was that *the whole prospect of inducing comprehensive change in local systems afforded an unparalleled opportunity to evaluate not only the differential effects of instructional variables but also the process of planned change.* If substantial (although not horse-choking) resources were to be provided to local systems to facilitate self-initiated change, then the "price" of such an opportunity for the local district would be the willingness to be closely and carefully researched in order to deepen and broaden our understanding of what contributes to the learning of children in schools and how change proceeds in local settings.

Tacit Assumptions

In addition to the stated assumptions, it is possible to extrapolate another set of tacit assumptions. Not to be found expressed in so many words, they emerge from the actions of project officials and the events associated with ES/SSP. One of these, for example, is that *federal initiative for stimulating this kind of change was necessary*. The scale of the projected efforts would mean that developmental and initial operating cost would be incurred at a level beyond the ability of individual districts or states and that, furthermore, the costs of evaluative research could not be justified by state and local units of school governance to their relevant constituencies.

A second tacit assumption was that *the federal action in launching the ES/SSP justified the operational assertion that the federal interest in the local project site was paramount*. Accordingly, the evaluation requirements, the criteria associated with the concept of comprehensiveness, and the influence brought to bear in the development of advisory mechanisms at the local level, were all justified in terms of the requirement that the ES/SSP as a whole be successful, at least from the Washington perspective.

A third assumption was that *the assertion of criteria like comprehensiveness and the creation of advisory bodies would not intrude into local initiative*. These three tacit assumptions were seen as givens, as process requirements fundamental to any and every attempt to produce local change.

A fourth assumption was that *educational change at the local level is a management task aimed at changing professional behaviors and practices through greater awareness of the known or through the careful development of new practices of greater promise than the old*.

The belief that the program would constitute a better bridge between research and practice rested on a set of assumptions: *that a sufficient store of already developed ideas was available to permit their incorporation into comprehensive designs, that they could be so incorporated, and that their existence could come to be known to the local sites so that they could be adopted or adapted to meet local needs*.

A sixth assumption implicit in the announcement was that *the initial commitment to the projects at the local sites (engendered by the opportunity to compete and the winning of the competition)*

would be reinforced throughout the project by the continuously received funds to accomplish the intended goals. There had to be a belief that the "contract" between the school districts and ES/Washington would remain strong as long as the money flowed according to the long-range commitment made to each district.

A seventh assumption, present in the criteria and pressed with considerable energy during the early stages of the management of the project, was that *the existing policy and professional structures in the districts insufficiently connected the districts to their constituencies*. This assumption manifested itself in the announced requirement that active community involvement was a mandatory component in the concept of comprehensiveness. In more than one district, it found expression in the project officers' pressures for the establishment of advisory mechanisms of one kind or another.

An eighth assumption that existed at the outset was that *ES/Washington could carry the program to its logical and appointed conclusion*.

Finally, implicit in the launching of the program was the assumption that *ES/Washington knew how to facilitate change at the local level or could learn how in timely fashion*.

Goals

Based on these assumptions, the Small Schools Project was launched to capitalize on ways to achieve quality and improvement specifically appropriate to smallness. Its goals were to create a new initiative in the continuing attempts to bridge the gap between research and practice by creating cooperative field experiments in "comprehensive programs encompassing whole schools or whole schools and communities" (House of Representatives, 1969, p. 896). Intensive investigation of the effects of instructional variables and the actual processes of educational change were research goals for the program. The focus on comprehensiveness as presented in the 1972 Announcement from ES/SSP was to "find out whether new educational programs which address all parts of an educational system simultaneously will be more effective than past reform efforts."

WHAT WERE THE OUTCOMES OF ES/SSP?

ES projects might be evaluated against a number of criteria. Did the children affected demonstrate higher levels of achievement? Did

the communities change in productive ways? Were the changes proposed in the original local project plans implemented as intended? Did ES/Washington facilitate the process of project implementation and maintenance? Did the program as a whole demonstrate the validity of the assumptions about comprehensive change as applied to rural settings?

At this time it is not possible to assess ES/SSP against all these criteria, for a number of reasons. First, the local projects are still in their final year of funding and their work thus not fully concluded. Second, the cross-site studies (including achievement measures) of the Abt Associates research program have not yet been completed. Third, there can be no way of knowing at this time whether project activities begun under ES/SSP will be continued following the termination of federal monies.

The Extent and Character of Local Change

On one of the essential criteria, however, the extent and character of the changes in the rural school districts, the essential data are already available in the case studies presented in chapters 4 through 8. Mindful of the fact that they are presented virtually in outline form (each, remember, is the work of a full-time observer who spent at least two years on site), the case studies still provide ample testimony of the extent and character of the change in the rural district schools. The materials presented document that the experiment ES/SSP set out to conduct was never put into place.

River District, for instance, while changing to some degree as a result of its involvement in the program, clearly did not meet the expectations about community involvement. It produced categorical changes rather than the comprehensiveness to which ES/Washington aspired (chapter 4).

Jackson County, struggling with the illusive nature of the concept of comprehensiveness, "developed a project plan that called not so much for comprehensive change as it did for piecemeal change on a massive scale." The narrative in chapter 5 makes plain that some of the pieces were far more fully and effectively developed than others.

In Butte-Angels Camp, "the superintendent's and ES/Washington's original goals were at best only partially met." Less than half-way through the project, the focus had shifted from the kind of comprehensive coordinated change envisioned in the 1972 Announcement to the support of a whole variety of smaller programs which

"allowed the faculty to implement ideas they had been thinking about for years" (chapter 6).

Most of the changes introduced in Arcadia were not radical ones, and furthermore they had not generated widespread community interest (chapter 7). In addition, by the first year of implementation, the project coordinator began to eliminate the use of the name "Experimental Schools" in favor of the more bland reference to "changes in curriculum." While this development might be taken as evidence of the desire to integrate the total effort more securely into the fabric of the district's operations, the narrative suggests that the same pattern of a collection of component parts characterized Arcadia as it did Jackson County and Butte-Angels Camp.

Finally, the program ultimately put in place by Shiloh County "bore little resemblance to what was contracted for by ES/Washington" (chapter 8). The reading program was successfully implemented, but the backbone of the original proposal, diagnostic instruction, failed to be successfully implemented. Despite such deviations from the original project proposal, the school system succeeded, as measured by its new membership in the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, statewide television programming, and a rising rate of immigration.

The rural districts did not achieve the intended comprehensiveness; starting out on that pathway, they drifted away from it, a phenomenon aptly called "project decay" (Mann, 1976, p. 318). Small wonder that, compared to its earlier initiatives, by early 1976 ES/Washington "was far less interested in what was taking place in these small rural school districts" (see chapter 3).

Evaluation Research

Although the experiment was never implemented as intended, execution of its component of evaluation research appears to have more faithfully followed the broad original intent. The rich evaluation design was initiated on ES/Washington's insistence (the three-to-one ratio of experimental support to support in research and evaluation) and then carried to fruition by Abt-Associates. The comprehensive, intensive, multifaceted approach to the study of change by Abt Associates is a singular achievement in itself and in all likelihood will turn out to be the lasting benefit achieved by ES/SSP.

Process Inventory

A third outcome of ES/SSP is more in the nature of a process inventory. It relates to the management of the project and encompasses first the noise generated between ES/Washington and the rural districts as well as the stresses within the federal establishment which involved or otherwise affected the Experimental Schools program.

Noise between feds and locals. The case study narratives are full of the tensions and difficulties which quickly emerged between the locals and the feds. The experience of the project in River District began with a promise of "no strings," as the locals put it, or as the superintendent wrote, "we will be able to do what we want to do, not what someone else thinks we should do." Within one month the impression of local freedom began to be compromised by ES/Washington's insistence on the creation of an advisory council and the utilization of university consultants. Within a few more months, and following a change in project officials, ES/Washington's negative reactions to what was happening in River District became increasingly insistent, particularly when the district opted for a course of action different than that discussed with the project officer during a December 1972 site visit. The unacceptability of certain local administrative arrangements further heightened the tension between the district and ES/Washington. The story of the long delayed workshops affords still another example of conflict.

The case study narrative for Jackson County notes the locally prepared draft plan submitted by the superintendent and its return with "copious annotations" and blunt criticisms. The district felt that it was not getting clear signals from ES/Washington and, in fact, the project officer "had concluded that Jackson County administrative personnel did not have the training or experience to prepare the kind of plan ES/Washington expected." She did not communicate that, however, to Jackson County at the time.

The case study narrative of Butte-Angels Camp relates their considerable confusion and pain. They could not tell who was making what kinds of decisions about their project. They could not be sure which advice was merely suggestion and which constituted orders. The district began to feel that ES/Washington was operating according to criteria other than those publicly stated and that in fact the plan they had developed was not a proposal based on their own

ideas, but on what ES/Washington wanted. The experience of Butte-Angels Camp in negotiating the contract left them "with a fear of ES/Washington that lasted . . . two years." They found ES/Washington abrasive and harsh. Their difficulties continued into 1974 when the ES/Washington program director "ordered the district to reconsider its governance system and emphatically suggested the Project Advisory Committee be reduced." District personnel opposed reorganizing the committee only to encounter the ES/Washington project officer's directions that the superintendent give teachers more advance warnings about future planning activities for the funded summer work. All of this is summed up in the case study narrative as a "struggle for control" of the project.

The case study analysis of Arcadia affords a similar picture. Local planning and the elevation of hope thus engendered first led to anxiety over what ES/Washington would say about the draft plan document and then ultimately to frustration and irritation over the nature of ES/Washington's criticisms. A second draft was rejected. The superintendent became angered over the threat which forced re-writing represented to the emphasis on local initiative. On the other hand, it appears that Arcadia was more successful in "managing ES/Washington." Perhaps the early frustrations quickly solidified in Arcadia and produced consistent behavior which effectively forced ES/Washington project officers to maintain a kind of distance which served the needs of the Arcadia project personnel.

The case study account of Shiloh County focuses on the adversary relationship of the superintendent to Washington, which apparently had roots in the superintendent's cynicism about the original plan and his view that various elements in it would help him secure funding needed by the district. While the superintendent may have included the diagnostic instruction theme because it was the "in-phrase," the critical responses of ES/Washington to the provisions for evaluation and community involvement reinforced the superintendent's derogatory reactions to ES/Washington's demands. The view extended beyond the superintendent to the project coordinators, who considered that Washington's criticism of their plan represented impossible demands without offering constructive help.

This testimony from the five case studies may be summarized in two ways. First, it is apparent that cooperative arrangements, an essential element of the original program conception, were badly

compromised in most of the rural sites. Second, the basis for that condition is to be found in the conflict that the local districts perceived between the underlying principle of local initiative (to which they all subscribed at the time of application) and the substance and style of the interactions they had with the program officers of ES/Washington.

Noise within the federal establishment. The second part of the process inventory focuses on the stresses within the federal establishment which involved or affected the Experimental Schools program. These are well chronicled in chapter 3 and only need highlighting here. They include the timing of the funding of the ES program, budgetary pressure, and conflict over the management promises on which the program was grounded.

Part of the problem for Experimental Schools was that, ironically, when it was barely a year old, the National Institute of Education (NIE), the agency which would ultimately be responsible for administering Experimental Schools, became "the new kid on the block." Such "mobility" is typical of Washington, but its adverse effects in this case were compounded by a climate hostile to educational research and development. NIE was created in the first place because of the considered judgment that the preexisting agencies for research management were inadequately staffed, mistakes had been made, and a whole new initiative was called for. Experimental Schools, though it was originally proposed at the same time that the NIE initiative was put forth, unfortunately came to be viewed as a competitor for scarce funds. It was not what the new institute wanted to do, and to that extent the commitments made under the ES program were impediments to the new initiatives expected of NIE by Congress.

The pressures reported in chapter 3 to reevaluate ES obligations to the eighteen existing projects and the organizations evaluating them was part of this tension. But it was also a function of the serious budget pressures of NIE. In that sense it was an issue larger than Experimental Schools per se, and it was to have its effects. Two direct ones can be identified. One was that it must have preoccupied key ES/Washington staff. Part of the delays and confusions experienced by the school districts are no doubt attributable to internal conflict in the agency. Second, the budget pressures operating on all of Washington, particularly on NIE (because it can theoretically

spend the money itself *or* grant it to others), reduced travel funds substantially and therefore the capability of project officers to do much more than monitor the contracts.

Finally, there was a third aspect of the internal conflict. In some ways it may be more important because it suggests other reasons why NIE may have looked especially hard at Experimental Schools at the time of its own most serious budgetary troubles. The discussion in chapter 3 of NIE leadership's concerns about the way in which the bridge between research and practice was being built points to two sets of attitudes about research and development in education. On the one hand, NIE was troubled that the 3:1 ratio of the subsidization of practice to the support of research gave it "too little research leverage for its overall ES dollars." On the other hand, NIE found itself with "a group of project officers committed primarily to the facilitation of practice, rather than to research on practice." These two worries constituted an attack on the basic foundations of the ES approach to educational change.

WHY DID PROBLEMS OCCUR?

It is important to explore not only what happened, but why. Explanations lie in four main areas: imprecise and inconstant goals; leadership problems; incongruence of the management of the program with critically important operating assumptions; and fundamental flaws in the assumptions about the nature of change.

Imprecise and Inconstant Goals

One of the most important factors explaining why events occurred as they did cannot be extrapolated from the case studies, although its effects can be seen there. That factor, imprecise and inconstant goals, was the outcome of policy processes common to the executive and legislative branches of the federal establishment during this period. Those processes, and the interactions of numerous public officials at all levels responsible for driving those processes, constitute the foundation on which the parent program and its project rested, the policy context in which their fortunes would play themselves out.

Whatever the individual case studies reveal about the precision (or lack thereof) of local goals and objectives, the story of Experi-

mental Schools and ES/SSP is one of a program imperfectly conceptualized, which then became subject to emergent pressures, of its own generation, compromising an already difficult situation. Its tottering pace is hardly surprising, given the character of the policy process in Washington, especially considered against the backdrop of America's pluralism and the value conflict certain to be encountered in educational matters, particularly those involving the prospect of change.

Policy processes in Washington are inherently messy. From time to time, key decisions focus attention on one or another agent in the process, thereby appearing to lend some order and sense of simplicity, but the submission of a presidential budget, the passage of a piece of legislation, or the approval of an appropriation are only milestones in a process that is disorderly, confusing, and subject to numerous pitfalls; in a word, labyrinthine. There are, of course, exceptions to the rules where events seem to move swiftly and surely. Even then (see, for example, Bailey and Mosher, 1968), the complexity is still there, but—momentarily and as a result of the exercise of considerable skill—in “phase,” thereby permitting extraordinary progress.

The “politics of the budget process,” in Wildavsky's (1965) exacting phrase, is equally subject to confusion and complexity. The President's budget proposals to the Congress are the result of a process influenced by many layers of the federal bureaucracy, by career civil servants and politically appointed leaders, by the powerful staffs of the Executive Office of the President (Office of Management and Budget, Domestic Council and special presidential aides), and by the continuing staff offices at agency and departmental levels, which frequently successfully challenge the line leadership in a department.

These points are pertinent here because Experimental Schools was launched under the provisions of the Cooperative Research Act, the legislation which provided the principal statutory basis for the tremendous expansion of educational research and development in the mid-1960s. That expansion was grounded on the belief that improvement in educational practice was not occurring, in part because of an inadequate base of knowledge and a resulting absence of “technological” development. The initiatives of the 1960s were of sufficient scale and promise to attract the attention of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, leading it in the late

1960s to sponsor an intensive examination of the processes of educational research and development policy in the United States.

One of the central features of the report of the examining team was their analysis of what they called the "Christmas tree" problem (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1971, pp. 31 and 79), that is, that the weighted staff branches at the higher levels of the bureaucracy managed almost everywhere to touch the staff branches of lower levels without going directly through the line. Their analysis seems especially appropriate to the Experimental Schools program which was, after all, under development only very shortly after the examining team undertook its study, framed its conclusions, and sufficiently irritated the staff branches at HEW departmental level and the White House to lead them all to withdraw from participation in the so-called "confrontation session" between the examining team and American national policy figures.

Chapter 3 identifies a number of the key proponents of Experimental Schools. Nixon, Moynihan, Robert Finch, and Robert Westheimer are all named. The fact that the "multitude of sponsors did not, unfortunately, signify a solid consensus for a single item" is also noted. My own experience allows me to document the inherent confusion and disagreement even further. Policy documents prepared by HEW planning staff late in 1968 and early in 1969 proposing an "experimental schools" program were fundamentally confusing, variously suggesting that the program was to support (1) careful engineering and development of entire schools, (2) the testing of already developed components or segments in comprehensive installation, (3) the demonstration of practice as a diffusion instrument, or (4) the careful and highly sophisticated evaluation of the relative impact of instructional variables on educational achievement (Brandl, 1970). This jumble continued in documents submitted to the House Appropriations Subcommittee in May, 1969 (House of Representatives, 1969). It was still not clear in the appropriations hearings a year later (House of Representatives, 1970). Further shifts, and therefore continuing uncertainty, are evident in the ES/SSP Announcement. There was an apparent drift away from the earlier focus on the "comprehensive combinations of promising practice" (implying the installation of already-developed segmental innovations) to locally initiated design and development of programs, and from the appropriations rhetoric of single schools to a focus on entire districts.

The absence of a clear common view within HEW of the prime

objectives of the program was a direct outgrowth of a confusing process of decision. The program was initiated and elaborated (1) at levels of the bureaucracy which could not themselves administer the program and (2) in ways which created almost a certainty that there would be conflicting views and purposes of the objectives and worth of the Experimental Schools program. One last example epitomizes the point. The Acting Director of Experimental Schools from February to November 1970 (the month before the program was launched with the first call for proposals), was not even invited to the meetings of an HEW Policy Advisory Group established in July 1970 to guide the development of the program (Hall, 1970). If the Experimental Schools program had been a component of a comprehensive project in a rural school system, one wonders what the project officer would have said about that kind of administrative structure!

Sloppy structures for policy development and the failure to match purpose and procedures at all levels of HEW meant sorry consequences for Experimental Schools. After the program was started up (prior to the creation of NIE), and then transferred from USOE to NIE, the leadership of NIE entertained thoughts of program re-orientation which should have been but were not promptly quashed by the higher level of HEW. The resulting difficulties for ES/Washington clearly had negative impact on project monitoring, as documented in chapters 3 through 8.

It is ironic that the very justification for Experimental Schools contributed to NIE's later difficulties with the Congress. NIE presented a rationale for the program which rested on an implicit criticism of what had gone before, rather than on an argument that a natural evolutionary process of program development was involved. While there are references to the latter in the justifications, the new Experimental Schools initiative was coming at a time when component development as a concept was barely ten years old. Furthermore, another whole new set of institutions—educational laboratories and research and development centers (the principal exponents of component development) was struggling for its existence as NIE sought to pare back further on obligations which appeared to threaten its opportunity to devise new directions of its own. Experimental Schools might have been in place, but the rationale that got it there helped increase the belief that anything in educational research and development was not worth a tinker's dam!

There is another message in the program insecurity which char-

acterized the middle years of the Experimental Schools program. The experience of the program would be bad enough were it a single example. It becomes even worse when compared to the experience of other program initiatives. The picture which emerges is one which reveals how stable in the Washington environment is the phenomenon of instability in educational research and development programs. With few exceptions, program after program with implied or stated commitments for extended program life or secure funding found itself starved, truncated, or terminated. The reasons in each case for the shortfall may have been different, but the consequence was the same. One more example of nonsuccess was written into the books, increasing the likelihood that it would happen again when a new opportunity or pressure presented itself.

Part of the reason for such instability rests outside the executive branch. Congress is a difficult master. Viewpoints on what should be done are varied; they run all the way from the enlightened to the benighted. The budgetary pressure beginning in the late 1960s and then continuing as a result of recession also played a role.

But the most telling conflict was inside the executive branch. Critics of educational research or the way in which it was being done or managed were and are numerous. An unjustified (and frequently quite undignified) brand of elitism often held sway. Even more influential is the turnover of senior personnel in research management, in the directorship of NIE, and in the commissioner's and assistant secretary's offices of USOE. Each occupant wishes to make his or her mark. Each seeks out identifiable priorities. Each feels constrained by the programs or orientations of the former occupants of the post. Finally, the pressure is even more intense as a consequence of the monies in educational research and development being largely discretionary so that it really is possible (though perhaps not politically feasible) to alter the direction of expenditures. All of this characterized the environment in which the Experimental Schools program struggled. It goes a long way toward illuminating the "why" of the program's problems.

One final comment at this point seems appropriate. The existence of political conflict within the executive branch is not and ought not to be seen as an evil. In fact, it can be the means by which purposes can be sharpened and approaches refined. On the other hand, political debate ought to take place within some structure, pro-

ceed according to certain rules (even if they are not committed to writing), and allow roughly equal access to affected constituencies. It is not political conflict, therefore, which is problematical but rather a refusal to recognize it as politics (i.e., choosing to see it instead as a matter of differences in the "intellectual quality of the policy analysis" or in the acceptability of the credentials of the protagonists) and a failure to adopt mechanisms for review and decision making which adequately reflect the political character of the interactions taking place.

Leadership Problems

The preceding analysis suggests leadership problems on a larger scale. This is especially so if one defines leadership as seeing to it that the kinds of policy and program difficulties described above are either prevented or disposed of properly. The case studies suggest that leadership problems existed closer to the firing line, certainly on the local scene. The most insistent instances, albeit of a quite special kind, are associated with the role of the ES/Washington project officer in the five districts. It is this special kind of leadership which is so often ignored by those who design federal programs.

Two essential features stand out. The first is the incredible turnover of project officers. The second is the idiosyncratic nature of their performance. No district kept a project officer throughout the life of the planning grant and the contract. River District had six different project officers in four years. The average number of project officers was slightly more than three for each site. If project monitoring was considered essentially an accounting procedure, the duration of project officers would not be important. But those experienced at project monitoring, especially long-term projects of complex conception and uncertain outcome, know that it takes an absolute minimum of eighteen months—and more nearly two years—to build a base of experience which allows a project officer to work comfortably and effectively with the project as a whole.

The turnover exhibited among project officers had to be a serious impediment to the local districts. It could not have helped ES/Washington in its own internal battles within NIE, for inexperienced and unknowledgeable people cannot provide the kinds of analysis and justification that a beleaguered program director requires to maintain position.

The second difficulty in the leadership provided by the project officers is to be found in the questionable quality and consistency of their performance, suggested by the wide range of strategies and techniques they used as they went about their duties. The variegated canvas that the five case studies provide leads to a number of questions. How carefully was the project officer's upcoming role defined in the planning prior to and immediately after the program's beginning? On what basis were project officers recruited? Did they go through any kind of training prior to or concomitant with their entry into their responsibilities? How much attention was given to opportunities for peer development as they separately began and then continued their duties?

Perhaps because the narratives available for review are from the perspective of the on-site researchers, and there is no discussion from the ES/Washington perspective, these matters were dealt with in Washington but are simply not addressed here. On the other hand, the range of interactions between sites and even within sites by different project officers is sufficiently great to warrant the conclusion that the questions raised above either were not considered or, if they were, given very cursory treatment.

Incongruence of ES/Washington Management with a Key Program Assumption

A third explanation for the difficulties encountered by ES/SSP may be found in the lack of congruence between the management practices of ES/Washington and a key assumption underlying the project: the importance of a cooperative relationship between the local district and ES/Washington. The way in which ES/Washington worked—or did not work—with the local districts undermined the development and maintenance of the kind of relationship which had been originally projected to the applicants and which clearly meant a great deal to them.

The operation of the project was compromised in many ways. One of them, already mentioned, was the rapid turnover of project officers. The several instances where districts felt they had clear green lights on their own initiatives (e.g., River District's feelings about "no strings," only to learn later that there were numerous strings) was another. Shiloh County's experience at hearing its plan criticized—unconstructively—twenty minutes before the project officer's departure was a third. Contracting delays caused activities to be

postponed as much as a year (River District's teacher workshops, for instance). Other kinds of bureaucratic snafus were equally irritating, such as site visits to River District on one day's notice, falling behind in payments to Butte-Angels Camp, or the January 24 response to the December 15 draft of Arcadia's plan due to be submitted to ES/Washington February 15.

Technical problems, however, were not the only kind. An analysis of the Jackson County case study suggests that what was happening between ES/Washington and the local districts was one culture imposing itself on another, rather than interacting cooperatively with it. "Scope of work statements," for example, are second nature to Washington project officers, but the case studies suggest that the whole activity associated with preparing work statements was an immersion for local district officials into a strange new way of doing things. Federal officials think nothing of going through dozens of iterations in the development of legislation, plans, and budget documents, but the writing and rewriting of project plans must have been a whole new enterprise for most rural school officials.

Finally, the differing meanings of the concept of "success" appear to have led ES/Washington to intervene in ways which hindsight suggest were less than fully responsive to important characteristics of the rural sites. The kinds of advice given in Jackson County concerning "required" planning skills, for example, seem in retrospect to be more culturally based than technically mandated. The instances where ES/Washington suggested to Jackson County and Butte-Angels Camp the hiring of consultants identified by ES/Washington constitute another example. The apparent ease with which project officers suggested specific organizational arrangements and, in the case of Jackson County, even tried to define lines of authority between an appointed project director, an elected board, and an elected superintendent suggest an orientation quite different in character from that of local officials and professionals.

Fundamental Flaws in the Assumptions About Change

There is one last explanation why the program ran into serious difficulties. This explanation may well turn out to be one of the most important findings of the project, and we are indebted to the careful documentation of the process of change, which allows us to see clearly the importance of these flaws.

One fundamental flaw lay in assuming that educational change

was essentially a management problem, involving people, to be sure, but still a technical task of putting the right people with the right training into the right structure with the right data. It was assumed that it could be contracted for, that work statements could be written to define it, and that the influences of a project officer could be brought to bear as a consequence of the contractual agreements which had been made.

If these five case studies tell us anything, they tell us that change is a *political* process, rather than a managerial one. It has to do with people, values, relationships, social mores, and the idiosyncracies of communities. Some might argue that distinguishing between "politics" and "management" is a futile enterprise. Good politics entails competent management; good management is inseparable from a keen political sense. By drawing the distinction here between politics and management I am not recasting the old semantic debate between management (emphasis on the "big picture") and administration (nuts and bolts processes), but instead pointing to the importance of initial premises, the basic assumptions on which all later action rests. A management task, as I am using the term here, is one whose goals are fairly well articulated, exist under the sanction of some recognized authority, and are accomplished within a more or less rational frame of reference. By a political task I mean one where goals are not clear, where authority structures are likely to be multiple and mixed, and where goal achievement (whether initially or in process) is heavily dependent upon consensual commitments of a considerable number of different individuals and role occupants.

The evidence that the tasks were political more than managerial jumps out of the case studies. Jackson County's kinship system and unique political structure for elected board and superintendent dictated the way in which change would occur. The politics of Butte-Angels Camp's struggle for unification did the same. Professional politics—and its breakdown—told the story in Arcadia. The way Shiloh County and its superintendent used each other is a phenomenon common to politics. The prime purpose of Experimental Schools for River District was to pursue a political goal of unification at odds with the concept of comprehensiveness as prompted by ES/Washington. The consequences of this misunderstanding were the considerable array of behaviors, decisions, and interactions which created fears, anxiety, frustration, and anger in relating to the representatives

of the agency that was supposed to be working cooperatively to facilitate changes in local schools and in the educational achievement of children.

A second flaw was closely related to the misunderstanding of the nature of change. ES/Washington was apparently unaware that, to facilitate successfully the process of change, they, too, would have to be prepared to change, not only in themselves but in the basic ways in which civil servants understand their functions and their responsibilities. They would have to become true partners with the locals, willing to learn from one another, certainly not presuming requisite knowledge in advance. But there is little sign that this was understood.

An early clue to the differential underlying attitudes of ES/Washington concerning themselves and others can be found in the requirements placed on local schools (and the contract evaluators) that they spend *an entire year* in detailed planning before they launched their activities. Nowhere can one find a reference to similar expectations concerning those who were to manage the effort from Washington. In fact the evidence suggests Washington's attitude was that, by virtue of being responsible for the program's conception and inception, it could be assumed that a basic capacity to carry out the required duties existed.

This point relates to the observations made earlier about the training received by project officers. While it was assumed that the schools would need staff development programs to train the district personnel to carry out the comprehensive programs, no such assumption seems to have occurred to anyone concerning parallel needs of ES/Washington staff. Consider the following point. When the superintendent of Arcadia suggested a meeting of six winning rural site superintendents, he was promptly dissuaded by the project officer on grounds that such a meeting would "contaminate" the experiments. No one seems to have given much thought to the extent to which ES/Washington's posture would have analogous effects on each of the sites; the evidence is clear that it did, yet the message was "sent" far more effectively than it was "received." In a parallel analysis, the local districts were in fact much better at being consistent with their own premises on the importance of decentralization, especially to the level of individual schools, than ES/Washington was in fulfilling its priority commitment to the principle of local initiative. In River

District and Jackson County, the principle of decentralization (i.e., *local initiative*) seems to have been considerably more effectively honored than it was between ES/Washington and the districts as a whole!

All of this suggests that, the next time the federal government proposes to launch an experimental or operational program aimed at the facilitation of local educational change, it will have to improve the assumptions about change with which it begins. In fact, the evidence of the ES/SSP experience to date does not definitely confirm any of the eighteen assumptions discussed at the beginning of this chapter. Only one, having to do with the opportunity for comprehensive evaluation, is possibly confirmed. The others are apparently contradicted. These include the assumptions bearing on impact beyond the funded sites, the district being the unit of change, the paramount character of the federal interest, the nonobtrusiveness of the criterion of comprehensiveness, change as a management task, program continuity at the federal level, the presumed inadequacy of local policy structures, Washington's capacity to carry the program through, and its possession of the requisite knowledge or capacity to learn how to facilitate local change. (The assessment offered above is not quite as bad as it might seem at first glance. Many of the assumptions could not be proved or disproved by ES/SSP, even if the local projects had been supremely successful. The validity—or lack thereof—of many of the assumptions rests on material and judgments antecedent to the ES/SSP program, for example, the feeling that past research and development in education had been unsuccessful in raising student achievement because of its segmental character.) These conclusions leave open the question of what assumptions might have proven more viable than the set on which ES/SSP seems to have been based. It is to this that we now turn.

IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PROGRAM

The implications of ES/SSP for policy and program are varied and far-reaching. They run a gamut from specific ideas concerning projects or programs which ought to be mounted with federal research and development funds to suggestions about the manner in which federal officials carry out their change-facilitating activities in the future. They extend from counsel on ways in which the policy

structures might be made to operate better to some basic adjustments in the very conceptions we have of the nature of change in educational systems.

The challenge of this last section is to offer useful, implementable-in-Washington-as-it-is advice. Policy analysis is full of logical, straightforward, convincing suggestions and solutions that are wrong because they bear so little relation, if any, to the climate or milieu in which their implementation is proposed. How to offer advice to the federal establishment, executive and legislative, that is truly responsive to the realities of the pressures and incentives that govern the day-to-day lives of the key role players is no easy task. The recommendations which follow are offered in ascending order of priority and importance.

Training Packages

Conventional wisdom has always pointed to the importance of administrators as the critical gatekeepers in innovation processes. They can start them and they can stop them, but there are no successful instances without their participation. The great bulk of the focus on administrator training, however, has been in terms of improving the background perspective, sharpening problem-solving and decision-making skills, dealing with span-of-control issues, working in a human service environment and a grants economy heavily constrained by public law, and relating effectively to policy boards and teachers' associations.

The message of these case studies is that the exercise of management skills takes place in an essentially political context involving local boards, administrators, teachers, state and federal officials, community leaders, the lay public, students, and their parents. A very concrete, specific suggestion for federal policy and program, then, is to survey existing training packages and programs for all types of professional and policy roles in education to ascertain if there are any designed to improve the effectiveness of political skills, and then support the development of "curriculum" materials of all kinds wherever gaps may be found to exist.

It is important that administrators not be the only designated target group for such curriculum materials. Training packages suited for school board members, for teachers, for leaders of teacher organizations, and for parents, for example, need to be provided. Develop-

ing such materials will require careful assessment and understanding of how a political context alters managerial functions and responsibilities, how problem solving and decision making alter in a political environment, and what it means to be assigned or have to play the different roles expected in today's complex educational environment.

Knowledge and the Process of Change

A second implication for federal policies and programs is directed to the role played by knowledge, and, by implication, the understandings we have about knowledge as it may be applicable to change. Chapter 3 notes one conclusion which emerged from the research and development strategies adopted prior to the initiation of the Experimental Schools program, that a comprehensive change with a focus on *process* rather than *products* might be preferable. The conclusion has merit; unfortunately Experimental Schools committed itself to a particular kind of process in a way which made it indistinguishable from a product—its dimensions were too narrowly prescribed—and it employed the wrong process—it thought it was a management task rather than a political one.

The conclusion as stated in chapter 3 is a powerful one, nonetheless. It has important ramifications in the context of facilitating change, for what it clearly implies is that the specific change (the product or, in research terms, the knowledge) is less important than the process (the way in which knowledge is acquired and, indeed, accepted as knowledge).

This is not the place to undertake a discussion of the political (read "integral relation of values") character of behavioral and social science research, or the extent to which the complexity of interactive variables renders the research for generalizability much less important than the attempt to illuminate the character of specific sites and settings. Nevertheless, everything in the ES/SSP experience underscores the likelihood that using the techniques of disciplined inquiry as a basis for rational change and improvement in education waits upon quite fundamental paradigmatic changes in the understandings which practitioners of research and development have about the character of their craft, their functions, and the purposes which guide those functions.

A conceptual reorientation of the kind I suspect is required will

not come easily or quickly, but the likelihood that it will seems a little greater as a result of the documentation of ES/SSP. That it must come before research and development can contribute widely to improvement in education is a certainty.

Expectations for Reciprocal Change

The successful facilitation of local change will require that the traditional performance of both federal and local officials undergo substantial modification. Some of the modifications that would appear to offer promise are listed below:

1. Federal officials will have to understand that *facilitation* of change (improvements) is their goal and that the nature of those changes is what must be left to local initiative and choice. This distinction will never be neat. Conflict, therefore, must be expected and dealt with.

2. Feds and locals must come as equals to negotiating tables to resolve those almost certain conflicts. This will mean that federal officials will have to bolster local resolve to "speak their piece" in the presence of the formidable power of the federal agency (e.g., the monies can always be stopped).

3. Federal officials will have to learn much more about the sites and the people locally than they have in the past. This knowledge is important because it is local factors which will primarily influence the degree and character of the changes that will occur. In the absence of that knowledge, project officers at the federal level can hardly be appropriately responsive.

4. Special attention must be given to the question of project officer turnover. The recruitment, training, and tenure of project officers must seek to assure stability in the relationship between local sites and Washington. It is perhaps ironic, but understandable, that the facilitation of beneficial change cannot occur if everything is in flux. Eliminating as much flux as possible in project management seems highly desirable. An important feature here is the adequacy of the training that prospective project officers receive. Their task is a complicated and sensitive one. It requires quite explicit skills. Based on the experiences chronicled in chapters 4 through 8, the critical skills required of project officers would appear to include at least the following:

- a. Capacity to listen and communicate effectively in two directions, to local sites and to the federal establishment.
- b. Capacity to negotiate compromises compatible with the basic self-interests perceived federally and locally.
- c. Capacity to perceive and understand the basic purposes of local systems and the federal agency and the contexts which govern, shape, and otherwise nurture those purposes.
- d. Courage and tact to present the purposes of one agency to the other so that each may understand the other and to serve as an advocate of the prime purposes of the local when federal action raises the prospect of potential harm.
- e. Capacity to identify resources accessible to and believable by local officials to meet needs recognized by those officials.
- f. Working knowledge of organizational change and facilitative strategies for such change.

Lastly, serious consideration should be given to "contracting" with project officers for the duration of the activity. This might require some kind of incentive arrangement, for example, a period of paid leave coming at the conclusion of a project or perhaps even a bonus payment of some kind.

5. A final change which needs careful consideration has to do with the classic Washington fear of supplanting local funds with federal monies. No single policy has had more to do with the failure of Washington efforts to facilitate change than this prohibition. It is not the policy itself which is the problem; on its face it is proper and responsible. The problem is its secondary effect, the creation of a circumstance where all innovative or related activities are conceived as add-ons, requiring separate accounting, separate management, and separate consideration. The result is that the main mass of activity remains untouched except perhaps at second hand. The federal establishment will have to give serious consideration to finding change-facilitating ways to accomplish the same fiscally responsible aim, but without doing so in such a heavy-handed and narrowly framed way. The real objective is to maintain effort, not keep the funds separate. It is to accomplish new purposes, not necessarily the old ones *plus* the new ones. Innovation must be seen as a process which, to be lasting, first and foremost requires the *reallocation* of existing resources, be they money, time, people, materials, or structure.

Facilitating Change in Rural Areas

Although it may seem in direct contradiction of the ES/SSP experience, one conclusion that can be drawn from the five case studies, and that ought to be thoroughly explored, is that change can be facilitated in rural settings. The case studies suggest the unleashing—and then the misdirecting, curbing, or wasting—of considerable energies at the local level. An experiment or even a program (admittedly unlikely now in the light of the federal tendency to try things only once before concluding, irrevocably, that they cannot work) based on a rather different set of assumptions and on greatly modified facilitative and supportive practices at the federal level probably could be highly successful.

The attractiveness of thinking about such a possibility lies in the relatively modest investments that would be required, in terms of both time and dollars. The number of districts is easy to calculate. The cost of a program that could reach all of those that wished to be reached over a period of ten or fifteen years, providing four to five years of support on the margins to help local boards, administrators, and teachers accomplish desired changes, would not be impossible to undertake.

In the main, the assumptions under which such a new experiment or program for rural school districts could be successful would be quite different from those which underlay ES/SSP. For example:

1. Innovation would have to be defined explicitly as the reallocation of existing resources or the commitment to generate additional resources after the change-facilitating period.

2. Local definitions of improvement would have to be accepted.

3. Federal project officers would function as true facilitators, helping local officials and professionals refine their objectives, connecting them to information and training resources, providing neutral frames of reference to help resolve inevitable differences of opinion which change processes elicit.

4. Resources available from the federal government could be used only to pay start-up costs, staff development, planning, or other developmental costs unless districts could demonstrate firm *decisions* to provide additional resources in the future to supplant project

resources used initially to pay increased program costs (in other words, not just *intentions* to seek decisions to do so).

5. Training opportunities would have to be provided for the federal project officers to equip them for their special roles. Officials in the local districts would be key participants in the evaluation of federal facilitation staff.

6. Goal setting and program planning would comprise phase one of the program, extending perhaps for an eighteen-month or two-year time span. Program implementation, including staff training, would be contingent upon successful planning. Success would be defined in terms of broad community and professional commitment, the promise of significant improvement, and a clear sequence of implementation steps. Projected changes in district programming would meet the innovation criteria of resource *reallocation* (as contrasted to additional allocation) and a capacity for continuous assessment and program reformulation.

Improvement of Policy Processes

Serious attempts need to be made to improve the operation of policy structures within NIE, USOE, and HEW, and between them and Congress. The faults which the history of the ES/SSP reveals will need to be overcome.

Overcoming those faults will be difficult because doing so will mean countering myths which now dominate the policy development process. Those myths include the ideas that brighter is better (elitism) and higher is better (the agency's planning staff is better than the unit's, the department's better than the agency's, the Executive Office of the President's better than the Department's). Who is "right" is much less important than whether the program is workable, the consensus behind it substantial, the goals clear at all levels of the bureaucracy including Congress, and the staff fully trained or newly recruited and trained to administer the program in terms of its own requirements.

More specifically, this means that, particularly within the executive branch, policy and program development is going to have to be a much more participative process involving all levels to a much greater extent simultaneously. It is going to have to be much more comprehensive—not only program conceptions but plans as well—and it should be undertaken cooperatively with key representatives of ex-

ternal constituencies who have a stake in *what* is being proposed and the *way* in which it will be administered, if and when it is approved and funded.

Most federal officials will not object to such prescriptions. They would be quick to point out, however, that it will never happen because such processes will be seen to have the following drawbacks. First, the wrong kind of people (for which read the unimaginative, uncreative, haven't-had-a-new-idea-in-ten-years career civil servants) would be involved. Second, the prerogatives of decision makers at ever higher levels of the bureaucracy would be compromised. Third, the involvement of persons outside the bureaucracy would be misinterpreted as lobbying and get the executive branch in trouble with Congress.

All three propositions are frequently offered or implied as reasons for not engaging in the processes of policy and program development being recommended here. First, the attitude toward the "working stiffs" in the federal bureaucracy is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Furthermore, it isn't a true representation of reality. Finally, even where it is true, the reality of the civil service is that the people about whom such a concern is expressed were there before the transient policy-types and will be there afterwards. If there are failures or flaws in the civil servant's conceptualizations of the issues, then these conceptualizations will have to be improved in any case, because the civil servants are the ones who will be managing the program after the conceptualizers have long since departed.

Second, there is nothing about participative processes of policy development that necessarily compromises the capacity to make decisions at a later point in time. What is needed are clearer conceptions of differential roles and responsibilities which allow even decision makers to participate in the development of policy alternatives in one capacity, but then to operate in another when it is time for decision.

Third, there are few members of Congress who will fault an agency for careful and complete planning when new program proposals are presented. Again, agencies would need to be mindful of the differences between prospective planning and lobbying and respect them. In the past, it would be fair to say that the principal error has been to substitute lobbying for careful planning, and this is what senators and representatives rightly are quick to raise objections about.

A Concluding Comment

Change inherently provokes anxiety. It means giving up familiar habits and practices. It means exchanging the old and tested for the new and untried. Even if the consequences of the old are less than desirable, even painful, they are charted and familiar. They feel right, they are known. An important corollary of this view is that it is far easier to try to get someone else to change than it is to bring it about in oneself.

Given these conclusions, it is clear that an absolutely essential requirement to federal facilitation of change at the local level is the presence or the creation of a trust and confidence shared between both parties to the process. Trust and confidence rest on perceptions of mutuality, of equal risk for equal gain, of respect, and of caring. All of the recommendations above can be read in the context of suggestions designed to engender trust and confidence between those who want to change, for whatever reasons, and those who propose to facilitate the process others seek to undergo.

REFERENCES

- Bailey, Stephen K., and Mosher, Edith K. *ESEA: The Office of Education Administers a Law*. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1968.
- Brandl, John E. "A Program of Experimental Schools." Author's files, ca. January 1970.
- Hall, Robert C., to Harry Silberman. "Experimental Schools Unit—A Chronology of Administrative Events, Products, and Problems During the Period of February 2, 1970 through November 2, 1970." Author's files, November 20, 1970.
- House of Representatives. *Hearings, Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriations for 1970*. The Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Part 5, Office of Education, 91st Congress, 1st Session, 1969.
- House of Representatives. *Hearings, Office of Education Appropriations for 1971*. The Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, 1970.
- Mann, Dale. "Making Change Happen?" *Teachers College Record* 77, no. 3 (February 1976): 313-22.
- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. *Reviews of National Policies for Education, United States*. Paris: OECD, 1971.
- Wildavsky, Aaron. *The Politics of the Budgetary Process*. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1965.

Leadership and the Change Process: Preparing Educational Administrators

Terry Tinson Saario

An anthropologist well known for his work in developing countries once noted, "As long as humanity lasts, men will be reformers . . . endeavoring to change others in order to maintain or create desired situations for themselves, or to change themselves in order to accommodate to unyielding circumstance or to realize a new dream. . . . Whatever else he may be, Man is a reformer" (Goodenough, 1963, p. 15). Judging from the case studies in chapters 4 through 8, Professor Goodenough's wisdom can be applied far beyond the realm of developing countries.

The planners of the Experimental Schools (ES) program dreamed of reform and change for the nation's schools. Too frequently their plans failed to acknowledge the power and resistance of the status quo and unyielding circumstance. Where their plans succeeded, they seem to have succeeded in spite of themselves. Where they failed, they stumbled and tripped over many of the same obstacles which halted the efforts of their many predecessors who sought to reform the nation's schools to serve more adequately the needs and wants of children. There is much to be learned from these cases. Admittedly, they might have been told differently by one or another of the key players—a federal bureaucrat, local administrator, com-

munity resident, teacher, or student. Nevertheless, these case studies tell us much about reform and change, about communication and expectation, about role and reciprocity, and about the "organized anarchy" (March, 1973) that is education in this society. They also tell us much about how inadequately prepared the administrators who led the various ES projects were, and they offer suggestions for the design of alternative training programs for educational administrators. The sections which follow highlight an alternative model for training administrators and suggest certain avenues for incorporating this model into major university training programs.

THE CONTEXT OF REFORM IN THE 1970s

The overall Experimental Schools program was designed as a "comprehensive" change effort for eighteen remarkably diverse communities. Some of these communities were experiencing a major population loss; others were reeling from a recent influx of population from other sections of the country. These ebbs and flows of population, compounded by the drop in birth rates in the late 1950s, were having their effect upon the school districts serving these communities. What has become commonly described as the "steady state" of education was upon them. Loss of substantial student enrollments and attendant state and federal revenues necessitated consolidating outlying and adjacent districts, cutting staff size, shutting down school plant facilities, and coping with an overabundance of certified teachers and administrators. Moreover, the social unrest of the 1960s had left a residue of distrust of federal intervention in local schools and a hypersensitivity to all calls for reform on the part of those administrators and teachers who had been most affected, usually negatively, by previous reform efforts. It was within such a context that the Experimental Schools program was inaugurated.

These factors should not have been cause for alarm or a gloomy perspective on the potential of the Experimental Schools program. Rather they should have been taken into account in the ES plans, for they were apparent in data available while the ES program was being designed, and they represent a different set of circumstances from those which existed in education over the previous several decades. Large-scale interventions in a period of limited or contained growth can provide unusual opportunities for restructuring education

bureaucracies and pedagogical programs. The consolidation of a number of adjacent school districts, for example, can be a golden opportunity for reordering the administrative hierarchy in a district or enhancing the provision of educational services to a community. The trick is recognizing the unusual opportunities for leadership prompted by greatly curtailed circumstances.

In this regard, educational leaders and change agents in the 1970s and 1980s must be different from their predecessors. They should have skills, talents, and motivations different from the change agents of yesteryear. Instead of being drawn to their positions by the promise of status and community recognition, they should be attracted by the possibilities for providing leadership, for establishing long-term educational goals for communities, and for improving the quality of educational services.

In many communities the position of superintendent is no longer as unquestioningly respected as it once was. Their troops—teachers and subordinate administrators—are more sophisticated, more articulate about their needs, and far better organized than were their predecessors of thirty years ago. Moreover, the entire educational enterprise in the United States has become more bureaucratized, more hierarchical, and more regimented and rule-bound. Compare a simple set of circumstances. In the early 1940s there were approximately 112,000 school districts in the U.S. (James, 1974, p. 121). By 1975 approximately 16,500 remained (*Digest of Educational Statistics*, 1975). A tenfold reduction in the number of school districts over a thirty-year period implies different routes or channels of access and mobility for those interested in administrative positions in education.

This is not to say that the total number of points of entry to administrative roles has decreased, for minor administrative roles have proliferated enormously as districts grew larger over those three decades. Rather, there is something quite different in the opportunity offered an individual entering administration as the chief administrator under a board of education, even in a small district, from that offered to one appointed by a principal, let us say, to a vice-principalship. In the first instance, from the day he is appointed he deals with the totality of problems of a local school board making public policy for the schools. . . . Quite different is his counterpart in the role of vice-principal. He is excluded by tradition, as most probably is his superior and others in the chain of command above him, from the meetings where public policy is made for the schools. (James, 1974, p. 121)¹

Again, these events could be viewed from a despairing perspective, but they need not be. The consolidation, routinization, and regimentation of schooling in our society has lessened the idiosyncratic influence that one or two individuals could have upon decisions affecting the quality of education and the conditions of work, such as students' rights and teachers' rights. Lessening the power of such influence had also lessened its unpredictable and somewhat ad hoc nature. Over time, this shift in the balance of power in school districts could sharpen the ability of "school boards and administrators, teachers, pupils, and citizens, to introduce in *orderly* ways the *specific* changes needed in *specific* schools to meet the expectations of *specific* communities" (James, 1974, p. 124, emphasis added). Greater articulation of roles and their boundaries could result in greater rigidities or, conversely, enhance communication among various parties in educational settings (teachers, administrators, board members) by lessening the potential for misunderstanding between various local, state, and federal agencies promoting change within schools.

Under these circumstances, the administrator's role and its incentives shift markedly. He or she becomes less of an agent for controlling others, guided primarily by highly personalized incentives and ambitions, and much more someone who achieves success through leadership, allocating resources to others and mediating among the competing political demands upon the schools (Kelly, 1974, p. 143). The administrator becomes a catalyst for change, the spark which generates initiative in the system. The 1980s call for a cohort of flexible administrators, those not too tied to traditional patterns of behavior and reaction. They require the influx of newly certified and eager administrators trained more in competencies than heroics, more in commitment than ambition (March, 1974, p. 138).

Looking at the history of training programs in educational administration since the turn of the century, one is struck by the subtle shifts that similar societal influences have brought to bear on their structure and content:

In the early decades of the century there was emphasis on skills and techniques—a kind of how-to-do-it approach. At a later period, the preparation of educational administrators was influenced by concepts borrowed chiefly from industry and from Taylor's time and motion studies, with a resulting push toward standardization as a basis for effective mass production. Still later, the-

ories of administration began to be borrowed from such writers as Fayol, Culick, and Urwick and other public administration theorists; and this was succeeded by ideas derived from studies conducted by Mayo and Roethlisberger at Harvard, the work of Rensis Likert and others at the University of Michigan, Yale, and elsewhere. Other influences on the thinking of professors of educational administration in the fifties and beyond stemmed from the work of Max Weber. Thus began a strong emphasis on theories of organization and administration incorporating some of the ideas referred to above, plus theories developed by education professors, such as Getzels, Coladarci, Neal Gross, Campbell, and others. (Chase, 1975, p. 46)

Now we are entering a period in which those who theorize about the declining state of education have primacy.

A MODEL FOR TRAINING ADMINISTRATORS IN THE 1980s

One of the first to comment on the similarities between the characteristics of education in the 1970s and other "declining" industries was James G. March. His analysis is particularly valuable for it leads to the definition of the variety of analytic skills that will be required of an administrator in the 1980s. March (1974, p. 133) notes that education seems to be entering:

... the third natural phase in the history of a social institution. The first stage is a period of dynamic growth. Social expectations rise; the institution is able to meet those expectations; there is excitement, expansion, and self-confidence. The second stage is a period of conflict. In the period of neglect social expectations outrun capabilities. Social expectations decline; the institution remains able to meet many of the reduced expectations; there is indifference, passivity, and stagnation.

While March's third phase does not portray all of the five school districts described in chapters 4 through 8, it does characterize a broad ennui afloat in this country today with regard to educational change. Witness the public opinion polls calling for a reemphasis on basic skills in lieu of the many educational reforms of the 1960s and early 1970s. These outcries, coupled with defeats of school bond elections, are evidence of a new period in education—a period of reduced expectations and modest public endorsement.

The degree to which these concerns have been integrated into training programs for educational administrators is difficult to conjecture. The rather extensive literature on educational change, be-

moaning the lack of success of major educational experiments in the 1960s and yet sounding the call for new efforts in the 1970s and 1980s (see, for example, *Teachers College Record*, 1976), seems not to have infiltrated the communication channels in administration to any great degree. Professional journals which anoint and legitimize the latest ideological stance or educational buzz phase seem remarkably untouched by these reformist efforts. Nevertheless, presuming that there are words of wisdom in this extensive literature, and that the phasing or synchronization between reform efforts and training programs are out of synch by only four or five years, what would one expect to see incorporated in such programs by 1980?

Presumably, if the advice of recent critics (James, Kelly, March, and Mayhew) is heeded, administrative training programs by the 1980s will place less stress on the acquisition of skills which are defined by time or circumstance, and more upon a set of talents which would define the consummate leader in any circumstance. March, for example, offers a concise analytic model for administration that contains within it many of the skills which others have suggested are necessary for enlightened leadership in education. According to his model, administration requires the following talents:

1. *The analysis of expertise*: The management of knowledge. Much administration involves managing the relation between the expert and non-expert, the taking and giving of advice.
2. *The analysis of coalitions*: The management of conflict. Different individuals and groups bring different interests and objectives to the organization. An educational manager is a builder of political coalitions.
3. *The analysis of ambiguity*: The management of goals. Educational administrators are involved in decision making under ambiguity. That is, not only are they uncertain about the consequences of alternatives, they are also unclear about their goals, uncertain of their technology, and unaware of their alternatives. They need to be able to act intelligently in the absence of clear objectives.
4. *The analysis of time*: The management of attention. Educational administrators, like other managers, operate under time constraints. Time and attention are scarce goods.
5. *The analysis of information*: The management of inference. Decision making in education involves data. There are data; the data are often relevant to some decision; they are usually incomplete or subject to some error or indecisive; as a result, they require some kind of inferential judgment. (March, 1974, p. 139)

Ability at each of these skills would be required by someone charged

with responsibility for maintaining or renewing an educational bureaucracy.

Administrators have another mission beyond providing jobs for adults and maintaining the educational bureaucracy, and that is educating. As Chase would remind us, an administrator must "provide *active impetus* to the reform of *curriculum* and *instruction* in order to meet the needs of those for whom traditional school programs have proved unsuitable" (Chase, 1975, p. 45, emphasis added). While March's model does not overlook this function, it does not highlight it. In similar fashion, too many university training programs also give short shrift to one of the more serious of an administrator's multiple responsibilities, providing pedagogical leadership.

How relevant are these skills to the day-to-day tasks of a local school administrator? Do they inform our understanding of the decisions to be made, the leadership demanded, and the boundaries on the tasks to be performed? The best way to answer these questions is to juxtapose the model against the actions of the administrators in the five school districts participating in the Experimental Schools program. If the model leads to a critical understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the leadership these men exhibited, then it proves to be a useful device in thinking about educational leadership and change.

The administrators performed admirably under some circumstances and rather abysmally under others. The reader should not be misled. The same comment could apply to most of the nation's current pool of administrators. There is much to learn from the stark illustrations of administrative behavior in the five school districts. But we should be humble in our criticisms, for few of us have acquired the skills or been blessed with the talents it takes to be a leader among leaders.

Analysis of Expertise

At one time or another, the superintendents in all five districts were inundated with advice. Federal agency representatives prodded and cajoled, frequently offering unsolicited and gratuitous comments on the ideal "comprehensive" change effort. Consultants were drawn in to sanctify and legitimize program activities. Teachers championed the cause of their pet projects. Parents had their own notions about the most critical foci for the ES change effort.

None of the superintendents handled this flood of advice well.

Two relied heavily upon the advice of outside consultants, but in neither instance was the result salutary for their Experimental Schools project. March suggests two discrete skills administrators need to nurture in order to manage the volume of unfiltered advice they receive—interrogation and confrontation (March, 1973, p. 29). The first involves determining what is relevant in the expert advice and how much confidence one can place in it. The second is the process of confronting experts with each other and listening carefully to how they argue their positions. None of these administrators did either of these. Rather, they hired consultants to assume responsibility for major components of their ES projects, not to offer advice which would be critically evaluated.

Jackson County. In response to pressure from ES/Washington, Mr. Hinton, the county superintendent, hired a series of consultants including Boyd Campbell, a local educator, and Jeffrey Carlson, an outsider. In both instances, the consultants were assigned major project responsibilities. Campbell drew up the proposal and much of the initial documentation issued to the federal government, and Carlson literally served as a chief administrator for the project during his tenure with the district. ES/Washington made this arrangement by suggesting to Hinton that someone be hired to spark "leadership potential" in the system. In fact, Carlson had been hired as an adjunct professor at the university, but received his salary from the ES project. Fortuitously, perhaps because Carlson was as talented as he was, a positive residue remained among ES staff members when he departed from the district.

Shiloh County. Shiloh County's superintendent erred in the opposite direction. He hired a cadre of consultants who were committed to one of the then-current educational fads, diagnostic instruction, to offer technical assistance to his teachers. Unlike Hinton, who divided his project into components and then relegated responsibility for those parts to the consultants, the Shiloh superintendent imposed an educational ideology complete with a layer of consultants upon his teaching staff. Consultants rapidly became the buffer between the superintendent and his many publics. Consultants were used to explain the ES project to the community, to the teaching staff, and occasionally to the feds. In this role, their words were to be taken as dictum. Because of this heavy-handed approach, however, the superintendent was soon confronted with an incipient teacher revolt.

Ideally the use of expert advice results in more informed judgment and decision making. Too frequently, consultants are hired for political purposes—to persuade skeptical publics or to sway opinions among those impressed with a consultant's status.

Analysis of Coalitions

A master at the analysis and management of coalitions can generate support for the most unpopular decision imaginable. President Lyndon B. Johnson, for example, raised the task of coalition building to the level of a fine and high art in his domestic programs, especially in the area of civil rights. What such tasks require is sensitivity to the key actors, the boundaries on their power, how numerous and great their concerns are, and a sense of their negotiable resources.

In education, where constancy across any group—community, parent, teacher, external funding source—is fleeting at best, attention to the competing demands of various political constituencies is essential to successful leadership. Promoting efforts at change requires even greater attention to building coalitions since education and schooling are primarily such conservative processes. The press of educational institutions is toward stability, tradition, and business as usual.

Most of the administrators in the five school districts could be faulted for insufficient attention to building coalitions of support for change. Even those who successfully sought appropriate support at one point in the process apparently seldom returned to those negotiated exchanges on a regular basis. Coalitions are fragile beasts which must be pampered and soothed throughout a change effort. To illustrate, a particularly successful use of a coalition and an equally disastrous one will be drawn from the case studies. These are singled out simply for purposes of illustration. Other examples could just as easily have been drawn.

River District. Attention to the demands of varying constituencies should have been at the top of this superintendent's list of things to do. A district covering 4,300 square miles with three major industries—mining, ranching, and commerce—would undoubtedly be fraught with factions. Furthermore, the district was the stepchild of a recent consolidation of five former districts covering the same territory. The schools in the district were widely scattered, being based near the seven major population areas—towns with different geographies, economics, and cultures.

Communication among the various factions of the district began to break down soon after the superintendent and assistant superintendent responded to the announcement of the Experimental Schools competition. Spring Creek, the superintendent's home, dominated various planning and consultative committees both in terms of numbers and in terms of the primacy of their expressed needs. Residents in outlying areas felt as though their needs and desires were of minor importance in the development of the ES project. The same feeling soon was transferred directly to the chief administrators of the outlying schools. One of the first steps taken during the consolidation was the establishment of an administrative council composed of the superintendents and administrative principals, with occasional participation from the high school principals and the elementary head teacher. An overzealous ES project director violated verse and ritual in working with the administrative council and caused a breakdown in communication which eventually resulted in a major decentralization of the project's activities. At that point, the "comprehensive" effort at change initiated with funding from the Experimental Schools program became a mosaic of bits and pieces here and there within the district.

Representatives from the various communities and members of the administrative council had much to gain from the Experimental Schools program. Lack of attention to their needs and resources apparently resulted in the withdrawal of their support and the eventual decline of the project.

Jackson County. Perhaps the most successful builder of coalitions within the five school districts was the county superintendent in Jackson County. Born and bred in a county that cherished family ties and a broad sense of community, Mr. Hinton early learned that political power can be gained by attention to the needs of his constituencies. His first administrative appointment in the Experimental Schools project was Albert McPhail, a long-time resident of the county and a member of one of its largest extended families. When it became apparent to ES/Washington that Mr. McPhail's talents were not up to the task of ES project director, Mr. Hinton placed him in a position of lateral respectability and status within the community, thus satisfying two conflicting demands impinging upon the decision—maintaining political ties to the community and yet removing the ES responsibility from a less than satisfactory administrator.

In contrast to the superintendent in River District, Mr. Hinton was particularly sensitive to the desires and responsibilities of his administrative staff. By placing his principals on the project planning committee, Hinton slyly accomplished two results necessary to the success of the project. He gave the principals a vehicle to air their skepticism and grievances and co-opted their later support and enthusiasm for the project.

Shiloh County's superintendent challenged the authority and autonomy of his teachers without the solid backing of the board. In Butte-Angels Camp, the school board emerged victorious because of the superintendent's inattention to constituency building. The lesson to be learned from these examples is that constituencies have desires and wants and, more importantly, power. Any effort at change must attend to their needs and will, as a result, be transformed by them. Coalition building is a process of mutual exchange and reciprocity.

Analysis of Ambiguity

Education has always been an ambiguous enterprise at its best. The multiple demands that various publics place upon schools frequently result in insufficient attention to goals. Parents want their children to acquire reading, writing, and arithmetic skills so they can achieve economic security in later life. Communities want schools to produce moral adults and a concerned citizenry. Some social reformers believe that schools should address the particular needs of the dropout, the delinquent, and the drug addict. The decisions that confront an administrator on a daily basis must in their very nature be ambiguous. What will be the consequence of adopting a particular curricular reform for students with reading difficulties, for highly motivated and talented students, for the early maturer? What alternatives exist? Satisfactory answers to such questions are not in the current repertoire of researcher or administrator.

How, then, does someone with responsibility for these decisions proceed? Relying upon intuition, experience, and tradition can be helpful if these "resources" are approached with a healthy skepticism—a trial-and-error mentality. Goals should not be rigid markers of success. Hypotheses should be explored, tried, and possibly rejected. Evaluations should be performed to help form future judgments, not to weigh whether an experiment strictly adhered to its initial guidelines. All experiments alter as they are implemented.

The five rural ES projects were beset by frustrating and inconsistent charges from representatives of federal agencies. The turnover in federal staff was high; the guidelines issued by ES/Washington were vague and poorly defined and coupled with the heavy threat of loss of funding. Undoubtedly the federal project officers were not intentionally undermining the Experimental Schools program. Their directives and demands grew out of criteria and reporting requirements they were expected to meet within their agency. Congressional skepticism about many of the National Institute of Education's programs probably prompted much of the erratic behavior emanating from ES/Washington. Despite the reasons which may explain ES/Washington's attitude towards the districts, the districts paid a high price for the inconsistencies.

Arcadia. The Arcadia Public Schools were known for their ability to attract federal project money. Roughly 20 percent of their annual budget was derived from federal sources. Dealing with the feds was not new to the administrative staff in the district.

Great enthusiasm for the ES project was evident among both the teaching and administrative staffs early in the planning period. Committees of teachers and administrators devoted long hours to the development of a series of drafts for the project plan. Each succeeding rebuttal from ES/Washington became more and more enervating for the participants. Drafts were altered to conform to emerging federal priorities and, in that process, more and more of the teachers' ideas were deleted. Each rewrite added unbudgeted costs to the project and created the feeling that ES/Washington viewed the local initiatives with condescension. Teachers began to feel used since their ideas were shelved and they had not received compensation for their time.

Animosities between the administrative and teaching staffs were heightened by the process. Teachers sometimes mistakenly thought the administrators had rejected their ideas and participation. By the fall of 1973, a wildcat strike occurred, apparently brought on in part by the lack of communication between administrators and teachers, which could be traced to inconsistent demands placed upon the district by the federal project officers.

Butte-Angels Camp. The administrators in Butte-Angels Camp were faced with the same kind of ambiguity. Individualized education was adopted as the district's theme for its efforts at comprehen-

sive change. No one, including the teachers, clearly understood what "individualized education" would mean when applied to the classroom. With each succeeding intervention by ES/Washington, the concept became more ambiguous. Federal project officers offered criticism and advice, frequently contradictory and confusing in its brevity, for structuring the district's individualized education program. The result was an inability on the part of the administrators to separate suggestion from directive, advice and criticism from dicta and mandate. Instead of taking the opportunity to assert their own definitions and plans for individualized education, the administrators apparently allowed sparing and inconsistent advice to sway their judgments and to stifle their initiatives.

The federal directive that an Experimental Schools project be comprehensive was a serious stumbling block in each district's planning. The promise of funds and the prods of directives left many of the administrators in a muddled position. None of them turned the confusion into an asset.

Analysis of Time

Time is a precious and scarce commodity. Most things can be accomplished if only there is enough time for thorough and adequate planning. Time was a devilish factor in developing each Experimental Schools project. Launched with grand platitudes about local initiatives and sustained support, the ES program rapidly collapsed into a series of projects within the more usual federal standard, which funds a planning period *possibly* followed by three years of support. Most of the administrators used their planning periods poorly. Overburdened administrative and teaching staffs seldom turned their attention to drafting a plan for their project until the due date was almost upon them. Frequently teachers and administrators assigned to projects were not released sufficiently from their other duties, nor allowed enough time to accomplish the tasks before them.

Once contracts were awarded, many teachers viewed project requirements as simply more time-consuming paper work. Diagnostic instruction in Shiloh County and diagnosis and prescription in Butte-Angels Camp were especially viewed as the routinization and formalization of things that good teachers were already doing in their classrooms without the added burden of forms and checklists.

Administrators also seemed to be the victim of time constraints.

None was apparently good at delegating authority, in modulating demands upon themselves or their teachers, or in using discrete time periods effectively for planning the major initiatives they were undertaking.

Analysis of Information

Americans, as a society, do not use information very effectively. Conventional wisdom and the myth of the moment usually carry far greater weight in determining public opinion than does accurate information.

The administrators in these five districts followed in this tradition. Few conducted systematic surveys of needs and wants before devising their plans for the ES project. Many paid lip service to the federal request for community involvement in the planning process, none in a rigorous fashion. Shiloh County's superintendent benefited immensely in his first year in office from a management consulting firm's report prepared for his predecessor. The report, however, soon became too rigid a blueprint or rationale for the actions he took, to his professional embarrassment.

The five case study narratives do not give the impression that administrators sought information systematically as a basis for decision making. Political coalitions can be built only if the desires, numbers, and resources of the various factions are known. Ambiguity can be decreased only if data relevant to operating hypotheses are collected and applied. Expert testimony becomes useless without an information base upon which to judge and weigh its advice. Even time can be more effectively used if the demands and boundaries upon it are known.

IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAINING PROGRAMS IN UNIVERSITIES

In general, the administrators in these five districts do not fare well when viewed through the matrix of March's model. Nor, do I suspect, would most. They were no more inept than most of their peers. Rather, they suffered the typical problem of being inadequately or insufficiently prepared to cope with many of the obstacles they encountered during their involvement in the Experimental Schools[™] program. March's model has served us well for it has high-

lighted the obstacles these administrators faced and the insufficiency of their responses.

But where does the fault lie? Beyond pointing a guilty finger at the incredibly erratic behavior of the federal agencies, I would argue that much of the responsibility for the planning and implementation difficulties of these Experimental Schools projects should rest with university training programs, both pre- and inservice, which train the administrators who run the schools in these five school districts and elsewhere.

Most university programs which prepare educational administrators are out of synch with the demands of the time by roughly four or five years, perhaps longer. (Preservice programs are probably more out of phase than inservice ones.) A simple way to confirm the observation is to compare the current problems facing school administrators with the typical catalogue listing of courses for a graduate degree in educational administration. Most university training programs today do not teach the kind of skills posited in March's model. Rather, they are still embracing organizational theories and philosophical orientations which emerged from the enormous growth period in education during the mid to late 1960s. There may be a direct correspondence between the skills required by administrators during a growth period and in a steady or declining period in education, but the evidence is not very convincing. Those who can be capable administrators in a period of reduced resources and subdued public support may have mastered a set of talents which will allow them to be capable administrators under any circumstance. The reverse relationship seems not to hold, however.

Why the lag? Some of the answers are found in the social organization and reward structures of the university. Over the years, innovative attempts at restructuring administrator training programs have faltered on many of the same stumbling blocks that have caused havoc in large-scale reform efforts in schools. Universities and schools are collectivities of professors and teachers who take pride in their professionalism and autonomy. Notions about status, hierarchy, and the traditional way of doing things are similar in both settings. Both are susceptible to the latest educational fad, but seldom incorporate more than the rhetoric into ongoing courses and instruction. The university is particularly resistant to changing educational currents. Careers are made by creating and testing literatures. It sometimes

takes as long as two years to see one's latest theory in print. The diffusion of new ideas in the field is thus a slow process and is further compounded by the necessity of having one's ideas aired at professional meetings, replicated by some and challenged by others.

Time lag becomes critical when one turns to the university's relationship to the public schools. Universities interact with school administrators at two critical phases of the administrators' socialization—during their preservice training and, once they are on the job, through a variety of inservice programs (Gross and Herriott, 1965, p. 98). If my argument about the synchronization of exterior events impinging upon schools and the content of university training programs is sound, then most administrators today are ill-prepared to handle the set of events brought on by the steady state in education. The current governor of California has taught us that the kind of leadership required in a period of great abundance is quite dissimilar from that required when "small is beautiful" has become the slogan of the day.

The declining or steady state in education may herald the onset of a period of receptivity to introspection and change on the part of university training programs in educational administration. As Frank Chase noted, the rhetoric and structure of training programs do alter as societal demands shift. If so, then what elements might these new training programs contain?

FORMAL ELEMENTS IN A TRAINING PROGRAM

Leadership is not as elusive a quality as most people think it is. Its mystique results primarily from a lack of attention to those skills and traits most people associate with those individuals acknowledged to be exceptional leaders. (Personality is all that is really *sui generis*.) Most exceptional leaders know much about how to influence organizations, people, and events. They know much about the people with whom they deal on a daily basis. In education, leadership requires knowing more about teachers and their characteristics than most administrators do. It requires being steeped in a developmental literature related to cognition and growth among young people. It requires a substantial grounding in law, politics, and economics, and familiarity with the interests and complexities of various publics—communities and state and federal agencies. It also requires the ability to

maximize resources, both internal and external, limited or vast. Most importantly, effective leaders know how to acquire information. Few leaders would be described as polished repositories of all of the above, but most can reach the best source for advice in these areas with relative ease and modest energy. Doing all this with grace and panache marks the exceptional leader.

How can these skills and traits be incorporated into the formal elements of a curriculum for preparing educational administrators? We return to March's model since it represents the core of skills to be acquired. Mayhew (1974, p. 17) expanded March's model to include:

1. Peer skills: the ability to establish and maintain a network of contacts with equals;
2. Leadership skills: the ability to deal with subordinates and the complications of authority, power, and dependence;
3. Conflict resolution skills: the ability to mediate conflict, handle disturbances, and work under psychological stress;
4. Information-processing skills: the ability to build networks, extract and validate information, and disseminate information effectively;
5. Skills in unstructured decision making: the ability to find problems and solutions when alternatives, information, and objectives are ambiguous;
6. Resource-allocation skills: the ability to decide among alternative uses of time and other organizational resources;
7. Entrepreneurial skills: the ability to take sensible risks and implement innovations;
8. Skills of introspection: the ability to understand the position of manager and its impact on the organization.

These skills do not prescribe a program. That is, there are many ways of acquiring them. Over the past few years, many unusual approaches to training administrators have appeared on the horizon. None of them has been accepted as the ideal model for all programs, nor should one be. Some universities have opened professional graduate training programs to course work across the entire university; some have incorporated a joint major with other professional schools, such as law or business; others have turned more heavily to the social sciences in their orientation. The relationship between these courses and the acquisition of the kinds of skills listed above, however, too frequently remains unclear or unspecified.

Many graduate programs, for example, have recently required a field-based clinical experience. But the relationship between the experience and its relevance to certain traits has remained a relatively

idiosyncratic or unexamined question for most students. I could argue that all administrators should be intimately familiar with a teacher's perspective on the joys and frustrations of running a classroom. Does this mean all administrators should teach for awhile? How many newly certified administrators have ever dealt directly with a school board and its peculiar and time-pressed demands for data? Few, I would suspect. Try a different audience. What of responding to Requests for Proposals (RFPs) from federal agencies and dealing with the vagaries of their decision making? What of state legislatures and the mandates they issue which structure the daily activities of many schools? How many programs have seriously examined the demands of the client, the consumer, unions, and collective bargaining issues? These questions could go on endlessly. The point is that simply incorporating a field-based experience into a preservice training program for educational administrators is an inadequate response to the request for timely, relevant skill acquisition. Moreover, the insertion of clinical training experiences into an otherwise academically or theoretically oriented program implies a tension between theory and practice which I do not accept. It reinforces the notion that on-the-job, trial-and-error learning is nontheoretical and that theories have no practical relevance. The exceptional leader is one who is comfortable in both milieus, one who, while experienced, appreciates and understands theory or who, as a theorist, recognizes the importance of experience.

One of the more novel approaches to field-based learning in recent years, the Nova University Off-Campus Degree Program in Educational Administration, has attempted to stress the dual and complementary nature of theory and practice. Initiated by an educational leader and maverick, Donald P. Mitchell, Nova's program took cognizance of the demographics facing education for the next decade or so (Mitchell and Hawley, 1972). Recognizing that many of the administrators currently in place are likely to remain in their positions for some time, Mitchell argued that massive preservice training programs were no longer needed. Instead, changes and the infusion of new ideas in schools was, by necessity, going to have to come from within the districts. The off-campus degree program required that all participants be practicing administrators and relied heavily upon their field-based experiences as legitimate background for theoretical appreciation and understanding of the forces in operation in schools.

In reviewing a number of major experimental change efforts in universities and school settings over the last several years, Frank Chase has noted: "Successful implementation of programs demands realistic anticipation of the problems to be encountered and unremitting efforts to define and utilize strategies to surmount the impediments to success" (Chase, 1975, p. 47). That simple statement says much about rational planning, knowledge of multiple audiences, and a lucid inductive mind which operates with imagination, sustained commitment, and an ability to live with ambiguity. Once again, we are back to March's and Mayhew's models.

These models have proven to be useful devices in thinking about the administrative talent, or lack thereof, which the administrators in the five ES districts exhibited. These men are not unusual in either their command or lack of administrative talent. They share the strengths and foibles of their counterparts around the country. Juxtaposing their behavior against a general model of administration, however, has demonstrated how sorely lacking they, and the training programs from which they emerged, are.

We have dealt at great length with the skills to be acquired in administrator training programs. What of their organization? Universities have traditionally supplied and certified administrators and in all probability will continue to do so. The markedly changed circumstances facing education in the 1980s ought to give those in charge of university training programs a moment of pause. Their clientele is likely to shift heavily toward the on-the-job administrator whose interests and demands are keyed to the problems they face daily in their districts. Maximization of scarce resources will become a litany chanted by more and more communities, more state legislatures, and even federal agencies whose remarkably elastic dollars are being stretched to their limits.

University training programs need to be responsive to these curtailed circumstances, but also need to heed the pitfalls inherent in overreacting to the declining state of education. It is my contention that a skillful administrator has in her or his command a set of talents common to all successful administrators, whether the state of education is steady or expanding. Do not misunderstand. I am not arguing that a successful administrator in a period of rapid expansion is, by definition, likely to be successful when the situation is reversed. Instead, I am arguing that a common set of leadership skills can be defined, articulated, and demonstrated.

What implications does this view of leadership have for the organization of university training programs?

1. Serious attention needs, first and foremost, to be given to the definition of the common skills and talents all successful leaders demonstrate. March and Mayhew have only begun this task.

2. Second, all of us need to be more creative about the ways in which these talents may be acquired, polished, honed, or improved. For example, major change efforts backed by private or public funding sources ought to have sustained training and support systems built into their design.

3. Third, equal significance or weight ought to be attached to inservice and preservice education for administrators. Too frequently university professors gain status or are ranked in terms of their student clienteles—highest rank to those who teach the doctoral student who will become a university professor, lowest to those who work with the practitioner on the job.

4. Equal attention should be accorded theory and practice. Few of us have escaped adopting the jargon and methods of social science in our daily lives. We simply do not recognize it for what it is. Conversely, social science is the science of observing behavior and commenting on it in its aggregate form. There is nothing particularly mysterious in that, nor in the theories it generates.

5. Serious thought needs to be given to the question of how certain skills and theories can best be learned. Inservice training programs are much more market-oriented than preservice programs. They are usually short intensive efforts directed to a current problem. Similar modules could be introduced into preservice training efforts. Consider, for example, a series of six-week courses on the various publics with which an administrator must deal—students, teachers, parents, school board members, other administrators—or, alternatively, modules on the bureaucratic structure of federal agencies, state governments, and local agencies.

6. These courses should be opened to practitioners as well as novitiates, and others responsible for educational decisions—school board members, parent leaders, representatives of various educational agencies. Each of these groups speaks its own language, has its own priorities, and controls its own resources. Nevertheless, they are all

part of the enterprise of educating our next generation, and hence ought to learn to view each other as compatriots, not adversaries.

7. University faculties ought to be broadened to include individuals with multiple backgrounds and experiences—the practitioner is as vital a partner in the enterprise as is the theoretician. Do not misunderstand. I am not debunking the value of the academy, nor am I mouthing the anti-intellectual or anti-educational rhetoric of so many reformers. It is the wise person who, over time, can stand back and recognize the patterns and consistencies of his or her own behavior, and then comment on the frailties and strengths we all have when confronted with the complexities of that which we know as education.

Those familiar with the last several decades of reform in educational administration will recognize that there is nothing new in these suggestions. All have been tried, occasionally implemented, and frequently discarded by both larger and lesser lights in the field.

I make no claims for novelty or originality in my approach to leadership. I am trying to argue that there are no magic formulas. The skills great leaders employ can be captured, contained, and taught to others. Admittedly, educational administration is an imperfect science. Nevertheless, far more of what we think of as leadership is science, not art. The Churchills, Roosevelts, and Machiavellis of this world have known that, but have deceived us with their grace and charm into believing that the art form was the most telling part of their success. More research, more theories, and more time will be needed before we will be able to say with precision just how one becomes the exceptional leader able to traverse the peaks and valleys of a terrain like education. But look around, there are many such remarkable agents of change among us. Observe them, watch them, theorize about them, test their behavior with hypotheses. Can we learn from them? I think we can.

NOTE

1. Parenthetically, one might note that access to even the most limited of administrative positions remains blocked to a considerable degree for women and minorities.

REFERENCES

- Chase, Francis S. *The Consortium for Educational Leadership and Preparation Programs At Seven Universities*. Report to the National Academy of Education, July 1975.
- Digest of Educational Statistics*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1975.
- Goodenough, Ward Hunt. *Cooperation In Change*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1963.
- Gross, Neal, and Herriott, Robert E. *Staff Leadership in Public Schools*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965.
- James, H. Thomas. "Education: A Declining or Rising Sun?" *Educational Leadership and Declining Enrollments*, edited by Lewis B. Mayhew. Berkeley, Calif.: McCutchan, 1974.
- Kelly, James A. "Enriching Education Administration as a Field of Study." *Educational Leadership and Declining Enrollments*, edited by Lewis B. Mayhew. Berkeley, Calif.: McCutchan, 1974.
- March, James G. "Analytical Skills And The University Training of Educational Administrators." Paper presented at the Seventh Annual Walter D. Cooking Memorial Lecture, National Conference of Professors of Educational Administration, Bellingham, Wash., 1973.
- March, James G. "Commitment and Competence in Educational Administration." *Educational Leadership and Declining Enrollments*, edited by Lewis B. Mayhew. Berkeley, Calif.: McCutchan, 1974.
- Mayhew, Lewis B. (ed.). *Educational Leadership and Declining Enrollments*. Berkeley, Calif.: McCutchan, 1974.
- Mitchell, Donald P., and Hawley, Anne. *Leadership in Public Education Study: A Look At The Overlooked*. New York: Academy for Educational Development, 1972.
- Teachers College Record* 77, no. 3 (February 1976): 313-427.

PART IV

Summary and Conclusions

14

Theoretical and Practical Implications

Neal Gross and Robert E. Herriott

This volume has been concerned with the dynamics, management, and fate of federally stimulated efforts to institute comprehensive changes in local educational systems. It has attempted to provide new insights and perspectives about the dynamics of educational change, factors that can block or facilitate it, and ways to conceptualize and analyze the educational change process. It has emphasized the utility of viewing a change effort in a holistic manner and as a process whose time line consists of a set of interrelated stages, each of which has its own unique difficulties. The problems we have examined bear on issues of central concern to educators who manage major innovations in American school systems, federal and state officials whose agencies initiate, fund, and monitor externally stimulated educational change efforts, and analysts of planned organizational change. They bring into bold focus the impact that implementation barriers, context, leadership performance, and timing can have on the fate of innovations, circumstances that have frequently been overlooked in the design, management, and analysis of educational change efforts.

Heavy reliance was placed on the case study method because it constitutes a highly useful mechanism to describe and analyze the

353

353

Pages 350, 351 + 352 are blank

complexities and realities of change efforts and the personal, social, and cultural factors that influence them. The case studies provided the types of data needed to examine the dynamics of educational change attempts, a problem that requires longitudinal data, holistic perspectives, and an analysis of the reciprocal interplay among a complex set of variables. Prior to presenting the case studies, a number of ideas from the social science and educational literature about organizational change, including conceptual schemes, were introduced to facilitate their analysis and interpretation. To further maximize the "learnings" that might be derived from the five case studies, they were analyzed from diverse perspectives by five social scientists and educators knowledgeable about organizational change problems.

In this concluding chapter we shall initially inquire if the findings of the case studies and their interpretation by the five analysts press for any important revisions in the LOC model of educational change presented in chapter 2. Then we shall consider the practical implications of this theoretical question. The remainder of the chapter focuses on three tasks. The first is to specify major implications of the case study findings and analyses for educational change efforts at the *local* school district level. The second is to indicate what we believe they imply for *state* and *federal* agencies that stimulate and fund local change efforts. The third is to consider their implications for the need to establish new mechanisms to strengthen the relationships between officials of local school districts engaged in change efforts and their external funding agencies.

LIMITATIONS OF THE LOC MODEL OF EDUCATIONAL CHANGE

As noted in chapter 2, a case study conducted by Gross et al. (1971) of an educational change effort identified a set of circumstances of critical importance in accounting for its failure. Most of these circumstances, however, had been overlooked in the Overcoming Resistance to Change (ORC) model of planned organizational change, the theory most frequently invoked to account for the fate of organizational change efforts. These developments led the investigators to propose a new theoretical formulation of the educational change process to account for the success or failure of change efforts, the Leadership-Obstacle Course (LOC) theory. We now inquire if the

findings and analyses of the five case studies press for modifications in the LOC formulation. That is, do they identify important variables overlooked in the LOC formulation that need to be taken into account in theoretical formulations designed to explain the fate of educational change efforts?

After reviewing the case study findings (chapters 4-8) and their analyses (chapters 9-13), we concluded that the LOC model had five major shortcomings. The first is that it overlooks the possibility that events can or cannot occur *before* a proposed change is introduced into an organization that may have a major impact on the reception a change effort will receive, the implementation barriers it will encounter, and, hence, its likelihood of being eventually incorporated or abandoned.

The case studies disclosed a number of situations of this kind. For example, before the objectives of the local ES projects were specified, little consideration was given in any of the five school districts to developing a change program that would meet its special or unique educational problems. Another illustration is their lack of concern for potential implementation barriers during the planning period. Inattention to this matter also had serious negative effects on the change efforts. As Kent notes in chapter 9, one of the exemplary features of the ES program was its commitment to, and support of, a one-year planning period for local projects. However, he and other case analysts pointed out that the planning activities of the five school districts were generally disorganized and characterized by a lack of realism, continuity, and coherence. They observed that issues such as educational priorities, short-run and long-run targets, and staffing or resource allocation problems were seldom examined. They also pointed out that since little consideration was given to barriers which the proposed change efforts were likely to encounter, little attention was given to strategies which might be employed to prevent or overcome them. Numerous circumstances of this kind, highly dysfunctional for each of the five change efforts, were identified in chapters 9 through 13.

These findings point to a major limitation of the LOC model: its truncated time line. That is, they make us aware that the LOC model needs to be elaborated so that it will give conceptual recognition to two important aspects of the change process that it ignores: the stages of *exploration* and *strategic planning*. In short, the case studies bring into bold focus the fact that many actions and decisions

that occur or do not occur *prior to* the initiation stage can materially influence later developments in the change process.

A second limitation of the LOC formulation is that, although it specifies a number of circumstances that may serve as *internal* blocks to the implementation of educational innovations, it largely overlooks *external* barriers. The model does not consider, for example, that an important source of major impediments to local change efforts may be constraints or pressures placed on school districts by agencies of the federal, state, or local government. It does not take into account the impact on change efforts of conflicts over financial matters that can occur between officials of the school districts and their external funding agencies. It overlooks external circumstances that may constitute impediments to change efforts of *individual* schools, for example, the inept performance of officials in the central administration or the stalling tactics of school board members who have become disenchanted with a change effort.

The case studies described numerous vexing problems that the school districts encountered in their relationships with ES/Washington. For example, they showed that the following actions of ES/Washington resulted in serious obstacles to the change efforts of Butte-Angels Camp (chapter 6): its withholding of long-term funding, its imposition of an outside consultant, its definition of the role of liaison personnel, and its issuance of ambiguous communications. External constraints of a similar nature also occurred in the other projects. The case studies also showed how another aspect of the external environment of school systems, the communities in which they are embedded, can influence educational change efforts. The conservative financial posture of Butte-Angels Camp markedly affected the dynamics and outcomes of its change program. The community power structure of Arcadia materially influence many of the major developments of its change efforts. In Jackson County, community norms influenced the selection of ES project personnel and placed constraints on their behavior. The findings of the case studies thus highlight the neglected fact that barriers whose *loci* are outside of school systems may constitute serious impediments to achieving change targets. The empirical facts strongly press for the recognition of *external* as well as *internal* obstacles to implementation in theoretical formulations designed to account for the fate of change efforts.

A third limitation of the LOC model that surfaces as a result of

the case study findings is that it overlooks ways in which school personnel can hinder educational change efforts. In Butte-Angels Camp and Shiloh County, factionalism among the faculty impeded the implementation of their ES projects. In Arcadia, high faculty turnover constituted a serious obstacle to achieving ES objectives. In River District, staffing difficulties blocked them; and in Jackson County, problems that arose over the appointment of ES project coordinators served as impediments. Implementation barriers of this nature, overlooked in the LOC model and identified in the ES projects, also require conceptual recognition. They imply the need for including them in the *internal* "obstacle course" posited by the LOC formulation.

A fourth limitation of the LOC model is that it ignores (a) obstacles that arise and are overcome at one point in a change effort but that reappear later and (b) the need for monitoring and feedback mechanisms to identify emergent implementation problems. The LOC model gives no *formal* recognition to the importance of problems and mechanisms of these kinds.¹ The five case studies, however, described numerous unexpected impediments that emerged during the attempted implementation period and showed the damage that barriers that reoccur can do to an educational change project. The case study findings, in combination with those reported by Bentzen (1974), Gross et al. (1971), Sarason (1971), and Smith and Keith (1971), strongly press for elaborating the LOC model so that it gives recognition to emergent obstacles, barriers that reappear, monitoring processes, and feedback mechanisms.

A fifth limitation of the LOC model is that its definition of the functions of management in change efforts largely excludes its involvement in political activities. It restricts the role of management to the performance of two basic functions: overcoming, if it exists, staff resistance to change, and establishing and maintaining the conditions required by the staff to implement innovations. These, indeed, are critical managerial functions in any change effort. However, as the case study analysts stressed, this restricted role definition overlooks essential managerial tasks of a political nature, such as securing and maintaining the support of the change effort by the central administration, the school board, and community residents and officials.

Nearly all of the analysts stressed that a major weakness in the

role performance of those who managed the local change efforts was their failure to develop consensus among the staff and in the community about the objectives of their Experimental School projects and to secure support and protection for their activities. Kent, for example, attributed the failure of the change efforts primarily to the inept political leadership performance of their administrators. He maintained that a basic cause of their inadequate performance was their unrealistic belief that the educational change process had few political ramifications or implications and states in chapter 9 that "nothing could be further from reality." Gideonse stressed in chapter 12 that each of the local administrators treated his educational change effort as essentially a technical management problem, that is, as a "task of putting the right people with the right training into the right structure with the right data." He then observes that: "If these five case studies tell us anything, they tell us that change is a political process, rather than a managerial one." In his elaboration of this statement, Gideonse states that he views a political task as "one where goals are not clear, where authority structures are likely to be multiple and mixed, and where the achievement of whatever is adopted is heavily dependent upon consensual commitments of a considerable number of different individuals and role occupants." In his appraisal of the change efforts, he concludes that the critical tasks that confronted the administrators of the ES projects were more "political" than "managerial" and that they were unaware of this reality. In his view, their failure to understand it, and to give primacy to the political aspects of their role, constituted a fundamental cause of the serious difficulties they encountered in attempting to implement their change efforts. Although ES/Washington placed heavy stress on community participation, the local officials did not take this formally agreed upon ground rule very seriously. For example, the school superintendent in Shiloh County managed his project in a highly authoritarian manner, and his disregard for the political realities resulted in resistance to the ES project in both the schools and the community and eventually to his resignation and the project's demise.

The case studies, in short, reveal the deleterious consequences for educational change efforts that can result when the officials who manage them neglect their political functions or perform them ineptly. They strongly imply that the LOC conceptual scheme needs to

be elaborated so that it includes political functions as part of the essential responsibilities of their administrators.

To summarize: the "neglected facts" identified in the case studies press for reformulation of the LOC model so that important variables which it overlooks can be incorporated in its conceptual scheme. Our analysis indicates that the following changes in the LOC model would markedly improve its utility as a theoretical formulation for the analysis of change efforts in educational systems. First, its time line needs to be extended to give conceptual recognition to two time periods in the change process that it presently overlooks, the *exploration* and *strategic planning* stages of the change process. Second, the LOC model needs to make room for circumstances *external* to school systems which may constitute obstacles to the implementation of change efforts. Third, the model needs to include additional *internal* school system obstacles to implementation, for example, conflicts within the faculty and teacher turnover. Fourth, the LOC formulation needs to make formal provision for emergent barriers and impediments that reappear and for the need for monitoring and feedback mechanisms to identify and resolve these and related problems. Fifth, the LOC model needs to be revised so that it includes political responsibilities as part of the functions of management in change efforts.

AN ELABORATED LEADERSHIP OBSTACLE COURSE (ELOC) MODEL

The model presented at the base of figure 2 represents an elaboration of the LOC model. It gives conceptual recognition to facts identified in the five change efforts that were overlooked in its earlier formulation. To highlight the distinguishing features of the new model, we present it in juxtaposition with its own predecessors, the ORC model and the initial LOC model. An examination of figure 2 shows that whereas the ORC model specifies two stages in the change process (initiation and incorporation) and the LOC three (initiation, attempted implementation, and incorporation), the new model specifies five stages: exploration, strategic planning, initiation, attempted implementation, and incorporation or rejection. Since the new conceptual formulation constitutes an elaboration of the LOC model, we designate it the Elaborated Leadership Obstacle Course (ELOC) model.

Figure 2
Three Models of Planned Educational Change:
The Overcoming Resistance to Change (ORC) Model, the Leadership Obstacle Course (LOC) Model,
and the Elaborated Leadership Obstacle Course (ELOC) Model




Table 1
Some Basic Leadership Tasks of Key School System Officials in Change Efforts
Under the Expanded Leadership Obstacle Course (ELOC) Model

Stage in the Process				
Exploration	Strategic planning	Initiation	Attempted implementation	Incorporation/Rejection
Provide leadership in identifying: 1. The major current problems of the school system 2. The priority in which these problems need to be addressed 3. The range of possible solutions to priority problems in view of the "political" situation 4. The obstacles within the school system that can block particular solutions to priority problems 5. The strengths within the school system that may facilitate particular solutions to priority problems 6. The resources from beyond the school system that may be available to implement particular solutions to priority problems 7. The most promising solution, i.e., the innovation to be attempted	Provide leadership in: 1. Identifying potential obstacles to the implementation of the innovation 2. Identifying potential facilitators to the implementation of this innovation in this school system 3. Developing a realistic strategy for minimizing each obstacle and maximizing each facilitator of this innovation in this school system 4. Obtaining the financial resources necessary to implement this innovation in this school system 5. Specifying internal and external political considerations that can have a major bearing on the innovation and developing strategies to cope with them	Provide leadership in overcoming obstacles identified during the strategic planning stage such as: 1. Staff lacks the necessary motivation 2. Staff lacks the necessary technical knowledge 3. Staff lacks the necessary interpersonal skills 4. Staff lacks the necessary instructional resources 5. Dysfunctional organizational arrangements within the school system 6. Conflicts between different groups within the school system 7. Conflicts between the school system and its community 8. Conflicts between the school system and its external funding agency 9. Cultural values within the community in conflict with the idea of change 10. Lack of consensus about or support for the change effort	Provide leadership in overcoming previously identified obstacles and emergent obstacles such as: 1. Misunderstandings about the objectives of the innovation 2. Misunderstandings about the procedures of the innovation 3. Resignation of key school system personnel 4. Turnover in the membership of the school board 5. Turnover in the staff of the external funding agency 6. Role overload on the part of teachers or administrators 7. Delays in receipt of necessary instructional materials 8. Serious political problems confronting the change effort	Provide leadership in ensuring that the innovation remains a viable part of the ongoing activity of the school system by: 1. Obtaining views about the innovation from teachers 2. Obtaining views about the innovation from students 3. Obtaining views about the innovation from parents 4. Obtaining objective evidence on the degree to which the innovation is achieving its intended objectives 5. Obtaining objective evidence on the financial costs of continuing the innovation 6. Assessing the benefits of the innovation in the light of its costs 7. Considering the desirability of continuing the innovation without modification 8. Considering the desirability of continuing the innovation with modification 9. Considering the desirability of abandoning the innovation altogether

The ELOC model offers no detailed specifications about the specific obstacles likely to arise when a major innovation is introduced into a particular school system. Rather it provides a roadmap of the educational change process and facilitates the identification of the types of obstacles that may be encountered in each of its stages and the essential leadership tasks required to overcome them.

The kinds of leadership tasks that need to be performed during each of the five stages of the change process are presented in table 1. It stresses the need for intensive exploratory activities and strategic planning at the outset of change efforts. It emphasizes the importance of identifying major obstacles that will probably arise during the implementation stage of the change process. It focuses attention on relationships among the stages and on the need to establish feedback and monitoring mechanisms. It alerts administrators to emergent barriers and to their opportunities to take the initiative in overcoming impediments to a change effort. In addition to stressing management's responsibility to overcome staff resistance to change and to provide and maintain the conditions required if they are to implement an innovation, table 1 also specifies the political and other important responsibilities of administrators.

The ELOC formulation constitutes a general model of the educational change process. Its basic purpose is to conceptualize its stages and the types of circumstances that can influence them. Educational officials who employ it, therefore, need to be aware that it provides a *broad* (rather than detailed) map of the change process and that it provides *general* (rather than specific) guidelines for the management of change efforts. The model stresses that successful change efforts generally can be expected to move through five stages. It assumes, furthermore, that the duration of these stages will be a function of several factors, including the complexity of the innovation, how much resistance there is to it, and the nature of the impediments to its implementation. The model also specifies that educational change efforts generally will be exposed to implementation problems that derive from circumstances that are both internal and external to a school system.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASE STUDY FINDINGS FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE EFFORTS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

What do the case study findings, their analyses, and the ELOC model imply for the management of local change efforts in school systems? In examining this question we shall stress those implications that in our view have an especially important bearing on the fate of educational innovations.

The Decision To Innovate

The change efforts introduced into the five school districts resulted in enormous expenditures of time and energy and exposed their administrators and teachers to serious role overloads. Each of the case studies reported ways in which an innovation can disrupt school programs, lead to divisiveness and conflict within school faculties, and result in staff tension and frustration. Furthermore, during the course of the five change efforts, two of the school superintendents were forced to resign and a third was not reelected. In short, organizational innovations entail costs as well as potential benefits for social systems and their members.

Yet the case studies reveal that, prior to the involvement of the five school systems in the ES program, their school superintendents stressed only its potential benefits. They did not recognize the possible dysfunctional consequences that could result from the introduction of an ES project into their schools. None of them appeared to be aware of the damage to the schools and to staff morale that could occur if the proposed change effort backfired or was poorly executed. These and related findings of the case studies imply that local school officials who ignore the potential organizational and human costs of a major change effort, and treat the highly complex task of instituting fundamental changes in their districts simply as routine matters, are engaging in irresponsible administrative performance.

The case study findings also strongly imply that before school systems embark upon major change efforts, their administrators need to engage in a number of essential exploratory activities. They need to ascertain whether a proposed innovation is on target with respect to the educational problem it is intended to solve. They need to determine how teachers and principals will react to a proposed innovation and how they believe it will affect the operation of their

schools. Officials also need to consider the kinds of impediments within and outside the schools that the innovation is likely to encounter and they need to explore as best they can possible unanticipated consequences of the proposed change. Deliberations about these and related matters during the exploration stage of the change process will reduce the likelihood of introducing "misfit" innovations; they will also enhance the probability of the early identification of potential obstacles to implementation.

The Selection of Innovations

We have stressed that many school systems have introduced innovations without any *systematic* attempt to diagnose the problems they were expected to ameliorate. The case study findings revealed that the ES school districts also largely ignored this critical step in their change efforts or undertook it superficially. In the River District school system, for example, an effort was made to elicit the views of citizens about ES project goals. Messerschmidt reports in chapter 4 that:

Five of the suggestions were eventually chosen as ES project goals—vocational or "career" education, as it came to be called, cultural education, community involvement, special services, and curriculum evaluation and coordination. Of the five, career education took precedence.

The April, 1972, Letter of Interest had identified career education as one of the greatest needs in the new school district.

However, no effort was made by school officials or parents to diagnose systematically the basic educational problems of the system before project goals were specified. Other evidence presented by Messerschmidt suggests that the educational problems implicit in the ES goals were symptomatic of more fundamental ailments of the school district, for example, its outmoded and dysfunctional curriculum. In the Jackson County case, presented in chapter 5, Wacaster reports that the objectives of the Letter of Interest submitted to ES/Washington were based on a "crash needs" assessment of the school system carried out by its curriculum director the year prior to the receipt of the planning grant, and that it was never used in the district's subsequent ES planning activities. In Butte-Angels Camp, Firestone reports that the central theme of its ES project was "personalized" education, a notion that its superintendent had been "pushing"

for several years, but that had little relevance to the priority problems of the education system.

An examination of the early developments in the change efforts reveals that none of the school systems engaged in serious attempts to identify their basic educational problems or to specify and examine critically the range of options available to cope with them. In spite of encouragement from ES/Washington to design a tailor-made ES project that would meet the special and unique educational needs of their students, none of the districts followed this approach. Most school systems simply introduced innovations that were readily available and widely publicized, for example, programmed or individualized instruction and career education. We submit that one of the basic reasons that most of the ES innovations floundered or were abandoned was that the problems they were intended to solve were ill-defined or never diagnosed in a systematic or realistic manner. The case study findings imply that the selection of a major innovation to be introduced into an educational organization should be made only *after* the completion of a systematic analysis of the problem or problems it is supposed to solve and a careful exploration of options available to cope with them, including tailor-made solutions.

Barriers to Staff Implementation

Many of the major difficulties that developed in the change efforts shortly after they were launched can be traced to failure of the administrators to anticipate the kinds of problems that the teachers would encounter during attempted implementation. In addition, administrators failed to undertake courses of action to prevent problems or to minimize their impact. In describing the attempted implementation period in Butte-Angels Camp, Firestone states in chapter 6: "In the fall of 1973, the staff's initial ambivalence was turned into resistance, leading to open conflict in the winter and spring of that school year." He describes in detail the serious difficulties the teachers encountered in attempting to carry out their "diagnosis/prescription" tasks and the frustration they experienced because they were unclear about how they should diagnose and treat different types of students and about how to employ an individualized d/p approach in classroom settings. Furthermore, the innovation exposed them to serious time allocation and role overload problems. They were overwhelmed by the number of meetings they had to attend and the

extensive "education bookkeeping" required by the change effort. Their school principals offered them little help or support, in part because they, too, had serious misgivings about or little understanding of the innovation.

Maximizing Project Resources

One of the primary functions of management is to maximize the use of available resources, including time, to achieve organizational objectives. In the case of the management of educational change, the skills and time of the staff and consultants need to be employed in a manner that will maximize their contribution to achieving the change targets. The evidence presented in the case studies, however, revealed that the officials responsible for the direction of the ES projects generally were unaware that maximizing project resources was one of their basic responsibilities or, if they were aware of it, they did not know how to fulfill it. A good example of their inadequate role performance in this respect was their poor use of the one-year planning period that was a part of each of the five projects. For example, River District's planning dealt with peripheral matters rather than basic issues. No attempt was made to undertake a *systematic* assessment of the educational needs of the students and the extent to which they were being met. The goals of its ES project did reflect the opinions of community residents, but were not based on a hard-headed appraisal of the strengths and weaknesses of its elementary and secondary schools. The tasks of specifying short-term, intermediate, and long-range objectives in operational terms for the project were bypassed or ignored by the various committees operating under the ES umbrella. Nor was consideration given to the types of implementation problems that could be anticipated or to strategies that might be used to resolve them.

In Jackson County, tasks required by the planning grant were performed primarily by an outside consultant. No serious effort was made by school officials to involve teachers in the development of a comprehensive change program. No efforts were made to identify major potential implementation problems. The administrators of Jackson County, like those in the other four communities, showed little awareness of the impact their performance during the planning period could have on later stages of the change effort.

The administrators of the several change efforts, generally

speaking, did not make effective use of their human resources. In the case of consultants, Lippitt points out (chapter 10) that local officials usually did not know where to obtain able consultants, showed poor judgment in selecting them, or appeared to be unaware of how to maximize their contributions to the change effort. Furthermore, the available evidence indicates that the selection of the directors of the ES projects was generally made in a cavalier matter and with little regard for the required skills. In Jackson County, a long-term local resident and educator who lacked managerial skills was appointed initial ES project director, and his inept performance accounted for many of the serious difficulties encountered by the project during its first year of operation. Wacaster points out (chapter 5) that local "kinship" norms largely dictated this "political" choice. Since another local educator later replaced the initial director and managed the project in a responsible manner, it appears that the superintendent did not initially make effective use of available talent. Each of the case studies provides numerous illustrations of ways in which staff time was wasted, human resources ineffectively deployed, or the services of consultants improperly or ineffectively used.

The case study findings imply, in short, that the efficient and effective management of educational change efforts requires careful planning to maximize available resources. This in turn raises a point stressed by the case study analysts: those who managed the ES endeavors did not perceive time as a valuable commodity that can be maximized or frittered away, depending in large part on the care with which it is allocated. The case studies also imply that those who manage educational change efforts need to be acutely aware of the importance of selecting individuals who have the technical and interpersonal skills required to perform key roles in an exemplary manner. Finally, they imply that maximizing human resources requires specification of the short- and long-term targets of a change effort and the kinds of role performance that will be required to achieve them.

The Need for Leadership

We observed earlier that there is a considerable difference between managing an educational change effort and offering it leadership. With reference to the five change efforts, this distinction makes

us aware that considerable time was expended on "managing" the ES projects, but that little time was devoted to offering them leadership. Officials of the central administration in each of the five school districts uncritically accepted innovations without regard to their quality or relevance to the basic problems of their school systems. They did not raise questions about these matters or the assumptions underlying the innovations. One of the major consequences of their abdication of leadership responsibilities was that most of the innovations introduced to their school systems did not appear to be relevant to their basic problems.

In addition, officials in the five school districts were not able to specify common threads or themes among project activities. As Kent observes in chapter 9, this circumstance was in part attributable to the unwillingness of ES/Washington to define the term "comprehensiveness." However, clarifying and coordinating project missions are leadership responsibilities of local management. They were largely ignored in the change efforts. In short, those who managed the ES projects exercised little influence in clarifying their missions and in coordinating their programs.

The dearth of leadership exhibited in the ES projects was also reflected in the tendency of their managers to address implementation problems in an ad hoc manner. They made little effort to anticipate them or to prevent their occurrence. They infrequently obtained feedback from teachers. They seldom took the initiative in preventing implementation problems and generally reacted only to those that had reached a crisis stage. Local educational officials could have identified at the outset of their projects many of the obstacles later encountered, but they did not. If they had, they could have designed procedures to prevent their occurrence or minimize their effects.

Individuals who manage innovations generally focus on implementation difficulties only when they are brought to their attention or when conditions get "out of hand." But leadership of a change effort requires that its manager take the initiative in identifying its salient problems and in establishing the mechanisms and procedures to resolve them. A proactive posture is required. This stance facilitates the development of a professional climate and supportive relationships, circumstances that appear to be essential for successful change efforts.

Another important implication of the case study findings for school districts proposing to launch change efforts is that, in selecting the director and key staff of a major change effort, they need to appoint personnel who have leadership capabilities. Top administrators and their school boards in the five communities too frequently acted in an irresponsible manner in this respect. Furthermore, when they appointed individuals to key roles, they did not provide them with the opportunity, prior to assuming their positions, to obtain an understanding of the dynamics and complexities of the educational change process and to acquire the conceptual skills that would enhance the likelihood of their exercising leadership in their difficult and challenging roles.

Other Implications

The inept way in which the five ES projects were managed reflected the fact that the school officials lacked realistic and functional ways to conceptualize the educational change process. Many of their serious difficulties could be attributed in large part to the ad hoc manner in which they managed ES activities. The administrators lacked dynamic models of change efforts that could alert them to critical decision points and potential implementation obstacles. Two models of the process of planned educational change were described in chapter 2 and a more elaborate one, the ELOC model, was presented earlier in this chapter. We believe that the ELOC formulation provides administrators with a conceptual scheme that will increase the likelihood that their school systems will introduce appropriate innovations that can be implemented. If school officials embark on change projects in a disorganized manner, then they, themselves, become major obstacles to their own change effort. In short, the case study findings imply that conceptual frameworks or models of planned educational change constitute desiderata for successful change efforts. The lack of leadership displayed by the administrators was a function, in part, of the poverty of the conceptual tools they brought to their difficult assignments.

Another implication of the case studies is that they underscore the importance of context in educational change efforts. The case studies provide a unique set of comparative data about ways in which the values, norms, economic conditions, interpersonal relations, and social structures of school systems and communities vary and how

these circumstances influence the fate of change efforts. In River District, for example, the ES project was undertaken in a recently consolidated school district, one formerly composed of five independent communities, and this circumstance had a significant impact on numerous aspects of the change effort. Thus, Messerschmidt informs us in chapter 4 that: "Many of the major decisions made in designing and attempting to implement the project reflected the efforts of local school administrators to unify a set of communities with diverse interests." Furthermore, the demands for new educational programs and other services in this ES project reflected changes in the size and composition of the local population. The resistance of the school trustees to the involvement of the state university in ES affairs was attributed essentially to the community's distrust of "outsiders." The vigorous attempts made to involve local citizens in the planning activities of the River District Project reflected local norms about the importance of citizen involvement in community affairs.

In describing the developments that occurred in Jackson County, Wacaster demonstrates how local norms governing kinship relationships influenced the selection of the first director of the project. He also reports how disrespect for community norms led to the ouster from the ES project and the school system of a professionally competent woman administrator. The implication of findings of this kind in the case studies is that social context must be considered from the outset in planning a change effort. That is, the personnel of school districts and residents of communities have beliefs about the goals of education, and views about new pedagogical notions and the primacy to be given to education as a public service. The case studies provide numerous illustrations of how local values and norms influenced the outcomes of the change efforts. An understanding of context is essential not only because it helps us identify many constraints in which a proposed change effort will probably be subjected; in addition, it also permits exploration of ways to modify or to draw on them to define and achieve change targets.

The case studies also remind us that striking differences frequently exist among schools in the same district and, therefore, that tailored strategies of initiation and implementation may be required for individual schools. In other words, the notion of educational context can be functional for planning and implementing change efforts in specific schools as well as school districts.

The case study findings also alert school officials to the many kinds of difficulties that can arise if their school systems initiate externally funded innovative programs. A school system that has not previously been involved in such an arrangement usually assumes that once its educational change proposal has been approved for funding, it will be able to proceed in an essentially autonomous manner and will encounter few difficulties in its contacts with the funding agency. The numerous problems that arose in the relationships between ES/Washington and officials in each of the five school districts implies that a school district that receives external funding to institute innovations may find that it will be subject to considerable surveillance and influence from the funding agency and that numerous difficulties and conflicts may arise. Courses of action that a school district can take to cope with problems of this kind were discussed by Kirst (chapter 11) and Gideonse (chapter 12).

IMPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES

The catalyst for the five educational change efforts and the agency that initially funded and monitored them was the Experimental Schools (ES) program of the U.S. Office of Education. As noted in chapter 3, this federal program was later placed under the jurisdiction of the National Institute of Education (NIE) whose top officials subsequently developed serious reservations about it.

In contrast to many federal programs, ES/Washington required its program officers to become centrally involved in the change efforts of participating school districts. Some provided technical assistance to local school officials, others offered general advice, and still others largely restricted their activities to contractual matters. A few adopted a "mixed" definition of their role (Corwin, 1977). The extensive involvement of federal officials in the five local change efforts provides a unique opportunity to examine the types of problems that arise in federally stimulated educational change efforts and steps that might be taken to minimize them. If, as educational officials generally believe, the federal government will continue to play a significant role in the funding of public schools, then both parties in the relationship have an important stake in minimizing these problems.

As Corwin (1977) notes, government officials who monitor the

progress and quality of performance financed by federal agencies are "... in a position to exercise a vital influence on the nature and quality of relationships that federal agencies establish with local communities" (p. 1). The frequency and intensity of the interactions between local officials and ES/Washington varied greatly during different stages of the projects.² Yet, *throughout* the five change efforts, local officials in each of the school districts frequently were at a loss to account for the pronouncements or decisions of ES/Washington or the actions of its local representatives. Furthermore, local educators were at times greatly concerned and perplexed by what they viewed as the efforts of Washington bureaucrats to take over their school systems. Local school administrators blamed many of their problems on what they perceived as needless constraints imposed by ES/Washington, on difficulties in communicating and working with its officials, and on their unpredictable or inept performances. One matter that especially vexed the local administrators was the meaning that ES/Washington attributed to the term "comprehensive educational change." The "locals" reported that ES/Washington never responded to their repeated requests for clarification of this matter. Ambiguities about this phrase and the uncertainties it created, as Kent notes in chapter 9, produced serious difficulties in each of the change efforts at the time they were initiated and throughout their histories. The evidence indicates that this matter was never resolved.

A second problem that confronted the school officials was their inability to make decisions or implement them due to the inordinate delays they encountered in obtaining responses from ES/Washington to their questions or requests. The local ES administrators reported that they frequently experienced great difficulty in obtaining replies to their requests for approval of project plans, personnel recommendations, or the expenditure of funds. A third problem concerned community participation. The local educators claimed that the requirements established by ES/Washington were unrealistic, failed to provide sufficient flexibility with respect to permissible forms of participation, and disregarded local norms. A fourth difficulty was the needless restraints to which local officials felt they were exposed. They maintained that the regulations established by ES/Washington made them too subservient to the "feds" and largely precluded their offering leadership to their change efforts.

What do these and related findings of the case studies imply for future government programs concerned with instituting major changes in local school systems? Prior to examining this question, it is necessary to point out that we lack two types of important information required for its full and systematic treatment. The first is that *detailed* information is unavailable about developments that were occurring in ES/Washington while the local change efforts were in progress, developments that undoubtedly influenced the performance of its personnel in their relationships with the school districts. As noted in chapter 3, ES officials in Washington were embroiled in disputes and power struggles that had significant consequences for the way its staff could respond to local officials. Detailed reports of these conflicts within the National Institute of Education are currently unavailable. The second is that we lack testimony from the ES/Washington officials who worked most closely with the five school districts. However, in view of the highly similar reactions of the local administrators in the five school districts to the "feds," the similar nature of problems they encountered in relating to them, the findings of Corwin's (1977) study that examined patterns of ES federal-local relationships, and the information presented by Herriott in chapter 3 and Gideonse in chapter 12 about federal agencies and their operations, we feel justified in offering several suggestions that may be of value to officials of governmental agencies who will design and administer programs to facilitate educational change at the school district level in the future.

As noted, not being told what ES/Washington meant by the term "comprehensive educational change" (even though whatever it meant constituted a primary objective of local ES projects), and not receiving prompt or clear responses to their questions, were conditions which especially frustrated local educational officials and which were highly dysfunctional for the management and operation of their projects. One important implication of these findings is that before a governmental agency launches a new educational program involving local school districts, it needs to put its own house in order. In addition to specifying the responsibilities and obligations of participating school districts, a governmental agency needs to specify its responsibilities and obligations to them and the functions it will perform to assist local projects in achieving their objectives. It needs to establish effective, efficient, and flexible arrangements and procedures de-

signed to offer maximum service to the field. In short, the findings of the case studies strongly suggest that a "governmental store" should not be opened until it is equipped to meet the needs of its clients and to offer them services of high quality.

A second implication of the findings is that government agencies need to exercise great care and caution in the selection of school districts to participate in their programs. As Kirst suggests in chapter 11, the primary attractiveness of the ES program to the school officials in the five districts was not its stated objectives. What primarily motivated them to enter the ES competition was their interest in obtaining sorely needed funds for their financially strapped school districts. The case studies identified additional motivating conditions. In Jackson County, the superintendent of schools viewed its ES project as a means to increase local employment opportunities and to enhance his power base in the community. In River District, the "locals" perceived it as a means to unify five scattered school districts that had recently been consolidated. Shiloh County viewed its ES project as a vehicle whereby it could obtain accreditation for its high school. In view of the serious fiscal and educational problems confronting their schools, it is not surprising that funds available under the ES program were viewed as resources that could be used to ameliorate fiscal and other pressing school district problems. Thus, the case studies imply that federal agencies need to take steps to assure that the funds they allocate to achieve their programmatic objectives are not diverted to other purposes.

The case study findings also imply that federal and state officials interested in stimulating educational change at the local level need to recognize that school districts selected to participate in their programs are not interchangeable units. The districts selected for participation in the ES program varied greatly in many respects, for example, in their capability to design and implement innovative projects. School personnel in Arcadia brought to their ES activities a previous successful experience with an ESEA Title III project. Its superintendent of schools was noted for his leadership skills. In Jackson County, however, in spite of previous extensive outside funding of its educational programs, local educators had exhibited little leadership and little success in dealing with difficult educational problems.

State and federal educational officials responsible for facilitating local change efforts need to consider carefully how their pro-

grams can be designed to help a Jackson County without imposing unnecessary obstacles in the path of an Arcadia. In the case of a school district with a history of failure in previous change efforts and with inadequate administrative leadership, government funding may need to be withheld until the school system can demonstrate that it has developed the required organizational capabilities. For a school system, however, that has demonstrated its ability to engage in successful change and that has able administrators, external funding agencies may find it functional to provide it with considerable latitude in carrying out its proposed innovations.

A third important implication of the case study findings for governmental agencies comes to the surface when we focus on the negative effects that the performance of local administrators had on the change efforts of their school systems. Administrative failures included: (1) the way they largely wasted their year of planning; (2) their uncritical acceptance of widely publicized innovations; (3) their unawareness of, or inattentiveness to, implementation obstacles; (4) their poor choices of consultants or their inability to maximize consultant services; (5) their inability to conceptualize the educational change process; and (6) their lack of leadership. The frequency with which these inadequacies appeared and their negative impact on the change efforts strongly imply that government agencies may need to take the initiative in establishing arrangements to provide local administrators with leadership skills. Government agencies, for example, could sponsor or facilitate the establishment of educational change seminars or workshops that would focus on planning skills, models of organizational change, strategies to identify and solve implementation problems, and the role of leadership in educational change efforts.

A fourth implication of the findings is that governmental agencies need to pursue courses of action designed to minimize friction in their relationships with "locals." The case studies revealed that the relations between ES/Washington and local officials badly deteriorated in several of the communities over the course of their change efforts largely because of blocked communications and the behavior of ES/Washington personnel that local officials perceived as abrupt, abrasive, or discourteous. The tensions and anxieties that arose in federal-local relationships generally were dysfunctional for the change efforts. They precluded the kind of open and frank communi-

cations essential for productive working relationships. One strategy to reduce these interorganizational and interpersonal problems would be to hold informal meetings between the "feds" and "locals" several times a year that would focus on federal-local problems, their causes, and steps that could be taken to strengthen their relationships. A neutral third party might be asked to chair these meetings.

A fifth implication is that government agencies need to pursue courses of action that will assure that their personnel perform their responsibilities in a competent manner. The case studies revealed that some ES/Washington staff members had little understanding of the local constraints under which school superintendents work and of the complex nature of their roles. Others appeared to have simplistic conceptions of the change process or the ways that political and social forces can influence school systems. These findings imply that government agencies also need to develop inservice training programs and related socialization devices designed to increase the quality of the performance of their personnel. As Gideonse notes in chapter 12, *both* partners in programs involving federal-local relationships may require "retooling" if they are to carry out their tasks in a competent manner.

Finally, we turn to three other implications of the findings. The first has reference to educational change projects that school districts submit to federal or state agencies for funding. The case study findings about impediments to educational change suggest that one part of the application might focus on anticipated implementation problems and proposed ways of coping with them. The time and effort devoted to preparing this section of the application by local officials would increase their awareness of the importance of implementation problems and their need to attempt to identify them early in the change effort. This innovation would also provide useful information about the basic assumptions underlying a proposed change strategy. The second implication bears on the problems the school districts encountered in selecting consultants and using them effectively. These difficulties imply the need for a small handbook written by experts that would identify available competent consultants by their area of specialization. It could also offer suggestions similar to Lippitt's proposals in chapter 10 about ways to maximize the services of consultants. A third is that, just as it is functional to conceive of a change effort at the local level as consisting of a series of stages, each of

which has its distinct problems, it also may be highly useful for government agencies to attempt to specify the phases through which a federal-local relationship must pass if their collaboration is to be successful. Such an analysis would identify the several stages of such a relationship, problems that can be anticipated to arise in each stage, and strategies that could be followed to minimize or eliminate them.

THE NEED FOR NEW MECHANISMS TO STRENGTHEN FEDERAL-LOCAL RELATIONSHIPS

The serious shortcomings and weaknesses in the relationships between ES/Washington and the ES school districts had many dysfunctional consequences for the educational change efforts. In earlier sections of this chapter we suggested courses of action that the "locals" and the "feds" might *individually* pursue to strengthen their relationships. Now we inquire about what the case studies imply for establishing new *interorganizational* mechanisms or procedures that could strengthen the bonds between local school districts and their external funding agencies.

The interactions between the "feds" and "locals" were frequently characterized by misunderstandings, misperceptions, distrust, and lack of confidence. At times they appeared to be adversaries, rather than collaborators, in an important educational enterprise. The sources of their difficulties included lack of understanding of the regulations and constraints to which the other party was exposed and the problems created by these constraints. Other factors were the failure to spell out clearly the rights and obligations of a local school district in its relationships with ES/Washington and the ambiguity and confusion that existed about the extent to which the "feds" had a right to influence local school affairs. These circumstances imply that for any major governmentally stimulated and funded educational change effort, it may be advisable to hold regularly scheduled meetings that would involve the "feds" and "locals" in candid discussions of their relationships and how they can be strengthened.

The case study findings imply the need for an additional innovation: the establishment of a new role whose incumbents would serve as middlemen or brokers between school districts and their external funding agencies. A basic assumption underlying this proposal is that

local officials in many school districts are frequently at a loss in negotiating with the "feds," are not aware of their rights, and in general are placed in a subordinate bargaining position. A related assumption is that the "feds" frequently have little understanding of the problems of the "locals," are also uncertain of their rights and unclear about the limits of their authority.³ Brokers could perform several important functions. One is to protect the interests of both parties in their negotiations and relationships. A second is to call meetings of the two groups when serious misunderstandings occur and assist them in working out solutions to their problems. A third is to serve as fact finders when either of the parties requested their services.

A third innovation suggested by the case studies is the development of a manual that would describe major problems in federal-local relations that arise at each stage of the change process, major types of implementation problems, and ways to conceptualize the change process and related matters. It could suggest various kinds of strategies and procedures to deal with problems that frequently arise in change efforts. A document of this kind would not present "cook-book" rules, but perspectives and understandings about the change process, ways of conceptualizing it, and alternative strategies to overcome implementation problems.

CONCLUSION

This volume has emphasized that educational change efforts at the local, state, and federal levels need to be conceptualized in dynamic terms and as consisting of interrelated stages, each of which has its own special activities and problems. It has stressed the importance of adopting a holistic perspective in searching for factors that may influence the introduction and implementation of innovations. It has emphasized the importance of identifying potential internal and external impediments to change efforts and of developing strategies to deal with them. It has maintained that the management of educational change requires constant concern for political considerations. It has stressed that successful change efforts must be based on a recognition of the importance of contextual factors and of the need to tailor educational innovations to local situations. It has placed special emphasis on the need for leadership of high quality in

each of the stages of a change effort. Leadership of this kind creates and maintains the conditions essential for the accomplishment of a change effort and pursues courses of action that result in the removal of impediments to the achievement of change targets.

NOTES

1. Gross et al. (1971) indicate their awareness of these conditions. For example, in reporting their empirical findings, they describe unanticipated obstacles that emerged during the period of attempted implementation. They also point to the lack of monitoring and feedback mechanisms as a major factor that impeded the implementation of the innovation effort they studied and describe the many dysfunctional consequences of this condition.

2. This observation has also been made by Corwin (1977) based on his interviews with ES/Washington officials.

3. See Corwin (1977) for a series of first-person accounts of such ambiguity on the part of ES/Washington program officers.

REFERENCES

- Bentzen, Mary M. *Changing Schools: The Magic Feather Principle*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974.
- Corwin, Ronald G. *Patterns of Federal-Local Relations in Education: A Case Study of the Rural Experimental Schools Program*. Cambridge, Mass.: Abt Associates Inc., 1977.
- Gross, Neal; Giacuinta, Joseph, B.; and Bernstein, Marilyn. *Implementing Organizational Innovations: A Sociological Analysis of Planned Educational Change*. New York: Basic Books, 1971.
- Sarason, Seymour. *The Culture of Schools and the Problem of Change*. Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1971.
- Smith, Louis M., and Keith, Pat M. *Anatomy of Educational Innovation: An Organizational Analysis of an Elementary School*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971.

APPENDIX

The Announcement

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Office of Education
Washington, D.C. 20202
March 10, 1972

EXPERIMENTAL SCHOOLS PROGRAM: ANNOUNCEMENT OF A COMPETITION FOR SMALL RURAL SCHOOLS

The Experimental Schools Program

Experimental Schools is the first program in the U.S. Office of Education to offer support for long-term testing, documentation, and evaluation of comprehensive educational change. Introduced by President Richard M. Nixon in March 1970, the Experimental Schools program provides the Nation with an unprecedented opportunity to find out whether new educational programs, which address all parts of an educational system simultaneously, will be more effective than past reform efforts which have focused on only one or several parts of an educational system at a time.

Each Experimental School project receives funding for five years; also unique within the Office of Education.

Experimental Schools is a small research program, not a general grants program. Since only a limited number of new sites can be funded each year, and since the ideas they test are of interest and importance to many people throughout the country, Experimental Schools places a heavy emphasis on the thorough documentation and

evaluation of each project. The evaluation and documentation process will be concerned with questions which relate to local needs and goals as well as those of interest to educators throughout the country.

The Experimental Schools program is now in its third round of competitions. The first three Experimental Schools projects, designated after a national competition, began operations in September 1971. A second national competition resulted in the awarding of grants for projects which will begin operation in September 1972. This third round of grant awards will be made through a series of separate competitions. The first in this series is the competition for comprehensive projects in small rural schools. Projects funded in this series are expected to begin operation no later than September 1973.

The Experimental Schools program is interested in supporting a wide variety of different ideas and designs for comprehensive educational change. In order to respond effectively to the changing needs and potential of American education, Experimental Schools will continue to maintain flexibility regarding the design and requirements of the program in the future. Thus, the procedures and requirements for Experimental Schools projects may change significantly as the program continues to evolve.

Introduction

The U.S. Office of Education is pleased to announce a competition for Experimental Schools projects specifically and exclusively for small schools in rural areas. This announcement contains: (a) project requirements; (b) the procedures for applying; and (c) a description of the selection process for the small rural schools competition.

Over 75 percent of the 17,498 operating school systems in the United States have 2,500 students or less. These systems are responsible for educating eight million young people who reside with their families in rural areas. Over the years, there have been efforts by the Office of Education and other agencies to help small rural schools improve the education available to their students. Many of these efforts, however, have fallen short of their goal.

Many people who have been involved in reform in rural education argue that a main reason for failure is that the problems, needs, and goals of small schools have traditionally been defined in terms of

large schools; and improvement has been sought through models developed for large urban and suburban schools. For example, for a long time it was said that the problem with small rural schools is that they are too small to be economically efficient, or to provide the range of services a "good" school system should provide. Hence, what followed, in many cases, was the formation of large units which could more easily offer all of the courses, services, and facilities of large schools. Too often this process has been disappointing.

Many educators today argue that "smallness" may be an advantage, especially in the quest for quality education. This search for quality by rural schools may not, in fact, be found by following the models of large urban and suburban schools, but rather through designs which capitalize upon the unique characteristics of small rural schools. The argument can be made that the problem is not that rural schools are small, but that small schools have not been encouraged and supported to seek quality and improvement in ways specifically appropriate to smallness.

The Experimental Schools program, through this competition, is making available the opportunity for a limited number of rural school systems to test new ideas for educational improvement which are developed in and for a small rural school setting. Since the number of projects that can be funded is limited, and since what can be learned from them may be valuable for many small school districts, it is important to have these efforts thoroughly documented and evaluated. In that way, those who try new ideas, as well as those who look forward to doing so, will know what succeeds and what does not succeed in the quest for improved quality education in rural schools.

We invite and encourage your involvement.

A. Project Requirements

1. *Eligible Applicants.* Applications will be accepted from public school systems (singly or in groups) in rural areas.
2. *Comprehensiveness.** A small rural Experimental Schools

*The term "comprehensive" has acquired a specific meaning among educators referring to the breadth of the curriculum, e.g., the Comprehensive High School. The term is used here in its broader and less technical sense meaning, including at a minimum all the significant elements of a school program.

project must be comprehensive, that is, it must include at least the following components:

- (a) A fresh approach to the nature and substance of the total curriculum in light of local needs and goals;
- (b) Reorganization and training of staff to meet particular project goals;
- (c) Innovative use of time, space, and facilities;
- (d) Active community involvement in developing, operating, and evaluating the proposed project; and
- (e) An administrative and organizational structure which supports the project and which takes into account local strengths and needs.

(Legal Authority: 45 CFR 151.51, 151.54(b) (1)–(4) (36, F.R. 13993, 7/29/71))

This does not mean that everything that is currently being done in each of these areas must necessarily be replaced completely with something new. It does mean that what is going on in each of these areas should be related to, consistent with, and supportive of all of the other areas. Therefore, applicants may elect to retain parts of the current educational program as long as they support whatever new directions are taken.

3. *Size and Governance.* Each small rural Experimental Schools project must include all pupils, kindergarten (or grade 1) through grade 12. Several rural school systems (district/local education agency/governance unit) may join in making an application. Their partnership can be solely for purposes of the Experimental Schools project and can be dissolved at any time after the five-year life of the project by mutual agreement of the participating systems. This does not mean that any one district must be designated as the fiscal agent for the partnership. In the event that such a group of districts is selected, the Office of Education will work out with all parties a method of distributing funds that is mutually agreeable to all.

(Legal Authority: 45 CFR 151.52(a) (36, F.R. 13993, 7/29/71))

Again, each project must contain the entire enrollment of the school system. It may not consist of only a part of the students in a school or in a school system. For example, a school system with

pupils only in K-8 may form a temporary partnership with a K-12 or a 9-12 systems to become an Experimental Schools projects, providing all the pupils in the cooperating systems are in the project.

There is no minimum number of students required. The maximum number acceptable is 2,500. If there are separate elementary and secondary schools in a given project, they must form a coherent K-12 feeder system.

(Legal Authority: Proposed rule soon to be published in the Federal Register for public comment.)

4. *Student Population.* Priority in selection will be given to projects which focus primarily (but not necessarily exclusively) on students who are not experiencing educational success and who come from families of low income.

Low income need not be defined in OEO or Title I, ESEA terms, but may be defined in terms of the specific locality. When such a definition is used, a clear and concise rationale should be provided.

(Legal Authority: Proposed rule soon to be published in the Federal Register for public comment.)

5. *Experimental Schools Funds.* Experimental Schools funds cannot support activities currently or normally considered part of regular operating costs (present per/pupil expenditures) nor can these funds be used for major renovation of school facilities or construction.

Experimental Schools funds are meant to supplement, not replace, local funds. Experimental Schools funds are provided for those costs associated only with the development and implementation of the project. Examples of such costs might include staff training, development of curriculum, purchase or development of special materials and equipment, community involvement costs, and efforts at documenting and evaluating all facets of the program.

(Legal Authority: 45 CFR 151.56(a) (36 F.R. 13993-4, 7/29/77); proposed rule soon to be published in the Federal Register for public comment.)

The Office of Education, through Experimental Schools, supports each project for five years of operation. Of key importance as the program is being designed is a requirement that the local district be able to continue the project, if successful, with its own resources after Federal support has ended. This is done to protect the sites

from having to discontinue the projects after five years because the costs are prohibitive; as well as to ensure that the ideas tested, if successful, will be economically practical for other districts to implement.

(Legal Authority: 45 CFR 151.56(b) (36 F.R. 13994, 7/29/71))

No fixed amount of money is projected for each small rural Experimental Schools site; each project will be awarded supplemental funds based on its unique needs. It is anticipated, however, that no Experimental Schools grant will exceed 15 percent of the annual operating costs of the school system(s) involved.

(Legal Authority: 45 CFR 151.56(b) (36 F.R. 13994, 7/29/71))

Specific grant details and budget requirements will be worked out individually after the small rural Experimental Schools sites have been selected.

6. *Evaluation and Documentation.* A major purpose of the small rural Experimental School project is to discover means to improve rural education generally. Therefore, each project must have built-in methods for evaluation and documentation, in terms of its own purpose and goals. Since evaluation and documentation is generally not included in the budget of an operating school system, this part of each project is considered an expenditure which will be covered by the grant from Experimental Schools.

The Office of Education will also assist each selected project in developing an effective local procedure for evaluating and documenting the project.

(Legal Authority: 45 CFR 151.54(b) (36 F.R. 13993, 7/29/71))

After selection of small rural Experimental Schools sites, the Office of Education will contract separately with a team of evaluators for external documentation and evaluation throughout the 5 years of the project. Its purpose is to provide a means whereby what is learned can be made available to other rural districts.

(Legal Authority: 45 CFR 151.6)

NOTICE—The requirements for application set forth in this Basic Program Information are in draft form and are subject to revision. If revisions are made, parties receiving this document will be notified immediately. We do not consider revi-

sion to be likely; therefore, applicants are advised to proceed on the basis of the information contained in this document.

B. Procedures for Applying

The preparation of lengthy proposals with many appendices requires large expenditures of time, energy, and money. Such a process is inequitable for those applicants whose time and energies are already taxed completely in the daily operation of schools and who cannot afford to purchase help to prepare proposals. Since the Experimental Schools program is concerned that the competition be equitable, and since we are interested in receiving ideas written by the participants themselves, only letters of interest of no more than fifteen pages in lengths are required. Letters of interest of more than fifteen pages cannot be considered. Each letter of interest must contain, as a minimum, the information herein requested.

In cases where more than one school system is the applicant agency (see Section A of Part 3 of this announcement), all information required should apply to all cooperating systems. The applicants may designate one contact person for all cooperating systems, or they may choose to name one person from each one. In the event that one person is designated, this does not necessarily mean that his/her district must be the fiscal agent, should the project be selected. (See Section A, part 3.) The partnership arrangement among the cooperating school systems should be spelled out in enough detail to make clear to the Office of Education who the applicant is and why the partnership was formed.

Letters of interest should not be bound (other than with a staple) or placed in covers; this simplifies handling by the Office of Education.

Five copies of your letter of interest should be sent to the following address no later than April 10:

Experimental Schools Room 4012
Office of Education
400 Maryland Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20262

Letters which are received after April 15 cannot be considered.

The required information follows. To aid you in responding, we suggest that the answers to *I* through *IV* be as brief as possible, and still include the required information. Answers may be in one sentence or written out descriptively, as you desire. Emphasis in terms of time and space devoted to answers should be given to numbers *V* - *XI*.

- I. Name, title, mailing address, and telephone number of contact person(s), for the applicant agency. (Partnership arrangement if there is one.) Please be sure that the legal name of each applicant agency is included.
- II. A statement indicating that the applicant is in compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
- III. Description, as clear and brief as possible, of the community or communities your school district or system serves; be sure to include the following information:
 - (a) where your district is located within the State;
 - (b) what the physical geography is like (mountainous, plains, etc.);
 - (c) what towns are in the district;
 - (d) total population of the district giving town/rural breakdown;
 - (e) name of nearest city and number of miles away;
 - (f) approximate area of the district;
 - (g) major sources of employment for residents;
 - (h) a description of the district's socioeconomic conditions;
 - (i) racial, ethnic, and cultural background of students and residents (include percentages).
- IV. Description of the school district; be sure to include the following information:
 - (a) organization (county, independent, consolidated, etc.);
 - (b) enrollment: separate figures for total/elementary/secondary;
 - (c) schools with grade-level span for each;
 - (d) number of public school students who live in town;
 - (e) number of students who ride a bus to school;
 - (f) number of staff employed by the district giving separate figures for administrators/teachers/noncertified personnel;

- (g) number of students who started working immediately after completing high school in 1971;
 - (h) number of students who went on to further education after completing high school in 1971;
 - (i) number of students of school age not regularly attending school;
 - (j) your dropout rate and how it is calculated;
 - (k) total school budget for 1971/72;
 - (l) per pupil expenditures for 1969/70; for 1970/71; and for 1971/72;
 - (m) information about any other educational institutions within the district.
- V. Describe your current educational program stating present educational purpose and goals, the nature of the curriculum, and the present organization to accomplish stated purpose and goals.
- VI. List and describe what you feel to be the most important strengths and resources available to your school which would be most helpful in developing an improved educational program. Please rank them in order of importance.
- VII. List and describe briefly what you feel to be the most significant weaknesses of your current educational program, ranking them in order of importance.
- VIII. Describe how you would change and improve your educational program, utilizing the strengths and resources you have identified in attempting to overcome your weaknesses. Be sure to include a discussion of:
- (a) changes in organization and administration;
 - (b) curriculum;
 - (c) use and training of staff;
 - (d) use of time, space, and broader use of facilities; and
 - (e) community involvement.
- IX. Describe how the changes you envision in your Experimental Schools project would help to meet the individual needs of your students, especially of those who have not previously experienced educational success.
- X. Describe how the proposed project would improve the community as a whole.
- XI. If you expect to call on outside agencies for help in making the changes you envision, please describe:

- (a) what types of agencies these would be;
- (b) what their relation to the project would be;
- (c) how the community would be involved with any outside support agency; and
- (d) what your process might be for choosing those agencies which can render you the best help to meet your local needs.

(Legal Authority: 45 CFR 151, Subpart E (36 F.R. 13993-4))

DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITED—Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states: "No person in the United States shall, on the grounds of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal finance assistance."

C. Selection and Funding Procedures

1. Letters of interest received by April 15, 1972, will be reviewed by Office of Education staff and an independent review committee. A site visit may be included in the selection process.

(Legal Authority: Proposed closing date soon to be published in the Federal Register.)

2. The Experimental Schools program expects to fund three to five sites in this competition. Applicants will be notified of action taken on their application no later than June 15, 1972.

3. To aid you in writing a letter of interest, the following questions are included to indicate the types of information the selection committee will be looking for in the process of evaluating proposed projects:

- (a) To what extent does the community and target population meet the description of a small rural school site stated in Section A, Parts 1, 3, and 4?
- (b) To what extent do the ideas for educational change utilize local strengths and resources to overcome weaknesses in solving local educational problems? (See Introduction.)
- (c) To what extent are the ideas for change, in fact, logical steps to overcome the stated weaknesses?
- (d) To what extent do the ideas for the proposed project meet the description of comprehensiveness detailed in Section A, Part 2?

- (e) To what extent does it appear that the suggested changes will meet the needs of individual students in the district?
- (f) To what extent will the community be significantly involved in all aspects of the project?
- (g) To what extent will the suggested ideas benefit the community as a whole?
- (h) How well does the proposed project meet the quest for quality education in small rural schools?

(Legal Authority: 45 CFR 151, Subpart E (36 F.R. 13993-4, 7/29/71); proposed rule soon to be published in the Federal Register.)

Name Index

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>Argyle, Michael, 31, 62
 Arnstein, Sherry R., 251, 257

 Bailey, Stephen K., 50, 71, 72
 Baldridge, J. V., 38, 43, 45
 Benne, Kenneth D., 253-4, 257
 Bentzen, Mary M., 22, 45, 357, 379
 Berke, Iris, 291, 292, 296
 Berke, Joel, 50, 71, 72, 288, 296
 Berman, Paul, 10, 18, 30, 43, 45, 277, 284, 296
 Bernstein, Marilyn, 19, 45
 Brademas, John, 374, 296
 Brandl, John E., 311, 327
 Budding, David, 51, 72

 Campbell, Koald F., 332
 Charters, W. W., Jr., 22, 45
 Chase, Francis S., 332, 334, 346, 349
 Clough, Wilson, 74, 111
 Coladarci, Arthur, 332
 Conant, James, 10</p> | <p>Corwin, Ronald G., 61, 69, 72, 371, 373, 379

 Deal, T. E., 38, 43
 Denton, Trevor, 108, 111
 Doyle, Dennis, 69, 71, 72

 Fantini, Mario, 285, 296
 Finch, Robert, 64, 311

 Gallaher, Art, Jr., 95, 111
 Getzels, Jacob, 332
 Giacquinta, Joseph B., 19, 30, 45, 379
 Goodenough, Ward H., 328, 349
 Goodlad, John I., 283, 296
 Gordon, Edmund W., 10, 17
 Gross, Neal, 9-10, 17, 18, 19, 33, 43, 44, 331-2, 343, 349, 354, 379

 Hall, Robert C., 312, 327
 Hawley, Willis D., 282, 296
 Hechinger, Fred, 3-4, 19</p> |
|---|---|

- Herriott, Robert E., 44, 45, 343, 349
James, H. Thomas, 330, 333, 349
Johnson, Lyndon B., 336
Keith, Pat M., 357, 379
Kelly, James, 331, 349
Kirst, Michael, 17, 50, 71, 73, 288, 294, 296
Leavitt, Harold, Jr., 32, 46
Likier, Rensis, 332
March, James C., 329, 331, 332, 333, 335, 344, 346, 347, 349
Marland, Sidney, 64, 279, 281
Mayhew, Lewis B., 333, 344, 346, 347, 349
McLaughlin, Milbrey W., 10, 30, 43, 45, 277, 284, 296
Mencken, H. L., 240
Morrow, John, 280, 296
Mitchell, Donald P., 345
Mosher, Edith K., 50, 72, 310, 327
Moynihan, Daniel P., 64, 279-80, 281, 311
Nixon, Richard M., 50-1, 64, 279, 311
Pincus, John, 294, 296
Popp, Helen M., 25, 46
Rickover, Hyman, 10
Rivlin, Alice B., 279, 297
Rose, Barbara E., 56-7, 61, 73
Rowen, Henry, 283, 297
Sarason, Seymour, 22, 46, 283, 297, 357, 379
Smith, Louis M., 22, 46, 357, 379
Sproull, Lee, 66, 68, 72, 73
Stromquist, Nelly P., 285-6, 297
Sufrin, Sidney C., 50, 73
Summerfield, Harry, 50, 73
Timpane, P. Michael, 10, 19, 49, 73
Weber, Max, 331-2
Westheimer, Robert, 64, 311
Wildavsky, Aaron, 310, 327
Wilkerson, Dorey A., 10, 19

Subject Index

Abt Associates Inc., 56
 Accountability, 212-3
 Achievement scores, 229-30
 Administrators, educational:
 catalysts for change, as, 9-10
 changing role of, 256
 management of educational change
 and, 21, 23-4, 41, 208
 Arcadia:
 accountability, 212-3
 administrative involvement, lack of,
 204
 annexation, 188
 application, 193
 barriers to implementation, 185,
 199-200
 citizen participation, 186, 195, 213
 commitment of project staff, 214
 community setting, 186-7
 conflict, local, 210-1, 214
 consultants, use of, 196, 199, 205-6,
 212
 contract negotiations, 199, 210-1

Arcadia (*continued*):
 curriculum, expansion of, 186
 decision-making authority, degree of
 centralization in, 195, 200-1,
 208, 211-2, 213
 discipline, student, emphasis on, 206
 education, humanization of, 186,
 205
 education, individualized, 185-6,
 204
 education system, 188-92
 enrollments, increased, 188, 190
 evaluation, 207-8
 federal aid, previous district experi-
 ence with, 191-2
 federal control, local fear of, 203
 federal-local relations, 194, 197-8,
 201, 210-1, 213
 financial support by school board,
 213
 funding, project, 201, 210
 goals, 185
 governance, educational, 188-9, 191

Arcadia (*continued*):

- governance, project, 194-5, 208-9
- grantsmanship, local tradition of, 193
- guidance counseling and student services, 186, 209
- implementation, 201-10
- initial contact: with Washington, 193-4
- initiative, teacher, increased, 208
- innovations in, 185-6
- integration to curriculum, 207, 212-3, 214
- leadership, 213
- math program, 204
- morale, teacher, improved, 208
- mutual adaptation, lack of, 211
- needs, educational, 190, 193-4
- objectives of Experimental Schools project, 185-6
- planning, 194-201
- political support for Experimental Schools project, local, 199-200
- reading program, 204
- role overload, teacher, 201
- school finance, 191
- stability of project operations, increased, 207, 210
- staff development, 205-6, 210
- staff participation, 194, 195, 213
- staff resistance, 212
- strike, teacher, 202-3
- success, partial, 210
- teacher coordinators, 205, 207-8
- theme, project, 186
- turnover, local staff, 206
- upgrading, school district, general, 185-6

Barriers to educational change:

- backlash, potential for, 363
- communication problems, 11
- community pressures, 11, 20
- conception of change process, inadequate, 29, 369
- contextual factors, 369-70

Barriers to educational change (*continued*):

- diagnosis of problems, inadequate, 25-6, 364
- expectations, unrealistic, 11
- failure to anticipate obstacles to teacher implementation in the classroom, 21, 23, 26-7, 365-6
- federal-local relations, 371
- funds, inadequate, 11
- leadership, lack of, 30, 367-8
- monitoring and feedback mechanisms, lack of, 23, 28
- participation, parent and teacher, lack of, 29
- plan, role of, lack of local understanding of, 244
- planning, local, inadequate, 29, 89-95, 243, 244-5
- politics, school, 11
- preplanning, strategic, lack of, 363-4
- role overload, 363, 365
- scarce resources, failure to optimize use of, 366-7
- selection of inappropriate innovations, 28, 364-5
- staff resistance, 11
- types of, 11

Barriers to implementation:

- administrative support, lack of, 27, 171-2, 183, 204
- Arcadia, in, 185, 199-200
- Butte-Angels Camp, in, 153, 155-8, 169-74, 182-3
- conflict, local, political, 183, 185, 210-1
- conflict, staff, 153, 155-8, 357
- decision-making authority, degree of centralization in, 256
- federal-local relations, 147, 171-2, 183, 210-1
- financial constraints, 155
- funding, delays in, 171-2
- inflated expectations, 245
- Jackson County, in, 146-9
- leadership, lack of, 256, 378-9

- Barriers to implementation (continued):**
 management, project, 183
 materials, instructional, unavailability of, 23, 27, 171-2, 245
 mechanisms to cope with, need for, 246
 mutual adaptation, lack of, 23, 26, 146-7, 182-3, 185, 211, 229, 257, 357
 organizational, 282
 plan, local, inadequacy of, 147
 political conditions, 378
 priorities, divergence of teacher and administrative, 212-3
 risk, 245
 role ambiguity, 23, 245
 role overload, 23, 26, 147, 169, 172, 183, 245
 Shiloh County, in, 228
 staff participation in planning, lack of, 256
 staff resistance, 23, 26, 31-2, 152-3, 156-7, 160-1, 256
 staff skills, inadequacy of, 23, 26, 147
 technology, inadequacy of, 228
 types of, 11
 underestimation of implementation difficulties, 199-200
- Butte-Angels Camp:**
 application, 159-60
 barriers to implementation, 153-9, 169-74, 182-4
 citizen participation, 160-4
 collective bargaining, 155, 158
 community setting, 153-4
 conflict over project goals and management, 150-1, 168, 174-7
 consolidation, 152, 154-5, 157
 consultants, use of, 167, 169-70, 172, 174, 180, 182, 184
 contract negotiations, 166-7
 decision-making authority, degree of centralization in, 160, 163-5, 168, 172-3, 175-6, 184
- Butte-Angels Camp (continued):**
 diagnosis and prescription, de-emphasis of, 177-80
 diversity of teacher interests, 152-3
 education, personalized, 151-3, 160-1, 163, 165, 169
 education system, 154-9
 evaluation, 167, 133-5
 federal-local relations, 161-2, 167, 171-2, 177, 180, 181-2
 fiscal constraints, 154, 159
 funding, project, 166-7
 goal diffusion, 179, 180-1
 goal displacement, 178, 181, 182-3
 goals, 164-5
 governance, project, 160-1, 165, 171, 172-3, 175-7
 grantsmanship, local tradition of, 156, 159
 implementation, ES project, 169-81
 initial contact with Washington, 159-60
 initiative, teacher, increased, 177-8, 179
 innovations in, 165-6
 leadership, 163, 182-3
 learning disabilities approach, 151-2, 160, 164-5, 169-70
 needs, educational, 164
 objectives of Experimental Schools project, 151-3
 outcomes, 181-2
 planning, ES project, 160-8
 resignation of superintendent, 180
 restriction of superintendent's authority, emergent, 176-7
 role ambiguity, 162-4
 school finance, 155
 staff participation, 160, 162-3, 164, 168, 184
 staff resistance, 156-7, 160, 162-3, 165, 168, 173-4, 176, 182-3, 184
 success, 182
 superintendent-staff relations, history of conflict in, 155-9

- Butte-Angels Camp (*continued*):
 theme, project, 151-2, 159-60, 163, 164-5
 transformation of project, 177-82, 184
- Career education:
 Jackson County, in, 140-3
 River District, in, 75, 87-8, 96, 97, 100, 103
- Case studies:
 assumptions underlying, 13
 data sources, 15-6
 focus, 13-4
 generalizability, 14
 implications for federal policy, 371-8
 implications for local management of educational change, 363-71
 LOC model as provisional framework for analysis of, 36-8
 methodology, 15-6
 rationale for use of, 21-2, 353-4
 utility of, 7, 13-4, 22-4, 353-4
- Categorical programs, 50, 279
- Citizen participation:
 Arcadia, in, 186, 195, 208, 213
 Butte-Angels Camp, in, 160, 162-3, 164
 failure of, 251-3, 278, 285-7
 importance of, 257
 Jackson County, in, 113, 136
 lack of, 29, 243, 244, 245, 255-6
 mechanisms for institutionalizing, 251-2
 need for, 257
 opportunity for, 252-3
 River District, in, 76, 86-90, 96-7, 98-9, 100, 104, 107
 role of, in educational change efforts, 255-6
 Shiloh County, in, 216, 223-4
- Collective bargaining, 155, 202
- Commitment to the Experimental Schools project, local, 105-6, 110, 200, 214, 244
- Communications, 192
- Community involvement, *see* Citizen participation
- Community setting:
 Arcadia, in, 186-8
 Butte-Angels Camp, in, 153-4
 Jackson County, in, 114-6
 River District, in, 74-5, 77-9
 Shiloh County, in, 216-7
- Comprehensive educational change:
 as viewed by federal officials, 53-4, 129, 147, 241-2, 300-1
 as viewed by local officials, 136, 147, 242-3, 284, 339-40
 lack of, 108, 242, 274, 304-5
 problems created by ambiguities in the concept, 77, 129-30, 147, 161-2, 241-3, 275
- Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, 192
- Conflict, local:
 Arcadia, in, 209-10, 214
 Butte-Angels Camp, in, 168, 174-7
 Jackson County, in, 135-6
 River District, in, 98, 100, 109
 Shiloh County, in, 227, 234-5
- Conflict management, use of consultants for, 264-5
- Consultants, 244, 247
 Arcadia, in, 196, 199, 205-6, 212, 266-7
 Butte-Angels Camp, in, 167, 169-70, 172, 174, 180, 182, 184, 264-6
 change strategies, usefulness in development of, 262-3
 conflict management, 264
 Experimental Schools projects use of, 262-9
 function of, 269-70
 goal setting, 264
 guidelines for local use of, 269-72
 implementation, role in, 261, 264, 265
 imposition by Washington, 261, 264, 265

Consultants (*continued*):

- indications of effective use of, 258-60
- Jackson County, in, 128-30, 134, 137, 139, 141-6, 262-4
- liaison with federal government, 265, 267
- new, need for, 7, 289-90
- performance assessment, 258, 260, 262, 270-2
- planning, role in, 261, 264, 265-6
- problems in the use of, 6
- recruitment, 261, 270, 272-3
- relevance of expertise, 261
- resistance to, local, 263, 265, 268-9
- River District, in, 87, 262-3
- role definition, 258-62
- role overload, to relieve, use of, 263, 266
- roles of, multiple, 258
- Shiloh County, in, 215-6, 221, 224-5, 226-7, 229-31, 234, 268-9
- staff development, use for, 259, 264-5, 266-7
- strengths and weaknesses of, 258-73
- successful use of, factors leading to, 258-60
- techniques and timing, 258-60
- voluntariness, 259, 260-1
- Cooperative Research Act, 65, 299, 310
- Cultural education, 76, 87, 96, 98, 100, 104

Decision-making authority:

- Arcadia, in, 194-5, 208, 211-2, 213
- bottom-up view of, 262
- Butte-Angels Camp, in, 163-5, 167-8, 172-3, 176-7, 184
- restriction of, 176-7
- River District, in, 105-8, 109
- Shiloh County, in, 223-4, 227, 233
- traditional view of, 252
- Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 64, 325
- Diagnosis of educational problems, 25, 177-9

Discipline, student, 206

Domestic Council, 310

Early childhood education, 139-40, 284

Economic growth, 75, 185, 187

Education, public:

- declining industry of, 332
- functions of, 293-4
- humanization of, 186, 205
- inability to innovate, impact of, 4
- individualization of, 163, 185-6, 205, 215-6, 226-7
- personalized, 151-3, 159-60, 163, 165, 169
- problems with, 3-4
- public support for, 4-5, 332

Educational change:

- atheoretical nature of literature on, 30-1
- barriers to, *see* Barriers to educational change
- board of education, role in, 253-4
- bottom-up approach to, need for, 290-5
- catalysts to, 9-10
- community and school system attributes, role of, 240, 257, 287-8
- conceptions of, new, need for, 5-8, 12, 20-1, 240, 321, 353, 369, 378-9

Experimental Schools program strategy, 52-6

- factors, precipitating, 8-11
- factors shaping dynamics of the change effort, 42-3
- failure to achieve, 10-12
- federal flexibility in supporting, need for, 316-8
- federal role in, 49-52, 298-327, 371-7
- funding, 9-10, 49-52, 249-50
- guidelines for, 294-5
- implementation of, 298-9, 319-27
- implications of study for, 363-77

Educational change (*continued*):

- leadership, role in, 41-3, 328-48, 367-9, 378-9
- logistical support, need for, 248-50, 284
- management of, 20-2, 302
- models of, 30-7
- mutual adaptation, 211, 277, 323
- participation of citizens and staff, 255-7, 295
- planning, role of, *ir*, 255
- political nature of, 251, 317, 363, 378-9
- political ramifications of, 253-4
- remission of, 332
- resistance to, 227-9, 230-1, 246, 256
- rural, guidelines for, 324-5
- school boards, role of, 254
- staff development, and, 254-5, 295
- stages of, 256-7
- successful, contextual nature of, 8, 369-70
- types of, 8-9
- utilization of research on, 38-41

Educational innovations:

- Cambire School, 24
- failure of, 3-4, 10-1, 22-3, 25, 283, 299
- inability to design and implement innovations, 4, 6
- management of, 23-4
- negative impacts on faculty and students of, 5
- problems with, 6, 25-30

Educational reform:

- federal role in, 274
- flexible approaches to schooling, need for, 294
- guidelines for, 293-5
- merit salary increases, 295
- regulations, counterproductive, elimination of, 295
- staff development, 295
- staff participation in, 295
- synchronization with administrative training, lack of, 332-3

Educational reform (*continued*):

- varied approaches to schooling, need for, 294

Educational renewal, 280

Educational systems participating in rural Experimental Schools program, description of:

- Arcadia, 188-92
- Butte-Angels Camp, 154-9
- Jackson County, 117-22
- River District, 79-84
- Shiloh County, 217-21

Elaborated Leadership Obstacle Course Model (ELOC):

- description of, general, 359-60, 360-1
- elaboration on the Leadership Obstacle Course Model (LOC), *as an*, 354, 359-60
- implications for federal officials, 371-7
- implications for local management of educational change, 363-71
- leadership responsibilities, 360
- stages of the educational change process, 359, 361
- utility of, 360

Elementary and Secondary Education

- Act of 1965, 50, 82-3, 119, 374
- Title I, 10, 119
- Title III, 83, 121, 374

Enrollments:

- diminished, 329
- increased, 188, 190

Evaluation:

- Arcadia, in, 207
- Butte-Angels Camp, in, 167, 173-5
- component of the Experimental Schools program, 55-6, 301, 305
- formative, 250, 282
- Jackson County, in, 137, 145
- problems with, 282
- River District, in, 102-3, 108
- Shiloh County, in, 216, 226
- Experimental Schools program:
 - announcement, 52-3, 56, 61, 65,

Experimental Schools program (*continued*):announcement (*continued*):

84, 123, 159, 193, 221, 304-5, 311

approach to educational change, 70-1

assumptions underlying, federal, 300-3

budget, 51, 65, 66, 68, 70-1, 299, 308-9, 310, 313

bureaucratic context of, federal, 52, 63-70, 307-9, 312-3

comprehensive change, 54

conflicts, political, early, 64, 67-8, 279-82, 312

dismissal of original director, 68

evaluation, 55-6

federal-local relations, and, 49, 51-2, 70-1

federal priorities, changing, effect of, 308-9

funding, 54-5, 70, 280-1, 308-9

goals of, 51, 275-6, 303

historical context of, 329-32

history of, 63-70

implementation phase, 63

implementation policies, federal, inflexibility and inefficiency of, 276

implications for administrative training, 341-3

leaders, performance of Experimental Schools administrators as, 334-42

local discretion in, 299

monitoring, project, 70

morale, staff, 70

objectives of, 51

origins, program, 50-1, 311

outcomes of, 298-9, 303-9

planning phase, 53, 58-62

political ramifications of, 312

problems with, 67-8

project selection phase, 51-2, 56-8, 64-5

Experimental Schools program (*continued*):

public support for, 223

relocation in NIE, 65

review, program, 66-7, 69

rural component, initiation of, 52, 65

rural schools, federal relations with, shift in, 69-70

staff cutbacks, 70

subordination of, 70

Federal aid to education:

categorical aid, 50, 279

control, federal, 50

Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 50

Experimental Schools program, 50-1

forms of, major, 49-50

general aid, 49-50, 279

grant consolidation, 279

guidelines for, 288-96

legislation for, factors leading to passage of, 50

National Defense Education Act, 50

previous school district experience with, 83-4, 191

strategies for, shift in, 50-1

Federal education policy:

conceptualizations of the educational change process, new, need for, and, 321-2

democratization of federal-local relations, and, 322-3

history of, 49-52

implications of the case studies for, 319-27, 363-79

implications of the Experimental Schools program for, 319-27

participation in setting, multilevel, need for, 325-6

political skills, local, need to enhance, and, 320

process, federal policy, guidelines for improved, 325-6

Federal-local relations in education, 274-98

Arcadia, in, 194, 197-9, 210-1, 213-4

Butte-Angels Camp, in, 161-2, 167, 171-2, 177, 179-80, 181-4

citizen participation, federal demands for, and, 278, 285-7, 303

communication, federal, lack of clarity in, 93, 161-2, 182, 225-6, 280-1, 306, 372-3

contract negotiations for the Experimental Schools projects, 91-5, 132, 166-7, 199, 210-1

control, federal versus local, 50-1, 167, 176-7, 198, 200, 210-1, 213-4, 224, 260-1, 264-5, 267, 307-8, 372

delays, federal, and, 201-2, 211, 277, 281, 372-4

democratization of, 322-3

differential treatment of sites, 375
discrepancy between federal and local goals, 235, 241-2

effort to eliminate barriers to change, federal, need for, 375

erratic behavior of federal personnel, and, 244-5

Experimental Schools program, and, 52, 56-63, 241-2, 244

Experimental Schools program, effects of the, and, 49

federal policies, changing, and, 280-1

flexibility, federal, need for, 276-7, 318, 372

funding, project, cuts in, impact of, and, 280

history of, 49-52

implications of the case studies for, 288-96, 322-3, 371-7

insensitivity to local needs, federal, 316

local barriers to implementation, lack of federal understanding of, and, 282, 319-20

Federal-local relations in education (continued):

mechanisms, new, potential, 377-8

monitoring, ineffective, 282

negative impact of on local projects, 194, 210-1, 222, 225, 244-5, 274-8, 306-9, 315-6

political context of, 278-80, 288-9

problems in, sources of, 279-88, 306-8

project selection, need for improved, 374

reforms, long-run educational, implications of the case studies for, 293-6

role definition, federal, need for clarification of, 373

school finance, expanded federal role in, and, 49-51

school reform, and, 293-6

solutions to problems in, potential, short-run, 288-93

support for local change efforts, federal, 171, 179-80, 198, 376

unit of change, focus on school vs. district, need for, 278, 283-5, 301

Federal Voting Rights Act, 118

Florida Senate Education Committee, 286

Funding:

continuation, 249, 251

delays in federal, 94-5, 171-2

project, 94-5, 110, 146, 166, 201, 210, 226

unpredictability of federal, 249

General Accounting Office, 67

Goals of the Experimental Schools projects:

Arcadia, in, 185-6

Butte-Angels Camp, in, 164-5

clear statement of, lack of, 241, 242, 244, 245, 275-6, 309-10

consultants, use of in setting, 264

diffusion of, 179

displacement of, 178, 181, 182-3

- Goals of the Experimental Schools projects (*continued*):
- Jackson County, in, 112-3, 123-4, 129, 136-7
 - River District, in, 75-7, 85, 87-8
 - Shiloh County, in, 215
- Governance, educational, 79-82, 116-9, 121-2, 286
- Governance, project:
- Arcadia, in, 188-9, 192, 195, 208-9
 - Butte-Angels Camp, in, 160, 165, 171, 172-4, 175-8
 - Jackson County, in, 113-4, 124-7, 132-3, 135-6
 - River District, in, 85-6, 88-90, 93-4, 95, 98-9, 104-5
 - Shiloh County, 223
- Grantsmanship, local tradition of, 60, 122-3, 157, 159, 193
- Guidance counseling, 186, 207
- Harvard University, 64-5
- Head Start program, 10
- Hearings, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare:
- appropriations for 1970, 300, 303, 311
 - appropriations for 1971, 311
- Implementation, 26, 62-3
- accommodation to local norms and federal initiatives, impact of, 112
 - administrative performance, and, 112
 - Arcadia, in, 201-10
 - barriers to, *see* Barriers to implementation
 - Butte-Angels Camp, in, 169
 - Cambire School, in, 23
 - component of the Experimental Schools program, 62-3
 - conflict of innovation with other school programs, and, 26
 - consultants role in, 27, 264
 - decision-making authority, degree of centralization in, 284
- Implementation (*continued*):
- differential success across school districts, 283
 - district support for, effect of, 284
 - educational change, and, 319-27
 - failure of, 10, 299, 304
 - inadequate technology, impact of, 310
 - Jackson County, in, 136-46
 - materials, lack of, and, 27
 - mutual adaptation during, lack of, 277, 281
 - organizational barriers to, 282
 - problems in, 245-8
 - resistance to, local, 26, 282
 - River District, in, 96-106
 - role definition, import of, and, 246
 - role overload, teacher, and, 26-7
 - school board support for, lack of, 27
 - Shiloh County, in, 226-33
 - skills, local, lack of requisite, 26
 - stability of program operations, 207, 210
 - staff conflict, and, 27
 - staff participation, import of, 283-4
 - stages of project evolution, 233
 - transformation, project, and, 177, 181-2, 184
- Innovations, 3
- ad hoc approaches to, 27
 - Arcadia, in, 185-6
 - Butte-Angels Camp, in, 165-6
 - Cambire School, and, 22-4
 - educational needs, precipitating, and, 8-9
 - failure to incorporate, 10-1, 275
 - incorporation, difficulties with, 246, 248
 - Jackson County, in, 113-4
 - motives for attempting, local, 287-8
 - obstacles to utilization of research on, 38-41
 - problems with, 76-7
 - River District, in, 162-3
 - search for appropriate, 196
 - selection, need for care in, 364-5

Innovations (continued):

- Shiloh County, in, 215-6
- types of, 9
- uncritical acceptance of existing, 28, 363-4
- utilization of research on, 38-41

Instruction:

- diagnostic, 215, 221-2, 226-7, 230, 234
- individualized, 57, 215-6

Jackson County:

- administrative involvement in implementation, lack of, 136, 138-9
- application, 123
- barriers to implementation, 146-7, 147-9
- bottom-up planning approach, 128
- career education, 140-3
- citizen participation, 113, 136-7
- community setting, 114-6
- conflict, local, 135-6
- consolidation of schools, 118-9
- consultants, use of, 128-32, 134-5, 137, 139, 141-6
- contract negotiations, 132
- cultural norms, influence of, 115-6, 133-6
- curriculum, reform of, 113, 137-8
- diffusion of project goals, 146-7
- early childhood education, 139-40
- education system, 116-22
- evaluation, 137, 143, 145-6
- federal-local relations, 125, 129-33, 136, 141
- fiscal crisis, 125
- funding, project, 133, 146
- goals, 113, 123-4, 128-9, 136-8
- governance, educational, 116-9, 121-2
- governance, project, 133-4, 124-7, 132-3, 135-6
- grantsmanship, local tradition of, 122-3
- implementation, 136-46
- initial contact with Washington, 122-4

Jackson County (continued):

- innovations in, 113-4
- integration, racial, 118-9
- leadership, 141
- management, project, problems with, 139, 143-6
- management study, 113-4, 137-8, 144-5
- needs, educational, 112-3, 123-4
- objectives of Experimental Schools project, 112-4
- planning, 124-36
- political expertise of superintendent, 134-6
- project implementation, 139-46
- reorganization, 116-7
- replacement of project director, 131-2, 133, 134-5
- school finance, 122
- staff training, 113, 132, 136-7, 139
- theme, project, 113, 129

Leadership Obstacle Course Model

- (LOC), 34, 354, 359
- assumptions underlying, 34-5
- attempted implementation, 34, 36
- description of, 34-5
- extension of the ORC model, as an, 34, 35-6, 354
- implications of case studies for expansion of, 353-4, 358-60
- incorporation, 35
- initiation, 35
- management performance, 34, 35
- materials and equipment, 34
- motivation, 34
- organizational arrangements, compatibility of innovation with, 34, 35
- shortcomings of, 355-9
- staff capabilities, 34
- staff resistance, 34, 36
- staff understanding of the planned change, 34, 36
- stages of the educational change process, and, 35-6

- Leadership Obstacle Course Model (LOC) (*continued*):
 successful educational change, factors contributing to, 33-5
 utility of, 35, 36
- Leadership performance, 8, 30, 240, 263
 administrators, Experimental Schools project, 334-41, 346
 Arcadia, in, 213, 339
 Butte-Angels Camp, in, 163, 182-3, 340-1
 conceptions of the educational change process, new, need for, 7-8
 curriculum reform, impetus for, as, 334
 educational change efforts, and, 41-3, 256-7, 328-49
 generalized skills, need for, 383
 Jackson County, in, 141, 335, 337-8
 management, relation to, and, 38-41, 316-8, 320, 367-9
 problems with, 24, 314-5
 project officers, 314-5
 River District, in, 97, 99, 106, 110, 336-7
 role in education, changing, 12, 256, 330-2
 Shiloh County, in, 335, 340-1
 successful, contextual nature of, 42, 333, 343-5
 tasks, central, 41-2
 training, lack of synchronization with educational reform, and, 333
- Management of educational innovations:
 community conflict, and, 183
 difficulties in, 12, 139, 143-6, 366-7
 implications of case studies for, 363-71
 improvements in, need for, 5-7
 inept, consequences of, 22-4
 leadership, relation to, and, 38-41, 256, 316-7, 320-1, 367-9
- Management of educational innovations (*continued*):
 self-evaluation, and, 113-4, 137, 144-5
 stages of, 256-7
 teacher coordinators, use of, and, 205, 207-8
- Materials, instructional, new, role of, 216, 226-7
- Mechanisms for strengthening federal-local relations:
 need for, 275-88, 377
 specific proposals for, and, 288-93, 377-8
- Media center, 83
- Models of educational change:
 Elaborated Leadership Obstacle Course (ELOC), 359-62
 implications of the case studies for, 359-62
 Leadership Obstacle Course (LOC), 34-6, 354-9
 Overcoming Resistance to Change (ORC), 31-3, 360
- Monitoring and feedback mechanisms, absence of, 28
- Morale, improved teacher, 208
- Mutual adaptation, 211-2, 277, 281-2, 322-3
- National Committee for Citizens in Education, 286
- National Defense Education Act, 50, 82
- National Institute of Education (NIE):
 attitude toward the Experimental Schools program, 59, 65-6, 68-70, 280-1, 312, 371
 contract awards for implementation, and, 62
 interactions with Experimental Schools projects, and, 289
 policy processes, internal, 325
 relation to other federal agencies, 308-9
 role in framing evaluation research, 15

- National Institute of Education (NIE)
 (continued):
 vehicle for testing strategy of comprehensive educational change, as, 50-1
- Needs, educational, local:
 Arcadia, in, 190, 193
 Butte-Angels Camp, in, 164
 diagnosis of, initial, lack of adequate, 242-3
 Jackson County, in, 113, 123-4
 River District, in, 75-6
 Shiloh County, in, 221, 233
- Nova University, 345
- Objectives of the Experimental Schools program, 52-6
- Objectives of the Experimental Schools projects, 57
 Arcadia, in, 185-6
 Butte-Angels Camp, 151-3
 Jackson County, in, 112-4
 River District, in, 75-7
 Shiloh County, in, 215-6
- Objectives of the rural portion of the Experimental Schools program, 52-5
- Office of Education:
 categorical aid, 50
 educational renewal, and, 280
 general aid, 50
 impact aid, 49
 original funding agency for the Experimental Schools programs, 51, 63-4, 65-6, 68, 312, 371
 policy processes within, 325
 role, historical, 49-50
- Office of Management and Budget, 310
- Outcomes, project, 303-9
 Arcadia, in, 210, 214-5
 assumptions, federal, underlying, impact of, 316-9
 Butte-Angels Camp, in, 181-2
 categorical change, 304-5
 comprehensive change, absence of, 274, 304
- Outcomes, project *(continued)*:
 discrepant federal goals and management practices, impact of, 315-6
 educational technology, inadequate, impact of, 310
 evaluation research, 305
 failure to induce classroom change, 282-3, 299, 304-5
 federal-local relations, poor, and, 306-8
 implementation, failure of, 304-5
 implications for federal policy, and, 319-26
 leadership problems, impact of, 314-5
 local political support, role of, 251
 problems in federal implementation of the Experimental Schools program, 308-9
 process inventory, 306
 range across Experimental Schools projects, 298-9
 reasons for limitations of, 309-19
 River District, in, 76-7, 108
 Shiloh County, in, 232-3, 233-5
- Overcoming Resistance to Change Model (ORC), 31-4, 354-9
 description of, 31-4
 group dynamics, 32
 incorporation, 35
 initiation, 35
 limitations of, 33-4
 power equalization, and, 32-3
 shortcomings of, 33-4
 staff resistance, role of, 31-2
 stages in the educational change process, 35-7
 strategies for overcoming resistance to change, 31-3
 utility of, 33
- Plan, project, fragmentation of, 105, 107, 147
- Planned educational change:
 community factors, impact of, on, 316-8

- Planned educational change (*continued*):
complexity of, 240-1
comprehensive, infrequent occurrence of, 274
difficulty of, 239
history of, 9-11
local support, impact of, 248-50
problems precipitating, educational, 9-10
school district factors, impact of, 239-57
- Planning, 58-62
accommodation to local norms, effects of, 112
administrative performance, impact on, and, 112
Arcadia, in, 194-201
assumptions, reexamination of underlying, 60
budget and staff, federal approval of, and, 61-2
Butte-Angels Camp, in, 116-68
component of Experimental Schools program, 58-62
comprehensive, need for, 61-2, 325-6
consultants, role in, 264, 266-7
development of project plan, procedures for, and, 59-60
educational change, and, 255
evaluation, formative, and, 62
federal requirements, 59-62
Formal Project Plan, 59-62, 63
Jackson County, in, 124-36
local, inadequacy of, 29-30, 243-5, 255
participation in, citizen and staff, 60
problems with, 20
River District, in, 85-95
role of the project plan, lack of local understanding of, and, 244
Shiloh County, in, 223-6
staff additions for, 162
staff participation in, lack of, 243
- Planning grants, award of, 85, 124, 166, 194, 222
- Policy, federal education, *see* Federal education policy
- Policy implications of the case studies:
administrative training programs, for, 320-1, 331-2, 341-3
agencies that fund local educational change efforts, for, 371-7
federal education programs, for, 319-26
federal-local relations, for, 288-96, 371-7
management of local educational change efforts, for, 363-71
- Principals:
Arcadia, in, 189, 193, 194-6, 204, 206-8, 209, 213
Butte-Angels Camp, in, 154, 169, 172, 176
Jackson County, in, 120-2, 126, 127, 130, 131-2, 133, 135, 138-9, 141
River District, in, 80-2, 97-8, 110
Shiloh County, in, 232
- Problems in American public education, 3
erosion of political support, 3-4
financial squeeze, 3
- Problems in federal-local relations, sources of, 278-88
citizen participation, federal demand for, 285-7
community context, and, 287-8
discrepant federal goals and local needs, 281-2
failure to understand barriers to local implementation, federal, 282-3
funding, federal, reduced, 281
political context of the Experimental Schools program, 279-80
priorities, federal, changing, 280-1
unit of change, school districts as, emphasis on, 283-5

- Project director-school administrator relations:
 Arcadia, in, 209
 barriers to implementation, as, 27
 River District, in, 98, 99, 105-6, 109-10
 Project director-teacher relations, 202-3
 Project selection, 56-8, 64-5
- Reading programs, 204, 228-9
- Research of educational change:
 procedures, 56
 uses of, proper and improper, 38-41
- Right-to-Read program, 120
- River District:
 application, 84-5
 barriers to planning, 88-95
 catalyst for unity, 106-7, 107-8
 citizen participation, 76, 36-90, 96-7, 98-9, 101, 104-5, 106-7
 commitment, administrative, deterioration of, 110
 community setting, 74-5, 77-9
 conflict, local, 98, 99-100, 109-10
 consultants, use of, 86-7
 contract negotiations, 91-5
 control, federal, local fear of, 91, 93-4, 95
 decision-making authority, degree of centralization in, 105-8, 109
 declining interest in the Experimental Schools project, 105
 education system, 79-85
 evaluation, 101-3, 107-8
 federal aid, previous district experience with, 82-3
 federal-local relations, 84-5, 90-6, 99, 106, 108-11
 forum for change, 106
 funding, project, 94-5, 110
 goals, 75, 85, 87
 governance, educational, 79-82
 governance, project, 86, 89-90, 93-4, 95, 98-9, 104
- River District (*continued*):
 growth, 75
 implementation, 96-106
 initial contact with Washington, 84-5
 innovations in, 75-6
 leadership, 98, 99, 106, 109-10
 needs, educational, 76
 noncomprehensive change, 108
 objectives of the Experimental Schools project, 75-7
 outcomes and factors in, 76-7, 107-8
 planning, 85-95
 resignations and dismissals, 109
 staff development, 95, 96-8
 staff participation, 110
 turnover, federal staff, 90, 95
 turnover, local staff, 90, 109
 unification of school districts, 74
- Roles:
 ambiguity in, 163
 articulation of, 331
 definition of, 101, 245-6, 260-2
 key, in educational change, *see* Administrators, educational; Principals; Superintendents; and Teachers
 leadership, 256
 new, need for, 289, 377-8
 overload, 147, 169, 171, 175, 183, 201, 248, 363
 redefinition of administrative roles, 256
 redefinition of teacher roles, 22, 183, 205-7, 212-3, 214, 215, 226-7, 229-30, 233, 302
- Rural Experimental Schools program.
See also Experimental Schools program
 comprehensive approach, 53-4
 eligibility for funding, 52-5
 evaluation, 55-6
 federal-local relations, 56-63, 69
 federal role in the planning process, active, 58-9
 funding, 54-5, 70, 301

- Rural Experimental Schools program
(*continued*):
- goals, confused and overambitious, 275-6
 - implementation, 63
 - initiation of, 65-6
 - objectives of, 52-5
 - planning, 53, 58-62
 - problems addressed by, 57
 - project selection process, 51-2, 56-8, 65-6
- Rural Experimental Schools projects:
- federal expectations regarding the planning process, and, 59-62
 - implementation, 63
 - planning, 59-62
 - project selection, 56-8
 - relation to Experimental Schools program in Washington, 56-63
- School boards:
- Arcadia, in, 188-9, 194, 200, 201-3, 208, 212, 213-4
 - Butte-Angels Camp, in, 155-6, 166, 176, 179-80, 183-4
 - Jackson County, in, 116-8, 125, 130-3
 - passive role of, 242
 - River District, in, 79, 82, 85-6, 89, 96
 - Shiloh County, in, 217-9, 220-1, 223-4, 227, 232
- School board-superintendent relations, 253-4
- Butte-Angels Camp, in, 176-7
 - River District, in, 81-2, 85-6
- School district:
- annexation, 188
 - consolidation, 118-9, 152, 154-5
 - factors and planned educational change, 239-57
 - reorganization, 116-7
 - unification, 74, 329
- School finance:
- Arcadia, in, 191
 - Butte-Angels Camp, in, 155
- School finance (*continued*):
- financial crisis, 220
 - Jackson County, in, 122-3
 - River District, in, 82-3
 - Shiloh County, in, 218-20, 233
 - use of Experimental School funds for fiscal relief, 242
- Schooling:
- functions of, 293-4
 - integration of, 118-9
- Shiloh County:
- achievement scores, 229
 - administrative pressure for implementation, 216, 227
 - administrative support, lack of, 216
 - application, 221
 - barriers to implementation, 228-9
 - citizen participation, 216, 223-4
 - community setting, 216-7
 - conflict, local, 227, 234
 - consultants, use of, 215, 221, 224-5, 226, 228-31, 234
 - curriculum reform, 216
 - decision-making authority, degree of centralization in, 223-4, 227, 231-3
 - education, individualized, 215-6, 227
 - education system, 217-21
 - evaluation, 216, 226
 - federal-local relations, 222, 225-6, 233, 234
 - financial crisis, 218-9
 - goals, 215
 - governance, project, 22
 - implementation, 226-33
 - initial contact with Washington, 221-2
 - innovations in, 215-6
 - innovations, recent history of attempted, 220-1
 - instruction, diagnostic, 215, 221, 226, 230, 234
 - materials, new, 216, 227
 - needs, educational, 221-2, 233

Shiloh County (*continued*):

- objectives of the Experimental Schools project, 215-6
- outcomes, 227, 229-30, 232-3, 234-5
- planning, 223-6
- political support for the Experimental Schools project, local, 221, 223
- reading program, 228-9
- remission of change, 232
- remodeling of an inadequate school system, 215
- resignation of superintendent, 232, 235
- reversal of population decline, recent, 217
- staff development, 215-6, 226-7, 229-31
- staff resistance, 227-8, 230-1
- stages of project evolution, 233
- success, image of, 215, 232-3, 235
- theme, project, 221
- Special services, 76, 87, 97, 104
- Staff additions to, 101, 223
- Staff, conflicts among, 98, 99-100, 109-10
- Staff development:
 - alternate approaches to, 247-8
 - Arcadia, in, 205-7, 210
 - consultants, use in, 259, 264-5, 266-9
 - continuity in, lack of, and, 246, 254-5
 - innovative approaches to, need for, 247-8, 320-1
 - Jackson County, in, 113, 136-7, 139
 - planning of, poor, 248
 - political skills, need to enhance, 320-1
 - River District, in, 95-8
 - role in educational change, 246-7, 254
 - Shiloh County, in, 215-6
 - traditional approach to, 247
 - utility of, 256

Staff participation:

- Arcadia, in, 194, 195, 213
- Butte-Angels Camp, in, 160-1, 162-3, 164, 168, 184
- import of, 257, 284, 295
- Jackson County, in, 124-5
- lack of, 29, 160, 162-3, 168, 183-4
- need for, 257
- planning, and, 243, 256
- River District, 110
- role in educational change, 255-6

Staff resistance:

- Arcadia, in, 212
- barrier to implementation, as, 11, 26, 31-4, 256, 284-5
- Butte-Angels Camp, in, 156-7, 160-1, 162-3, 165, 167-8, 173-4, 176, 182-3, 184
- Cambire School, in, 22-4
- increase during attempted implementation, 176
- overcoming, means of, and, 247
- River District, in, 105
- Shiloh County, in, 227, 230-1

Stages in the educational change process, 359-62

- ELOC model, in, 359-62
- leadership responsibilities, and, 359-62
- LOC model, in, 35-6, 360
- ORC model, in, 35-6, 354-9, 360
- problems in different stages, and, 35-6, 359, 362

Stanford Evaluation Consortium, 284, 291

Strike, teacher, 202-3, 288

Superintendents:

- Arcadia, in, 189, 193, 198, 199-200, 204, 208-10, 212, 213, 339
- Butte-Angels Camp, in, 150-2, 154-9, 160, 162-4, 165-6, 172-7, 180, 183-4
- changing role of, 330-2
- Jackson County, in, 112-4, 116-7, 122-4, 126-7, 130, 132-6, 137-8, 335, 337-8

Superintendents (*continued*):

- River District, in, 79-80, 82-4, 85, 90, 92, 96, 336-7
- Shiloh County, in, 216, 220-1, 223-8, 230-5, 335

Teacher-administrator relations, 253

- Arcadia, in, 200-4, 208, 212, 339
- Butte-Angels Camp, in, 155-9, 163-4, 167-8, 174-7, 183
- River District, in, 82
- Shiloh County, in, 227-8, 230-2, 234-5

Teachers:

- Arcadia, in, 190, 193, 194-6, 200-1, 202-3, 204-6, 208, 211-2, 213-4
- Butte-Angels Camp, in, 151-2, 155-9, 160, 162-5, 166-71, 172, 173-5
- Jackson County, in, 113, 135, 137, 140, 141, 143
- resistance to educational innovation, 23
- River District, in, 81, 97-8, 100
- Shiloh County, in, 215-6, 226-31, 234-5

Theories of the educational change process:

- Elaborated Leadership-Obstacle Course (ELOC), 359-62
- Leadership-Obstacle Course (LOC), 34-6, 354-9

Theories of the educational change process (*continued*):

Overcoming Resistance to Change (ORC), 31-3, 360

Technical assistance, consultant role in, 6, 258, 268

Training programs, administrative:

- components of, 343-8
- implications of case studies for design of, 320-1, 332-4, 341-3
- leadership requirements, changes in, 343
- model for, 332-41
- need to synchronize with educational reform, 342
- organization of, 346-8
- use of field experiences in, 344-5
- types of, 343

Turnover of personnel:

- federal, 90, 91, 95, 277, 280, 313
- local, 90, 109, 131-3, 135, 206, 288
- superintendents, 180, 237, 234-5

U.S. Congress, 325

Utilization of research:

- innovations, on, 38-41
- obstacles to, 38-9
- political uses, 40-1
- proper and improper, 38-41